DESIGNING A EUROPEAN FISCAL UNION: LESSONS FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF FISCAL FEDERATIONS

A Map of Relations between Central and Subnational Fiscal Authorities

A conference organized by the Ministry of Economy and Finance of France and the Fiscal Affairs Department of the IMF Paris, September 10, 2013

The Great Recession has brought to the fore the question of the role of central governments in countries with a decentralized fiscal framework. Attention has focused, in particular, on the instruments they can use to safeguard macroeconomic stability and more specifically, the sustainability of public finances. A study of the practices of thirteen federations across the world, of different size and income level, helps shed light on this critical policy issue. The insights can be of interest for the European Union, that although not a federation, faces challenges that closely mirror those faced by the central and subnational government levels in federations—and where the move to more intense forms of fiscal integration is the source of an active debate.

| C. Lagarde, Managing Director, IMF 10:00-11:15 am To Centralize or Not to Centralize: The Distribution of Fiscal Responsable Federations. Notwithstanding the benefits of decentralization, key fiscal allocated to the center. In practice, what functions do federal government what if the typical size of the central budget? When fiscal policies are decentrally harmonized across levels and regions—and if yes, how? And when the contral budget is the central budget is the central budget. | al functions are nts retain and hence, ecentralized, are they |
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| allocated to the center. In practice, what functions do federal government what if the typical size of the central budget? When fiscal policies are de usually harmonized across levels and regions—and if yes, how? And wh | nts retain and hence, ecentralized, are they |
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| usually harmonized across levels and regions—and if yes, how? And wh | |
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| from the federal to the subnational governments typically play? | nat role do transfers |
| from the federal to the subnational governments typically play? *Presentation: M. Guerguil (IMF) | |
| Discussants: M. Bordignon (UNICATT), A. Fatas (INSEAD) | |
| 11:15-11:30 am Coffee break | |
| 11:30-12:45 pm To Constrain or Not to Constrain: Institutional Arrangements across | ss Levels of |
| Government. Because the vertical structure of the government can raise | |
| bailout expectations, fiscal federations often introduce explicit institution | |
| ensure that fiscal policies at different levels of government are mutually | |
| types of arrangements are most frequently used, what degree of constrain | |
| and how effective have they been? Do matching arrangements exist at the | ne procedural level? |
| Have practices evolved over time? Presentation: L. Eyraud (IMF) | |
| Discussants: D. Sutherland (OECD), C. Wyplosz (Graduate Institute) |) |
| 12:45-1:45 pm Lunch | <u>'</u> |
| 1:45-3:00 pm Below the Line: Subnational Debt and Subnational Debt Crises. Con | mmon borrowing by |
| the central and subnational governments is unusual in federations, but fire | |
| exist across government levels. What form do they take and how do they | |
| cost of subnational debt? What have central governments done when sub | bnational entities |
| have faced financing difficulties? What arrangements exist to prevent an | nd resolve such |
| problems? | |
| Presentation: M. Moreno-Badia (IMF) | ******\ |
| Discussants: R. Beetsma (University of Amsterdam), T. Philippon (NY | YU) |
| 3:00-3:15 pm Coffee break 3:15-4:30 pm Lessons from the Crisis: Minimal Elements for a Fiscal Union in the | E-ma Amas The |
| 3:15-4:30 pm Lessons from the Crisis: Minimal Elements for a Fiscal Union in the crisis has revealed critical gaps in the functioning of the European Mone | |
| are these gaps? What role can deeper fiscal integration play in correcting | |
| weaknesses in the system? What are the minimal elements of a fiscal ur | |
| reduce the incidence and severity of future crises? | |
| Presentation: C. Allard (IMF) | |
| Discussants: V. Gaspar (Bank of Portugal), R. Strauch (ESM) | |
| 4:30-6:00 pm Looking Forward: Insights for the European Union and Beyond. The | |
| fiscal federations reveal some regularities but also recurrent challenges a | |
| offs. What lessons can be drawn that would minimize future risks to fisc | |
| Can these experiences shed some light on the path to fiscal integration in | n tne European |
| Union? Panel discussion: M. Buti (EC), C. Cottarelli (IMF), R. Fernandez (Fr. | anca) |
| C. Monticelli (Italy), J. Moran (Ireland), T. Steffen (Germany) | инсе <i>)</i> , |
| Chair: A. Vitorino (Notre Europe) | |
| 6:00-6:15 pm Concluding Remarks | |