
The Vision of Europe in the New Member States

Notre Europe asked different personalities of the New Member States to give their vision of Europe in 2020

Contributions of Carmel Attard (Malta), Jiří Dienstbier (Czech Republic), Jaan Kaplinski (Estonia), Ioannis Kasoulides (Cyprus), Manja Klemenčič (Slovenia), Lena Kolarska-Bobinska (Poland), Lore Listra (Estonia), Petr Pithart (Czech Republic), Pauls Raudseps (Latvia), Gintaras Steponavicius (Lithuania), Elzbieta Skotnicka-Illasiewicz (Poland), Miklós Szabo (Hungary).

Summary by Gaëtane Ricard-Nihoul, Paul Damm and Morgan Larhant

Authors of the summary

Gaëtane Ricard–Nihoul

Graduate from Liege University in political science and public administration, Gaëtane Ricard-Nihoul was awarded a Mphil and a Dphil in European politics and society by Oxford University. Her research focused on policy formation in the European Union, and more particularly on education policy.

From 1999 to 2002, she was in charge of the team for "European and international affairs", in the cabinet of the Belgian Vice-Prime Minister Isabelle Durant, also Minister for Mobility and Transport. She acted, among other things, as a coordinator during the Belgian presidency of the EU Council. As an adviser for insitutional matters, she represented the Vice-Prime Minister in the Belgian delegation at the WTO ministerial conference in Seattle and also in the Inter-Governmental Conference, taking part in the Biarritz, Nice and Laeken European Councils. She was also a member of the Belgian government working group on the Laeken Declaration.

Gaëtane Ricard-Nihoul then joined the European Commission Directorate-General for Education and Culture, in the Audiovisual Policy unit. Employed in the Sector for external relations, she was in charge of the accession negotiations with the 13 applicant countries for audiovisual matters as well as the relations with countries from the Western Balkans and South Mediterranean. She also assumed the coordination of an interservice group on intercultural dialogue and followed the work of the Convention on culture.

In April 2004, she joined Notre Europe, first as President adviser, then as Secretary General.

Morgan Larhant

Morgan Larhant graduated of *Sciences Po* Strasbourg (IEP de Strasbourg), the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna (MAIS) and the University of Political Sciences in Paris (research master). He published a book about the financing of European election campaigns (published by Harmattan). During his internship at Notre Europe he was responsible for the ratification process of the Constitutional Treaty in France and in Europe and then as a research fellow for institutional questions. At the moment he is attending a preparation class for qualifying examinations in the administrative field.

Paul Damm

Paul Damm is a graduate of *Sciences Po* in Paris, the Louvre school and the Sorbonne. For his thesis he chose to write about the French Navy in the 18th century. At *Sciences Po* in the framework of the European Convention of students of political sciences his research focused on educational questions. During his current internship at Notre Europe Paul Damm is in charge of communication and public relations.

Authors of the contributions

CARMEL ATTARD (MALTA)

Carmel Attard is the director of the Malta-EU Information Centre (MIC). He joined MIC as a press attaché in July 2000 after nine years in journalism as the editor-in-chief of a Maltese weekly and information director of a national radio station. He had previously served as a teacher for 10 years..

JIRI DIENSTBIER (CZECH REPUBLIC)

Graduate in philosophy from Charles University in Prague, Jiri Dienstbier has served as prime minister and foreign minister of Czechoslovakia, ambassador and representative of President Vaclav Havel to the United Nations. In addition, he has been a rapporteur for the former Yugoslavia at the UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for Refugees). He is a member of the International Press Institute and of the Commission on Global Governance. Jiri Dienstbier has written a number of works, including: *Donesia: From Sukarno to Suharto* (1967); *Radio against Tanks* (1988); *Dreaming of Europe* (1990); *From Dreams to Reality* (1999); and *The Blood Tax* (2002).

JAAN KAPLINSKI (ESTONIA)

After studying linguistics at Tartu University, Jaan Kaplinski has been a researcher in linguistics, anthropology and ecology, director of the literary department of a theatre and journalist. From 1992 to 1995, he was a member of parliament in Estonia. As a poet, he translated French, Spanish, English, Polish, Russian and Swedish poetry and prose. He is considered as being one of the greatest living Estonian poets and is a member of the Universal Academy of Cultures, founded in 1992 in Paris by Elie Wiesel. He has been regularly put forward for the Nobel Prize in Literature.

IOANNIS KASOULIDES (CYPRUS)

Having graduated in medicine in 1974, Ioannis Kasoulides began his political career in 1985 by joining the Democratic Rally party (DISY) of Cyprus, where he served, amongst other posts, as chairman of the party's youth movement. His high level of activity was rewarded in 1991 when he was elected Member of Parliament for Nicosia and was subsequently appointed government spokesman. From 1997 to 2003 he served as minister for foreign affairs of the Republic of Cyprus. He is now a Member of the European Parliament (EPP-ED) where he sits in the foreign affairs committee. He is also a member of the delegation to the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly and vice-president of the parliament's delegation for relations with the Palestinian Legislative Council.

MANJA KLEMENCIC (SLOVENIA)

Manja Klemenčič is studying for a Phd at the Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge. In her research, Manja analyses patterns of government coalitions and negotiation strategies within the EU-25, with specific focus on the Convention on the Future of Europe and the 2003/04 InterGovernmental Conference. Her other area of specialty is European higher education policy in the context of the Bologna Process. Manja graduated in economics from the University of Maribor, Slovenia, and in European Studies from the University of Cambridge. .

LENA KOLARSKA-BOBINSKA (POLAND)

Lena Kolarska-Bobinska is professor of sociology, she had worked at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at the Polish Academy of Sciences (1970-1991) and she was director of the Public Opinion Research Center, Poland's biggest public opinion survey institute (1991-1997). She was a member of the Socioeconomic Strategy Committee – advisory board of the Polish Prime Minister (2002-2005) and member of the Advisory Group to the EU Commissioner responsible for "Social Sciences and Humanities in the European Research Area" in the European Commission. Currently, she is director of the Institute of Public Affairs, an independent non-partisan public policy think tank.

LORE LISTRA (ESTONIA)

She has been the director of the Estonian Institute, where she acted as a consultant for 2 years, since 1995. She studied Romance languages and literature and German languages and literature at Tartu University. She graduated in 2003 with a master's degree in economics at Tallinn Technical University. From 1990 to 1992 she worked in the department of foreign affairs in the Ministry of Culture. In 2001 she was bestowed with the honour of becoming a 'Chevalier dans l'Ordre National du Mérite'. She is a member of the national commission of UNESCO and vice president of the national programme 'Estonian culture and languages in the world'. She works on various magazines such as 'Estonian Literary Magazine', 'Estonian Art' and 'Estonian Culture'.

PETR PITHART (CZECH REPUBLIC)

Czech politician, political scientist and legal historian Petr Pithart was one of the first to sign Charter 77 in 1977. He was one of the founders and top representatives of Občanské Fórum (Civic Forum) after November 1989. After the overthrow of the regime, he served as prime minister of Czech Republic (part of federal Czechoslovakia) from 1990 to 1992. After the split of the country he served the Czech Republic as President of the Senate from 1996 to 1998 and from 2000 to 2004. He is now member of the KDU-ČSL party (Christian and Democratic Union, Czechoslovak People's Party). He is author of books on the modern history of 1968 and of political essays (*The Year 1968, Defence of politics and History and Politics* and others).

PAULS RAUDSEPS (LATVIA)

Pauls Raudseps is editorial page editor of Diena, the largest and most respected daily in Latvia. Mr. Raudseps was one of the newspaper's founders. He was born in the United States to Latvian parents, came to Latvia in 1990 to work for the Latvian independence movement, and has been living there ever since. He holds degrees in Russian history from Harvard College and Indiana University.

GINTARAS STEPONAVICIUS (LITHUANIA)

Gintaras Steponavicius was one of the founders in 1990 of the Lithuanian Liberal Union, of which he has been the vice president since 2001, currently – the vice president of the Lithuanian Liberal Movement. He worked for the CSCE (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe), and has lectured at the Institute of International Relations and Political Sciences at the University of Vilnius, where he graduated in law. Member of Parliament in Lithuania since 2000, he is now Deputy Speaker of the Seimas (Lithuanian parliament), a member of the European Affairs and Education, Science and Culture committees (ALDE, centre ground liberal party).

ELZBIETA SKOTNICKA-ILLASIEWCZ (POLAND)

She is advisor to the Minister Office of the Committee for European Integration, Member of the Polish European Movement and "Poland in Europe" Foundation. She cooperates with the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw University and Collegium Civitas in Warsaw. She has written a number of works, including: Parliamentary elite vis-a-vis Poland's membership in the European Union, The First Year of Membership in the Social Evaluation, The Election to the European's Parliament in Social Opinion Pools, The Costs and Benefits of Poland's European Union Membership in Social Awareness. And she is one of the co-authors of essays: The Significance of Preconceptions: Europe of Civil Societies and Europe of Nationalities, Public Attitudes and Elite Opinions, Les aspects culturelles de l'intégration européenne, Poland in Europe: Suppliant, Creditor or Partner.

MIKLÓS SZABO (HUNGARY)

Professor of ancient and proto-historic archaeology at the University of Budapest, where he was also the rector from 1994 to 1999, Miklós Szabo devoted the bulk of his work to Greek archaeology and the proto-history of central Europe, and in particular Celtic civilisation. In 1991, he was one of the commissioners responsible for the international exhibition on the Celts organised at the Palazzo Grassi in Venice. He took part in the excavations of Saint-Blaise, directed by the University of Aix-en-Provence and he has been the director of the Hungarian excavation on mount Beuvray (Bibracte) since 1988. He was a commissioner for the Hungarian cultural season organised in France from June to December 2001. He is now professor at the

University Eötvös Loránd of Budapest and member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and correspondent of the Académie Française.

Notre Europe would like to point out that the missing of a contribution of a Slovak author is not intentional. One author wanted to communicate us his reflexions but could not do so at the last moment because of health reasons.

Notre Europe

Notre Europe is an independent research and policy unit whose objective is the study of Europe – its history and civilisations, integration process and future prospects. The association was founded by Jacques Delors in the autumn of 1996. It has a small team of in-house researchers from various countries.

Notre Europe participates in public debate in two ways. First, publishing internal research papers and second, collaborating with outside researchers and academics to contribute to the debate on European issues. These documents are made available to a limited number of decision-makers, politicians, socio-economists, academics and diplomats in the various EU Member States, but are systematically put on our website.

The association also organises meetings, conferences and seminars in association with other institutions or partners. Proceedings are written in order to disseminate the main arguments raised during the event.

Foreword

The historic importance of the accession of ten states to the European Union on 1 May 2004 is as monumental as was the surprising indifference that marked the event. But what a huge moment for European history... the reunification of a continent, nearly double the number of member states, 75 million new European citizens...

We have just celebrated the second anniversary of this event and yet, unfortunately, this indifference appears to have been joined by fear and prejudice. The fear is that the project of the Europe of 15 and the prospects of a political union has been 'deformed' by an unprecedented enlargement. The prejudices concern the economic and social differences and the unfair competition that these new member states might represent.

If we take the trouble to look closely at the reality of this enlargement, we very quickly see that these fears and prejudices have no foundation and are essentially based on a lack of knowledge of these countries.

And yet, caught between the official political discourse and the cursory distinction between 'old' and 'new' Europe projected by the media, it is difficult to home in on the daily reality of the citizens of these countries and to understand their state of mind and aspirations.

That is why Notre Europe wanted to bypass the official and media speak to pick out from these countries some intellectuals – from political, academic and cultural backgrounds – to give us their unjaundiced views. The question that we asked them, deliberately open and ambitious, was: what should the Europe of 2020 be like?

Those who feared for the future of political union will be reassured. These authors have what is at times a philosophical, very often political and almost without exception optimistic vision, but one that is always a source of inspiration. We are far from the big-market Europe that some predict for the Union of 25.

The deliberately 'impressionist' approach to this study does not allow us to lay claim to any generalisations. Nor can the delicate summarising exercise attempted in the introduction to this work do justice to the texts as a whole. The reader is therefore invited to reflect on the contributions themselves and to develop his/her own 'unjaundiced opinion'.

Summary

Introduction	2
1 Europe in 2020 : summary of contributions	5
Political Imagination and Optimism	5
Europe of Hope – Peace, Freedom and Prosperity	5
Europe of Values – Rule of Law, Solidarity and Tolerance	6
Europe – Diversity, identities and Frontiers	7
Democratic Europe – Constitution, Citizens and Communication	10
Europe of Projects : Single Market, Education, Social, Immigration and Energy	12
Europe in the World : Common Foreign and Security Policy	13
Good Sense and Utopia	15
2 Contributions	15
2.1 Europe in 2020 by Carmel Attard	15
2.2 What Europe by 2020 ? by Jiří Dienstbier	19
2.3 A Vision of Europe by Jaan Kaplinski	22
2.4 My vision of the EU in 2020 by Ioannis Kasoulides	24
2.5 Europe – the real ‘last great hope’? by Manja Klemenčič	28
2.6 What developments should take place in the EU by 2020? by Lena Korlarska–Bobińska	32
2.7 Europe, twenty years on by Lore Listra	34
2.8 What developments should take place in the EU by 2020? by Petr Pithart	35
2.9 A Europe of Law by Pauls Raudseps	38
2.10 Vision of Europe. The EU in 2020: What developments should take place in the EU by 2020 by Gintaras Steponavičius	41
2.11 Thesis: The crisis we are experiencing is one relating to the condition of the Europeans rather than to the condition of the European Union institutions by Elżbieta Skotnicka – Illasiewicz	43
2.12 Visions of Europe in 2020 by Miklós SZABÓ	47

*“A map of the world that
does not include Utopia is
not worth even glancing at”*

Oscar Wilde

Introduction

OLD AND NEW MEMBER STATES – OPENING THE IDEAS DEBATE

It is now two years since the European Union enlarged to include ten states from central, eastern Europe and the Mediterranean basin, increasing the number of European citizens to 75 million. Despite its unprecedented scale, this enlargement has unfortunately not been perceived in the Europe of 15 as it should have been. Barely celebrated in 2004, this historic moment of reunification for the continent today gives rise too often to misleading discourse that shows the so-called deep rift between 'old' and 'new' Europe. The media have jumped on each piece of European news, be it the US intervention in Iraq, the debates on the directive to liberalise services or the negotiations on the 'financial perspectives'. However, on these questions the Europe of 15 is as divided as the Europe of 25.

Analysis of public opinion also contradicts this rift between the 'old' and the 'new'. Eurobarometer surveys show, for example, that when asked about the perceived benefits from belonging to the European Union – while taking account, moreover, of the time needed to assess these benefits and the larger number of neutral responses from the new member states – the three countries showing the highest percentages of positive responses are Ireland, Luxembourg and Lithuania (between 70% and 86%). The same rapprochement between the two 'old' and 'new' 'blocs' can be seen in the opposite sense as Cyprus is, along with the UK, Austria and Sweden, among the countries with the lowest levels of positive response (between 35% and 40%). The same goes for opinions on the EU's image, with Poland closer to Portugal (with around 50% of positive responses) than Latvia, which is close to Finland (with 39% of positive responses)¹.

On some issues, the EU-15 and the EU-10 share the same views, with budgetary negotiations on the structural funds perhaps being the most noteworthy example. Nor it is any great surprise to see that, in the Eurobarometer surveys, the ten new member states are overall more supportive of further enlargements than the old member states (+25% by comparison with the level of support recorded in the old member states)². Those who, on the contrary, think that this latest round of enlargement has sounded the death-knell for political integration may be surprised to see that the ten new member states as a whole are also more in favour of a political Union³ (67% against 57%).

¹ Standard Eurobarometer, n°64, autumn 2005, p.14-19.

² Standard Eurobarometer, n° 64, autumn 2005, p.31-33. Note, however, that this support is slightly down on the results of the spring 2005 Eurobarometer.

³ Standard Eurobarometer, n° 63, spring 2005, p.120 et s. . J. Rupnik also underlines three major issues – transatlantic relations in the context of the CFSP, the question of the cost of enlargement and solidarity and that of the reform of the European institutions. See Jacques RUPNIK (Dir.), *op. cité*, p.34 and following.

As logic would dictate, there are also more of them who want an increase in the Community budget (+10) as well as a more prominent role for the Union in the next five years (60% in the new member states, i.e. 13% more than in the old ones).

How then can the ongoing 'dual' and often distorted view of the current EU be explained? There are many reasons but there is one in particular for which action can be taken – the low level of knowledge of the new member states. That, in any case, is what emerges from Eurobarometers which, semester after semester, underline the lack of knowledge of the 'other' between Brest and Warsaw, Tenerife and Vilnius, or Dublin and Nicosia. In the spring of 2003, although 80% of those polled said they had already heard of enlargement, far fewer knew the identity of the future member states (from 73% of correct responses picking out Poland against less than 50% correctly identifying the Baltic countries)⁴. Even fewer were able to differentiate between the candidate countries and the member states (1%). Three years on, the situation is not much better – less than half of them can correctly name the member states in the Union⁵.

The relative youth of the Europe of 25 is of course the first explanation for this lack of knowledge. We know that the map 'in the mind's eye' of citizens does not keep pace with the geographic map of the Union. In December 2002 for example, i.e. seven years after the EU had expanded to 15 member states, 72% of EU citizens still thought that the Union was only made up of twelve members⁶. Another explanation is the lack of information, no doubt mainly due to the media coverage. This is true for other EU issues. But in the case of enlargement, the situation has become practically a caricature⁷. Another explanation is citizens' lack of first-hand experience of the ten new member states. With a poor knowledge of their languages, cultures and history⁸ plus the fact that they rarely travel to these countries, citizens from the old member states have a remote relationship with the central and eastern European countries. The March 2003 Eurobarometer established a clear correlation between the fact of having already visited one of these member states (which is true for only a third of those polled) and knowledge of the enlargement.

4 Flash Eurobarometer, 'Enlargement of the EU', March 2003, p.11. Notable differences were also observed among member states, with countries such as the UK, Italy, Ireland or Portugal registering lower percentages than the average. Two factors seemed to come into play here – the size of the state but also the geographic proximity between that particular state and the state where the person polled comes from (with the notable exception of Malta).

5 Standard Eurobarometer, n° 63, spring 2005, p.79

6 Standard Eurobarometer, n° 58, autumn 2002, p.15

7 Olivier Baisnée reports an interview with a French journalist who points out that, on the very day of enlargement, TF1 had just named the ten new member states. Olivier BAISNEE and Thomas FRINAULT, Les rédactions françaises et l'actualité de l'UE. Les logiques de l'intéressement et du désintéressement à l'Europe, Journée d'études de la Revue Mots, Toulouse, 21 October 2005

8 Eurydice, 'Key figures for teaching languages at school in Europe', 2005 edition (available online at the following address: http://oraprod.eurydice.org/portal/page?_pageid=196,1&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL). See also special Eurobarometer 63.4 'Europeans and languages', September 2005

But this lack of knowledge is also based on a lack of debate about ideas. Shut away in its “rhetoric of the inevitable”⁹, the Union would have given the impression that it was expanding for predetermined historical, geographical and cultural reasons. The idea of a “return to Europe” bandied about in the candidate countries was echoed by the “historical responsibility” of the West, making any attempt to hold an objective debate a non-starter. “By forcing the issue, we are tempted to say that east-west European trade and the free movement of people have grown while the debate between the intellectual and political elites has been impoverished [...]. As if, after the disappearance of the common adversary embodied by Soviet totalitarianism, we no longer had much to say to each other,” writes Jacques Rupnik¹⁰. This truncated debate has had two perverse effects – in the West, the veil of ignorance has grown darker, making the awareness [of the new member states] all the more stark after 1 May 2004. To the East, the last few years of negotiations have seen the re-emergence of eurosceptic movements, basing their discourse on a refusal of conventional pro-EU thinking¹¹. In both cases, feelings of mistrust towards Europe have grown.

It is this lack of knowledge and debating of ideas that leads EU citizens to interpret the new member states as a bloc. Yet European integration has been a differentiating experience for them, be that between their countries and other candidate countries or within their own societies.

This study seeks, in its own modest way, to increase understanding. By asking intellectuals from the new member states, be they active players in or observers of the ongoing process, to give their vision of the Europe of 2020, our aim is to confront the intellectual worlds of the enlarged Europe and bring them together.

9 Eric DACHEUX, *L'impossible défi : la politique de communication de l'UE*, CNRS Editions, 2004.

10 Jacques RUPNIK (Dir.), *Les européens face à l'élargissement*. Paris', Presses de Sciences Po, 2004, p.20

11 Laure NEUMAYER, *De l'euro-réalisme au souverainisme ? Le discours eurosceptique dans trois nouveaux membres de l'UE : la Pologne, la Hongrie et la République tchèque*, dans Pascal DELWIT, Philippe POIRIER (eds), *Parlement puissant, électeurs absents ? Les élections européennes de juin 2004*, Bruxelles, Editions University of Brussels, 2005

Europe in 2020 – summary of contributions

POLITICAL IMAGINATION AND OPTIMISM

While, as Elzbieta Skotnicka-Illasiewicz says, “an indispensable attribute of the Union’s vitality is imagination”, the Europe in 2020 debate has the great advantage that it rekindles this imagination. This is crucial at a time when the EU is undergoing one of the most major crises in its young history. As Ioannis Kasoulides puts it, we need to remember that the EU is still very young. In his words, “50 years is just a drop in the ocean of European history”.

This leap into the future and historical perspective should make us look at the current crisis in an optimistic way. That is what the authors of these contributions have on the whole chosen to do. For Ioannis Kasoulides, “crisis is always a time of danger but it simultaneously provides an opportunity and challenge to move forward even stronger”. After all, as Jiří Dienstbier says, it is “in the course of its ‘crises’” that “the EU has developed from its modest beginnings into the world’s largest internal market and laid the foundations for political integration”. Elzbieta Skotnicka-Illasiewicz goes even further by saying that confidence in the meaning of the European project will come back and that when that happens “we will have to thank the French and Dutch for having forced us – before it was too late – to think about what comes ‘afterwards’ [after accomplishing the dream of bringing down the post-Yalta divisions] for the Union and for Europe”.

EUROPE OF HOPE – PEACE, FREEDOM AND PROSPERITY

Manja Klemenčič sets the tone in the title of her contribution “Europe – the real ‘last great hope’?” A hope for peace, first and foremost, that our authors point out by siding with the traditional line taken by the founding fathers. Take Jiří Dienstbier for example: “Peace in Europe has become so self-evident that it is easily forgotten that it demanded great courage to overcome the desire of people from the victorious nations to take revenge, to cope with the broken spirits of the defeated nations and with the prejudices of centuries of European conflicts”.

But for these authors the objective of peace is more than a historical reference. As Miklós Szabó puts it, “the birth of a Europe of 27 and then a Europe of 30 will have a symbolic value. The people of central Europe, divided and set against each other by world wars, will finally be able to reach out to each other. Mistrust and disagreement will gradually be replaced by trust and co-operation. As with the Franco-German reconciliation, the new generation of Hungarians, despite being hurt by the Treaty of Trianon, no longer has a fear of investing in Slovakia or Romania. Another positive sign is that the new regions – which are perhaps growing a little too slowly – tend to be unaware of the borders of current states. The Union can make Europe a haven of peace. And that would be something extraordinary in itself, a major gain”.

The issue of peace is also an ongoing one for Paul Raudseps. As he puts it, “of late one often hears the proposition that the original purpose of the European project – to prevent conflict in our continent – has lost its salience and that Europe must search for some new idea to give it meaning and relevance in the twenty-first century. Not infrequently it is suggested that this new project must be the construction of some rather vaguely defined political entity that will make the European Union a major player on the global stage, comparable to the United States of America. Yet, while this goal may have a certain appeal to some national elites within Europe, I would argue that it is at best a distraction and at worst a hindrance to the real work of Europe, which is still and will be for the foreseeable future the prevention of conflicts within our continent, not the projection of force outside of it.” For him, the continuing existence of fragmented identities in Europe and the impending birth of nations justify his comments. “The presence of large, socially isolated Muslim populations in a number of European countries only compounds the problem of creating a real sense of common European identity that would be the main locus of its citizens’ loyalty,” he adds.

In addition to easily forgetting the huge contribution that European integration has made to peace on the continent, we no longer highlight the fact “that the European Union promotes the spread of freedom”, says Jiří Dienstbier. Before 1989, he adds, “the appeal it held for nations under the rule of Soviet empire was so strong that Milan Kundera and many others believed that the Czechs, Poles and Hungarians were more devoted Europeans than their western neighbours”. He rightly points out that “the prospect of joining the EU is a driving force for political and economic reforms in the countries for which it represents the hope of a life of freedom and prosperity”.

EUROPE OF VALUES –RULE OF LAW, SOLIDARITY AND TOLERANCE

Paul Raudseps puts it very clearly: “All the countries in the EU and the vast majority of their citizenries do share a commitment to the same political values.” He thinks that the value of the “the rule of law” is “the most important one for the European project”. He says that “the rule of law which protects the peace, regulates the conflicts inherent in human societies, and creates the framework both for the enjoyment of human rights and the growth of prosperity”. He adds that “any state that is willing to enter into such a “social contract” with other like-minded states, ceding part of its freedom/sovereignty in exchange for the stability and security of being part of a mechanism that resolves conflicts peacefully and with an eye to the common good, is “European” in the sense that matters most – in its adherence to a set of political values.

The values are also those that are features of the EU’s economic and social model and that most of the authors vigorously defend. Solidarity is the first of these values. As Carmel Attard puts it, “very often the European Union is criticised for the emphasis it places on social solidarity. This is seen by some economists as hindering the Union from becoming more competitive by comparison with the models of other economic blocs”. But in his eyes, “what is perceived by some as weakness is one of the strong points that makes the EU unique because solidarity and the EU social policy give a human face to economic development”.

Manja Klemenčič puts it in even stronger terms. In her view, "it is time to remind ourselves that superficial comparisons based on statistics of GDP growth are at best inconclusive and conceal serious social dislocations that we are not and should not be willing to pay in Europe". She takes things further too: "Europe at its best offers humanity a different vision. Even if it has its problems, this vision works and produces gentler, safer, and more socially equitable societies. The defenders of this European model are the true visionaries."

The strength of the European social model as an alternative vision for mankind is also advocated by Jiří Dienstbier. As he puts it, "Europeans face global economic challenges from two sides - from a cheaper labour force in the developing world, especially in China and India, and from the US 'productivity dictatorship', which does not give employees even two weeks of holidays". He borrows Lionel Jospin's phrase, "yes to market economy, no to market society" to describe the European tradition and agrees with Jeremy Rifkin's comments on the European dream in which Rifkin recommends building on the social *acquis* rather than neglecting them.

"Europe has no reason to feel weak, apathetic and irresolute. Why not think of ourselves rather as a bastion of antimilitarism, tolerance and moderation?" adds Manja Klemenčič. Lore Listra goes further: "Solidarity is not just an act of giving, of (re)distributing. It is also about understanding and respecting."

EUROPE – DIVERSITY, IDENTITIES AND FRONTIERS

The issue of EU enlargement is addressed by practically all the contributors. They speak plainly and directly, with no holds barred. Their aim is to be open and so they make the best of the uncertainty about the future shape of the European Union. They tackle – and we can be grateful to them for doing so – issues that are often complex and ambiguous and that many political leaders or opinion shapers from the EU-15 have in the backs of their minds.

All would no doubt approve of the way Ioannis Kasoulides summarises the situation: "The reunification of the continent has been a tremendous achievement of the Union and the last two years have shown that despite the difficult parameters in the Treaty of Nice, the EU of 25 works and works well. In fact enlargement, and the political and socio-economic transformation of neighbouring countries before (and after) joining, is in my view the ultimate success of the EU." When he says this, Ioannis Kasoulides is not just referring to central and eastern European countries but also to Spain and Greece. The contributors probably also share the author's lucid and straight-to-the-point analysis that the logic of enlargement goes on and on: "Once a stable, democratic and prosperous area is established, it is natural for both those inside and outside to wish to continually extend it to cover more neighbours and reap more common benefits."

It is very much the objectives of stabilisation, democratisation and security that motivate our contributors first and foremost. Starting from his definition of the EU as a bulwark of political values, Paul Raudseps points out that "these values are the only measures by which a state can be objectively judged to belong to Europe" and that "using them as a reference point disposes of any kind of Christian chauvinism, prejudice or racism in the decisions on EU

membership". But they also underline the very pragmatic nature of these arguments: "The attraction of belonging to the European Union and the concrete steps necessary to bring these political and legal values to life in the states neighboring the EU is a powerful force for stability, enhancing the security of the member states even as it helps neighboring states in their struggle to modernize." Petr Pithart goes even further, saying that "we must even be prepared that peace and security in the Union may at some point have to take preference over homogeneity of values".

Looking at it this way, most contributors hope that the western Balkans countries, or in any case a good number of them, are part of the Union in 2020. For, in the words of Jiří Dienstbier, they must not continue to be "an isolated enclave in the middle of the Balkans". While Miklos Szabo puts the western Balkans on the outer limits of enlargement – because, in his words, "the determination of the founding fathers seems to have evaporated" – others see it as going further.

Lena Kolarska-Bobińska thinks that the aim of promoting security and democracy through enlargement will particularly concern Ukraine and Turkey, because these two countries are "not just key neighbours of the European Union but also bridgeheads towards other countries on other continents". Jiří Dienstbier also sees in Turkey's accession the advantage of having European borders with the Middle East and having the Middle East as a neighbour of Greece and Bulgaria. He also points to the plus points of Ukraine and the countries of the Caucasus. Paul Raudseps hopes too that, beyond the countries of the western Balkans, "Turkey, if it is not already in, will be on the verge of joining, and Ukraine and Moldova will be in the process of negotiation".

As a Cypriot, Ioannis Kasoulides addresses the issue of Turkey joining the EU at great length and concludes that, despite the many and important obstacles (democracy, minorities, Armenian question, occupation of Cyprus, etc), it would be a good thing. For him, "a Europeanised, democratic and reformed Turkey will inevitably lead to the solution of national questions with neighbouring member states, as well as boost the stability and economy of the whole Eastern Mediterranean". But its accession would also have advantages for the whole of the EU, whether they come from "its high growth rates and young workforce, the symbolism of having a Muslim country in the EU or the added value it brings with its strategic and military position". Carmel Attard is the most optimistic. For him, the EU will, by 2020, be a Community of 35 nations. He sees the countries of the western Balkans, Turkey, Norway and Switzerland among these countries. Gintaras Steponavičius is, surprisingly, one of the few to point to the role that Russia could play in which countries join the EU. According to him, "Russia is one of the external forces that could make Europe behave like a lost child" and that this challenge "will persist throughout the next decade".

But this relative openness towards the idea of new rounds of enlargement comes hand in hand with some words of caution. The first concerns the workings of the EU. In Petr Pithart's words, "before any future enlargement, we must first make sure that institutional and decision-making structures are ready". Ioannis Kasoulides uses the expression devoted to the "Union's absorption capacity" to refer to both the functioning of the institutions and the finances of the

Union. Petr Pithart also stresses the importance that citizens of signing up to the next enlargements and recommends that these be approved democratically. For Jiří Dienstbier, the need to make Europe an important political player must lead us to weigh up future enlargements and the dates of such enlargements very carefully.

This commentary by Jiří Dienstbier shows that the positive stance of these authors on the prospect of other enlargements does not mean abandoning political integration in the future. We almost have the impression that the specificity of the political project of the Union is better understood by these representatives of the new member states than it is by some 'old' member states. Jiří Dienstbier's meaning is clear from his opening lines: "European integration has been a political project right from the beginning." We might have thought, however, that the importance of the nation state would prevail because, as Carmel Attard points out, "most of these 'new' member states are still 'cherishing' their newly-acquired democracy and sovereignty 15 years after the end of the Warsaw Pact, which had kept them under the iron fist of the Soviet Union for more than 40 years". But, according to Carmel Attard, it is precisely this desire to keep their identities and national sovereignties that has led Europeans "to be creative in how they go about forging a community of nations with federal characteristics without "offending" the national sentiments of its citizens".

The Union's federal project understood as a political system allowing for national diversities to be accommodated within one political community is at the heart of most of the visions of Europe set out by our contributors. In their eyes, even if there will always be tension between what Elzbieta Skotnicka-Illasiewicz calls the vision of "co-operation" and that of "domination", unity and diversity, far from being incompatible, strengthen one another and their combination is an asset for the European Union. Lore Listra is perhaps the most explicit on this point. "Europe," she says, "is imbued with cultures, with different cultures. This diversity is one of the great advantages of Europe. In biology, diversity in an ecosystem is a guarantee of its viability – the more species there are in this system, the more chance there is that, in the event of an accident of whatever kind, some will survive. The greater the diversity, the stronger the system." She concludes that "Europe must move towards unity whilst valuing diversity. Instead of simply coming together under the Made in EU brand, we need to support and encourage knowledge of this cultural diversity". Describing a family trip across Europe, Pauls Raudseps also sees the main defining characteristic of Europe as its cultural diversity and sees the Union as the way to preserve this diversity. The final words of a contribution by Miklós Szabó sum up this vision in an inspired way: "While keeping their linguistic and cultural identity, the nations of the European Union will be capable, in the 21st century, of creations that deserve to stand beside the most extraordinary masterpieces of our common past."

Jaan Kaplinski takes this reflection on cultural diversity onto a global scale and considers it in the context of a reflection about Europe's identity and borders, a reflection that deserves to be dwelt on. In his view, Europe has moved from a desire to subjugate and change the world to religious and cultural tolerance. The process of cultural and ethnic emancipation that has emerged has meant that "not just Europe but the whole world has become a multicultural mosaic". People, he adds, "often have multiple identities or an undetermined identity".

According to Jaan Kaplinski, there is a possible compromise between those who seek to draw Europe into its Judaeo-Christian and Greek identity and those who are heading towards a US-style globalisation – as Europe's own experience and history show: "Unity in plurality, plurality in unity." It is possible, says the author, "to live in a perpetual flux, to find an identity in this very flux, in the permanent construction, deconstruction and reconstruction of this identity". Along these lines, "European identity is not necessarily European or not only European".

Jaan Kaplinski concludes that Europe "has become a Europe without precise cultural or geographic borders". The European peninsula "does not have clearly demarcated borders, the ones that we know are purely conventions". According to the author, it is worth thinking about Europe not just as a continent but as a process. In his words, we must not "think that this process will be stopped at the furthest points of what we are used to considering as our peninsula, our part of the world". This train of thought leads him to state clearly that it is "possible and desirable that a union of nations, a confederation which revolves around Europe, encompasses the entire world". He continues: "The rise of a more united Europe that is more aware of its identity and its means may have an influence on the integration of other continents and regions. Such a Europe will certainly be able to contribute to the development of the United Nations into a more effective instrument of international policy".

DEMOCRATIC EUROPE – CONSTITUTION, CITIZENS AND COMMUNICATION

For virtually all the contributors, reform of the institutions continues to be a fundamental work in progress for the Union in view, as we have seen, of the need to "digest" this enlargement and prepare the next ones. Many think that this could be done by adopting a Constitution. Miklos Szabó thinks that the lack of a European Constitution stands in the way of Europe adopting a genuine federal system, which he would prefer to a two-speed Europe which, in his view, would make a mockery of integration. Without using the federal terminology, Lena Kolarska-Bobińska expresses a similar idea: "The Union needs to clarify its institutional approach in view of its end goal. So it is important to approve the Constitutional Treaty or a document close to that, which will provide the 'foundations' and will, thanks to clearly defined objectives, prevent the EU from drifting".

In this respect, Ioannis Kasoulides rightly points to three positive aspects that must be borne in mind during this period of reflection: "Firstly, we have a text that has been elaborated by a body with much more legitimacy than an intergovernmental conference (IGC) and agreed and signed by 25 governments. Secondly, it has been ratified by a majority of them, including two by referendum, and thirdly, the necessity of most of the institutional changes proposed is acknowledged by all concerned." Most authors do not come out in favour of any one of the technical proposals to "emerge from the crisis" but seem to share Ioannis Kasoulides's view. He says that, whatever the future of the Constitutional Treaty, "essential is that the basis for future reform is there, and is unlikely to change".

The need for the Union to adopt its 'constitutional foundations' is not just based on effectiveness. For many, it is also a matter of improving democratic practice in the EU. Petr Pithart has an imaginative way of expressing the problem that all the authors have identified in

one way or another: "Between 1989 and 2005, the EU deepened its integration, introduced the Euro as its common currency, and accepted 13 new members in two enlargements. In the dash, Brussels runners did not realize they were breaking away from the popular peloton". There are many who want to "give Europe back to its citizens" in the manner of Elzbieta Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, who views the crisis as the detachment of Europeans rather than that of the institutions. The debate on the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty is not just a debate about the future of the Union, she says, but also "a debate about what unites and divides Europeans". In that sense, this debate "offers a chance to shed light on the real societal idea, as yet not revealed, of the reason, aim and significance of the project to unite the European continent, but also the maturity of Europeans to follow up on this project".

It is thinking along these lines that a majority of these authors, while wanting the Constitutional Treaty to enter into force by 2020, also envisage a second revision of the treaty before then. If they come, these revisions must continue to increase the capacity of institutions to make or not make citizens actors in the Union, because that is what will determine the future of Europe.

Strengthening the powers of the European Parliament and the role of the national parliaments are among the foremost proposals put forward, in particular by Carmel Attard, Jiri Dienstbier, Ioannis Kasoulidès and Petr Pithart. The latter in particular would like the European Parliament to have more clout than the member states in terms of the budget. The perception of this power should, in his view, increase citizens' turnout at the European elections. The issue of democracy leads Petr Pithart and Carmel Attard to point to communication as a major challenge, whose key aim is to make citizens more aware and better informed about European debates. They also underline the important role of national parties and parliaments in this pedagogical effort. Ioannis Kasoulidès wants governments to be more open about decisions taken in Brussels. In his view, Europe needs to enter into citizens' daily lives.

Jiří Dienstbier and Manja Klemenčič, however, point out that the debate on the Constitutional Treaty must be put in perspective. The former underlines that the controversy about the treaty is only one of the stages in the process of integration and that it is also a national consideration – in particular the dissatisfaction by comparison with some governments – or a certain malaise related to broader problems such as immigration. In this context, he cites the Czech President, an opponent of pushing political integration too far and who has described the disagreement as being "not a dispute about the Constitution but a clash of world views". Since 1989 and the end of the Soviet threat, the integration of post-communist countries has, according to Jiří Dienstbier, who borrows from Daniel Cohen, "let the fear of globalisation enter the same centre of European debate". Manja Klemenčič also urges us not to downplay the current situation after the French and Dutch 'Noes': "The European ideal is much more than about having or not having a Constitution." It is about "forging stronger relationships between European countries. It is about working together, pooling our resources and expanding common opportunities".

EUROPE OF PROJECTS: SINGLE MARKET, EDUCATION, SOCIAL, IMMIGRATION AND ENERGY

Starting from the idea formulated by [Lena Kolarska-Bonbińska](#) “that a powerful Union is a Union that is making economic progress”, several authors return to what they consider to be one of the bedrocks of European integration, i.e. the achievement of the single market and the four freedoms of movement (goods, capital, people and services). [Paul Raudseps](#) thinks that the EU needs to focus on strengthening these four freedoms at the same time as it streamlines decision-making procedures. Similarly, [Gintaras Steponavičius](#) thinks that the achievement of the single market is among the agreed aims which the EU needs to focus on. [Jiří Dienstbier](#) goes further by explaining that, in his view, conflicting positions on the relationship between competitiveness and social cohesion in a globalised economy are temporary. These positions will be “smoothed out by the gradual removal of all the obstacles to the full advantages of the largest internal market in the world”. On the issue of free movement of people, he points out in particular that “Britain, Ireland and Sweden, which did not introduce restrictions for workers from new member countries, found that this did not work to their detriment”.

Education and research are priority areas for the majority of contributors. [Lore Listra](#) sees this as the key for Europe to move towards unity while valuing its diversity. “We still remember maps of Europe in European schools that showed Europe without Finland or northern Sweden,” she says. “Knowledge of the different European regions and Europeans being themselves open about Europe are important factors in strengthening this diversity.” [Jiří Dienstbier](#) also believes that investment in education, research and innovation has a key role to play, as they can “support sustainable development and cultural diversity, to promote cultural and natural heritages, quality of life, solidarity and equal opportunities as the precondition for personal happiness”. In the same way, Miklos Szabó advocates a genuine European area of higher education and research, beyond the formal criteria of the Bologna process. Manja Klemenčič and [Ioannis Kasoulides](#) point out that the target of spending 3% of GDP on research and development is far from being achieved, though it continues to be the best way to promote economic growth and job creation as well as protecting the social model, the environment and social cohesion.

The European social model, which as we have seen, everyone is proud of, is among the priority objectives of the EU. Starting with mobility, which he thinks will become an economic and intellectual driving force for Europe, [Miklos Szabó](#) argues that we should get rid of some taboos, especially in efforts to create jobs. [Carmel Attard](#) goes further as he is convinced that, by 2020, the EU will have passed more legislation in social policy. He goes as far as to advocate the creation of a common social security system, financed by a European tax. He also advocates that the EU think about “the social fabric” of integration for which the family continues to be the foundation. “What is the point of generating wealth when society is living in highly stressful conditions to achieve a high level of performance and with the detrimental effect that that has on family life?” is his rhetorical question. However, on social issues, there are considerable differences in opinion. [Gintaras Steponavičius](#) says he is sure “that there will be no tax or social policy harmonisation by 2020”.

Reflections on the social model lead to thoughts about the budget and the need to reform the Common Agricultural Policy. A majority of contributors thinks that it is necessary to reduce the amount of funding earmarked for the CAP, in order to finance new priorities. Gintaras Steponavičius is probably the most outspoken on this point, as he says saying that the CAP should be “abolished or radically reformed”. Petr Pithart warns against the consequences of dismantling the CAP in terms of the preservation of the European countryside, which he considers to be an essential aspect of European identity. The Lisbon strategy is also frequently addressed when issues of education or the social model are raised. Most are critical both of its objectives – which some consider to be unrealistic – and of its results. Petr Pithart challenges the Lisbon strategy’s philosophy in the following way: “The point is not to “catch up and exceed.” The point is to cultivate what matters to us as Europeans”

The immigration issue is also often raised and developed in particular by Lena Kolarska-Bonbińska and Ioannis Kasoulides. Both underline the legal dimension as well as the economic and social impact of this policy. For Lena Kolarska-Bonbińska, the Union needs to “develop a common migration policy, which would take into account demographic issues as well as the labour market, education, social policy and security”. Ioannis Kasoulides also stresses the importance of making joint decisions on immigration and points out that “not only can immigration further enrich our multicultural societies, it will also provide answers to our pressing economic and demographic problems”.

Several authors tackle the issue of energy policy, which, as Paul Raudseps puts it, is an area where the interests of member states can fall into line. Whilst Lena Kolarska-Bonbińska and Gintaras Steponavičius make more of the problem of energy security and resources, Manja Klemenčič dwells on the sensitive management of relations with the Middle East, Russia and central Asia and the need to invest in alternative sources of energy as well as in industries and lifestyles that are conducive to energy savings.

EUROPE IN THE WORLD: COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

This is one of the main points on which the contributions all agree. All the authors think of the Union as a leading political actor on the world stage in the future, rather than just a common market. If solidarity is a crucial value of the EU, then according to Paul Raudseps, the EU must show this solidarity to the rest of the world.

This key role is played out first and foremost via the EU’s neighbourhood policy. Lena Kolarska-Bonbińska calls for the implementation of “a more coherent good neighbourhood policy, matched with more concrete proposals for countries which are still due to join the Union”. She recommends the creation of a “European democracy fund”. In a similar vein, Ioannis Kasoulides, basing his arguments on the difficulty in reconciling the political visions of a large number of member states, advocates giving more weight to the European Neighbourhood Policy by increasing “the ability of neighbouring states to have enhanced association agreements that are customised to their needs and political will, so that they can

take cooperation to as high a level as possible, if they so desire". In his words, this approach is "close to the concept of privileged partnerships, which may be particularly relevant to our future relations with Turkey, Ukraine or even the Caucasus for instance". Manja Klemenčič also believes that the EU should "develop region-specific develop policies to manage relations with its immediate neighbours", such as Russia, the Caucasus, the western Balkans and the Middle East. This is something that, in her view, the current overall neighbourhood policy does not do enough.

Along similar lines to Lena Kolarska-Bobińska, most of the authors think that putting in place a Common Foreign and Security Policy is essential for the EU to play a key role and define its presence in a globalised world. Petr Pithart takes the same view but points out that the EU must "remaining aware that it will be a slow process and it will not always work out". He believes that there is no other way than to maintain unanimity and, as a result, to be ready for other failures in this policy area. However, several authors think that creating a Foreign Affairs Minister would bring more coherence to policy-making in this field.

Lena Kolarska-Bobińska points out that the CFSP is a matter of major importance for the new member states, who continue to fear for their security, and that co-operation with the United States to resolve global problems is paramount. In a similar vein, Jiri Dienstbier stresses the importance of a 'EuroAtlantic' partnership for global stability. But he underlines the need for balance between the Europeans and Americans, and advocates a European approach to the problems of terrorism and relations with authoritarian states that are not based on resorting to military force. In his view, "the experience with the dissolution of Soviet-type regimes after Helsinki 1975 indicates that the best instrument is to open closed societies, support independent civic activities and expand economic contacts". Carmel Attard believes that a common security policy must be based on common defence arrangements by 2020. The Rapid Reaction Force and the solidarity clause proposed in the Constitutional Treaty are steps in the right direction. Petr Pithart thinks that a common security policy also calls for a European judicial police, investigating magistrates and criminal law to be established. He warns of the effects of failure in this area: "As soon as the EU starts losing its battle with organized crime and terrorism, everyone will go off on their own, leaving the EU to water down to its eventual demise."

GOOD SENSE AND UTOPIA

Such warnings would tend to bolster Lore Listra's view that predictions, if you believe them too much, may turn into self-fulfilling prophecies. After all, these bouts of reflection about what the EU may and should look like in 2020 are full of attractive projects - based as much on utopia as good sense, on visionary thinking as concrete proposals, on optimistic enthusiasm as on reassuring realism. Let us hope that, whatever path Europe has ended up taking by 2020, European integration will have at least struck this balance, by becoming part and parcel of citizens' daily lives while making them dream of the future.

Europe in 2020

CARMEL ATTARD

The European integration project that started some years after the end of World War Two has come a long way in uniting the peoples of Europe into one big community and is unique in the way it handles its own affairs. This vision, as explained by the then French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman in his declaration of 9 May 1950 has been the driving force behind the construction of Europe over the past five decades. Schuman, echoing the wishes and dreams of his contemporaries, foremost among them Jean Monnet, declared that "Europe will not be made all at once". Schuman's ultimate goal was a European federation that would develop gradually through experience and the sharing of sovereignty among the participating states.

Initially, the member states pooled sovereignty over the production and marketing of steel and coal. This evolved into their sharing sovereignty via the establishment of a single internal market complete with a single currency and the abolition of internal borders. This also helped in the creation of a single external border in terms of visas, customs duties and levies. Europeans and their leaders began to describe this process as one of "deepening and widening" resulting in further integration within the existing community of nations as well as within the European continent by accepting new member states inside the European Community.

Fifty-five years since the Schuman declaration, Europeans are still coming to terms with the adoption of even more federal features to the integration project. For instance, a number of EU member states are debating the ratification of a Constitution for Europe that would give the European Community its first elected President and its Foreign Affairs Minister. This Constitutional Treaty should be in force by 2020. Between now and then it may even have undergone amendments giving more power to the European Parliament and making more policy areas subject to qualified majority voting.

Although maintaining national identity and sovereignty very often acts as a brake on the EU as a federation, it has nevertheless prompted Europeans to be creative in how they go about forging a community of nations with federal characteristics without "offending" the national sentiments of its citizens. The system of equal rotation in chairing Council of Ministers meetings and in the choice of a reduced number of EU Commissioners as proposed by the Constitutional Treaty are just two examples of how the Community respects the sovereignty of states while at the same time taking on board more federal characteristics. The distribution of members of the European Parliament according to their nationality and the size of their respective member state, the adoption of official languages reflecting the cultural diversity of member states and the choice of national symbols on euro coins are indications of this respect towards the status that individual member states enjoy as sovereign states in the international arena, for example at the United Nations.

In a Community of 25 member states, which will hopefully increase to 27 by January 2007, respect for sovereignty while at the same time allowing for part of this sovereignty to be pooled is of the utmost importance, not only to some of the founding and early member states of the Community but especially so to those states that joined the European Union in May 2004. Most of these 'new' member states are still 'cherishing' their newly-acquired democracy and sovereignty 15 years after the end of the Warsaw Pact, which had kept them under the iron fist of the Soviet Union for more than 40 years. It is therefore imperative that the citizens of these new states do not end up seeing the Community as a threat to their 'survival' as a nation state.

Having said that, these 'new' States still feel the need to 'go federal' in those areas where they consider themselves weak. This is, after all, a feeling shared by all member states and it is one that provided the impetus for the development of the European integration project. It is precisely this line of thinking that should, in my view, lead the Community to adopt more federal approaches and solutions in the coming two decades. Whereas in the past, national sovereignty was seen as a sign of strength, the recent history of post-World War Two Europe and the world at large has exposed the weaknesses of sovereignty, especially in a globalised world.

One such weakness lies in the field of security and defence. Most of the current EU member states and all the prospective candidates (with the exception perhaps of Turkey) have very limited military capability. In combination with their ever-shrinking military budgets, this situation should lead the European Union to have its own defence arrangements by 2020. All EU states are facing a common threat – terrorism – and common problems, especially in military procurement. These common 'weaknesses' should pave the way for the creation of a defence force that would make member states stronger in their fight against terrorists and in the deployment of military forces and hardware. The Rapid Reaction Force and the solidarity clause in the Constitution for Europe are both along these lines.

I imagine that, by 2020, the European Union will have 35 member states with the accession of Croatia, Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Turkey, Norway and Switzerland. The accession of Turkey should bring about drastic reforms in the current cohesion policy and budgetary provisions so as to ensure that the wealth of Europe is shared justly among the citizens of the 35 member states. While enlargement towards an EU of 35 member states would mean that the European continent would be united under one entity – the European Union, it would also mean tougher challenges for EU governance. The Constitution for Europe provides the basis for the EU to become more efficient and democratic in its decision-making process.

Very often the European Union is criticised for the emphasis it places on social solidarity. This is seen by some economists as hindering the Union from becoming more competitive by comparison with the models of other economic blocs. In my view, what is perceived by some as weakness is one of the strong points that makes the EU unique because solidarity and the EU social policy give a human face to economic development.

To further strengthen the European social model, the Union should, over the coming two decades, establish some kind of a common social security system to help and support workers and their families. This common social security system should also lead to the introduction of a European tax. As much as farmers receive no less than 43 per cent of the EU budget in the form of subsidies and financial help because their livelihood is vulnerable and fragile, it can also be argued that in today's world, the livelihood of millions of workers across Europe is facing huge challenges because of fierce competition from Asian markets. It is inconceivable that an economic bloc such as the EU, which generates billions of euros every year in wealth, still has some 20 million unemployed people. Although many barriers have been removed to facilitate the free movement of workers among the EU member states, most people still prefer to work in their own environment and community rather than leave their country and settle somewhere else in the EU. EU funding should address this issue by being used to offer incentives for investment in member states and their regions to help them reach full employment and make the Union the most competitive region in the world.

This brings me to another important issue - the future of the social fabric of European society. Given the trends that have been emerging in the past few years, such as the rise in broken marriages, cohabitation, children born out of wedlock and same-sex marriages, EU member states should spend more time reflecting on these phenomena, which, in my opinion, are undermining the very foundations of the EU. The current reflection period on the future of Europe should allow room for a debate on the changes that are affecting the EU's foundations and on the traditional family unit.

What is the point of generating wealth when society is living in highly stressful conditions to achieve a high level of performance and with the detrimental effect that that has on family life? The amendments to the Working Time Directive as well as the introduction of other directives on areas such as parental leave and maternity leave aim precisely to bridge the gap between family and professional life. However, more needs to be done in order to safeguard our families.

For instance, under the principle of subsidiarity, it is up to the individual member states to ensure that the country's workforce enjoys certain rights, such as 'flexi-time' at work and the provision of child-care centres. However, sometimes subsidiarity does not benefit the citizen due to the inefficiencies of public administrations. It is in these cases that the general public expect European solutions. A good number of complaints from the public include areas that fall under the jurisdiction of the member state because of subsidiarity. Therefore, by 2020, I expect the EU to legislate more in social policy areas that currently fall under the jurisdiction of member states.

With the adoption of a common currency and the fast and efficient spread of messages through the mass media, European consumers are now in a better position than ever to compare prices. The pressure that consumers are putting on their respective governments should lead to a situation where, by 2020, EU member states would have agreed on issues such as common registration taxation rates on vehicles and the provision of medical services

across Europe, allowing more freedom of choice to consumers as is proposed by the current draft proposal on the free movement of services.

I predict that, by 2020, the EU will be in a much better position when it comes to reaching out to citizens to inform them about the latest developments and involving them in the decision-making process. I come from a country where the debate on EU issues is kept alive by the government and its EU information centre, the political parties and civil society. Initiatives such as 'Communicating Europe, Plan D', as proposed by the European Commission, should lead to better-informed European citizens by 2020, resulting for instance in an increase in the number of people taking part in European elections. Information should empower EU citizens to take the initiative and participate in the implementation of the EU *acquis*. The EU provides a number of facilities, such as the European Commission complaints form and the European Ombudsman to mention just two. However, much depends on the role that national political parties and national parliaments play in the development of European policies to keep the debate on the EU relevant to citizens.

By 2020 the European integration project should make further concrete steps towards 'the federation of Europe' as set out 70 years earlier by Robert Schuman, leading the European Union to maturity and giving its citizens the protection they need in a globalised world.

What Europe by 2020?

JIŘÍ DIENSTBIER

European integration has been a political project right from the beginning. Schuman, Monnet, de Gasperi, Adenauer, Spaak and others concluded that the most effective prevention of further bloody conflicts would be such economic interconnection as would make any attack on a neighbouring country impossible, thus replacing confrontation and hatred with co-operation and solidarity.

What has happened since has proved them right - war among member states of the present European Union is not inconceivable. Peace in Europe has become so self-evident that it is easily forgotten that it demanded great courage to overcome the desire of people from the victorious nations to take revenge, to cope with the broken spirits of the defeated nations??? and with the prejudices of centuries of European conflicts.

Nor do we emphasise enough that the European Union also promotes the spread of freedom. Before 1989, the appeal it held for nations under the rule of Soviet empire was so strong that Milan Kundera and many others believed that the Czechs, Poles and Hungarians were more devoted Europeans than their western neighbours. The prospect of joining the EU is a driving force for political and economic reforms in the countries for which it represents the hope of a life of freedom and prosperity.

Before 1989, the expansion of west European integration eastwards used to be tempered by concern about the possible Soviet threat. Today, bringing post-communist countries into the EU has, as Daniel Cohen remarked, "let the fear of globalisation enter the same centre of European debate". The symbols are immigrants, the 'Polish plumber' or the increase in the number of job possibilities for countries with lower cost labour forces.

Controversies generate pessimism about the EU and a feeling of crisis. But in the course of its 'crises', the EU has developed from its modest beginnings into the world's largest internal market and laid the foundations for political integration. Disputes just confirm that the progress of European integration is a democratic process in which any further step can be made only after all participants accept it. But, by making at least small concessions in the course of difficult negotiations on the European Union budget for 2007-2013, all member states proved that that they have more to gain from the European project continuing than from it being paralysed due to their dogged defence of their own national interests.

The controversy over the European Constitution is just one of the stages of the process of integration. Arguments against the Constitution are based on domestic issues (dissatisfaction with their governments), on ideology (is the Constitution too 'socialist' or 'neo-liberal'?) or on uneasiness (fear of Turkey, of invasion of workers from new member states willing to work for lower wages, of the fact that the second generation of immigrants has not fully integrated as was confirmed by the murder of van Gogh, the suicidal terrorist attacks in the London underground or by the rioting in the suburbs of Paris).

As we can see, the Constitution is the latest issue. As an opponent of deeper political integration, the Czech President put it clearly - it is not a dispute about the Constitution but a clash of world views.

This ideological conflict has several levels. The most important one is the question of whether we want Europe as a mere free market area or as a political player.

In today's world some problems still have to be resolved at nation state level, but others can be solved only at the level of large-scale integration and some of them – such as terrorism, environment or the rules of the global economy– demand global governance. Even the largest European states cannot assert their interests individually on the world scene. Membership of the European Union strengthens the international standing of each member. Even the Chinese Foreign Minister said in Prague that Czech membership extends the possibilities of Chinese-Czech relations.

Irrespective of the fate of the European Constitution we need to create an institutional framework for the enlarged community, to search for the right balance of power between institutions, nation states and regions, to strengthen the checks provided by both European and national parliaments and to build the foundations of a common foreign and security policy.

State sovereignty can only be really promoted as an active and creative element of the European Union by channelling the experience of different countries into a joint EU policy. The inability of Europe to take a common position led to a chaotic approach to the Balkan wars. The different attitudes of governments to the Iraq war, not in line with the views of citizens, led to attempts to divide Europe into 'new' and 'old' and created tensions both between EU countries and in EU-US relations.

The EU-US transatlantic partnership is essential for world stability. But it can be sustainable only if there Europe is strong. The American opponents of the concept of the US's role as a hyperpower have a clear understanding of that. However, Europe should not waste resources imitating the USA in terms of the number and technology of its weapons. Such expensive technology is inefficient in countering terrorism, which uses asymmetrical means such as suicide attacks. Moreover, the Iraq conflict confirms that neither human rights nor democracy can be successfully promoted via military force. Putting embargoes on and isolating authoritarian states are not effective either, as they hurt the population and bring no harm to the dictators. The experience with the dissolution of Soviet-type regimes after Helsinki 1975 indicates that the best instrument is to open closed societies, support independent civic activities and expand economic contacts. One of the triggers of the Velvet Revolution 1989 in Czechoslovakia was the visit of President Mitterrand and his breakfast with dissidents in December 1988.

One theme of Europe-wide debates is the relationship between global competitiveness and social cohesion.

Competition inside the European Union in these areas is temporary. It will be smoothed out by the gradual removal of all obstacles to the full advantages of the largest internal market in the world. We need to implement the founding values of European integration without hesitation and without any hypocrisy – the free movement of people, capital, goods and services. Britain, Ireland and Sweden, which did not introduce restrictions for workers from new member countries, found that this did not work to their detriment. To make more progress, we need investment in education, research and innovation, we need to support sustainable development and cultural diversity, to promote cultural and natural heritages, quality of life, solidarity and equal opportunities as the precondition for personal happiness. Europeans face global economic challenges from two sides - from a cheaper labour force in the developing world, especially in China and India, and from the US 'productivity dictatorship', which does not give employees even two weeks of holidays. The European tradition is summed up by Lionel Jospin: "Yes to market economy, no to market society". Thinking about 'the European dream', American Professor Jeremy Rifkin, also recommends building on the aforementioned social achievements rather than neglecting them and effectively expanding economics guaranteeing a better future.

The questions of identity and values also relate to the boundaries of Europe. The prospect of joining the EU provides support for stabilisation and democratic development in the Balkans. As we should not leave an isolated enclave in the middle of the Balkans, we have to give more support to Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. The Turkish elites have wanted to be part of Europe since Kemal Ataturk. From a security point of view, it will be advantageous to have European boundaries in the Middle East than to have the Middle East as a neighbour of Greece and Bulgaria. Ukraine, with its 50 million inhabitants, and the states of the Caucasus are also interested in joining the EU.

Will such a large community be manageable? Those who understand integration as a mere free market do not care. Some would even accept Kazakhstan. But to build Europe as an important political player we should weigh up whether to enlarge the EU in the future and when to do so very carefully. The EU's political, economic and legal behaviour has to be anchored not only in the minds of political elites but also in the political culture of a country's people.

Given their historical experience, Europeans tend towards scepticism and pessimism. We Czechs tend to harbour permanent doubts too. We should therefore remind ourselves that optimism comes from will and that optimism is neither a consequence of a lack of information nor naiveté, but the strategy for success.

It is premature to say if Europe should be a federation, a confederation or what form its political institutions will choose. But as Arnold Toynbee once mentioned, the decline of the Roman Empire started when it only maintained its 'acquis communautaire'. "Evercloser Union" is therefore not only a project but a sine qua non of its success.

A Vision of Europe

JAAN KAPLINSKI

Europe has many faces and several identities. You have a Europe for the French, a Europe for the Poles, a Europe for the Estonians, a Europe for the Jews, a Europe for the Catholics, a Europe for the Protestants, a Europe for the Muslims. But ironically European identity was born and has developed in spite of and because of its differences and contradictions. So what exactly is Europe? In geographical terms, it's a peninsula of Eurasia. Europe is a peninsula, half attached to its parent continent and half separate from it. That also means that the European peninsula does not have clearly drawn borders – the ones that we know are purely conventional. This lack of borders recently stirred up a heated, sometimes even aggressive, controversy. The question we ask ourselves is if Turkey can be or become a European nation or if it is condemned to eternal 'otherness' without the option of an appeal. But there are others whose Europeanness is not so clear-cut either. What do you do with Ukraine? How about Russia? If Turkey passes muster and is deemed fit to join, what can you say to the Moroccans, Tunisians and Algerians if they also ask to be let in to the club?

It seems to me that we must not think that Europe is only the European continent and will remain so forever. From my perspective, Europe is more of a process and we must not think that this process will be brought to a halt at the boundaries of what we are accustomed to seeing as our peninsula, our bit of the world. It is quite possible and desirable that a union of nations, a confederation with the Europe of today at its heart, encompasses the whole world. There are plenty of ways to bind nations and regions together. The rise of a more united Europe with greater awareness of its identity and its means may have an influence on the integration of other continents and regions. And such a Europe will certainly be able to help the United Nations develop into a more effective international policy instrument.

This boils down to the idea that European integration is in all likelihood in its early stages, possibly marking the starting point of a global integration process. Setbacks and mistakes are probably an inevitable part of this process, but they should not hold it up for too long. As our continent has no boundaries, no precise borders, we simply don't know where we can stop.

In the past, Europe faced the same problem and found a solution – it subjugated and transformed everyone. In the European vision of the past, there was no place for the 'other', otherness as such had to disappear. This was a common vision of the conquistadors, the missionaries and the great thinkers of the enlightenment period. But otherness does not cave in so easily and has come back with a vengeance. The Romantic Movement, with the ideas of Rousseau and Herder, marked the beginning of the changes. These ideas gradually led to more tolerance of other religions and cultures, and resulted in nations and peoples oppressed and humiliated by the conquerors and colonisers discovering their identities. First of all it was the European peoples that had been ignored and derided until then, such as the Czechs, Slovaks, Estonians and Latvians, who took their place among the established nations and cultures. Later, this national emancipation spread beyond the borders of our continent. Nowadays it is

the Kurds, Polynesians, Aymaras and Inuits who are determined to follow in the footsteps of the Czechs and Estonians.

As a result of this process of cultural and ethnic emancipation, not just Europe but also the whole world has become a multicultural mosaic. People often have a multiple or non-determined identity. Europe no longer has precise cultural or geographic borders. There are forces lined up against this trend. Either they want to subvert it, return Europe to its borders, its Judaeo-Christian and Greek roots or they are heading towards a US-style globalisation.

You may well wonder if there are not other possibilities, other options. Isn't it possible to find a middle way between the emergence of new identities, the erosion of borders and a state- or market-imposed super-identity? I think that the existence and history of Europe show us that such a middle way, unity in plurality and vice-versa is possible, that such a future is possible. It is possible to live in perpetual flux, to carve out an identity in this flux, in the permanent construction, deconstruction and reconstruction of this identity. Such an identity is not necessarily European. But maybe we need to go still further and say that a European identity is not necessarily European or not only European. Europe is not necessarily, not only Europe. Europe is Europe, but Europe is also another, Europe can be found, can refind itself in its identity as well as in its otherness.

My vision of the EU in 2020

IOANNIS KASOULIDES

An observer standing at the beginning of the year 2006 may easily fall in the trap of being pessimistic about the future of the European Union. It is true that the preceding year, with its two rejections of the constitutional treaty by the electorates of founding member states and the difficult negotiations over the community budget for the next seven years, has been a year of crisis.

But crisis is the daily bread of the European construction! The two steps forward one step back dialectic has been the *modus operandi* over the last 50 years. Crisis is always a time of danger but it simultaneously provides an opportunity and challenge to move forward even stronger. In recent years the Union has been at work on three major building sites: Enlargement, the economy and the consolidation of the Euro, and treaty change. There have been successes and strong foundations laid in all fields, but work will continue well into the next decade and will certainly still occupy our agenda in 2020.

ENLARGEMENT

The reunification of the continent has been a tremendous achievement of the Union and the last two years have shown that despite the difficult parameters in the Treaty of Nice, the EU of 25 works and works well. In fact Enlargement, and the political and socio-economic transformation of neighbouring countries before (and after) joining, is in my view the ultimate success of the EU. And here I do not only refer to the Central and Eastern European states but also to older members such as Spain and Greece. Indeed the logic of Enlargement is unstoppable. Once a stable, democratic and prosperous area is established, it is natural for both those inside and outside to wish to continually extend it to cover more neighbours and reap more common benefits.

However, there is a growing tendency in the Union (amongst governments and peoples alike) for the need to have certain limits fixed to this relentless logic. The main reasons are not so much geographic, nor cultural, or even religious. The reason is firstly the Union's 'capacity to absorb', both in terms of the workability and functioning of its institutions and decision-making processes but crucially in terms of finances too. The second reason concerns the widening *vs* deepening debate, or to put it more crudely the quantity *vs* quality of integration.

Arguably it would be very complicated to pursue further political integration with an EU of 35 members, not so much due to problems of speed, but direction. It has often been written that a multi-speed Europe is not a barrier because it already exists (participation in the Euro and Schengen areas are examples). The problem arises not because of variable speeds but rather because of members' variable visions of the final destination. Trying to achieve ever closer union with even more states and, in particular, large and powerful regional players, is nearly

impossible as the identity change and convergence of political visions needed cannot take place in the short or medium term.

It is in this sense therefore that I foresee and support a significant increase in the importance of the European Neighbourhood Policy, and the ability of neighbouring states to have enhanced association agreements that are customised to their needs and political will, so that they can take cooperation to as high a level as possible, if they so desire. This brings us close to the concept of privileged partnerships, which may be particularly relevant to our future relations with Turkey, Ukraine or even the Caucasus for instance.

TURKEY

I was amongst those who did not oppose the beginning of accession negotiations for Turkey. In fact, if there are two countries in the EU in whose strict national interest it is to have Turkey as a full member state, those are Greece and Cyprus. For a Europeanised, democratic and reformed Turkey will inevitably lead to the solution of national questions with neighbouring member states, as well as boost the stability and economy of the whole Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey's candidature naturally offers advantages to the Union as a whole too, whether these stem from its high growth rates and young workforce, the symbolism of having a Muslim country in the EU or the added value it brings with its strategic and military position. Yet the obstacles on the road are daunting: the questions of democracy and the role of the military, the treatment of minorities, the Armenian issue, the occupation of Cyprus, but also the huge size of Turkey and the subsequent impact that would have on the EU.

In this light I fear that, faced with a difficult period of negotiations and radical reforms to its national system and institutions, coupled with the scepticism of some EU governments and peoples to back its candidature, Turkey itself may eventually give up on the idea. Though this is something I personally do not wish for, a privileged relationship like that supported by some countries today, may be a halfway solution in as much as it would allow both the EU and Turkey to make the most of the advantages without many of the risks.

CONSTITUTION

Despite the constitutional project being temporarily frozen during this current period of reflexion, there remain several positive factors. Firstly, we have a text that has been elaborated by a body with much more legitimacy than an intergovernmental conference (IGC) and agreed and signed by 25 governments. Secondly, it has been ratified by a majority of them, including two by referendum, and thirdly, the necessity of most of the institutional changes proposed is acknowledged by all concerned. Whether some parts of the treaty will be implemented by a future IGC, or a modified text will be agreed upon and resubmitted, or the current ratification process will continue at a later stage, remains to be seen.

What is essential is that the basis for future reform is there, and is unlikely to change. In trying to envisage how I would like Europe to function in 2020, the main elements of the constitutional treaty point the way: more power to European citizens through strengthening

the competences of the European Parliament, with co-decision becoming the normal way of legislating, and through increased involvement of national parliaments, amongst others; a more important political voice for Europe internationally with a foreign minister and a diplomatic service.

It is also very likely that by 2020 we may have more than one treaty change. Though the next treaty is likely to be a comprehensive one in terms of clarifying procedures and facilitating decision making, the new rules and policies may well need another revision before 2020. The one constant in our globalising world is change, and the EU should be able to continually adapt itself in order to defend its global interests. But for further treaty changes to be fully supported by all European peoples, we require and should strive for two dynamics: Ownership and Results.

The former will only be brought about by better communication and dialogue with citizens. An upgraded role for national parliaments in the EU process will be useful, but most important of all is for member state governments to own up and be frank about what goes on and what is decided in Brussels. The establishment of Europe-wide mass media, and an effort by local media to look beyond national micro-politics is critical if European citizens are to understand the value of the EU and become familiar with it on a daily basis, and not just during summits or elections.

ECONOMY

Results on the other hand must essentially come in terms of economic and social dividends. This ties in directly with the improvement of the EU's economic performances and the creation of new jobs. Our current efforts in this domain, the Lisbon Strategy, has largely remained on paper so far, but it does provide the framework for governments to implement measures that will shift the economy from manufacturing and traditional production into a knowledge-based and service-oriented economy. It includes many measures that are absolutely necessary but which national governments might not have the political courage to implement on their own, without peer pressure. Spending 3% of GDP on research and development, for instance, will be a serious sacrifice for many member states, but one which will go far in creating more jobs and sustainability. Investing in innovation and technological advances with the establishment of a European Institute of Technology (a larger and decentralised EU version of the MIT), is another such initiative.

The global challenges that we face today and which will inevitably intensify in the future, such as migration pressures from outside Europe, the ageing of the European populations and the rise of India, China and Brazil, among others, as global economic players, make cooperation and concrete action in the economic domain even more urgent. The 'open method of coordination' used in the Lisbon process needs to be extended to other policy domains that are currently outside the community decision making. Moreover, decisions in the area of immigration, both from a judicial and an economic perspective, must be common. Not only can immigration further enrich our multicultural societies, it will also provide answers to our pressing economic and demographic problems.

CONCLUSION

Current features of the international context, such as global terrorism, the self-fulfilling prophecy of the clash of civilisations and the relative divergence in US-EU foreign policy methods, also make the case for more, not less, Europe. But we cannot have more Europe with less money. New member states, both current and future, must be in a position to benefit significantly from cohesion funds in order to consolidate enlargement and cement its success.

Coming from a small member state, the prospect of more Europe is not a threat but on the contrary a safeguard of sovereignty and a more effective means to defend national interests. Though as a European I wholeheartedly support deeper political integration, as a Cypriot I would like to see the deepening and widening reconciled so that Turkey remains as anchored to the EU as possible.

Next year we will celebrate 50 years of the Treaty of Rome. What has been achieved since, common borders, common justice, and a common currency, is remarkable if not miraculous. But the EU is still very young, and 50 years is just a drop in the ocean of European history.

Brussels, March 2006

Europe – the real ‘last great hope’?

MANJA KLEMENČIČ

Europe is sometimes dismissed as a sick old man. It is often thought to suffer in comparison with the more dynamic societies of East Asia and North America. We often hear that its economic model is moribund and needs overhaul towards a more Atlanticist liberal direction. Its ‘soft’ foreign policy is likewise often dismissed as outdated and inadequate in the ‘age of terror’. Many within Europe have come to accept these criticisms as true. If the European model is seen as tottering from such feelings of inadequacy, the latest plebiscite results in Netherlands and France can be seen as yet another powerful blow, perhaps even a death blow, a so-called ‘political tsunami’ or a ‘political disaster’.

It is time to shake off these misgivings and feelings of inadequacy. It is time to remind ourselves that superficial comparisons based on statistics of GDP growth are at best inconclusive and conceal serious social dislocations that we are not and should not be willing to pay in Europe. It is time to remind ourselves that in a world that seems to be increasingly in the grip of simplistic ideologies, that sees a resurgence of militarism, jingoism and religious fanaticism (trends that unfortunately are also visible in the US), Europe has no reason to feel weak, apathetic and irresolute. Why not think of ourselves rather as a bastion of antimilitarism, tolerance and moderation?

Neoliberal critics of the European social model often succeed in presenting themselves as dynamic visionaries and their opponents as reactionaries. This strikes me as getting things the wrong way around. We have enough examples in the world of neoliberalism to witness its side effects in terms of social disequilibrium, crime rates and unequal access to education. By contrast, Europe at its best offers humanity a different vision. Even if it has its problems, this vision works and produces gentler, safer, and more socially equitable societies. The defenders of this European model are the true visionaries.

The European model can perhaps be seen at its best in the Nordic countries which combine dynamic economies with social welfare and protection of the environment through their emphasis on education and research, and a highly-skilled, flexible and independent-minded work-force. The Nordic countries have produced societies that stand comparison with any other region of the world.

A model of development that places emphasis on education, on social and environmental awareness, and on responsibility is also important for non-economic reasons. True democracy is only possible in societies where electorates are well educated, cultured and in which the disparities between rich and poor are not vast. Only such societies are immune to populist jingoism and religious fanaticism. Only in there are elections more than simply choosing which faction of the economic elite gets to rule the country for the next few years.

These reminders should give us Europeans confidence in our model of society. True confidence is, however, not the same as complacent self-glorification. A truly confident person does not

need constantly to tell others how great he or she is. Particularly in dealing with its immediate neighbours, Russia and the Middle East, Europe needs to be alive to the fact that it is often perceived, and not entirely without reason, as patronising. Even our talk of human rights and democracy is often seen as a thinly veiled cultural imperialism. We need to think hard about how to stay true to our values and at the same time not adopt the patronising ideas of a 'mission civilisatrice' or 'white man's burden'. The results of the invasion of Iraq should remind us that easy and populist rhetoric about spreading democracy can make life worse for millions of people and can have unforeseen and disastrous consequences even for our own security. We cannot and should not force any other country to adopt our values, but we can and should expect them to respect our values.

I also do not share the pessimism that gripped many Euroenthusiasts after the referendums in France and Holland. The European ideal is much more than about having or not having a Constitution. Many individual European states do not have constitutions, and if the electorates do not want a constitution then so be it. The European ideal is about forging stronger relationships between European countries. It is about working together, pooling our resources and expanding common opportunities. Once cooperation works and once its benefits become obvious to individual citizens, then their engagement in, and identification with, Europe will increase. We need to show that Europe works and that Europe is a practical necessity, not an abstract and elitist political plan.

Given the present discords among (and even within) the member states on the questions of the EU, little constructive planning as to the further constitutionalisation of the EU can be achieved. In fact, pushing a grand political plan forward before the new member states get fully socialised and some working balance has been regained might do more harm than good to the progress of European integration. For the next decade or so, the European Union should direct its efforts into developing policies and instruments of direct relevance to the citizens where benefits are tangible and directly attributable to the common European efforts.

For example, European mobility programmes for students and researchers certainly are but one of such instruments that have worked extremely well in the past and that make it possible for generations of young Europeans to benefit from opportunities to study or conduct research in other European countries. Programmes supporting and regulating organic farming are not only important from the environmental point of view, but will be immensely appreciated by the increasingly health conscious European consumers. A European drivers' licence which is just on the agenda at this very moment is a concrete and visible instrument of European cooperation. Policies regulating the 'roaming' charges for the mobile phone users when travelling could stop consumers being ripped off by the lack of regulation in this regard. This is just to name a few examples from a vast range of possibilities of tangible benefits the EU has been and can continue to deliver to improve the lives of European citizens.

Apart from focus on such practical deliverables within every area of European cooperation, I believe there are four areas that Europe needs to focus on particularly in the next 15 years. One is boosting investments into European education, science and research and European cooperation in these areas. Reaching the target of 3% of GDP spending in research and

development is politically acknowledged as an important target for the knowledge economy we live in today, but as of now far from being realised across Europe and in EU's own financial perspective. If Europe wishes to protect its distinct social welfare model, maintain environmental protection, and advance social cohesion across Europe while enhancing economic growth and employment, the key viable option for Europe lies in boosting its education sectors at all levels and investing in research and development.

The second focus should be on energy provisions to support our life-styles and our economy in the coming 15 years and beyond. Finding solutions will involve both managing sensitive relationships with the Middle East, Russia and Central Asia, and investing in alternative sources of energy and energy-friendly industries and life-styles. Third and related to the previous, Europe needs to develop region-tailored policies for managing relationships with its immediate neighbours. The current 'all-encompassing' neighbourhood policy does not sufficiently take into account the particularities of the 'special relationships' Europe should develop in a tailor-made manner with Russia, Caucasia, Western Balkans, and the Middle East. Finally, ICTs will in the coming 15 years surely penetrate into every aspect of our daily lives. Unless appropriate measures are taken, new imbalances will be created in our societies between those that are 'on-line' and know how to utilise the vast informational, educational, commercial, e-government opportunities and those for whom these opportunities do not exist. It will be crucial for the European Union to work on policies which will bring easy access to internet into every household in Europe and give training in how to use it effectively, i.e. gather, organise, evaluate, analyse and deploy information obtained through internet.

Having a more practical vision of Europe, rather than having grand plans and visions, is what is most needed at the present. This also means that in our discussion of further enlargement we might need to emphasise the question of practicality and postpone, without necessarily abandoning, more utopian projects of ongoing enlargement. We should of course not shut the door to anyone. We should emphasise, cherish and cultivate our ongoing cooperation with all countries that are at the gates of the European Union. If they wish to be considered for membership, we owe it to them to consider this very carefully, but we also owe it to ourselves to invite them into an entity that functions well.

In order to be able to realise these strategic objectives, financial means will be necessary. It is therefore important that the European member states as soon as possible agree on the future financing of the EU. Indeed, after the difficult negotiation exercise on the new financial perspective, no one is really eager or courageous enough to start this debate. I would hope that one of the upcoming presidencies to the EU will start the process without any illusions that there will be a quick or easy solution. But the question of financing is far too important for the European project to postpone it for too long. It is important for dealing achieving the objectives in education, research, energy and information society stated above. It is also important if we wish to proceed with further enlargement, as we need to be clear on how we will be paying for it. For Europe to work in the future, the debate on the future financing of the Union needs to be taken aboard without any further due.

The practical benefits of the EU have often been eclipsed in the debate by abstract political visions that are often seen, rightly or wrongly, as being imposed from above. We have a duty to show European citizens that the EU makes a difference to their lives; that it opens opportunities and brings benefits. Once this is done then I have confidence enough in the citizens of Europe that they will, as they are already doing, commit to an ever closer, and eventually perhaps larger, Europe.

What developments should take place in the EU by 2020?

LENA KOLARSKA– BOBINSKA

The European Union vested itself with the mission of ensuring peace on its continent, especially in the aftermath of the horrors of the Second World War. Nowadays the issue of peace is less high profile and what is at stake has changed. The European Union has seen its former *raison d'être* disappear without replacing it with others. What's more, the expectations and fears of Europeans have changed markedly. Faced with this new situation, the European Union owes itself to modify its aims, its institutions and the arrangements it has to take action.

1. For the new member states, it is important that the Union is powerful, effective and sticks together. Achieving these goals will only be possible provided that it defines a new mission and new aims to face up to the challenges of the 21st century. Defining these new challenges will enable it to retain its identity and be will be the guiding light for its actions and institutions. This redefinition of its role is essential for citizens who are asking themselves more and more questions about its purpose. The new objectives of the Union should be to ensure the security of Europeans, to promote democracy and the state based on the rule of law both on the continent and for its closest neighbours.

2. The Union must specify its internal workings in view of its end goal. It is therefore important to approve the Constitutional Treaty or a similar document; which will be its basis and, thanks to clearly defined objectives, will prevent the European Union from drifting.

3. A powerful Union is one that is developing in economic terms. It is therefore necessary to continue with the liberalisation of the EU's internal market and to strengthen freedom of competition and innovation. This objective could be supported by a radical reform of the Common Agricultural Policy by redistributing community funds to rural regions.

4. To play a key role in the world, the European Union must define its role and its presence in the globalised world. It is therefore important to set up a Common Foreign and Security Policy. This is a matter of great importance for the new members of the EU who are still concerned about their security. Cooperation with the United States in resolving global problems will be essential.

5. Continuous enlargement of the European Union will work in favour of security and the promotion of democracy in the world. That concerns Turkey and Ukraine above all. They are not just key neighbours in the European Union but also bridgeheads towards other countries and continents. It would also be worth foreseeing a more coherent good neighbour policy, along with more concrete proposals for the countries that are still to join the Union. At the moment there are several general documents, they are not coherent and, above all, they are not applied. It is also important to rapidly create a European Democracy Fund.

6. The Union needs to be more effective in its actions, especially in terms of flexibility and responsiveness. Problems that crop up today will have to be solved by drawing up policies and instruments that are able to kick in simultaneously and implemented by groups of countries

working together??? This concerns demographic issues, energy security, migration and internal and external security. This is why the Union will for example have to draw up a joint migration policy, which would take into account demographic issues as well as the labour market, education, social policy and security.

The Union will have to take part in several global processes. To do so, it must not just introduce economic and political reforms. Ongoing integration of new and old members, mutual awareness and the dispelling of fears??? Are also very important. That means there is a need to create an effective information policy within the European Union.

Europe – twenty years on

LORE LISTRA

Predictions are always a dangerous thing – by believing them too much you run the risk of influencing, though not deliberately, the future so that the prediction comes true. That may be why the ideas on the future of Europe in the press tend to be positive if not extremely optimistic. And this is the case, despite what we know from basic economic theory – we live and do things with limited resources.

Ongoing economic growth on its own will not ensure the well-being of Europeans. Culture, in the most direct sense of the word, sits alongside the economy, perhaps beneath or surrounding it. This is about expressing yourself, managing, worrying and enjoying, eating, ignoring, remembering or, on the contrary, forgetting.

Europe is steeped in culture and different cultures. This diversity is one of Europe's biggest plus points. Diversity in an ecosystem ensures long-term survival in biology. The greater the number of species within this system, the greater the chance that some will survive if there is an accident of some kind. The greater the diversity, the stronger the system. That is also true for culture.

The way you write your address or drink out of your glass, the way you arrange your hotel or cook your bread is part of this diversity to be respected and protected. There is of course a conflict between the interests of industry and culture. Europe must move towards unity while not losing sight of its diversity. Instead of simply gathering around the *Made in EU* brand, we need to sustain and encourage knowledge of this cultural diversity.

Not so long ago European schools had maps of Europe minus Finland and northern Sweden. Knowing the history of the different European regions and opening up Europeans themselves to Europe are major factors in strengthening this diversity.

So-called 'European' values such as solidarity are not a seasonal product (to be remembered when filling out an application or discussing the budget). Solidarity is not just an act of giving, of (re-)distributing. It's also about understanding and respect.

The importance of feeling that you are taking part in the construction of Europe, that you are respected and listened to cannot be underestimated. The truth is that Europe is not made up of new and old countries. The histories and cultures of all these countries have melded together so much over time that it would be impossible to separate one without knocking the whole out of shape.

And what will Europe be like in twenty years? Everything that has been said above will be the natural course of ideas which will shape Europe's daily life.

What developments should take place in the EU by 2020?

PETR PITHART

I. DECISION-MAKING AND THE PACE OF CHANGES

Over the next 15 years, Europe should be changing more slowly than it has during the past 15 years. Between 1989 and 2005, the EU deepened its integration, introduced the Euro as its common currency, and accepted 13 new members in two enlargements. In the dash, Brussels runners did not realize they were breaking away from the popular peloton. Sometimes it's better to pause to debate and even argue than risk a conflict that could throw Europe back to where it was before the Maastricht Treaty.

While trying to reduce the democratic deficit, mindful that it cannot be entirely eliminated, we should always check with Europeans to see what they want and can decide by themselves, whether directly through referendums or via national parliaments. What issues of immediate consequence for their lives do they understand well enough to make a decision, and what decisions are best left to EU institutions?

Europeans will probably not be interested in making decisions about EU institutions and their internal decision-making procedures and rules, because they do not and will not be directly exposed to them. If they want to be asked about anything, then probably about their willingness or unwillingness to show solidarity: whom should they show solidarity toward, why, and how much it is going to cost. In other words, they want to be asked about the redistribution of wealth they have generated.

Decisions to transfer powers from member states to EU bodies are best left to the European Parliament and national parliaments.

II. EU ENLARGEMENT

I will submit that decisions about any future EU enlargements are the easiest to understand, while having the most significant consequences for everyone, and should therefore be as democratic as possible. Yet, no one asked citizens of member states about the last round of enlargement that involved 10 candidate countries. First they heard of a "regatta," then three countries, then five...

A democratically approved enlargement could extend the Union even beyond what is currently called, with a certain degree of ambiguity, "the Europe of values." We must even be prepared that peace and security in the Union may at some point have to take preference over homogeneity of values, but we may not compromise on membership criteria or give anyone binding promises. It may sound like a paradox, but had the Union ever rejected a candidate country or delayed its accession, we would now find it a reassuring proof that the Union is capable of reversing wrong decisions.

Before any future enlargement, we must first make sure that institutional and decision-making structures are ready. Only then can we decide – as democratically as possible, perhaps through referendums – whether citizens of member states wish to proceed with such an enlargement. We need to determine whether they are willing to accept, perhaps for the sake of stability and peace that net contributors will have to contribute more, while some net beneficiaries will receive less or perhaps even become net contributors.

III. SOLIDARITY AND THE DEGREE OF REDISTRIBUTION

The line that divides net contributors from net beneficiaries seems to be critical and decisive. After all, solidarity is the willingness to give or forego, not to receive. In this sense, the fate of the Union will be contingent on the willingness of the more affluent member states to show solidarity.

When it comes to decisions about redistribution or now the “financial perspective,” the European Parliament should be given more weight than member states, because there is always a parliamentary election in one member state or another to make those decisions difficult. The European Parliament needs more clout. If it becomes clear that the EP will decide how much money one pays and another receives, more people will participate in European elections.

Although I will shy away from speaking of enemies, such solidarity can hardly be conceived without a clear source of threat. Europe will become aware of itself and its particular interests only if it can define itself in relation to the rest of the world, without necessarily defining itself in opposition to a particular enemy.

Once such a threat materializes, we must continue insisting on European values and the European way of life. We should not try to compete with the economic productivity of countries such as China and even the US, whose way of life and priorities we do not want and are not in a position to embrace. The goals of the Lisbon strategy were not acceptable. The point is not to “catch up and exceed.” The point is to cultivate what matters to us as Europeans. What do I think that is or should be? Culture and education that nurtures rather than only passes on information or produces experts; care for the disadvantaged through a reasonable welfare state; the individuality of nations and regions; the cultivation of the European landscape – as the Common Agricultural Policy is being dismantled, we need to consider our landscape an important part of European identity.

IV. COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

That is, among others, why we need to have a common foreign and security policy. The Union should spare no effort in pursuing a common foreign policy while remaining aware that it will be a slow process and it will not always work out. We have to brace ourselves for failures. It’s never an all-or-nothing game. Still, it has to be unanimous.

Nor should the Union spare any effort in pursuing a common security policy, covering police, prosecutors, the judiciary, criminal law, migration, and asylum law. In these areas, however,

we cannot require unanimity. As soon as the EU starts losing its battle with organized crime and terrorism, everyone will go off on their own, leaving the EU to water down to its eventual demise.

V. COMMUNICATION CHALLENGES

The language used by EU institutions and officials and taken over by mass media unnecessarily alienates the EU from the people. Every jargon serves only the initiated. Hundreds of acronyms that no one cares to explain, names of Treaties based on where they were concluded mean nothing to most people. All that makes people feel that they do not matter and should keep to themselves. Such an attitude of exclusivity comes across as arrogance.

We also need to bear in mind that some words have different meanings across Europe. In some places, they are liked; in others, they are not. The Treaty establishing a constitution for Europe has mostly been called a "Constitution," though in many linguistic contexts a constitution relates only to a country. Similarly, the word "federation" is understood differently in Central and Eastern Europe, namely as a notorious failure to deal with national issues, while nations are viewed in ethnic rather than political terms. After all, the term "nation state" means different things in different historical and semantic contexts.

The language of the Treaty establishing a constitution for Europe was unacceptable. Some passages were pompous, other bureaucratically dry, while the Preamble gush arrogant French rationalism and Euro-centrism. EU bodies have to work with better writers who can not only accurately render key EU texts in national languages but do so in an appealing voice.

A Europe of Law

PAULS RAUDSEPS

In the summer of 2004 my family and I made a pilgrimage to what might well be called one of the great pan-European celebrations of national sentiment – the European football championship. That summer the event took place in Portugal and the Latvian national team, having stunned the Turkish team both in Riga and Istanbul, had qualified for the tournament. It was, quite possibly, a once in a lifetime event for a country never known as a football powerhouse, and we had to be there.

It was a trip made under the sign of European integration. Only a few months before Latvia had become a full member of the European Union, and this was our chance to get to know our Western partners. We took a ferry from Riga to Lübeck, then drove south through Germany, down the Rhone valley to Provence, then along the Mediterranean coast to Barcelona and across Spain to Portugal. Having spent a week watching the football matches, we made our way back, sticking closer to the Atlantic – through Galicia, the Basque country, Bordeaux, the Loire valley, Luxembourg and finally to Lübeck for a quiet ferry ride back to Latvia.

It was a wonderful trip and we were glad to see that many of the people we met were happy and curious to talk to these tourists from one of the new member states. Yet one of the enduring impressions of the trip were the signs, both large and small, that far from being integrated in some larger European identity, many parts of the continent have yet to embrace even the nation-states of which they are a part. You could see that in the poem written in Provençal hanging on the wall of an inn not far from Avignon; on a road sign on the Spanish-Portuguese border, where the word “España” had been painted over and a rough-edged “Galicia” sprayed onto the sign’s blue background and ring of golden stars; in the Basque country, where a massive security operation accompanied the arrival of a minister from Madrid to Vitoria-Gasteiz and the police stations in the small villages in the Pyrenees are protected by high barbed-wire fences; in eastern Belgium, where “Lüttich” is sprayed over the name Liège on road signs; and in Münster, where a loud celebration broke out in the center of town when Portugal beat England in the quarterfinals of the championship we had left behind a week ago, half-a-continent away.

These were curious things to see for someone from a country which is often perceived by outsiders as being racked by ethnic tension, but where one is hard-pressed to find so many outward signs of it as I saw on my trip through the West. Yet, in a surprising way, it was precisely these observations that strengthened and deepened my conviction of the vital importance of the European project, if it is understood in the right way.

Of late one often hears the proposition that the original purpose of the European project – to prevent conflict in our continent – has lost its salience and that Europe must search for some new idea to give it meaning and relevance in the twenty-first century. Not infrequently it is suggested that this new project must be the construction of some rather vaguely defined political entity that will make the European Union a major player on the global stage,

comparable to the United States of America. Yet, while this goal may have a certain appeal to some national elites within Europe, I would argue that it is at best a distraction and at worst a hindrance to the real work of Europe, which is still and will be for the foreseeable future the prevention of conflicts within our continent, not the projection of force outside of it.

Ethnic groups with a sense of discrete identity are not about to disappear – if the Romans could not assimilate the Basques two thousand years ago, then none of the modern European nationalities with firmly entrenched educational systems will lose their sense of self in the coming hundreds of years. The presence of large, socially isolated Muslim populations in a number of European countries only compounds the problem of creating a real sense of common European identity that would be the main locus of its citizens' loyalty. Nor are nation-states about to give up the core ability to defend their national security. Under what circumstances can we imagine Great Britain or France ceding control of their nuclear arsenals to some pan-European institution? The elements of communal tension I noted on my trip are perhaps not the most important hindrances to European integration, yet they do highlight the continued fragmentation of identities in Europe, the lack of a common polity which is a precondition for a strong state, and, most importantly, the almost elemental nature of communal identity and friction as a feature of the human condition.

Yet, if there is no over-arching emotional sense of common European identity, I would argue that all the countries in the EU and the vast majority of their citizenries do share a commitment to the same political values, among which I would single out the rule of law as the most important for the European project. It is the rule of law which protects the peace, regulates the conflicts inherent in human societies, and creates the framework both for the enjoyment of human rights and the growth of prosperity. It is ideal of the rule of law which, inherited from the Romans, has for over two thousand years been at the basis of European civilization. Any state that is willing to enter into such a "social contract" with other like-minded states, ceding part of its freedom/sovereignty in exchange for the stability and security of being part of a mechanism that resolves conflicts peacefully and with an eye to the common good, is "European" in the sense that matters most – in its adherence to a set of political values.

The European Union must be open to all states that accept these values. As a matter of principle this is so, because these values are the only measures by which a state can be objectively judged to belong to Europe and because using them as a reference point disposes of any kind of Christian chauvinism, prejudice or racism in the decisions on EU membership, bringing the debates on expansion into line with Europe's claims to be a champion of human rights. But the arguments are equally strong when looked at pragmatically, because the attraction of belonging to the European Union and the concrete steps necessary to bring these political and legal values to life in the states neighboring the EU is a powerful force for stability, enhancing the security of the member states even as it helps neighboring states in their struggle to modernize. No state can be forced to take these steps, but it is my hope that by 2020 the Balkan countries will have joined the Union, Turkey, if it is not already in, will be on the verge of joining, and Ukraine and Moldova will be in the process of negotiation. The

decision-making procedures for the Union will have been streamlined, but the focus of the Union's policies will be to deepen and strengthen the four freedoms – of movement of goods, capital, services and people. European states will cooperate closely in implementing policies in areas where their interests coincide, perhaps, say, in the field of energy policy, and will exhibit solidarity vis-à-vis the rest of the world if the vital interests of a member state are involved, but will not waste time trying to develop common policies in every field of endeavor if the pursuit by one member state of its interests does not do active harm to another member state. In short, while falling short of a grand vision of a United States of Europe, the EU in fifteen years will hopefully have looked in the mirror and recognized what it in fact is: a collection of states that agree to regulate their relations by negotiations and compromise within a framework of law. This is a model that Europe can proudly present to the world.

Vision of Europe. The EU in 2020: What developments should take place in the EU by 2020 ?

GINTARAS STEPONAVIČIUS

What the European Union will look like in 2020 is unclear. This is mainly because we are in the process of discussing what kind of EU we want and are ready to create. This is a very important task for politicians. Unfortunately, we have failed to provide an understandable and attractive European Constitution for our citizens. We are discussing the financial perspectives, further enlargement, the Lisbon Strategy, multi-speed Europe and other issues. Our decisions today and tomorrow will be fundamental steps towards the European Union of the year 2020.

I would therefore like to base my forecast for the EU in 2020 on several factors. My main point is that if we fail to implement some crucial reforms today, we will see the decline of the European Union as an organisation that is effective in making decisions and supported by our citizens. There are some key decisions to be taken if we want to see the EU in 2020 as having taken a step forwards. The target to strive for is a smooth functioning European Union based on mutual understanding. I see the future EU first of all as an entity which is able to make political decisions to spur economic growth and dynamism. These are decisions that would strengthen the European Union as a major player on the world stage, capable of competing with other regions of the world.

However, today we often feel that the EU does not in reality live up to expectations that were raised during the stressful period of our accession negotiations. Slow economic growth, a common foreign policy still 'under construction', ineffective institutions and endless decision-making procedures plus a lack of a common identity as a 'European citizen' are just a few things to mention.

The risk of political collapse is one of the major challenges for the European Union in the coming decades. The Union has been falling apart for some time. The fact that different political interests are pulling in different directions is a great danger. A long-term agreement, not a vague compromise regarding the priorities and allocation of the Union's budgetary resources, must be reached. I was inspired by the ideas of the Belgian liberal Prime Minister Mr. Verhofstadt's vision of a federal Europe, but I do not think that the political structure of the Union is important. It is the long-term strategy and the will to follow it that are important. Yes, I dare to be straightforward and openly say that the Common Agricultural Policy must be either abolished or radically reformed, with its resources invested in research and development and other fields that would help us tackle the challenges of the 21st century. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is a relic of an agriculture-based economy, which I do not believe the European Union is any more. The Union must liberalise agricultural trade and free up CAP resources for other areas. If that does not happen in the two coming financial perspectives, our European Union in 2020 will lag behind not only the United States and Japan but also China and India. I perfectly understand that it is not an easy task for politicians to leave agriculture standing on its own two feet, but it is a matter of survival for the EU project.

The fact that countries will never give up their national sovereignty is the reason for the current confusion. No country is willing to sign up to a foreign or defence policy that does not entirely represent its interests. No country is willing to have its national laws trumped by lawmakers in Brussels. I would rather say that on the European level we would do better to concentrate and work on the issues that we all agree on, first of all on promoting economic growth and completion of the common market. With its unnecessary political ambitions set aside, the Union will successfully operate as a free trade area. However 'success' in the European economy is a relative term. Substantial changes in the labour market, bureaucracy and social welfare systems will need to be brought about before Europe can even hope to attain the growth level of the United States. The ageing of EU member states' populations is a looming economic problem. Most European countries are experiencing low or even negative population growth. European economic prosperity will simply not be reached until major structural reforms are implemented by national leaders. And they have to be strong and courageous leaders to implement them.

The Lisbon Strategy targets have not been achieved. The goals of the Lisbon Strategy are on the brink of failure. In 2020 the European Union will have a different strategy aiming to achieve only several very specific objectives. These could include economic growth, dealing with demographic problems, ensuring energy resources, development, etc.

On the foreign relations front, there is one key issue, very clear for us in the Baltics: Russia, whose relations with the Union are tenuous. Russia is one of the external forces that could make Europe behave like a lost child. I believe this issue will persist as a challenge throughout the next decade. By 2020 some Balkan states will have joined the club, and we would be talking of the EU-30. In general, the political arena will see the Union react to external challenges, global competition, and threats of a global and regional nature rather than see much change in terms of movement of its labour force within the EU or the redistribution of the structural funds.

I am not optimistic about what I expect the Union to look like in 2020. . In the year 2020 it will be coping with the leftovers of the 20th century, such as the trade-off between the so-called 'European social model' and competitiveness in global markets, the friction between hi-tech/knowledge economy and the agricultural sector etc. This is because my vision is prejudiced by my disappointment with current European affairs, e.g. the debate surrounding the Bolkestein Directive. However, as strange as it may seem, I am an optimist myself. I believe that at least some of the current newcomers (Lithuania among them) in the year 2020 will be as good and developed as some of the less economically dynamic founding countries. I am sure that there will be no tax or social policy harmonisation by 2020 and that this will allow some states to keep these as incentives for economic growth and development. I presume that the dangers and malfunctioning of the EU we face today are all clear to all the politicians of the EU, irrespective of whether they live near the Mediterranean or the Baltic Sea. We share the same future and are we all optimistic about it. So it is our responsibility to tackle the challenges of today in order to have the EU that fulfils our expectations in 2020.

Thesis: The crisis we are experiencing is one relating to the condition of the Europeans rather than to the condition of the European Union institutions

ELŻBIETA SKOTNICKA – ILLASIEWICZ

1. In the post-war period, politicians preoccupied with laying the foundations of the present-day European Union did not listen too carefully to public opinion. Bearing in mind that war-time divisions were fresh in the memory, if they had done so they would probably not have laid the foundations for security that we currently share. Jacques Delors's assessment was that, after Maastricht, the mild despotism of politicians of the mid twentieth century was replaced by the brutal despotism of public opinion in the early twenty first century. The collapse of the ratification process for the Treaty establishing a new Constitution for Europe served as a particularly clear reminder of this point, just as the previously ignored signals relating to the ratification of the Maastricht or Nice Treaties had done.
2. EU integration is a dynamic process, proceeding within frameworks delineated by the provisions of one Treaty after another. At the same time, the final form that it aims at continues to be open-ended and underdefined – which lies perhaps at its very essence. One might assume that an indispensable attribute of the Union's vitality is imagination. By imagination is meant in particular the political imagination of the Union's politicians, which lies behind the establishment of more objectives that mark the next stages of the process of uniting the continent. The Union is a process created by the people and for the people. Its future will be determined by whether inhabitants of the geographic area of the Union are and will be spectators of or active players in this process, whether they will still have sufficient imagination to – if not co-create - at least show the ability and willingness to adapt to the necessary changes. A question arises as to how – while increasing the range of democratic participation of a majority of the Union's citizens in decisions concerning the present or the future – to reduce the growing social disinclination to approve of new goals and tasks, a reluctance that extinguishes any dynamism and leads to stagnation or at least places obstacles in the path of this process. There is plenty to suggest that the success of the European project, consisting of building the feeling of being politically, economically and psychologically safe among the Union's citizens, may become a threat to its vitality. What has been achieved so far is taken by most Europeans for granted. Their awareness of having a secure future does not make them feel inclined to search for or approve of new ideas, which might make this process more dynamic, but tends to make them feel inclined to consolidate what has been already achieved. There are vast areas of society with less and less of an ability to adapt to a 'change' that might undermine the status quo of the welfare that they currently have.

3. The debate that took place in the run-up to the Constitutional Treaty's ratification process and that then followed once the ratification process had been 'suspended' is not just a debate about the future of the Union. It is also a debate about what unites and what divides Europeans, a debate about how much imagination we have, our ability to adapt to change, ie a debate about the condition not just of Union institutions but also about the condition of Europeans themselves. The debate provides an opportunity to shed light on the real but as yet undisclosed social notion of the reasons for as well as the aim and meaning of the project to unite the European continent, but also on the maturity of Europeans in following up on this project. In 2005 this project is significantly different from the one formulated half a century ago.
4. Maintaining a dynamic process that provides the framework for the Union's development requires constant efforts to redefine our notions of the Union, notions of the place each of us and each of our countries hold in this mosaic of interests and values, experiences, traditions and cultures. It is difficult to do this in practice, requiring considerable effort and sometimes forcing us to make painful reassessments of self-esteem in the context of the changing Union environment. The countries that less than a year ago completed the major step of 'learning about the Union' have recently learnt this lesson, in contrast to those that never aspired to membership or for existing members for whom the hardships of this learning curve were wiped from their memories a long time ago. This explains why Poland and most countries who have not been members for long are relatively more open to changes and more prepared to set and attain new goals.
5. The current crisis within the Union has largely come about because of a clash between two dominant visions in the EU. The division between the supporters of these two visions lies not between countries that have been members for different lengths of time but rather within each EU-25 country. The first vision sees Europe as a horizontally structured configuration of civil societies with considerable potential to work together. The second one sees Europe as a vertical configuration of graduated interdependencies of ethnic communities with high dominance potential. The first vision ties in with the idea of uniting the European continent as formulated by the founders of the European project while the second one is closer to nineteenth century concepts of the European political order and continues to dominate in countries either that still harbour imperial memories or those that do not aspire to join the Union.
6. The "cooperative vision" stems from the well-grounded conviction of the positive outcomes of the integration project as an optimal formula for the co-existence of the nations of the European continent. The broad spectrum of opinions that approve of this model is dominated by arguments about modernisation epitomised in a directive for further economic liberalisation, openness to the processes of globalisation, a limited role for the nation state as a whole and in terms of the social welfare that it

provides the citizen with. This vision is definitely closer to the hearts of the supporters of the Union's federalisation and the creation of Community policies. The diversified opinions presenting the views encompassed by this option are dominated by a pragmatic set of arguments focusing more on interests than values, pointing to economic and civilisational goals and tasks. In this model, the goals of modernisation are achieved in accordance with the principles of meritocracy and are regulated via negotiations rather than fighting, partnerships rather than orders or commands. But the goals are implemented in the form of a race or competition where the strongest is the most successful while marginalising vast segments of society, which have limited capacity to adapt to overly rapid change. It is such groups out of which opponents of new ideas or concepts emerge and it was due to them that the referendums on the Constitution were rejected, despite widely expressed support for the Union.

7. The 'dominance' concept goes hand in hand with a vision of the Union as a 'fatherland' of all fatherlands grouping nation states, identified by the historical process of natural bonds developed through relationships as well as shared traditions, culture and history. The interests of individuals and groups must be subordinated to communities understood in this way. An individual or group that does not respect these tenets is perceived as an alien, as "them". Any structure that might pose a threat to the integrity of the community understood in this way is perceived in a similar way. Appeals to the emotions predominate over appeals to arguments or pragmatic economic interests in this relationship. Nation states have either dominant or subordinate relationships with one another. The ability to impose and enforce one's own will or - at least - to defend oneself against the dominance of others, determines the 'dominance potential' of the community and is a major goal of its policy. The vision of Europe derived from this perception of the world must lead (in extreme versions present in nationalistic parties active in all member states) to the concept of European integration being challenged.
8. In all member states, including Poland, both among political elites and public opinion, these two concepts are still present and, depending on current events or on which political option comes to prominence, surface with varying intensity, either hampering or invigorating both attitudes towards the Union in a particular country and changes across the entire Union.
9. A strategy to build the Union's future must allow for elements of both these visions. Adopting the co-operation-modernisation vision could end up leading to a collapse in the legitimacy of the Union institutions with citizens unable to follow the change and as a result - to the stagnation or disintegration of the process. The direction of the Union as the 'fatherland' of all fatherlands cannot be maintained since narrowly understood national interests will block any initiatives aimed at deepening integration within the Union as well as the expansion of its borders to cover the

more and more neglected - in economic terms - states of eastern and southern Europe.

10. To meet the challenge of formulating a vision of the European Union in 2020, let us try to assess what the past 15 years have given not to the Union, but to Europe. This might help us better assess what the forthcoming years can provide for us if we manage to maintain the dynamics of this process. There is no doubt whatsoever that the main ideological goal of the founding fathers has come about - the goal of rebuilding almost the entire territory of Europe as it was before the traumatic experiences of the war. This reconstruction was based on the values that seemed at risk at the beginning of the project. The task of expanding the area of security on the European continent was accomplished from the political, economic and psychological points of view. The activity of the Union's institutions has increased in the past 15 years and can be measured by the number of summits held and treaties signed as well as the number of member states and EU citizens. The Union was given a boost by dynamic societies aspiring to join the Union at the time when it seemed that everything was "said and done", that the dynamics of the process might grind to a halt. New member states went through an inconceivably difficult transformation in many aspects (psychological, political, economic) and thereby gained some invaluable training in how to adapt, "covering a distance" in recent years that seemed impossible for them to cover just fifteen years ago. The experiences of the Central European and Baltic states helped them develop a permanent openness to change, which will support the Union in deciding on new goals and new horizons not only for itself but also for Europe as a whole, including the countries currently experiencing difficulties in their respective transformations. The prospect of joining the EU (which was not so obvious for Poland until the mid-nineties) was a decisive factor supporting systemic transformations. Such a prospect is also needed by other Europeans. Whether they become Union members or not will depend on fate and history, on their willingness and ability to make the required efforts and on us - Européens de l'Union - making an effort not just as spectators but as partners supporting them. The crisis we are currently experiencing does not concern Union institutions, which operate smoothly. The crisis concerns us, EU citizens, who have lost faith in the meaning of the European project once the dream of bringing down the barriers of the post-Yalta division had come true. This faith must be and will be restored. We will then have to thank the French and Dutch for forcing us - before it was too late - to think about what comes next for the Union, what comes next for Europe.

Warsaw, 12.01.2006

Visions of Europe in 2020

MIKLOS SZABÓ

It is common in Hungary for Hungarians to think that Hungary has always been part of Europe and that Hungarians have therefore always been Europeans and continue to be so. For 150 years, the Magyars acted as a bulwark protecting Europe from the expansion of the Ottoman empire. In 1956 they were the first to cast doubt on the invincibility of Soviet imperialism and it was them again that hauled down the first brick in the Berlin Wall.

In truth, this line of argument only serves to feed national pride. We understood that after 1990, in a period which led up to our joining the European Union – although in a (economically) second-class capacity. The euphoria of joining has been somewhat dampened for many of us by the consequences of the economic crisis that seems to be going hand in hand with the current phase of globalisation, as well as by the slowing down of the European Constitutional process. But, in spite of everything, we analyse how things stand for us and we can envisage the future from a European viewpoint – even though it will be harder for us to catch up with Europe than predicted. But we have no other alternative.

The first major step of the future that we now share with our European partners will be to continue EU enlargement, with Romania and Bulgaria joining, then Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia plus Serbia a little later and possibly Albania. That is where I see the limits of enlargement. But this is probably not my fault. The problem is that the determination of the founding fathers of the Union seems to have run out of steam... Nonetheless, the birth of a Europe of 27, then a Europe of 30, will have symbolic value. The people of central Europe, separated and set against each other by world wars, will finally be able to hold out their hands to each other. Mistrust and disagreement will gradually be replaced by trust and co-operation. Along the lines of the Franco-German reconciliation, the new generation of Hungarians, despite being deeply hurt by the Treaty of Trianon, no longer fears investing in Slovakia or Romania. Another positive sign is that the new regions, which are being built perhaps a little too slowly, tend to ignore the borders of current states. The Union will be able to make Europe a haven of peace. And that would be an extraordinary thing, a huge step forward.

Once the borders have disappeared, permeability and mobility will become the economic and intellectual driving force of Europe. But to get there we will of course need to get rid of some 'taboos' which currently hold sway in job searching, choosing where to live and even buying land. There is also a need to make the use of the single currency, the euro, more widespread. This of course raises the problem of the management of conflicting economic interests, as well as the possible problem of the rich countries making a sacrifice. The idea of a 'two-speed' Europe is not acceptable – that would make a mockery of integration. The question is therefore to understand what stands in the way of a united Europe adopting a federal system in the real sense of the word. We're talking, above all, about the lack of a European Constitution. We have a common interest in finding a solution to this problem as quickly as possible.

As a university professor and researcher, I can only hope that within a few years the European 'area' or network of higher education and research will become a reality and that the compatibility of institutions will not be based only on the formal criteria advocated as part of the Bologna process but also on criteria tied up with essential aspects of our activities. This is absolutely essential for the creation of a teaching and research structure capable of keeping in Europe the creative brains that come out of our universities. Failing that, the old continent will stand no chance of keeping pace with the US or the Far East in basic research and innovation.

Finally, I am convinced that, whilst keeping their linguistic and cultural identity, the nations of the European Union will be able in the 21st century to produce works worthy of the most extraordinary masterpieces of our common past.

Budapest, 5 January 2006

PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED “EUROPEAN ISSUES”

Available on Notre Europe Website

- Sense and Flexibility – Striking a Balance between Sovereignty and Harmonisation in the Implementation of the EU ETS
Stephen Boucher, University of Columbia Workshop on EU ETS – Available in English (May 2006)
- The Question of European Identity
Arliz Gouez, Marjorie Jouen, Nadège Chambon (January 2006)
- Report on East Asian Integration: Opportunities and Obstacles for Enhanced Economic Cooperation
Co-ordinated by Heribert Dieter, With Contributions from Jean-Christophe Defraigne, Heribert Dieter, Richard Higgott and Pascal Lamy
- An Honest Broker in Difficult Times: Austria’s Presidency of the EU
Sonja Puntischer-Riekman, Isabella Eiselt and Monika Mokre – Available in French, English and German (December 2005).
- The European Constitution and deliberation: the example of Deliberative focus groups ahead of the French Referendum of 29 May 2005.
Henri Monceau – Available in French and English (November 2005)
- The French “no” vote on May 29, 2005: understand, act.
Gaëtane Ricard-Nihoul – Available in French, English and German (October 2005)
- Defining a new European Social Contract
Marjorie Jouen and Catherine Palpent – Available in French and English (September 2005)
- The best laid plans: Britain’s Presidency of the Council of European Union
Anand Menon and Paul Riseborough – Available in English (June 2005).
- European Budget: the poisonous budget rebate debate
Jacques Le Cacheux – Available in French and English (June 2005).
- Analysis of European Elections (June 2004)
Céline Belot et Bruno Cautrès – Available in French (June 2005).
- Why they wanted Europe: A call of 12 French Pioneers of European integration
Jean-Louis Arnaud – Available in French (May 2005).

- Ratification and revision of the Constitutional Treaty
Henri Oberdorff – Available in French (May 2005).
- Luxembourg at the Helm; experience, determination and self denial
Mario Hirsch – Available in French and English (December 2004).
- A driving force despite everything: Franco-German relations and the Enlarged European Union
Martin Koopmann – Available in French and English (November 2004).
- Europe and its Think tanks: a promise to be fulfilled
Stephen Boucher, Benjamin Hobbs, Juliette Ebelé, Charlotte Laigle, Michele Poletto, Diego Cattaneo, Radoslaw Wegrzyn – Available in French and English (October 2004).
- A view from outside: the franco-german couple as seen by their partners
Matt Browne, Carlos Closa, Soren Dosenrode, Franciszek Draus, Philippe de Schoutheete, Jeremy Shapiro – Available in French and English (April 2004).
- Leading from behind: Britain and the European constitutional treaty
Anand Menon – Available in French and English (January 2004).
- US attitudes towards Europe: a shift of paradigms?
Timo Behr – Available in French and English (November 2003).
- Giving euro-Mediterranean cooperation a breath of fresh air
Bénédicte Suzan) – Available in French (October 2003).
- Italy and Europe 2003 presidency
Roberto Di Quirico – Available in French, English and Italian (July 2003).
- European attitudes towards transatlantic relations 2000-2003: an analytical survey
Anand Menon and Jonathan Lipkin – Available in French and English (june 2003).
- Large and small member states in the European Union: reinventing the balance (Paul Magnoste and Kalypso Nicoláidis) Available in French and English (May 2003).
- Enlargement and Investment in Central and Eastern Europe
Bérénice Picciotto – Available in French and English (May 2003)
- The institutional architecture of the European Union: a third Franco-German way?
Renaud Dehousse, Andreas Maurer, Jean Nestor, Jean-Louis Quermonne and Joachim Schild – Available in French and English (April 2003).

- A new mechanism of enhanced co-operation for the Enlarged Union
Eric Philippart – Available in French and English (March 2003).
- Greece, the European Union and 2003 Presidency
George Pagoulatos – Available in French and English (December 2002).
- The question of the European government
Jean-Louis Quermonne – Available in French and English (November 2002).
- The European Council
Philippe de Schoutheete and Helen Wallace – Available in French and English (September 2002).
- Multilevel government in three Eastern and Central European candidate countries:
Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic (1990-2001)
Michal Illner – Available in French and English (June 2002).
- The Domestic basis of Spanish European Policy and the 2002 Presidency
Carlos Closa – Available in French, English and Spanish (December 2001)
- The Convention of a Charter of Fundamental Rights: a method for the future?
Florence Deloche-Gaudez – Available in French and English (December 2001).
- The federal approach to the European Union or the quest for an unprecedented European federalism
Dusan Sidjanski – Available in French, English and German (July 2001).
- The Belgian Presidency 2001
Lieven de Winter and Huri Türsan – Available in French and English (June 2001).
- The European debate in Sweden
Olof Petersson – Available in French, English and Swedish (December 2000).
- An enlargement unlike the others ... Study of the specific features of the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe
Franciszek Draus – Available in French, English and German (November 2000).
- The French and Europe: the state of the European debate at the beginning of the French presidency
Jean-Louis Arnaud – Available in French, English and German (July 2000).
- Portugal 2000: the European way
Alvaro de Vasconcelos – Available in French, English and Portuguese (January 2000).

- The Finnish debate on the European Union
Esa Stenberg – Available in French, English and Finnish (August 1999).
- The American Federal Reserve System: functioning and accountability
Axel Krause – Available in French, English and German (April 1999).
- Making EMU work
partnership Notre Europe and Centro European Ricerche – Available in French, English, Italian and German (March 1999).
- The intellectual debate in Britain on the European Union
Stephen George – Available in French, English and German (October 1998).
- Britain and the new European agenda
Centre for European Reform, Lionel Barber – Available in French, English and German (April 1998).
- Social Europe, history and current state of play
(Jean-Louis Arnaud) Available in French and English (July 1997).
- Reinforced cooperation: placebo rather than panacea
Françoise de la Serre and Helen Wallace – Available in French, English and German (September 1997).
- The growth deficit and unemployment: the cost of non-cooperation
Pierre-Alain Muet – Available in French, English and German (April 1997).

Study available in French and English free on charge on *Notre Europe's* Website www.notre-europe.asso.fr



Education & Culture

With the support of the European Commission: support to active entities at European level in the field of active European citizenship.

Neither the European Commission nor *Notre Europe* is to be held responsible for the manner in which the information in this text may be used.

This may be reproduced if the source is cited.

© Notre Europe, June 2006