

THE ROLE AND PLACE OF PARLIAMENTS IN A GENUINE ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION

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At the head of the meeting of Speakers of Parliaments in Nicosia from 21 to 23 April 2013, *Notre Europe - Jacques Delors Institute* publishes this synthesis of an expert seminar organised together with the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) on the topic “The Role of Parliaments in the Coordination of Budgetary and Economic Policies” in which 30 experts and decision makers from the European and the national level participated in Brussels on 25 March 2013.

Introduction

This synthesis attempts to order the many important points which were raised by the participants of the seminar, according to institutional logic and to their level of national or EU policy making. It does not try to present a solution, but rather discuss ideas around the topical question of the role and place of parliaments in a genuine Economic and Monetary Union.

The seminar was introduced by Ernst STETTER, Secretary General of the Foundation for European Progressive Studies.

In its **first session** on “Political and Legal Uncertainties in the existing Budgetary and Economic Policy Coordination” (moderated by Christian DEUBNER) Christophe CARESCHE, Member of the French National Assembly; Marcel HAAG, Head of Unit, Europe 2020 - European Semester, Secretariat General of the European Commission; Johannes LINDNER, Head of EU Institutions and Fora Division, European Central Bank; Olivier ROZENBERG, Associate Research Professor, Centre d'études européennes, Sciences Po Paris; and Manuel SARRAZIN, Member of the German Parliament gave short introductions.

The **second session** on “Differentiation in Budgetary and Economic Policy Coordination” (moderated by Valentin KREILINGER) featured

Poul Skytte CHRISTOFFERSEN, Ambassador of Denmark in Belgium; Christian DEUBNER, Member of the Scientific Council of the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS); and Agata GOSTYNSKA, Research Fellow at the Polish Institute of International Affairs.

The **third session** on Multi-Parliamentarism was moderated by Olivier ROZENBERG, Associate Research Professor, Centre d'études européennes, Sciences Po Paris. Roberto GUALTIERI, Member of the European Parliament; Andreas MAURER, Head of Brussels Office, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik; Marcel MERSCH, Head of Unit, Economic and Social Policy, S&D Group; and Julie SMITH, Professor of International Relations, University of Cambridge, gave introductory statements.



In the **fourth session** on the “Convergence of National Policy Processes” (moderated by Christian DEUBNER) Markus GALLANDER, Adviser on Budgetary Issues, Parliamentary Group of the SPD; Beatrice GIANANI, Permanent Representative of the Italian Senate to the EU; Christian KASTROP, Deputy Director-General of the Economic Policy Department, Directorate for Public Finance and Economic Affairs, German Federal Ministry of Finance; Renaud THILLAYE, Senior Researcher, Policy Network; and Shahin VALLEE, Member of the Cabinet of the President of the European Council provided short introductions.

Yves BERTONCINI, Director of *Notre Europe - Jacques Delors Institute* concluded the event.

1. The political and legal landscape

The first session took the form of a brainstorming, aiming to bring out the most important reserves and uncertainties vis-à-vis the enormous challenges posed by the new coordination structures.

1.1. National parliaments in applying the new rules

The national structures of implementing the new rules of budgetary and economic policy coordination confront actors with some of the most important challenges. Many of them are well-known, but they gain added importance as the new EU policy rules reach much further into national policy domains.

Typical for this is for instance the difficulty of finding a unified parliamentary approach to complex EU issues the different elements of which are dealt with in many different parliamentary committees, Members of national parliaments (MPs) complain about this problem also in relation to the parliamentary control of European Semester-implementation.

National governments - more or less controlled and influenced by national parliaments: Governments are the principal partners of the European Commission and the Council during the European Semester, especially via their national Stability and Convergence Programmes. Parliaments are very differently equipped to influence these crucial national contributions to the coordination process. Certain of them complain about being restricted to a mere approval/disapproval vote of national Stability programmes, others about governments not giving them enough

time to scrutinise them. In a more general vein, MPs are dissatisfied with their limited access to insider knowledge about European policy making, which the governments divulge at their own leisure.

With all these insufficiencies, **certain parliaments have nevertheless reached very high degrees of control over their governments’ European policies**, including those concerning the budgetary and economic policy coordination. The German Bundestag has gained especially far-reaching powers in all decisions involving substantial budgetary risks or engagements, for instance in EU financial support programmes to certain member states with public solvency problems. The Bundestag also exercises sharp control over the government’s decisions concerning central new elements of budgetary and economic policy coordination, as the TSCG, or the banking union legislation.

Even so, control and influence of most national parliaments hit a barrier concerning their heads of state or government acting at the level of EU summits. Here it proves difficult to achieve the same degree of influence or even control which parliaments enjoy vis-à-vis government ministers acting in EU legislation and executive action. This remains a serious challenge given the eminent role which the summits continue to play in creating and implementing budgetary and economic policy coordination. Nevertheless, research has shown that progress has been made over the last years, albeit with large differences between the different member states. **Certain parliaments have achieved a degree of ex-ante control and influence on their Prime minister’s policy line at the summit, together with ex-post scrutiny; others have rather tried to hold their government leaders to account after the summits.**¹ But satisfying models remain rare among the twenty seven member states.

1.2. National vis-à-vis EU-level

The borderline between national/member state policy and EU/Eurozone competences becomes increasingly blurred. Accordingly, policy makers of each of the two sides find it more difficult to propose useful solutions to the most urgent problems all in remaining clearly within their traditional remit. Decisions made at either one of the two levels alone, many MPs and officials think, cannot really be legitimate any more. They are likely to provoke resistance and conflicts which might reduce the acceptance of

European solutions. Decision makers thus look for different modes of cooperation between the two levels, to bridge the gap and to increase policy ownership at national level (see section 3).

MPs also find themselves in a basic contradiction between their national task and the evolving European one. Closely linked to their national constituencies around national issues, they have difficulties to commit themselves to coordination structures at the European level.

EU-coordination calendar vs. national budgetary calendar: Seen from the EU level, a further first-order challenge is the synchronisation of the different budgetary processes in national parliaments, with the unified rhythm of EU wide budgetary policy coordination. In spite of substantial advances, this challenge is not yet thought to have been met in satisfactory manner.

Complexity: The complexity of different parallel coordination processes, taking place at different levels of cooperation (i.e. European semester, TSCG, Two Pack), still rapidly evolving, and having to be coordinated within a tight calendar, is a general concern because of a fear of responsible institutions to be unable to preserve full oversight and create coherent policy in this area. There is no interest to add still more coordination instruments, but to integrate the existing ones, as far as possible, into one European semester.

Banking Union: Legislation on Banking Union will intensify the load of political coordination. This would not remain only a matter of ECB surveillance, but would also demand new and sometimes farther reaching policy decisions at the national level.

Ownership and Compliance: Another frequently voiced concern regarded **the ownership of national political systems over the new coordinating measures at EU level**. After all, the scope, intrusiveness and binding force of these measures extend ever further into domains which were still considered national prerogatives even under the Lisbon strategy. How can these measures, and the accompanying conditionality, be prevented from being perceived as external constraints, and their objectives be mainstreamed even more closely into strictly national policies and the domestic political debate about them?

Important Eurozone actors still consider the new coordination structures - including the European semester - insufficient to hold national budgetary and growth policies in check. This might lead to an even more explicit inclusion of the national parliaments and the European Parliament in the system. Such a step would support those who plead for national parliaments gaining a stronger say in the drawing up of national stability and convergence plans, taking externalities more explicitly into account than up to now. The European Parliament might hold hearings of national governments defending their national semesters in committee, in the context of the economic dialogue. And there is also the idea of EU Commission and ECB representatives lobbying national parliaments more frequently.

1.3. EU Institutions

Finally, the evolution of European institutions and their manner of dealing with the new issues is of concern at many levels.

Council: As to the Council, there were contradictory appreciations. On the one hand, it now appears as an increasingly united actor, searching common positions for instance in evaluating individual Euro member states' budgetary stances, as compared to the former bilateralism between the affected MS government and the Commission. On the other hand, Council members often appear as more interested in defending their national interests than those of the EU, its proceedings are intransparent and secretive and not suited for a legislative body at EU level, especially in comparison to the European parliament. This reproach is even more frequently made to the European Council.

European Parliament: In comparison, the European Parliament was seen (together with the Commission) as the most European of EU institutions, to which a bigger role ought to be given in the new coordinating procedures, not only in the economic dialogue, but also in the formulation of ex-ante budgetary and economic policy benchmarks for the member states.



2. Fences and borders within the EU: What are the consequences of differentiated integration?

The second session addressed the relation between the EU and EMU: the consequences of differentiation in budgetary and economic policies and their coordination, for member states and their parliaments as well as for the European institutions.

2.1. What is differentiated integration?

Differentiation means that countries are not compelled to participate in a certain project, if they do not want to, and that the others are not blocked if they like to go further. Jacques Delors has defined differentiation as “one of the keys to Europe’s dynamism today, just as it has always been in the past”. Indeed, the phenomenon is not new: **Schengen and the Economic and Monetary Union are the most significant cases of differentiated integration.**

Preferences of member states: Differentiated integration can be seen a response to heterogeneous preferences between member states. This heterogeneity does not result from the 2004 enlargement, but already existed before: New member states fall within the range of preferences of the “old” member states.

In terms of confidentiality and exclusivity, the crisis has increased differences between the member states whose currency is the euro and the rest. The Eurozone can decide to advance without taking “pre-ins” on board, if their demands are judged as diluting the proposals. But the agreement on the Single Supervisory Mechanism proves that there is an awareness of the position of non-Eurozone members is a growing and that these positions are being taken into account.

2.2. Classification of differentiated integration: taking stock of existing groups of member states

How differentiated is the EU actually? Four major groups of member states exist: firstly, the 17 and soon 18 member states whose currency is the euro (the Eurozone); secondly, the “pre-ins” that have ambition to become member of the Eurozone in the future (the banking union can be seen as a test case on what side of the fence these states intend to be);

thirdly, the “wait and see” group whose “members” sit on the fence: Hungary, the Czech Republic and Sweden might be among them - while the fourth group may be constituted by one single member state, the United Kingdom.

Heterogeneity of these groups: The term “pre-in” which was mooted by “Future of Europe group” created at the initiative of German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle², is actually a generic term: **there is no internal cohesion among all the member states that have the legal obligation to join the euro.** These countries are divided on issues like how to go further in the integration process and on whether to take the necessary steps to fulfil the convergence criteria for their introduction of the euro. Even with a separate “wait and see” group, the remaining “pre-in” countries are still heterogeneous. At the same time, member states whose currency is the euro are also heterogeneous.

Instruments: The basis for differentiated integration can be either community instruments (which include opt-outs to the treaties and “enhanced cooperation” following to Article 20 TEU) or separate treaties like the TSCG (or, earlier, Schengen) that are concluded outside the community framework, but can still attribute competences to supranational institutions (as does the TSCG). These treaties can be integrated into the EU treaties at a later stage.

2.3. Key issues of differentiated integration

Persistence: An interesting feature of differentiated integration is its persistence: Initially foreseen to be a short-term measure, opt-outs and sub-groups are more persistent than thought at the moment of their creation. **Any form of differentiation should be open to every country that is willing to join, even at a later stage and this should be subject of common rules and criteria.** At the same time, in the case of the TSCG, “pre-in” countries have been able to choose the extent to which they want to be bound by the new rules when they signed up to the new treaty (Article 3 TSCG, for instance). In a similar way, the Single Supervisory Mechanism gives an exit clause to pre-in countries - in future, they might, however, have to share more obligations, since Eurozone countries might see some of the provisions that concern the decision making rights of “pre-ins” as too liberal.

Cohesion: Is the cooperation in the Eurozone endangering the cohesion of the EU as a whole? Differentiation only exists at the level of the national governments (Eurogroup and Eurosummit as sub-groups of the Ecofin formation of Council of Ministers, and the European Council); all other institutions have been stable and inclusive with all 27 member states.

Democracy at the national level: Differentiated integration does not affect all national parliaments in the same way: the powers of parliaments that are opposed to deepened integration are preserved (their countries do not take part in differentiated integration); the powers of national parliaments, whose countries take part, are affected – but depending on whether differentiated integration takes place inside or outside the treaties: these parliaments could strive for a common parliamentary body, if outside the union. If differentiated integration takes place inside, the European Parliament stands ready for democratic control, but the competences of national parliaments are affected – especially if such closer cooperation concerns budgetary and economic policies.

Democracy at the European level: The role of European Parliament might be challenged because of **its composition that includes MEPs from member states not taking part in the differentiated integration.** MEPs from member states that do not take part in an enhanced cooperation could tip the balance in a vote on launching an enhanced cooperation following Article 20 TEU or be an obstacle if there was a second reading on a legislative text that established such an enhanced cooperation under co-decision (where an absolute majority of all MEPs is required), but, obviously, there are also many questions that do not fall under co-decision (for example with respect to the European semester). Any split of the European Parliament could endanger the whole body that is the key actor for democratic control in the political system of the EU. Interestingly, the House of Commons also discussed this problem (the “West Lothain question”) with respect to devolution in the United Kingdom: Scottish MPs vote on laws that only affect England: in Scotland these matters are devolved to the Parliament in Edinburgh.

Differentiated integration and the role and place of both national parliaments and the European Parliament in the coordination of budgetary and economic policies will also be shaped by external

developments: The question of parliamentary control re-arises with a possible “Fiscal capacity”; here, the control mechanism could be adapted depending on whether the contribution(s) come from the community budget (controlled by the European Parliament) or national budgets (controlled by national parliaments).³ And if some of the budgetary and economic policy proposals or recommendations to be implemented at the national level were not “soft”, but “hard” law (in line with the trend to make “harder” recommendations in economic and fiscal policies which only apply to sub-groups), should multi-parliamentary cooperation, stable bridges between parliaments be built?



3. Bridges between parliaments: Under what conditions can multi-parliamentary cooperation provide an added value?

The third session discussed “bridges between parliaments”: Multi-parliamentarism stands for a concept meant to **accompany the EU’s executive-dominated budgetary and economic policy coordination with more parliamentary control - to be exercised jointly by national parliaments and the European Parliament** and thus to use their double legitimacy. The session looked at different models of multi-parliamentary cooperation; its participants engaged in a controversial debate about the merits of this concept and how to make it work and they discussed some design elements for the emerging inter-parliamentary architecture.

3.1. Different ideas about multi-parliamentary cooperation

It is possible to distinguish different broad ideas that are currently being discussed⁴:

- The first one could be called “Eurochamber”: National MPs would control a Eurozone government that would be composed of their national governments. Thus, multi-parliamentarism here has a purely national meaning: national parliaments establish a permanent cooperation.
- The second idea has been put forward by the “Future of Europe group” created at the initiative of German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle: For EMU matters voting rights in the European Parliament would be limited to Eurozone MEPs.
- The third option is inspired from the newly-created Conference for CFSP and CSDP (that subsumes the task of the WEU Assembly). Such a conference would combine both level and be composed of 6 MPs per member state and 16 MEPs in total.⁵

3.2. Considerations with respect to cooperation between parliaments

Main argument: The Protocol n°1 on the role of national parliaments and Article 13 TSCG provide the legal basis for setting up multi-parliamentary control. These provisions are vague about competences and composition of such a multi-parliamentary control; they put forward a “conference”. Within the European Parliament this multi-parliamentarism is often perceived as an attempt to impede the European Parliament from a drive for full parliamentary control of the decisions implementing coordination under EMU, either by according a parliamentary role to COSAC-style assemblies without true influence on an EU-level policy, or having the European Parliament participate in such assemblies eo ipso making them ‘inter-parliamentary’, but not any better entitled to the exercise of true control over EMU.

Differentiation: The differentiation of EMU policy making, dealt with in section 2, is seen as a first crucial variable which complicates parliamentary participation at EMU level by a controversy about representation: MEPs represent Union citizens; can they make decisions in EMU format? Even if a leading role is given to “Eurozone MEPs”, this has been questioned, but in fact, this has not been a problem in recent decisions. The fact that member states (with the exception of those that have an opt-out) are still expected to join the single currency decreases the

significance of the gap, but multi-parliamentary control remains a possible option.

Legal basis: A second complicating variable concerns the legal quality of the decisions implementing coordination under EMU. If member states are seen to retain their budgetary and economic policy prerogatives in Stability and Growth Pact and TSCG, can the European Parliament enter into the decision making process? Actually “coordination” (the word put forward in budgetary and economic policies) could be seen as a special kind of shared competences; since these policies are neither exclusive nor complementary. It is not a coordination of fully national competences. The EU can certainly not adopt directives, but can adopt binding decisions and obligations, including within the EMU framework. This would lead to the conclusion that the European Parliament is still able to make decisions, alone or together with national parliaments in a setting to exercise multi-parliamentary control.

Competences: Should multi-parliamentary involvement in consequence become a forum for discussion without control prerogatives? The European Parliament had already expressed many of its concerns in the Thyssen report of November 2012.⁶ It mentions the risk that multi-parliamentary control does not increase legitimacy but undermines the existing set-up (puts into question the legitimacy of the role of the European Parliament in economic and monetary policies). Important prerogatives for a multi-parliamentary body could bring the EU back to something similar to 1979 (and its indirect election of the MEPs).

Certain participants proposed to react to the double dilemma of parliamentary participation in EMU, by a two-pronged approach. **Concerning the competences of a new multi-parliamentary body, they would be limited to one important issue: The reinforcement of national parliaments’ scrutiny vis-à-vis national decision makers. There are good reasons for this, all in respecting the EU and the European Parliament as they are. The role of the European Parliament, on the other hand, could be strengthened in the European Semester** (for example amendments to the Annual Growth Survey).

It was also noted that when national parliaments come to the European Parliament in the “European

parliamentary week”, there is democratic activity in terms of speeches and debates, but little outcome. Instead of only meeting for discussion, at least a joint resolution could be agreed on at this occasion.

Motivational and procedural aspects: The motivation question is following directly from the competences: Motivation of MPs and MEPs is linked to the prerogatives. Is an inter-parliamentary conference attractive for national MPs? This concerns the value of the discussions and their visibility. Depending on the electoral system for national parliaments, many MPs could decide to use the time for their constituencies in order to ensure their own re-election. Electoral systems that ensure a close link between the MP and the citizens could hence be an obstacle for multi-parliamentary cooperation.

If competences are limited, it is also important to note that democracy is not only about decision making but that debating and arguing are also essential parts of parliamentary life, especially in Nordic countries. These functions are vital for more ownership of national parliaments in budgetary and economic policies coordination.

Motivational problems also encumber the democratisation impulse in a more general sense: It is not that high on the EMU governments’ agenda any longer: there was no new mission to the President of the European Council at the December summit and the building block on “Democratic Control and Accountability”⁷ still needs to be filled (it has very little substance up to now).

3.3. Design elements for the emerging inter-parliamentary architecture

The most concrete proposal that has been put on the table so far (and to which documents that are preparing the meeting of the Speakers of Parliaments in Nicosia from April 21 to 23 refer to) is the report of the French National Assembly, prepared by Christophe Caresche.⁸ In light of considerations of the previous section, **the proposal to create an inter-parliamentary conference with the task to monitor, to exchange information and to adopt joint resolutions seems like a feasible compromise.** Possibly with an “inner circle” for the Eurozone (a committee that deals with ESM matters) and this conference for budgetary and economic policy coordination being designed according to the conference for CFSP and

CSDP, this could easily turn out to be the central element of the emerging inter-parliamentary architecture that meets twice a year. This conference would implement Article 13 TSCG, avoid major splits and constitute an inter-parliamentary forum. It will be essential to engage all committees dealing with economic governance at large.



4. Junctions in national policy processes: How much similarity is necessary and possible?

The fourth session went beyond the question asked in the introductory question. The concern about the sustainability of differentiation in the face of urgent need for a more effective common coordination was understood to include not only the strong **divergence between national systems of ownership of and of compliance with the new rule-sets.** It was extended to the excessive diversity of the rule-sets themselves, instituted as they are, at the EU community level, at the EU intergovernmental level and at the international treaty level. And it also affected the medium-term vision for the appropriate integration level of the European Union and especially the Eurozone.

It was acknowledged that within the new coordination legislation, especially the Six-Pack, all parliaments already have to converge to the high degree of full involvement which the legislation explicitly demands, down to the committee level, for instance in the fiscal surveillance regulation. The TSCG adds to these obligations. But up to now, the EU legislation also respects large remaining differences, demanding such involvement stay “in line with national constitutional arrangements”. Should the EU ask for more?

4.1. Three models and their characteristics

Italy, Germany and France served as ‘models’ of how to play the role intended for national parliaments within the Eurozone of today and tomorrow, which would be ever more closely coordinated.

The German and the Italian parliaments share the basic ambition to comply fully with the new EU rules in the fields of budgetary and economic policy making. In this endeavor, both seem to defend a strengthening of the European Parliament and the European Commission and want to reduce the intergovernmentalism that is prevalent in the European summits and the Council of Ministers. At that level they also demand more transparency, less defense of national interests, less competence arrogation to the executives united in Council.

Germany: The line between national competences on the one, and European ones on the other, seems to be clearer for the German side. And the German parliament, pushed and legally underpinned by the German constitutional court, appears intent on stabilising this line against the pressure of mounting Europeanisation in this sector, and on preventing excessive blurring of competences. The Bundestag plays a responsible role in compliance, but also in standing their ground as to their budgetary powers even where this strongly reduced the government’s freedom of defining the German position in the new coordination of policies and the accordance of aid to illiquid member states whose currency is the euro, incidentally also preserving the maximum amount of national co-determination of European affairs.

Italy: Its parliament seems to draw the line - between national competences on the one, and European ones on the other side - closer to the core of Italian sovereignty and to concede more terrain to the EU. In its emphasis on getting more ownership of the new coordination procedures, it would also appear to accept some more blurriness between the national and a certain European role of the parliament. Insofar, it is more a model EU rule-taker with less emphasis than the Germans on a strong autonomous role in EU rule-making and EU rule application. In a certain manner this can also be seen in the prompt institutionalisation of an “Independent Body” - following Article 3 TSCG - for evaluating Italy’s compliance with the new coordination rules. Germany is still behind on

this point, slower to relinquish an older executive-leaning federal control body.

France: In the cases of Germany and Italy there appeared **no demand of further convergence between their respective parliamentary rule books in national compliance procedures with the new coordination rules.** This policy line is also taken by the majority of the French National Assembly, albeit less unequivocally than in Italy and Germany. There are more open demands for increasing the French parliament’s budgetary power and even following, as much as possible, with the Bundestag’s envied role in influencing the government’s European policy positions.

4.2. Just as much convergence as necessary?

There are dangers in aiding or demanding national actors to harmonise national parliamentary procedures for the sake of more effective European policy implementation. **Convergence of national parliamentary EU policymaking competences would likely take the strongest actor as benchmark. But if all parliaments aspired to the same powers as the Bundestag, this would, lead the Eurozone towards a situation of in-governability.**

The European Commission has not demanded still more convergence of national procedures, despite its avowed difficulties in achieving more effective European centralised policy implementation. As to national governments and parliaments, adapting their own policy cycles to this new EU process, was as such already considered a highly demanding task. A proposal for improving the effectiveness came only from the Council side, but with less emphasis on further convergence of parliamentary procedures and rather advising to clarify the institutional nature of the new structures of coordination, positing them more clearly on the national or on the European side of the borderline between member states and Brussels institutions and competencies. This line also received support from member state government side, with a clear demand for self-responsible compliance of national institutions within their national competence, with the new rules of EU-wide coordination. More harmonisation and centralisation should be avoided and could only come at a later stage of integration and federalisation.

It was only from the European Central Bank (see the first session), and from academic and think tank experts that the need for still more intensity and convergence of parliamentary procedures was underlined.

Firstly they perceived a crucial change in the EU's powers: It is on its way from a largely regulatory role to much more important redistributive functions. National parliaments hold the legitimacy concerning national budgets; this necessitated their full involvement even more than formerly. Closer to the session topic were two other arguments: On the one hand the admission that even with excellent constitutional provisions for parliamentary participation - as in Italy - there was no assurance that they would actually be applied. On the other hand, many medium and small member states with weaker state structures had only adapted parliamentary procedures to the European Semester 'on paper', without being willing or able to change their practice accordingly. One might at least seek a kind of formalised and verifiable corridor of procedural minima to be respected by all parliaments in complying with the European semester legislation, which might help for more effective policy coordination in the future.



Conclusion

The seminar allowed the Foundation of European Progressive Studies and *Notre Europe - Jacques Delors Institute* to join forces for an intensive expert debate among EU and national experts and decision makers. It contributed to the clarification of concepts and the emergence of new ideas and proposals for this important institutional question. In the context of the a further deepening of the EMU, the implementation of Article 13 TSCG and the discussions around the building block "Democratic Control and Accountability", the role and place of Parliaments in a genuine Economic and Monetary Union will remain a crucial topic in the ongoing debate.

1. Olivier Rozenberg and Wolfgang Wessels (dir.), Claudia Heffttler, Valentin Kreilinger, Mirte Van Den Berge and Laura Ventura, "Democratic Control in the Member States of the European Council and the Euro zone summits", Study by *Notre Europe - Jacques Delors Institute* and *TEPSA* at the request of the European Parliament, March 2013.
2. Future of Europe Group, "Final Report of the Future of Europe Group of the Foreign Ministers of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain", 17 September 2012.
3. Yves Bertoncini, "The parliaments of the EU and the governance of the EMU. What parliamentary dimension for the 'political union'?", *Tribune, Notre Europe - Jacques Delors Institute*, April 2013.
4. Andreas Maurer, "From EMU to DEMU: The Democratic Legitimacy of the EU and the European Parliament", *IAI Working Paper 1311*, Istituto Affari Internazionali, April 2013.
5. Working paper of the meeting of the Speakers of Parliament of the Founding Member States of the European Union and the European Parliament in Luxembourg on 11 January 2013.
6. Report with recommendations to the Commission on the report of the Presidents of the European Council, the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the Eurogroup, "Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union" (2012/2151(INI)).
7. "Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union", 5 December 2012; see also: "A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union, Launching a European Debate", European Commission, 30 November 2012, COM(2012) 777 final/2.
8. For precise proposals on the EMU inter-parliamentary conference, see Christophe Caresche, "Rapport d'information de l'Assemblée nationale", n° 202, 25 September 2012.

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