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EUROPEAN ATTITIUDES TOWARDS TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS 2000-2003: AN ANALYTICAL SURVEY

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We wanted to contribute to the distribution of this text which is an enlightening contribution to the current debate on transatlantic relations. Note Europe would like to thank the Greek presidency for having authorised this diffusion and its translation into French. We are also grateful to Chris Patten, European Commissioner for External Relations, for having agreed to present this work.

Foreword

How Europe relates to the world's superpower is the most important single issue for our foreign policy. The EU and the Unites States really are the "indispensable partnership". It would be hard to exaggerate how much depends – not just for Europe but for the world - on getting the relationship right.

Yet, since the foundation of the Community, transatlantic relations have been a fault line running through Europe. Is Europe being built *with* America or against her? Should dedication to the European cause be measured by opposition to the United States?

Those questions – which for me have only one answer - have been brought into sharp focus by recent events. This paper offers a dispassionate account of what went wrong. It also offers some helpful prescriptions for the future.

Chris Patten

Contents

Executive Summary

- The European see-saw of hope and frustration. Part One of the study looks broadly at transatlantic relations during the first two years of the George W. Bush administration. It recalls how the concern about the foreign policy direction likely to be taken by Bush was confirmed by his stance on Kyoto and the decision to push ahead with the missile defence project. Hopes that September 11 could be an opportunity to cajole the United States in a more multilateralist direction were soon frustrated by the increasingly hawkish line on Iraq, confirmed in the State of the Union address of January 2002. Signs of relative European unity rapidly disappeared as the showdown with Iraq moved closer.

- Analysing recent developments in Europe. Part Two observes that responses from European states – both current and prospective EU members – to the imminent war with Iraq showed a re-emergence of the classic Europeanist-Atlanticist division on the shape of the transatlantic security architecture. Nonetheless, it also points out that on many non-military foreign policy issues, the EU is able to foster relatively united and effective positions.

- The nature of EU-US divisions. Part Three engages with the notion that the future of EU-US relations is being determined by deep divisions in political values between Europe and the United States which help to shape their relative international power. At public opinion level, we find little evidence to back assertions of fundamentally different world-views, and much European hostility aimed at the Bush administration rather than America or Americans in general. While at government level, there are major transatlantic divisions over how to achieve international objectives, the nature of those international objectives is not radically different. We further suggest that the measurement of power in terms of military strength is an inadequate way of gauging European potential on the international scheme, as a number of European figures have recently pointed out.

- Recommendations. Our final recommendations centre less on immediate means to reduce transatlantic tensions – for example, the need for a calming in rhetoric on both sides – than on issues of longer-term institutional behaviour and the need for clearer strategic thinking and positioning:

1. The EU must as far as possible practise internally in CFSP what it preaches externally about multilateral and collective decision-making. A more closely-defined series of EU foreign policy ambitions may facilitate this.

2. Care must be taken in designing an institutional foreign policy framework that allows enough flexibility to avoid instances of unilateral action or action by small groups being seen as a failure for CFSP.

3. In order to help the EU to define its ambitions and roles in the foreign policy domain, a high-level working group should be created with the aim of surveying views within the Union and considering the possibility of an EU Security Plan.

Introduction

Transatlantic relations have endured a turbulent few months. Among the numerous questions confronting European states as a consequence are:

- How divided are Europeans in terms of their approach to international relations in general and the United States in particular?

- How deep are transatlantic divisions and to what extent do they reflect longer-term processes of drift on the two sides of the Atlantic?

- What can and should Europeans do to address the current divisions both between themselves and between them and the United States?

We were requested to provide a survey of European attitudes towards transatlantic relations, the way these have altered in recent months, and the various visions of the future of US-European relations that such attitudes have spawned. What follows is in no way meant to be exhaustive; nor does it cover the positions of all the member states in equal detail. Rather, it presents a broad overview of European attitudes, focusing in particular on the larger EU member states, these having been most prominent in recent controversies surrounding Europe's relationship with the United States.

Through an exploration of the first two years of the Bush administration and the specific context of the Iraq crisis, the paper illustrates that while there is considerable common ground between European states on many aspects of foreign, environmental and commercial policy, familiar divisions among European states over the appropriate form of relationship with the United States have tended to re-emerge as the former grapple with the challenge of adjusting to the threat – and actual use – of US military power. Thus while the United Kingdom and France (which have long epitomised the Atlanticist-Europeanist split in thinking over Europe's security architecture) have been able to work effectively since St Malo in 1998 to promote the development of the EU's European Security and

Defence Policy, the Iraq crisis has seen a reversion to type that many had hoped would no longer occur as the ESDP evolved. Certainly, these renewed divisions may, to an extent, be conjectural but they are nonetheless real and threaten to have an adverse effect on the Union's ability to act together on the international stage.

As far as the issue of broader US-European relations are concerned, we attempt to demonstrate that at both public opinion and elite level, the currently dominant hypothesis about fundamental differences between the world-views of Europeans and Atlanticists is at best an incomplete characterisation of the way in which Europeans see the world. We reject the notion of a fundamental clash or divergence in values across the Atlantic. Such a view both oversimplifies what 'Europe' is, and the divisions within it, and misunderstands the nature of transatlantic disagreements. Rather, we conclude that Europe and the United States are not so much separated by conflicting values as by different views of the most appropriate means to achieve their international objectives, objectives which are far from incompatible.

Nonetheless, alongside the question of intra-European divisions and current European-US tensions, one should also note an additional dimension: the fact that the United States itself has still not worked out what its international role should be in the early 21st century. While a detailed examination of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, it adds a further complication to calculations about the future of the transatlantic relationship on both sides of the Atlantic.

1. The European see-saw of hope and frustration

Arguably, there had been clear signs of increasingly unilateralist tendencies on the part of the United States over the past decade. However, the accession to power of George W. Bush heightened unease in Western Europe. Most EU capitals reacted with caution and in some cases alarm to a number of key emerging policy stances, notably the intention to pursue the missile defence program to protect against so-called 'states of concern'[1] – with the ensuing implications for the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty[2] – and not to submit the Kyoto Protocol for ratification.[3] There was also considerable criticism of US-UK military strikes on Iraq in February 2001, with the kind of doubts about UK commitments to the nascent European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and indeed to the EU itself, that have again been seen in the context of the Iraq crisis.[4]

Immediate tensions with the United States were to a limited extent assuaged by the summer of 2001:

- A high-level diplomatic campaign by the Bush administration succeeded in muting the most outspoken criticism of missile defence, in part by playing down the 'national' element of what was originally termed 'NMD' (European states were in any case somewhat divided in the level of their hostility).[5]

[1] 'States of concern', three of whom later famously became part of the 'axis of evil', had previously been known as 'rogue states'. The change in nomenclature occurred before the Bush administration came to power (in June 2000).

[2] In contrast to the Clinton administration's early plans for what was originally known as the National Missile Defence project, which foresaw renegotiation of the 1972 ABM Treaty, the Bush administration saw it as too restrictive and therefore wanted to abandon it.

[3] Although there was recognition that Kyoto was unlikely to have been ratified by the Senate even under President Clinton, the language used by Bush was initially more hard-line. In mid-March, the president wrote a letter to senators noting the "clear consensus that the Kyoto Protocol is an unfair and ineffective means of addressing global climate change concerns", and effectively stating that any measures would be subordinate to concerns about US economic growth at a time of what the president described as "a serious energy shortage" in the United States – i.e. that a unilateral approach to the question would be adopted. 'Letter from the President to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig, and Roberts', March 13, 2001.

[4] Perhaps these doubts have been somewhat naïve in that the United Kingdom has not been slow to underline its close relationship with Washington throughout the development of the ESDP: for example, launching with the United States a short bombing campaign against Iraq barely two weeks after the Saint Malo summit in 1998, and insisting on statements guaranteeing the primacy of the Atlantic Alliance throughout the development of ESDP.

[5] For reasons elaborated in Part Two, Spain, Italy, Poland and Hungary had moved to a position of public support by the summer of 2001, with the United Kingdom and Denmark quietly supportive.

- While American opposition remained constant (although a softening of tone on the global warming issue was evident in June), the Kyoto Protocol was saved at the Bonn Conference in July 2001, with almost 180 countries reaching a broad political agreement on the operational rulebook for the Protocol.

Indeed, initial concerns about the Bush administration notwithstanding, bilateral relations between the United States and individual European capitals remained relatively cordial. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, for example, paid a visit to Washington in March 2001 during which he and President George Bush issued a joint statement on a "Transatlantic Vision for the 21st Century" (March 29, 2001).

However, even among the most supportive of European allies, initial concerns regarding the general attitude towards international relations being adopted by Washington intensified and elite opinion was mirrored by public attitudes: a Pew Research Center Survey in August 2001 showed considerable hostility to Bush's international policy in certain parts of Western Europe: 59% of those questioned in France disapproved, compared to 65% in Germany, 49% in the United Kingdom and 46% in Italy. At the same time, however, it is notable that a solid majority disagreed with the view that Europe and the United States were growing apart.[6]

From 'We are all Americans'...

That the multiple terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 momentarily changed attitudes towards the United States has become something of a cliché. The *Le Monde* headline "We are all Americans" was indicative of a sharp increase in positive French opinion of the United States[7] which was, at least initially, widely mirrored across the continent. Furthermore, opinion polls revealed strong support for European participation in military action against terrorists.[8] Given current public misgivings in much

[6] Pew Research Center, 'Bush unpopular in Europe, seen as unilateralist', August 15, 2001.

[7] An opinion poll carried out for *Le Nouvel Observateur* on November 2-3, 2001 showed 65% of those questioned in France expressing a favourable attitude towards the United States. This had risen from around 35-40% in 1996-2000.

[8] A poll taken by GALLUP on September 14-15, 2001 showed that 73% of those questioned in France favoured participation with the United States in military action against terrorists. With the exception of the United

of Europe about the Iraq war, it is notable though not only that the same polls revealed distinct unease concerning the prospect of attacking those countries where the terrorists might be based, but also that French opinion was significantly more favourable to the idea than was British.[9]

At governmental level, as speculation mounted about the form any US military response might take, sympathy was mixed with the hope of being able to steer the Bush administration in a direction desired by all EU states: action through multilateral institutions in line with the strictures of international law. Thus when the UK Prime Minister offered to stand "shoulder to shoulder" with Bush,[10] as well as being a simple declaration of solidarity the phrase was taken by some to imply a desire to draw on longstanding US-UK ties and act both as an influence and a restraining force.

Certainly, the range of European military contributions to the campaign against the Taliban regime and al Qaida in Afghanistan mirrored the professions of support.[11] Given recent rhetoric on both sides of the Atlantic (and indeed the Channel) concerning Franco-US relations, it is perhaps worth emphasising the scale of the French contribution in particular: France's carrier battle group, headed by the Charles de Gaulle, supported combat operations for Operation Enduring Freedom from the North Arabian Sea; air resources were deployed in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, with Mirage fighters and tanker aircraft in action to support Operation Anaconda; an infantry company was deployed to Mazar-e-Sharif to provide security; special forces were used in a variety of operations. In addition, Paris provided a range of ongoing logistical and intelligence support.[12] In a real sense, the scale of French involvement - both in military and diplomatic terms, the latter symbolised by Chirac's trip to express solidarity with Bush in Washington following the events of September 11 – was in keeping with the tradition of the Fifth Republic. It has long been a French claim to be the closest ally of the

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Kingdom (79%), this was the highest level of support among the larger EU states: in Spain (58%) and Germany (53%), support was markedly lower.

[9] The GALLUP poll of September 14-15 showed that only 29% of those questioned in France favoured attacking "the country or countries where the terrorists are based". Moreover, the figure was only 21% in Italy, 17% in Germany, 12% in Spain and, perhaps surprisingly, 18% in the United Kingdom.

[10] Statement By Prime Minister Tony Blair on September 11 attacks, September 11, 2001.

[11] Not that European support for any attack was unequivocal even in the immediate post-September 11 period. The Dutch government repeatedly insisted – even during the North Atlantic Council meeting of October 2, 2002 – that the United States should provide sufficient evidence against Bin Laden and his network. See Monica Den Boer and Joerg Monar, '11 September and the Challenge of Global Terrorism to the EU as a Security Actor', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40 (2002), p. 13.

[12] For more on the French contribution to the war on terror, see Jeremy Shapiro, 'The Role of France in the War on Terrorism', Brookings Institute, May 2002.

United States in times of real crisis – hence rapid and overt support for Washington at the time of both the Cuban missile and Euro missile crises.

Nonetheless, although the invocation of NATO Article 5 was initially seen as a step in a multilateralist direction, it is notable that non-US contributions to the Afghan campaign were essentially offered on a bilateral basis, to be accepted or rejected by Washington. Mindful perhaps of the experience in Kosovo, the Bush administration was keen to avoid the kind of 'decision-making by committee' that it felt had undermined the efficiency of the campaign in the Balkans.[13] However understandable this approach may have been in operational terms, it appeared to many in Europe much more like an ad hoc 'coalition of the willing' than a serious attempt to mobilise through multilateral institutions – an impression merely reinforced by Donald Rumsfeld's comment that the "mission determines the coalition and the coalition must not be permitted to determine the mission."[14]

The 'cherry picking' approach adopted by the Bush administration certainly did little to foster EU unity in its response to September 11. Indeed, a striking feature of US policies towards Europe has been the willingness of the administration to promote divisions amongst Europeans on issues ranging from the ICC (where the administration placed heavy pressure on European states to sign bilaterals exempting US personnel from the jurisdiction of the court) to Iraq.[15] Despite this, there were signs of a growing understanding among the three most powerful West European nations – France, Germany and the United Kingdom. An Anglo-Franco-German conclave at the Ghent European Council in October 2001 (and subsequent mini-summit in London) unleashed controversy within the Union (with smaller member states enraged at what appeared to be large state domination), but suggested a growing desire to advance ESDP in the context of a changed security context and to present a more unified front to Washington, and on the world stage, as the 'war on terror' moved forward.[16] This appeared all the more timely in the late autumn / early winter of 2001 as hawks

[13] Interestingly, however, the man who was SACEUR at the time of that conflict, General Wesley Clark, has been outspoken in pleading for the United States to adopt a multilateralist approach to international security issues. See Clark, 'An army of one', *Washington Monthly*, September 2002.

[14] Remarks made at a press briefing by Rumsfeld, September 23, 2001 in response to a question speculating about tension between Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell over this issue of coalition building.

[15] Certain right-wing US commentators have explicitly propounded cherry picking as an approach destined to maximise American influence whilst minimising the constraints upon it. See, for example, Charles Krauthammer, 'American unilateralism', speech given at the third annual Hillsdale College Churchill Dinner, Washington, DC, December 4, 2002.

[16] See for example, Philip Stephens, 'Europe discovers a single voice...' in the *Financial Times*, October 5, 2001.

within the Bush administration began to talk once again of taking on Saddam Hussein in a subsequent wave of the 'war on terror', and international controversy began to build over the status and treatment of, and the possible use of the death penalty for, prisoners at the 'Camp X-Ray' facility at the US Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

...to 'simplistic' US foreign policy

By the end of January 2002, when President George Bush delivered the State of the Union address that included the famous reference to Iraq, Iran and North Korea as the 'axis of evil', European alarm about the potential for a military conflict with Iraq had increased substantially. While nobody was surprised that Iraq should again be singled out as a problem state,[17] the language was disturbingly aggressive and many European governments were unhappy about the expansion of the definition of the terrorist threat to include longstanding US worries about Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation.[18] Bush further exacerbated European concerns about possible US unilateralism with his statement that "some governments will be timid in the face of terror. And make no mistake about it: if they do not act, America will."[19]

In early February, with EU foreign ministers attempting to advance their plan for the Middle East Peace Process (an area where there is substantial consensus within the EU), then French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine received support after he condemned US foreign policy as being "simplistic".[20]

With relations between Washington and a number of capitals – particularly Paris – beginning to spiral downwards, London was once again placed in a difficult situation, torn between its preferred

[17] The issue of what the United States might do with respect to 'states of concern' such as Iraq had been simmering for some time. Indeed, as early as 1998, a number of figures, including Dick Cheney, Richard Perle, Donald Rumsfeld, Robert Zoellick and Robert Kagan, had written to President Bill Clinton urging him to "act decisively" against Iraq in order "to end the threat of weapons of mass destruction against the U.S. or its allies." Letter to President Clinton, January 26, 1998.

[18] In terms of sponsors of terrorism, European foreign ministries would probably almost unanimously have ranked Yemen, Pakistan and Chechnya above the three 'axis' states.

[19] State of the Nation address, January 29, 2002.

[20] In an interview on the France Inter radio station on February 6, 2002, Védrine commented that: "We're threatened by a new simplistic approach, which is reducing all the world's problems to the fight against terrorism..."

European policy (engaging on the ESDP) and compromising continental credibility and relationships by backing the Bush administration. However, it was clear which way the United Kingdom was turning. While London had previously suggested that action against Iraq should not be contemplated until clear evidence of a link between Saddam Hussein's regime and the attacks of September 11 could be produced, the emphasis began to shift onto showing that Saddam's regime did indeed pose a threat to international security.

Given the 'axis of evil' speech, and underlying European suspicions of Bush's intentions, when US tariffs were announced in early March 2002 on the vast majority of steel products, the angry reaction from European member states and the EU was symptomatic not just of periodic transatlantic trade tensions (which are relatively frequent and have so far been fairly successfully contained), but of a growing conviction that the United States was becoming more unilateralist. This was an issue which saw unanimity of condemnation and which cut across the European cleavages that often develop on security issues (see Part Two).[21] EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy captured the mood in an address to the European Parliament: "Despite the initial hopes for a relaunch of American interest in engaging with the international community after the events of September 11, we are at the moment faced with what seem to be increasingly unilateralist US tendencies. This can be seen in different policies and the list is continuing to grow: the International Criminal Court, the ABM Treaty, Kyoto and the steel market are the most striking."[22]

[21] UK Prime Minister Tony Blair told Parliament on March 6, 2002 that the steel tariffs were "unacceptable and wrong." In a BBC interview, Trade and Industry Secretary Patricia Hewitt commented that "[w]e won't stand by and simply let [the United States] dump their problems onto us." However, subsequent attempts to obtain special exemptions for the United Kingdom created some tension with EU partners.

[22] Pascal Lamy, 'Etat et perspective des relations transatlantiques', European Parliament, Strasbourg, March 13, 2002.

...and further European divisions

In the summer of 2002, although the positions of the three most powerful European players differed markedly over Iraq, there was as yet little sign of the Franco-German axis that would emerge so clearly in January 2003:[23]

- Against a background of strong misgivings within the ruling Labour Party and little public appetite for war, the United Kingdom was taking the most consistent line of support for the United States. While London made it clear that it wanted all possible avenues explored to address the Iraq WMD issue (particularly a return to the UN), there seemed little doubt that it would support the United States, both politically and militarily, if force were used against the regime of Saddam Hussein.

- At the other end of the spectrum, Germany (both at political and public opinion level) was opposed to the prospect of military action against Iraq. However, this opposition was reinforced by the anti-US tone taken by Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder in an election that the SPD only narrowly won. Where the former French 'plural left' government of Prime Minister Lionel Jospin and Foreign Minister Védrine had left off, Schroeder picked up, accusing the Bush administration of "adventurism", while his justice minister, Herta Daeubler-Gmelin, was alleged in a newspaper article to have compared Bush's methods to those of Hitler. Whatever the truth of this particular allegation, the Schroeder election campaign marked a mile-stone in US-German relations. Outright opposition to a major US

  foreign policy priority was a new departure for a German government.[24]

- While essentially substantively unchanged, French policy over Iraq was initially expressed with a degree of diplomatic restraint under the re-elected conservative President Jacques Chirac, who

[23] Franco-German relations were still at a relatively low ebb, having earlier been described by Hubert Védrine as "clinically dead". It was only once a series of difficult internal EU institutional and budgetary differences were overcome that the Franco-German relationship could begin to look more solid again.

[24] However, this was not just a case of electioneering in order to rally the SPD vote. Since September 11, German foreign policy-makers had wanted to avoid the battle against terrorism being superimposed on the debate over the appropriate policy response to states trying to acquire or boost their WMD capacity. There was an emerging consensus that, while pre-emption and prevention were necessary in the case of terrorism, containment was the more appropriate strategy for dealing with WMD.

had attempted to mend fences with Washington after the victory of a conservative-led coalition in the parliamentary elections of June. However Paris began to make it increasingly clear that it was not prepared to be pushed into a diplomatic and/or military line decided in Washington. Situated some way between the London and Berlin line, the French position was – and remains – essentially that the UN must be preeminent in dealing with Iraq and that force would only be justified once a full new weapons inspections process had been exhausted.

2. Analysing recent developments in Europe

The striking feature of the first few months of 2003 has been the very public re-emergence of classic Europeanist-Atlanticist divisions over the nature of the transatlantic security and defence relationship. In the past, the Europeanist-Atlanticist dichotomy has best been epitomised by the contrast between French and UK approaches to the European security and defence architecture. While the EU's commitment to the creation of the ESDP has clearly shifted the parameters of the debate – not least as a function of the British conversion, following the Amsterdam summit, to the cause of endowing the EU with a defence capability – the two terms are still apposite descriptive terms in pointing to national / common European security and defence aspirations that lean more towards balance and/or independence, or towards complementarity and/or relative dependence.

Europeanist axis?

The establishment of an apparent foreign policy alliance between France and Germany opposing the US strategy in the run-up to war was symbolised in comments made at the 40th anniversary celebrations of the Elysée Treaty on January 22, with both French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder emphasising that the UN must be preeminent in dealing with Iraq and that they were opposed to precipitate military action. Their comments followed blunt remarks by French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin to the UN Security Council suggesting that war on Iraq was so far unjustifiable.

This alliance was unusual in several respects:

- While the French stance appeared to owe much to a longstanding view of international relations, the German approach was not in keeping with Germany foreign policy traditions. As we suggest in Part One, it had its origins in the election strategy adopted by Schroeder in September 2002 as well as in a gradual reassessment of that country's position in the international order.

Nonetheless, there is no equivalent in Germany of the French Gaullist tradition that has consistently emphasised the desirability of a multipolar geo-political order.

- Despite statements suggesting a common approach to the Iraq crisis,[25] it was evident that there were still differences between France and Germany on the issue of the eventual use of force should the UN process fail, reflecting very different traditions of post-war military development and deployment. While Berlin appeared implacably opposed to the notion of taking military action (reflecting a strong pacifist and anti-militarist tradition), the French position was – and remained – that force would only be justified once a full new weapons inspections process had been exhausted.[26]

- While the French political class was fairly unified in its hostility to the line taken by the Bush administration over Iraq, there was far more disagreement between (and, to some extent, within) the Schroeder administration and the CDU/CSU opposition. In this respect, it should be emphasised that the tone taken by Schroeder would not have been mirrored in the event of a CDU/CSU victory in September 2002.

Nonetheless, the Franco-German understanding over Iraq was cemented further by their refusal in early February, together with Belgium, to countenance formal approval for NATO contingency planning for the provision of military support to Turkey in the event of an attack by Iraq. The three countries broke their silence on the issue on February 10. While the question was eventually resolved, the initial decision caused near apoplexy in the United States and deep concern in a number of other European capitals.

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[25] Jacques Chirac commented after the Elysée Treaty celebrations on January 22 that: "Germany and France have the same view on [the Iraq] crisis, which is essentially based on two ideas: the first is that all decisions lie with the Security Council, and it alone, pronouncing its verdict after having heard the inspectors' report, and in accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by the Council. And the second reality is that for us, war is always a symbol of failure and the worst solution."

[26] Comments made by Jacques Chirac in an interview on CBS news (March 16, 2003) are representative of the French line: ''France is not pacifist. We are not anti-American either. We are not just going to use our veto to nag and annoy the US. But we just feel that there is another option, another way, another more normal way, a less dramatic way than war, and that we have to go through that path. And we should pursue it until we've come [to] a dead end, but that isn't the case."

Transatlantic comment. Over the past few months, there have been a number of pronouncements from France, Germany and Belgium on the future of transatlantic relations. The three countries are, together with Luxembourg, due to hold a defence summit at the end of April. Although the emphases of public discourse have sometimes differed somewhat, there is a clearly expressed desire to bolster the European security and defence capability in order to work towards a world order with greater balance, in which international law and international institutions determine the scope of political and military intervention in global trouble-spots:

- French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin's keynote IISS speech last month, 'Law, Force and Justice' concentrated on the notion of complementary "regional poles" in a new world order. Strikingly, NATO was mentioned just once in the speech (and only in the context of EU involvement in Bosnia[27]): "To be truly stable, this new world must be based on a number of regional poles, structured to face current threats. These poles should not compete against one another, but complete each other. They are the cornerstones of an international community built on solidarity and unity in the face of new challenges. The determination of European countries to develop a common foreign and security policy must reflect that. This determination shows our will to bring about a true European identity."[28] A further hardening in the French position regarding the relationship between Europeanism and Atlanticism was evident in President Chirac's reported remarks to Latvian President Vaira Vike-Freiberga that NATO was no longer relevant in the modern world.[29] Interestingly, and perhaps dangerously, this again mirrors comments made by some US conservatives.[30]

- A speech by Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt in February emphasised "a new Atlanticism",[31] in which NATO could be reinvigorated by a stronger and more unified European presence within it: the final objective being that "NATO no longer remains an organisation

[27] In some respects, therefore, the speech was a mirror image of that given by Rumsfeld at the Wehrkunde in 2001; the Secretary of Defense failed to mention the EU once in his substantive comments, even in a section of the speech specifically on ESDP.
[28] Dominique de Villepin, 'Law, Force and Justice', IISS, March 27, 2003.
[29] Financial Times, April 16, 2003.
[30] See, for example, an interview with Richard Perle in *Berliner Zeitung* on March 26, which is dismissive about the future importance of the UN and NATO.
[31] Guy Verhofstadt, 'A call for a new Atlanticism', The Hague, February 19, 2003.

grouping a superpower and a series of states...We have to look for an alliance of partners, of two partners, not necessarily equal but strongly linked." This, according to

Verhofstadt, should take place in a multipolar world in which, notwithstanding the common values shared with the United States, Europe should continue to develop its own views and standpoints. The 'new Atlanticist' theme can in part be attributed to the conjuncture – NATO was in the throes of the Turkey protection crisis. A lecture on transatlantic relations in January by Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel appeared more similar to French public discourse, devoting little time to the future of NATO and concentrating on the need for the EU to develop as a serious foreign policy actor.[32]

- Remarks by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer have lamented the lack of real transatlantic debate over the issue of how to tackle new security threats, and more generally, over the shape of a future international order.[33] However, he has been very specific about German support for a strengthened ESDP: "If Europe stands for multilateralism, for a cooperative new world order, Europe must also have the political will and the full palette of options, institutions and capabilities to meet the demands of such multilateralism. A strong United Nations presupposes that the Europeans unite and do their part to ensure that a multilateral world order built on a cooperative security foundation becomes reality." At the same time, recent statements by Chancellor Schroeder have underlined Germany's continued commitment to ensuring that developments within the EU occur within a NATO framework (not least given Germany's insistence that NATO take over the ISAF mission in Kabul). Thus in a recent interview, whilst acknowledging that there is not "too much America but too little Europe" and that the CFSP should be built faster, he noted that 'this should happen inside the frame of NATO and not against it."[34]

Schroeder's recent comments seem to indicate a desire to repair relations with Washington after an exceptionally difficult period since last summer. They also confirm the somewhat conjunctural Europeanism that cemented the Franco-German alliance over Iraq earlier this year. Recent French comments about the need immediately to suspend UN sanctions against

[32] Louis Michel, 'Transatlantic relations', Conference at the University of Liege, January 24, 2003.
[33] Joschka Fischer address to the Bundestag, March 20, 2003.
[34] EU Observer, March 27, 2003.

Iraq may also be read as an attempt to ease transatlantic tensions, further to a phone call by Chirac to Bush. However, further evidence of France's intentions may become clear at the defence summit at the end of April.

Playing an Atlanticist card – the gang of eight

The January 30 newspaper letter signed by the leaders of five existing EU members and three applicant states (followed by a statement from the 'Vilnius group' a short time later) provided highly public and explicit evidence of intra-European tensions over the conduct of European policy towards the United States, and over the disputed nature of leadership in the EU. Indeed, the Franco-German behaviour on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty celebrations, and a number of subsequent pronouncements, had caused considerable resentment in a number of existing member states and applicant states, worried about both the question of 'who speaks for Europe on international affairs' and the implications for the longer-term balance of power within the Union.

Addressed as much to other European states as to the United States, the letter was a powerful statement of the common ground between Europe and the United States, formulated in the context of deteriorating transatlantic relations, particularly in the aftermath of the Elysée Treaty celebrations and the 'old Europe / new Europe' distinction subsequently coined by US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, which had provoked a deeply hostile response from those supposed pillars of the 'old Europe'. Two things are particularly striking about the letter. First, it reveals the degree to which the debate sparked by Robert Kagan on the possibility of a clash of values between the United States and Europe has shaped subsequent debates. The first sentence of the letter reads simply that the 'real bond between the United States and Europe is the values we share'.[35]

[35] Article in Wall Street Journal Europe and a number of European newspapers, January 30, 2003.

Perhaps more importantly, apart from the implicit warning to France over its UN 'responsibilities', the statement of solidarity contains little that other EU member states – including France and Germany – could not have signed up to themselves.[36] In this regard, the fact that there was only a partial set of EU member state signatories for such a statement probably contributed further to the negative diplomatic atmosphere developing between Washington and Paris and Berlin in particular – an atmosphere not helped by allegations that the letter had originated in mischief making by journalists from the Wall Street Journal.[37]

Nonetheless, it is notable that all the signatories shared a broadly 'Atlanticist' perspective. Three broad groups can be identified:

1. <u>Traditional Atlanticists</u>. The United Kingdom, Denmark and Portugal have been traditionally among the most solidly Atlanticist states in the EU.

- While British official discourse has for obvious reasons focused mainly on immediate matters relating to the major UK military involvement in the Iraq war, Prime Minister Tony Blair used a newspaper interview at the end of April to spell out his vision of transatlantic relations. In contrast to remarks made by De Villepin and Chirac, Blair notes that: "[s]ome want a so-called multi-polar world where you have different centres of power...others believe, and this is my notion, that we need one polar power which encompasses a strategic partnership between Europe and America." This, according to Blair, means a stronger Europe, but not a rival power which would be "the quickest way" to get unilateralism in America.[38]

[36] See, for example, the interview given by Chirac to the New York Times on September 8, 2002. "It's true that when the tragedy took place, my first reaction was to say : 'We are all Americans'. And I want to say today that those feelings have not disappeared ; on the contrary, they've grown even stronger with the anniversary… Something inside the French people was touched, and that hasn't changed...It demonstrates once again that when the chips are down, the French and Americans have always stood together and have never failed to be there for one another. That's been the case since Yorktown and it still holds true today. That's the reality."

[37] For a refutation of such allegations, see the Wall Street Journal Europe, February 3, 2003. Relations between Belgium and the Wall Street Journal were considerably worsened by an article on EU defence budgets on February 13, which singled out Belgium as an offender and provoked an outspoken protest from Belgian Defence Minister Andre Flahaut, who accused the paper of "prostituting itself" ('Letter to the Editor, an Insult to My Country and Its Military', February 26, 2003).

[38] Tony Blair interview in the *Financial Times*, April 28, 2003.

- Recent remarks from Danish and Portuguese ministers have emphasised the importance of the US partnership and of NATO as the main guarantor of security for all EU member states.[39] Indeed, a staunchly Atlanticist tone has been taken by the new right-wing Portuguese government under Prime Minister Jose Manuel Barroso. Although the decision announced earlier this year to pull out of purchasing A-400M military transport planes (and perhaps to buy new capacity from Lockheed Martin) was justified on cost grounds, it has nonetheless been interpreted symbolically in some quarters given the current international environment.

- Given the defence and security stance adopted by the Netherlands, it would have been unsurprising to have seen as a signatory to the open letter, and included in this section. Concern about the potential effects on European relations (particularly relations with Germany) of such a public EU division, together with the uncertainty associated with the absence of a new government after the general election, were key factors in persuading the caretaker Dutch government not to sign.

2 <u>'Reflex Atlanticism' in Central and Eastern Europe</u>. Comments by Polish Foreign Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz that NATO is today the only structure which can guarantee Poland's security,[40] reflect broader views shared by Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary (and other East European states) influenced by Cold War and post-Cold War history. The first wave of NATO expansion in 1999 has long preceded any enlargement eastwards of the EU, which (for now) offers no security guarantee of the kind still provided by NATO. The close ties between Poland and the United States were underlined recently with the signing of an agreement under which Poland will purchase 48 US F-16 fighter jets from Lockheed Martin.

The Central and East European applicants are also generally less than enthusiastic about the prospect of an EU potentially dominated by a resurgent Franco-German axis, a suspicion reinforced by comments made by French President Jacques Chirac after the European Council meeting of March 17, 2003 in which he (now famously) described their behaviour as "childish" and suggested that they had "missed a good opportunity to remain quiet".

[39] Svend Aage Jensby, April 10, 2003, Danmarks Radio P1. Source: BBC Monitoring European. Antonio Martins da Cruz, March 5, 2003, Radio Slovenia. Source: BBC Monitoring European.

3. <u>Conjunctural Atlanticism</u>. Neither Spain nor Italy are usually thought of as defining their strategic outlook in more Atlanticist terms and their stance over Iraq owes much to the position of the current government incumbents:

- The strong pro-US position adopted by the Aznar government has only really been evident in the last couple of years, since its position was strengthened by winning an outright parliamentary majority. Previously, Madrid seemed to be identifying far more closely with the pro-integrationist dynamic in the EU than with US interests. Recently, Spain – currently a member of the UN Security Council – has been playing a leading role, alongside the United States and United Kingdom, in the diplomatic manoeuvring which surrounded the immediate pre-war period. For Jose-Maria Aznar, the stakes are less high personally than for his party, given his pre-standing decision not to run for re-election in the next parliamentary elections.

- Similar to the situation in Spain, the Italian government's pro-US stance owes much to the influence of Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. Italy has traditionally adopted a position which prioritised multilateral institutions / agreement (eg. EU, NATO), while maintaining strong ties with Washington. However, Berlusconi's signature of the 'gang of eight' letter symbolises a far more explicit commitment to supporting elements of US foreign policy.

It should be noted though that in many of the so-called 'Atlanticist' states, there has been considerable public opposition to the stance taken by the governments over the Iraq war, and also intense political debate. This has in some cases seen divisions between the political class in general and the public (Poland), deep divisions within the ruling party alongside initial public hostility (United Kingdom) or shifts in the parliamentary handling of foreign policy issues:

- Danish participation in the Iraq conflict (in the form of modest naval support for surveillance and logistics) saw parliamentary backing, but not the tradition of a broad (cross-party) majority when Danish soldiers are sent to war (the broad majority was in favour of participation only under explicit UN mandate).

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[40] Interview published in French newspaper, *Libération*, March 21, 2003,.

- In Portugal, the cross-party consensus on foreign policy that has existed since the democratic transition in 1974-5 has been broken. While the Socialists made support for the war conditional on explicit UN backing, the PSD-led coalition government under Prime Minister Jose Manuel Durao Barroso aligned itself with the United States.

The neutrals / non-aligned (Austria, Ireland, Finland, Sweden)

While the relationship with ESDP and NATO is more complex in the four member states who have traditions of neutrality or non-alignment, the general tenor of deep concern about the current war on Iraq and the absence of a second UN resolution explicitly authorising the use of force also characterises their approach. The Swedish government explicitly pointed out that it did not believe that the action was in line with international law.[41] The Irish, Finnish and Austrian governments also made it clear that in their judgement explicit new UN authorisation for military action should have been received.

How deep are European divisions?

Fundamentally, the European preoccupation is about how to deal with a United States itself still coming to terms with its hegemonic status in international security terms. In the three largest member states, so divided over war in Iraq, the concern about unilateralism and its potentially negative effects on the wider international institutional, economic and security environment, is generally shared. Paris, Berlin and London would all like to steer the Bush administration towards a stance in the ongoing 'war on terror' more accommodative of a multilateral environment. However, in addition to differences over the shape of that multilateral environment (particularly with respect to security institutions as we have noted) the means of doing this and, to some extent, the interpretation of the nature of US power, vary:

[41] Foreign Ministry statement on the conflict in Iraq, March 21, 2003.

- For the current governments in Paris and Berlin, the need actively to oppose or at least present an alternative approach, has become increasingly important, not least because of a growing conviction that unchecked US power may not necessarily be motivated by ideological convictions to which many in Europe can subscribe.

- For London, due to a number of reasons related both to historic transatlantic ties and to Blair's evolving relationship with Bush, the "shoulder to shoulder" strategy of hoping to exercise restraint through solidarity remains paramount.[42] The United Kingdom is generally less suspicious of US motives and international action than France, and Blair sees this strategy as being as much about gaining influence though supporting US policies as about restraining the unwanted and irresponsible exercise of US power. Indeed, the show of Atlanticism in the 'gang of eight' letter can also be interpreted generally in the context of increasing concern about the potential for miscommunication at a time when there is great uncertainty within Europe about where the United States is heading strategically.

Clearly though, the UK position on European security policy is far more complicated than the label 'Traditional Atlanticist' suggests and is far from irreconcilable with the kind of 'new Atlanticist' rhetoric used by Verhofstadt earlier in the year. While the current Labour government in the United Kingdom may be committed to ESDP more through pragmatic strategic thinking than through a visceral commitment to European unity, this does not imply that a workable solution for ESDP cannot be found. To some extent, the outcome of the Franco-British Le Touquet summit demonstrates this, and it is clear that to be militarily viable any EU military capacity requires UK involvement. In this respect, it will be difficult for the meeting between France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg to achieve any substantial reorientation of ESDP.

We would re-emphasise that it is primarily in the security / defence domain involving specific military action / military strategies by the United States that this aspect of divisions is evident. In areas of foreign policy more generally, the pattern of European unity and disunity is very different.

[42] See, for example, Quentin Peel, 'An understanding lost in translation', *Financial Times*, March 3, 2003.

- As we point out in Part One, the EU has been fairly united on key questions of international economic and environmental policy, demonstrated most notably in the condemnation of Bush's rejection of the Kyoto Protocol and of the imposition of steel tariffs last year.[43]

- The EU has been fairly consistent in its message regarding the response to international terrorism and in its approach to the Middle East Peace Process, offering a plausible solution to the current impasse.[44]

- The EU has taken over policing in Bosnia and peacekeeping in Macedonia, with the hope of eventually taking over from the NATO-led force in Bosnia. Despite the public furore over Iraq that engulfed its genesis, discussion between the EU and NATO on putting this Berlin Plus mission in the field were rapid and effective.[45] Similarly, agreement has now been reached on allowing NATO to take over the ISAF mission in Kabul.[46]

- The EU is agreed that a diplomatic – rather than confrontational – engagement with Iran, the other Middle Eastern member of the 'axis of evil' offers for now the most promising way of achieving political change.

- Post-Iraq, the EU agreed at the Athens European Council on April 17 that the "UN must play a central role" including the process leading towards self-government for the Iraqi people.[47] While the press was quick to comment that the expression "a central role" was ill-defined and ambiguous, and certainly not synonymous with "the central role", it is clear that the EU, the United Kingdom included (even if Blair's scope to express this is constrained), is at odds with the way in which more hawkish elements of the Bush administration wish to conduct the physical and political reconstruction process.

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[43] Although maintaining unity of action in the steel crisis was admittedly difficult. While the UK backed the EU's stances on the tariffs, London also lobbied the Bush administration for special exemptions for UK companies.

[44] See, for example, Steven Everts, 'The EU and the Middle East: a call for action', Centre for European Reform Working Paper, January 2003.

[45] However rumours that the Pentagon did its best to block the deployment of the EU force, despite the supportive stance of the State Department, will hardly have helped transatlantic relations. See *Financial Times*, March 31, 2003.

[46] NATO may thus be taking on the kind of global role foreseen by Thomas Friedman, though not in the way – with Russia and without France – that he foresaw, which can only be good for Europe; for Friedman, see the New York Times March 30, 2003.

The risks of cultivated division

While it is certainly true that European member states on occasion need no encouragement from outside to split into rival or disputing factions, we have already noted that the United States has shown signs of encouraging such division. The cherry-picking of military partners certainly has the potential to undermine common EU action / positioning. At the annual Wehrkunde meeting in the spring of this year, Donald Rumsfeld made a point of insisting that there were more differences among Europeans on Iraq than between the US and Europe.[48] Beyond exacerbating existing long-standing strategic divisions, there is the additional danger that the conjunctural Atlanticism of Italy and Spain, linked so clearly by a very specific pair of political leaders, may be replicated if individual countries perceive that they can obtain advantages by attempting to do deals directly with the United States. As the EU strengthens its own foreign and security policy machinery, the incentives for opportunist bilateralism may diminish, but they will only do so if Washington can be persuaded that it is in its best interests to deal with the Union as an actor as opposed to national capitals. The past few months have provided clear evidence of how far from that point the EU still is.

Illustrating the problem

Some of these differences in approach to foreign policy and security / defence policy questions are illustrated in the chart overleaf. The four tables are intended to reinforce the key observation made in this part of the study that the Europeanist – Atlanticist division still forms a fundamental source of division that may emerge from within the dynamic of intra-state and intra-EU tensions, or be encouraged from outside.[49]

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[47] EU presidency statement on Iraq, April 17, 2003.
[48] Financial Times, February 10, 2003.
[49] The charts are intended to be broadly illustrative, rather than precise or comprehensive calibrations of EU member state and applicant state positions. For that reason, we do not include all member states or all candidates, rather we seek to point out the most evident differences and tensions.

MISSILE DEFENCE
(Early Summer 2001)



DECISION NOT TO RATIFY KYOTO (2001)
STEEL TARIFFS (2002)



Traditional Atlanticist
Reflex Atlanticist
Conjunctural Atlanticist

POST 9/11 - WAR IN AFGHANISTAN



IRAQ WAR



BE – Belgium	IT - Italy
DE – Germany	NL - Netherlands
DK – Denmark	E - Spain
EL – Greece	P - Portugal
FR – France	POL - Poland
HU - Hungary	UK – United Kingdom

3. The nature of EU-US divisions

Although most press and analytical attention in recent months have focused on the immediate ramifications of the Iraq conflict, there has been considerable discussion of the proposition that there is a basic strategic divide opening up between European and Americans. Indeed, Robert Kagan's convenient catchphrase 'Americans are from Mars, Europeans are from Venus', and the accompanying claim that US and European values are increasingly divergent, have in some respects dominated discussion on both sides of the Atlantic.[50] That debate has also been strongly coloured by the diplomatic fall-out from events earlier this year (particularly the NATO crisis), with a vitriolic reaction from US conservatives.[51] From the European perspective, a strong response to Kagan has come in the form of a speech by High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana at Harvard in early April,[52] and in a number of addresses by European Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten.[53] A significant contribution, emphasising the close nature of EU-US economic relations, has been made in a paper by Joseph Quinlan.[54]

Public opinion and shared values?

A central proposition put forward by Kagan is that "it is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world." Although he does not specify whether he means the public at large or the government policy community, we present here

[50] Robert Kagan, 'Power and Weakness', *Policy Review* 113, 2002; *Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (2003: Atlantic Books). One should not forget how ideologically engaged Kagan is. He was, for example, a signatory to the 1998 letter to Clinton on Iraq. See footnote 17.

[51] For an interesting discussion of American anti-Europeanism, see Timothy Garton Ash, 'Anti-Europeanism in America, *New York Review of Books*, February 13, 2003.

[52] Javier Solana, "Mars and Venus reconciled: a new era for transatlantic relations", April 7, 2003, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

[53] See notably, 'America and Europe: an essential partnership', speech to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, October 3 2002. Also Patten and Pascal Lamy, 'Let's put away the megaphones: a trans-Atlantic appeal', *New York Times*, April 9, 2003. It is not clear to what extent the symbolism of the latter – penned by a Brit and a Frenchman, was picked up in the United States.

[54] Joseph Quinlan, 'Drifting Apart or Growing Together? The Primacy of the Transatlantic Economy', Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University, 2003.

some evidence from well-known opinion polls in order to test this assertion. Values and ideologies are notoriously difficult to measure and large-scale public opinion surveys can only offer a snapshot approximation of views at a given moment. However, a number of major studies – notably those carried out by the Pew Research Center and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations / George Marshall Fund (CCFR-GMF) – do offer an insight into thinking both in the United States and Europe.

The CCFR-GMF report of last year ('Worldviews 2002'), based on fieldwork conducted in June-July,[55] provides what the authors describe as "partly a refutation of the theory of drift at the public level"[56]:

- **Mutual goodwill.** There is a considerable amount of mutual goodwill, with warm feelings towards the United States clearly in evidence not just in the United Kingdom, but also in Germany, France and Italy (60-68 degrees in the four countries, according to a "thermometer scale" of 0-100).

- **Unilateralism.** Americans are as supportive as Europeans of involvement in international institutions, such as the United Nations (77% of Americans thought that the UN should be strengthened, against 75% of Europeans), NATO (61% of Americans for strengthening and 63% of Europeans) and the WTO (63% and 59% respectively).

- **Use of force.** Europeans are as supportive as Americans (sometimes more so) of using troops in certain circumstances (for example, 80% of Europeans would approve if it was to uphold international law, against 76% of Americans).

- **Iraq policy.** 65% of Americans thought that the United States should only invade Iraq "with the approval of the United Nations and its allies" (against 60% of Europeans). Only 26% of Europeans (against 13% of Americans) thought that the United States should not invade Iraq.[57]

[55] The data is based on MORI fieldwork in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Italy, Poland and the United Kingdom in June-July 2002.
[56] CCFR-WMF, *WorldViews 2002*, p.3.

However, there are of course significant divergences:

- US public opinion is far more favourable, for example, to using troops to guarantee oil supplies (65% against 49% of Europeans) than to using it to contain a civil war (48% against 72% of Europeans). This had already been evident in attitudes towards intervention in the Balkans. A Pew Study in August 2001 found that only 47% of Americans favoured keeping troops in Bosnia and Kosovo, compared to 57-64% of those in the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy.[58]

- Threat perceptions differ considerably, sometimes for quite obvious reasons. Americans worry far more about international terrorism (91% view it as extremely important against only 64% of Europeans), Iraq developing weapons of mass destruction (86% to 57%), Islamic fundamentalism (61% to 47%), war between Israel and its neighbours (67% to 42%), and the development of China as a world power (56% to 18%).

- Europeans tend to be more sympathetic to Palestinian statehood – 72% favoured the establishment of an independent state on the West Bank and Gaza against 40% of Americans (although the latter were markedly more enthusiastic in supporting this option when it was presented as part of official Bush policy – which is perhaps cause for hope in the context of the much-vaunted 'roadmap').

In sum, on international affairs issues, the divisions look less about values in the most basic sense – eg. support of military force – than about perceptions of international affairs and national priorities. Caution should also be exercised about sweeping judgements regarding value questions such as the death penalty, a source of periodic tension between Europe and the United States. While there is an certainly an obvious problem at elite level, it not completely clear that there is a fundamental divide

[57] Although public opinion in the United States clearly moved once the UN route seemed to reach an impasse, a point made by Kagan to justify his standpoint. See 'Repairing the rift: the United States and Europe after Iraq', transcript of the roundtable at the Brookings Institution, April 3, 2003.
[58] Pew Research Center, 'Bush unpopular in Europe, seen as unilateralist', August 15, 2001.

between US (shifting steadily downwards in support) and European public opinion (itself not unified) on this question.[59]

Anti-Americanism or anti-Bush-ism?

The most recent European survey data from the Pew Research Center (carried out during March)[60] shows a marked deterioration in perceptions of the United States since the CCFR-GMF study was carried out and from a previous Pew survey mid last year:

- Only 48% of those questioned in Britain held a favourable view of the United States (from 75% in 2002). The figure was marginally higher in Poland at 50% (from 79%). In France, only 31% held a favourable view (from 63% in 2002), 25% in Germany (from 61%), 34% in Italy (from 70%) and just 14% in Spain (no figure given for 2002).

- There was higher European support for greater independence, although the change was less marked over the year. 48% of those questioned in Britain favoured more independence (from 47% in 2002). The figure was 67% (from 60%) in France, 52% (from 51%) in Germany and 63% in Italy (from 59%).

- Interestingly though, when asked whether the problem was "mostly Bush" or "America in general", 76% of those in France and 68% in Germany answered "mostly Bush" compared to 56% in the United Kingdom, where one might have expected greater general affinity with the United States. On the contrary, 31% of Britons blamed "America in general" compared to just 15% in France.

- In connection to the 'Bush or America' question, partisan divisions within the United States on the question of Bush's foreign policy are also increasingly evident: 44% of Democrat voters were totally opposed to military action against Iraq, while 59% of Republicans supported unilateral action.

[59] See, for example, Anthony Blinken, 'The False Crisis Over the Atlantic', *Foreign Affairs* 80/3 (May/June 2001), pp.36-8.

Public opinion moving forward. The results of the latest surveys contain mixed messages for the European political class as it seeks to stabilise and reinforce EU-US relations:

- The negative is that the Bush administration is seen as a major problem and the Iraq crisis has severely and dramatically damaged European popular perceptions of the United States (even if many of those questioned believe that Iraq will be better off as a result – 76% of those questioned in Britain; 73% in France; 71% in Germany; and 61% in Italy).[61] The slanging matches since January between Washington and certain European capitals have probably further contributed to this.

- The positive is clearly that such distrust and unfavourable views may be more temporary and conjunctural than necessarily structural. The data does not suggest that, at public opinion level at least, the doom-laden scenario of a 'parting of the ways' or deep division is an immediate reality.

Further detailed survey data will be needed to confirm such conclusions, and public perception may in any case evolve if, for example, it is perceived that US unilateralism may be more bi-partisan than many had realised.

Elite opinion and EU-US divisions

Whatever the faults of generalisation that Kagan's work may contain, he puts his finger on a salient and crucial point in relation to the policy communities in Europe and the United States. While in Washington there is a sizeable, and apparently growing, group which believes in the unilateral exercise of power, acting with allies as and when it is convenient to do so, Europe on both right and left is dominated by multilateralists who do not wish to see the United States acting without recourse to international law and institutions: the EU's recent compromise Athens statement on the Iraq crisis (in a period where there is a majority of conservative governments in western Europe) is a powerful demonstration of this.

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[60] Pew Research Center, 'America's image further erodes, European want weaker ties', March 18, 2003.
[61] Pew Research Center, 'America's image further erodes, European want weaker ties', p.4.

An interesting point of debate is the extent to which the current European insistence on the importance of the United Nations and international law is merely instrumental: does it represent a genuine attachment to these facets of the international order, or is it rather motivated solely by a desire to use these as methods to constrain a United States that is unrivalled militarily (the ropes that the Liliputians use to restrain Gulliver, to employ an oft-used current metaphor). One only has to look at the intervention in Kosovo, broadly supported by most Europeans, to see an example of a regional crisis dealt with without the UN. Some have even claimed that there is an element of opportunism in EU opposition to the United States even in areas where the Europeans seem to find it the easiest to agree on such a line.[62]

However, it remains generally true that the EU as an economic and political construction is a symbol of the importance placed upon broadly-accepted rules and norms, and that it has played a significant part in taming member states and prompting them to act through multilateral fora. This does not mean that those (many) critics, including Kagan, who point to the relatively low level of military spending and of the coordination of procurement and research and development are wrong. As Javier Solana acknowledged in his recent address in Harvard, more needs to be done. Nonetheless, as Solana himself and other key figures and commentators have pointed out, simply spending more money is not a sensible solution.[63]

Different power for different powers

[62] "On environmental matters the EU pushed on regardless of the US position, and indeed because of it. Conviction mixed with the knowledge that here was an issue, like GM foods, where European opinion was firmly opposed to any significant move towards the Bush policy, and indeed where some relatively cheap political points could be scored. It is convenient for the Europeans to be able to show their unity on a question where the US seems to be behaving selfishly and short-sightedly, and where, of course, European interests - on energy, welfare and business - differ markedly". Chris Hill, 'EU Foreign Policy since 11 September 2001: Renationalising or Regrouping?', First annual guest lecture Europe in the World Centre, University of Liverpool, October 24, 2002.

[63] "[A]s far as contemporary security is concerned, there is no standard 'unit of account'. How much additional security does an aircraft carrier bring? Is it more or less than spending the equivalent amount of money on peacekeeping or the reconstruction of failed states?", Solana, "Mars and Venus reconciled: a new era for transatlantic relations", April 7, 2003, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

One of the great weaknesses of Kagan's book is his uni-dimensional appreciation of power.[64] The EU is seen as weak because it does not choose to develop and exercise conventional military power in the way that the United States has chosen to do so. However, there are a number of responses to this:

- First, such an approach represents a huge oversimplification. Europeans have not eschewed the use of military force. Their troops made a significant contribution to the war in Afghanistan, and to peacekeeping missions such as those in Kabul or Macedonia. These lattermost, while small scale, have the potential to escalate into something more militarily serious. And all this is, of course without mentioning the significant UK contribution to the war in the Gulf.

- Second, it is far from clear what the most appropriate way of dealing with the threat posed by international terrorism and the new security threat posed by potential WMD proliferation by states of concern / failed states actually is. Indeed, Bush's attempt to link these two issues inextricably in the 2002 State of the Union Address alarmed many observers in Europe. The power to defend national interests may come as much from a top class intelligence network and police force as from laser-guided missiles.

- Third, power is often exercised through influence, and influence can be developed through a number of 'soft' tools such as aid conditionality or preferential access to markets. With the EU rapidly becoming the most important trading block in the world, soft power has considerable potential, as is becoming increasingly evident in areas such as Palestine and Iran.[65]

- Finally, Europe and the United States are not so much separated by conflicting values as by different views of the most appropriate means to achieve their international objectives.

[64] This is a point well made in a review of Kagan's *Paradise and Power* by Mark Leonard in *New Statesman and Society*, March 17, 2003.
[65] See Everts, op. cit. and Andrew Rathmell et al., A New Persian Gulf Security System, RAND Issue Paper, 2003.

Recommendations

Clearly, the Union itself is not fully in control of the current situation or of its possible future development.

- Much will depend on the attitude of the United States, not only towards areas of concern highlighted by Europeans – notably the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – but also towards the European allies themselves. Talk of 'punishing' states that obstructed the path towards war in the Gulf is hardly helpful in terms of the imperative of rebuilding transatlantic relations.

- Second, the Union is crucially dependent upon consensus between its member states in order to function effectively. One fundamental and obvious consequence of the Iraq crisis has been the rift between Europe's two major military powers, the United Kingdom and France. It is not our place to suggest, amongst our recommendations, that this relationship be repaired as soon as possible. However, there is something incongruous about discussions in the Convention and elsewhere concerning institutional proposals for enhancing the effectiveness of CFSP and ESDP at a time when the two states whose active participation is crucial to the effectiveness of either are at loggerheads.

Nonetheless, three general recommendations can be made regarding what Europeans could and should do to promote CFSP / ESDP revival:

1. Multilateralism in practice

What emerges clearly from the above analysis is the fact that, whatever their differences over specific issues, all the EU member states share the objective of attempting to ensure that the US works through multilateral institutions rather than pursuing unilateralist foreign policy initiatives. In order to do this more effectively, they themselves must endeavour to work collectively through such organisations in their own dealings. Both the 'gang of eight' letter and the mini summit on defence

planned for late April served to undermine European solidarity. In so doing they both eased the path for those Americans keen to maintain a posture of divide and rule vis-a-vis the 'Old Continent', and undermined their own case in arguing for the need for multilateralism in contemporary international affairs. As Philip Stephens has put it recently: "The presumption by France and Germany that they could speak for Europe followed by the public retaliation led by Spain and Britain brought only smiles to the faces of Washington's unilateralists."[66]

One possible means of addressing the tendency of unilateralist or small group initiatives to undermine Union solidarity would be to define more closely the scope of the Union's external policy ambitions. The EU, and EC before it, have had a marked tendency to define themselves in somewhat aspirational terms. Thus, the stipulations concerning not only the mechanics of the CFSP in the Maastricht Treaty, but also the aspiration to go further and eventually build – should the European Council agree – a common defence. The problem with such an approach is that it has a tendency to raise expectations unrealistically. Whilst this is relatively unproblematic in the sphere of domestic policies of the Union, the dangers of such an approach to external affairs have been all too evident in the myriad pieces bemoaning the death of the CFSP that have followed the recent Iraq crisis. Clearly identifying those issues on which the Union will act and those that will be left primarily to member states (perhaps in the context of the wise men's study we propose below) could be one way of avoiding such disenchantment.

2. EU institutions and CFSP

It is not the purpose of this paper to produce detailed recommendations for EU institutional change based on our analysis. The current state of these relations, however, does give pause for thought concerning at least two aspects of the Union's institutional architecture.

[66] 'Capital E', E! Sharp, April 2003.

- The creation of a European foreign minister / Council chair with a foreign policy remit. Clearly there are divisions between the European member states over one of the most important strands of foreign policy – relations with the United States. Clearly, too, these will not simply disappear with the final resolution of the Iraq crisis. Thus claiming, or seeming to claim, that Europe will create institutions to allow it to speak with a single voice is something to be treated with caution for the reasons alluded to in our discussion of the need to define the range of the CFSP. It is inconceivable that particularly the larger member states will defer to a European Council Chair or EU foreign minister, whoever these individuals might be. Thus care must be taken, in both presentational and institutional design terms to allow enough flexibility in the overall European foreign policy system that each instance of unilateral action (and these will continue) is not viewed as a failure of the new institution.

- The EU presidency should not be bypassed if it is not held by one of the larger member states. This happened both in the preparations for the letter by the 'gang of eight' – where the presidency was not consulted (although the signatories purported to speak for 'Europe') – and the recent Athens summit, where the declaration was reportedly drafted in advance by France, the United Kingdom, Spain and Germany. Institutions created to ease the task of pursuing multilateral policies should be involved in the formulation of these policies both in order to prevent resentment on the part of the smaller member states, and in order that Europe can be seen to be practising what it is preaching to the United States.

3. Be clearer about strategic objectives: towards an 'EU Security Plan'?

In order that the EU be able to act more effectively both towards the United States and in international relations more generally, a more sustained effort must be made to identify the Union's position on the major global issues. One particular criticism of the EU that has been made in this respect – particularly from the United States – is that it is too preoccupied with its own internal

development, which has bred a degree of introspection. This, it is claimed, prevents the Union from being clear about how it is positioned strategically in the current geo-political environment.[67]

We would recommend that steps be taken to identify both key global security issues, and the degree of consensus that exists between member states on appropriate measures to be taken in connection with them. The recent meeting about WMD represented an interesting and important first step in the right direction, but the task needs to be carried out in a far more wide-ranging and systematic way. The EU should appoint a group of senior experts capable of carrying out such a survey and considering the possibility of developing a US-style 'Security Plan' for the Union. The group would try to identify the provenance and nature of potential threats to European security, together with recommendations as to how best to tackle them. This would represent a concerted attempt on the part of the Union to look beyond immediate responses to international crises. It is only within the context of such a strategic assessment that plans for the development of either CFSP or ESDP can be effectively put into place.

Of course, sceptics might point out that the very nature of the EU means that a Security Plan would be unnecessary and that, certainly in the case of terrorism, specific member states – notably now the United Kingdom, Spain and Italy – may be far more likely targets and would need to undertake the appropriate security assessment at national level. Of course, we are not suggesting that national level planning should cease or be supplanted. On the contrary, it should feed into the overall EU assessment. However, as the struggle against the perpetrators of September 11 has demonstrated, there are many areas where European member states need to cooperate to be effective. Indeed, terrorism is only one area that the Security Plan would touch on. There is a far broader set of security questions, concerning the shape of the broader international political, economic, military and technological environment that are worthy of consideration.

[67] As Richard Haass, Director of Policy Planning at the US State Department put it: 'We have strong relationships and alliances around the world, but there is no "concert" of like-minded powers with the consensus, institutions, and capabilities to ensure the orderly functioning of the international system... Instead, today's Europe is occupied with completing its own internal development" ('From Reluctant to Resolute: American Foreign Policy after September 11', Address to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, June 26, 2002).

Postscript

This paper was originally commissioned by the Greek Presidency of the European Union as background for the informal meeting of Foreign Ministers held on May 2-3, 2003. At that meeting, the ministers agreed to ask the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, to start work on the development of an EU security doctrine incorporating an opinion concerning appropriate circumstances for the resort to the use of force.

Certainly, this represents a step in the right direction, in the sense that, as we point out in our recommendations, the EU's external policies need to be guided by a more explicit framework for action in the form of an EU Security Plan. Our reservations concern process more than intended outcome. The problems inherent in EU foreign and security policies – of which transatlantic relations represent a crucial element – stem in the main from the divisions between member states on issues as varied as the appropriate conditions for the use of force and the kind of relationship the EU should aspire to have with the United States.

Given this, it is imperative that member states themselves be involved in formulating any such Security Plan. Partly, this is in order to foster a sense of ownership on their part. Partly too, it is because only the member states themselves can commit to work together. This is in no way a criticism of Mr Solana himself, who has performed far more effectively than many thought possible when the post of High Representative was first created in the Amsterdam Treaty. Rather, it represents an acceptance of reality: the member states are the crucial actors in EU foreign and security policy and hence they must decide to what extent they are willing to cooperate in these policy sectors.

Consequently, national capitals must be encouraged to work together in devising a framework for EU involvement in security affairs. As we recommend in our original report above, this could be achieved through their involvement, or the involvement of experts from the various member states. A longer term measure that would foster greater convergence and participation on the part of national foreign policy establishments is the recreation of the old Political Committee. This would bring together the political directors of national foreign ministers, and represents an irreplaceable way of coordinating national foreign policy positions. These meetings could be chaired by the High Representative. The model for this is the Delors committee entrusted with discussing the modalities of EMU, which involved the participation of the key national decision-makers in the relevant policy area, in a committee chaired by a senior EU official.

The recent history of relations between the EU and US illustrates not only the importance of foreign affairs but also the fact that consensus between the member states is a *sine qua non* for EU effectiveness in this domain. It is unrealistic to expect that agreement on all aspects of security affairs can be secured by fiat or at all in the short term. Thus it is crucial that steps are taken not only to identify areas of common interest and consensus, but also to promote further convergence through regular interaction between national officials. Both the Union and its member states must learn from the harsh experience of recent months and work to enhance the effectiveness of the EU's external policies.

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