

Externalisation of migration management, a need for clarification

I • Definition

The externalisation of migration management is a component of the policies put in place by a given country to manage migration flows, in particular irregular arrivals. Although some practices like visa regimes, carriers' sanctions or preclearance bordering methods could be considered as externalisation practices unilaterally put in place to prevent irregular arrivals, the current understanding refers to practices whereby countries faced with important arrival of migration movements attempt to transfer part or totality of the management of these arrivals outside of their borders. It is a rather large concept that includes various approaches, ranging from border management and prevention of irregular departures, processing of asylum claims and or returns to the country of origin.

It requires the collaboration and agreement of a third country, possibly of EU agencies (Frontex so far), and in some cases the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), Interna-

tional Organisation for Migration (IOM) or NGOs can be involved as well. It is accompanied by substantial financial support to the collaborating third country to cover the costs incurred but, beyond a mere contribution to the costs, it must be sufficiently attractive to convince the latter to engage in such a process.

II • Rationale behind the growing interest of transferring part or the entirety of the management of migration outside national borders

The main objective of externalising or offshoring migration management is the willingness to reduce irregular arrivals, to lower the burden of asylum authorities that have to process individual claims despite the fact that many of the applicants have a rather low probability of being accepted (the average recognition rate at first instance is about 40% in the EU), to address the difficulty of returning people who have been refused asylum (in the EU not more than

**MIGRATIONS &
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Monique Pariat,
former Director
General for
Migration, Internal
Security and Crisis
Management of
the European
Commission

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for their comments
the members of
The Jacques Delors
Institute working
group on asylum and
migration, including
Judith Kohlenberger,
Blanca Garcés,
Jean-Louis
Debrouwer and
Jerome Vignon.*



30% of return ordered people are effectively returned to their country of origin) and to mitigate the political sensitivity of migration.

III • An international trend, experiences outside Europe

Some experiences have been developed and experimented in other parts of the world than Europe, in particular in Australia and more recently in the USA.

I AUSTRALIA

In Australia, it was initiated in 2001 until 2007 under the name of the Pacific Solution, whereby asylum seekers arriving by sea to Australia were intercepted before landing and transferred to detention centres on Nauru or Papua New Guinea (PNG) where their asylum claim would be examined with the possibility of resettlement to Australia or other countries.

A new initiative was launched in 2013 under the name of the Regional Resettlement Arrangement between Australia and Papua New Guinea, commonly called the PNG solution. Under this scheme asylum seekers who come to Australia by boat without a visa would be refused settlement in Australia, transferred to a detention centre in PNG Manus Island where their claim would be processed. If they were found to be legitimate, they would be resettled in Papua New Guinea, if not they would be either repatriated, sent to a third country other than Australia or remain in detention indefinitely.

The financial cost of this scheme is difficult to be measured with accurateness, but estimates suggest that it was on average at least A\$1 billion per year and reached upwards of A\$1.49 billion in 2017–18¹.

It is very much debated if the programme succeeded in discouraging refugees to arrive to Australia by boat. During the first phase (13 August 2012–18 July 2013), when offshore processing was implemented with the possibility of resettlement in Australia for people

found to be refugees, more than 24,000 asylum seekers arrived in Australia by boat. This number was considerably more than at any other time since the 1970s, when boats of asylum seekers were first recorded in Australia. After the new bar on resettlement in Australia more than 1,500 people on at least 21 boats arrived in the first 16 days of the policy change. The number of boat arrivals dropped dramatically only after Australia began maritime interceptions and returned to pre-2007 levels by 2016 (two years after the government stopped transferring people offshore). In parallel, arrivals by plane of people claiming asylum increased².

Australia's policy has been criticized internationally, from United Nations bodies and national and international human rights organisations contesting its compliance with the fundamental principles of the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention. In December 2021, the Morrison Government ended the programme, leaving the PNG Government with full responsibility for the refugees remaining in the country.

I USA

In reaction to the strict border policy implemented under the Trump I administration, the Biden Administration tried to initiate new approaches to a more human and welcoming migration while addressing the extremely challenging increases of arrivals at the Mexican border.

In 2022 different options to incentivise legal arrivals and discourage irregular ones were proposed:

- Humanitarian Parole Programmes were offered first to Venezuelans abroad (they would need to have a sponsor in the US and been able to pay their plane ticket) and further expanded to Cubans, Haitians and Nicaraguans.
- This was combined with a strict border policy where people arriving illegally at the border would be removed without examining their asylum claims.

1 https://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/sites/kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/files/Policy_Brief_11_Offshore_Processing.pdf

2 *ibid*

- Regional processing centres were opened in Latin America to help migrants to apply to come to the US.
- The Custom and Border Protection mobile application (CBP One) created in 2020 to provide travellers with access to certain CBP functions prior to their arrival in the United States, was expanded so that migrants without entry documents could schedule appointments at designated ports of entry on the southern border.

This policy contributed to incentivise more immigrants to seek entry at ports of entry and allowed refugees and migrants to access the U.S. asylum process. It expanded access to legal immigration pathways for Latin American and Caribbean nationals and secured the cooperation of other countries on immigration management.

However, the incapacity of Congress to propose and adopt a comprehensive immigration reform bill and numerous and endless litigations significantly reduced the sustainability and success of this new approach. Besides, the Biden administration struggled to maintain control of the border as the number of irregular border crossings had grown to record levels, due to after-Covid surge and new humanitarian crises in Latin American countries which obliged to revert to more restrictive border policies. Finally, according to a qualitative but limited analysis among asylum seekers at the Mexico US border, confusing interfaces, technical flaws and racial biases were reported in the use of the CBP One application.³

This policy was immediately terminated by the Trump II Administration.

IV • European initiatives: one concept, different approaches

In Europe, early discussions took place in the late 1990s/early 2000s, under the pressure of Austria and the UK, with the participation of the incumbent United Nations High Com-

missioner for Refugees. Several options were contemplated in preparation of the 2004 Hague Programme for the period 2004-2009 in the field of Freedom, Security and Justice. But it already demonstrated to be too sensitive and complicated to be developed further into concrete proposals. At the end it translated largely into capacity building measures in the framework of the newly created neighbourhood policy.

The massive arrivals of refugees from the Middle East in 2015, the growing importance and sensitivity of migration in the political debate over the last 15 years and the difficulty to agree on a common European asylum and migration framework reactivated the debate about externalisation.

The Turkey Statement of March 2016⁴ is the first significant milestone of this trend, leading later some countries (Spain and Italy in particular) to conclude bilateral migration agreements with specific third countries of origin or transit. In parallel, schemes to transfer or offshore totality or part of their asylum procedures were elaborated at national level by the UK and Italy.

At EU level, some comprehensive agreements with third countries of origin or transit have been agreed or are being negotiated. The externalisation question permeated the negotiations of the Pact on Migration and Asylum in the context of the discussions of the mandatory border procedure and the safe third country concept which will allow to declare inadmissible the application of migrants coming from a safe third country to which they have a connection link. It became even more articulated in May 2024, when a coalition of 15 Member States led by Denmark requested the European Commission to “think outside the box” to “identify, elaborate and propose new ways and solutions to prevent irregular migration in Europe”.⁵ In response, the latter adopted a revision of the EU Return legislation in March 2025 proposing the creation of “return hubs” in third countries and in April 2025 further measures to frontload relevant parts of the Migration

³ <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666623524000540>.

⁴ <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/>

⁵ <https://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/27/Joint-Letter-to-the-European-Commission-on-new-solutions-to-address-irregular-migration-to-Europe.pdf>

and Asylum Pact as well a proposed list of safe third countries of origin.⁶

I THE 2016 EU-TURKEY STATEMENT

The first situation in which a combination of internal and external actions was concretely put in place was in the context of the long summer of migration in 2015. The massive influx of refugees from the Middle East, largely from Syria but also from Afghanistan, Iraq, Eritrea or the Balkans, reaching an estimated 1.3 million people, led to a political crisis inside the EU, demonstrating that the EU was not properly equipped to manage such important influx. Following the failure of the Commission to get an agreement on an allocation of the migrants among the Member States, the dramatic situation at the Greek-Turkish border and the amount of Syrian refugees present in Turkey, negotiations took place between the EU and Turkey that resulted first into an EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan activated in November 2015 and a few months later to the 7 March 2016 EU-Turkey Statement.

The main features of the Statement (It could not be called “agreement” since it did not follow the traditional legal process) were the following:

- Turkey would take any measure necessary to prevent people from travelling to the Greek islands. Anyone who would arrive irregularly from Turkey would be returned.
- In compensation for every Syrian returned from the Islands, EU Member States would take one Syrian refugee in Turkey in resettlement.
- A financial support of 6 billion euros was approved to help Turkey to improve the humanitarian situation of the refugees in the country, the visa liberalization roadmap for Turkish citizens would be accelerated and the accession process relaunched.

Although a downwards trend of arrivals was already noticeable in late 2015, due

notably to the closure of the Balkan route, the statement and the Action plan certainly contributed to the containment of the flows from Turkey to the EU. A sharp 90 % decrease in the number of arrivals to Greece was witnessed in April 2016. There have been some peaks since but far below the 2015 levels.

The financial support has been renewed several times and now amounts to 10 billion euros. It has been disbursed largely to cover the needs of the refugees (humanitarian assistance via UN agencies and NGOs), access to health, education and work, resettlement programmes etc..) but also to strengthen Turkey border management and to relaunch the accession process.

Providing a full analysis and assessment of how the Turkey Statement has been implemented since its inception would deserve much more than just a few paragraphs and has been the subject of many reports and academic work over the years.

As a very short and succinct assessment the following elements can be highlighted:

If some 35 000 Syrians have been resettled, less than 3000 persons that arrived irregularly were returned. Turkey argued that the EU was not fulfilling its obligations under the Statement, for instance on payments or visas, even though payments were made according to well-known EU financial rules and that the visa liberalisation process was stalled due to the lack of progress by Turkey on the benchmarks.

Multiple incidents occurred between Greece and Turkey, both in the Aegean Sea and at the Evros land border over the years, reflecting the level of cooperation (or non-cooperation) between the authorities of the two countries (coastguards, administration, municipalities etc...) and the state of the political relationship between Turkey and the EU.

The Statement raised many concerns, notably by NGOs and human rights defenders who denounced the outsourcing of its migration policy by the EU and questioned

⁶ https://commission.europa.eu/news/migration-commission-proposes-new-european-approach-returns-2025-03-11_en
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1070

the compliance of these arrangements with the respect of fundamental rights enshrined in the European Convention of Human rights, particularly the non-refoulement principle.

Finally, the Turkey Statement highlights the inherent vulnerability of a country of migration destination. Beyond any robust internal management policy which the EU was missing at the time of the 2015 migration crisis and will have now once the Pact on Migration and Asylum will be applied, a good and trustful cooperation with countries of transit is key to prevent the temptation to use migration as a leverage, if not to instrumentalise it.

THE EU EMERGENCY TRANSIT MECHANISM

Since September 2019, the European Union has been funding a scheme operated by UNHCR that moves particularly vulnerable refugees from Libya to Rwanda or Niger. Known as the Emergency Transit Mechanism (ETM), it is a voluntary scheme designed to provide protection and assistance to refugees and asylum-seekers and other vulnerable people at risk in Libya in which UNHCR has limited power to provide protection. People transferred under the ETM are considered for asylum by UNHCR and then proposed for resettlement.

As of January 2024, some 6300 people have been processed through these ETM and 5800 resettled (UNHCR data). UNHCR received 45 million euros under the European Trust Fund for Africa to run this mechanism.

The ETM cannot be completely assimilated to an externalisation scheme. It is a mechanism to transfer vulnerable refugees from one third country to another one to allow UNHCR to process their asylum claim for resettlement. But it still offers an externalisation dimension in the sense that asylum seekers are not transferred directly to the EU to have their asylum claims processed but can receive international protection in the EU only after the UNHCR assessment and only through resettlement.

THE UK RWANDA PROPOSAL

Like the Australia PNG agreement, the UK Rwanda arrangement is a transfer of responsibility of migration management to a third country.

The UK and Rwanda Migration and Economic Development partnership was proposed in 2022 by the government of Boris Johnson and his successors Liz Truss and Rishi Sunak.

Migrants arriving irregularly to the UK would be transferred to Rwanda where their asylum claims would be processed under Rwanda law. If their claim was successful, they could stay in Rwanda but would not be resettled to the UK. People who wouldn't ask for asylum or would not be granted the benefit of asylum could either stay in Rwanda or be removed to their country of origin.

The aim of the government was “to deter people from making dangerous journeys to the UK to claim asylum, which are facilitated by criminal smugglers, when they have already travelled through safe third countries” most specifically those crossing the English Channel on small boats.

The arrangement was set up for 5 years as a “pilot”, with the possibility of extension. There was no indication about the number of persons that would be considered under this scheme, an unofficial estimate referred to 1,000 asylum seekers in the five-year trial period, which was a very small number compared to the 20 000 claims yearly processed in the UK.

The arrangement immediately raised several legal issues and was challenged in the UK's High Court. The High Court ruled in December 2022 that the policy was lawful. This was appealed to the Court of Appeal, which ruled the contrary. The Home Office appealed this judgment to the Supreme Court, which unanimously upheld the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

The Rwanda policy was unlawful because Rwanda was not a safe country to which asylum seekers could be removed, primarily because of inadequacies in Rwanda's asylum system that prevented Rwanda to process asylum claims properly and identify genuine

refugees. Consequently, there would be a risk that such refugees could be returned to the countries from which they have fled where they could face ill-treatment thus violating the non-refoulement principle. The UK's government responded to the Supreme Court's judgment by modifying the scheme under a new Treaty with Rwanda. On the one hand it provided that nobody could be removed from Rwanda except to the UK and secondly it introduced in parallel a bill declaring Rwanda as a safe country for asylum seekers. The bill became Law in April 2024.

In terms of costs and according to the UK National Audit Office, the Home Office was to pay £370 million into the Economic Transformation and Integration Fund (ETIF), designed to support economic growth in Rwanda. Further amounts would be disbursed depending on the number of people relocated to Rwanda: £120 million once 300 people would have been relocated and payments of £20,000 per individual relocated. The Home Office would also pay a total of £151,000 per individual relocated to cover the asylum processing and operational costs.

The scheme was cancelled by the Labour government when it took office in July 2024, and nobody was forcibly sent to Rwanda under it.

I THE PROTOCOL BETWEEN ITALY AND ALBANIA

In November 2023, Italy and Albania signed a "Protocol between the Italian Republic and the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Albania on strengthening cooperation on migration matters". The agreement regulates the construction and use by Italy of two centres on Albanian territory where Italy would process applications for international protection and, when necessary, return procedures of up to 3 000 third-country nationals every month under Italy's accelerated border procedure. One centre would be a disembarkation centre on the coast where people would be identified and medically checked and then transferred to another centre more inland where they would stay until their asylum claim has been processed.

The Protocol was ratified by both Italy and Albania. Italy adopted an implementing leg-

islation which was published on 22 February 2024.

The specificities of the scheme are the following:

- Only people rescued on the high sea (ie who have not entered the Italian territory) would be concerned.
- Only men would be taken to these centres, no women and no families and only men coming from countries considered safe.
- The centres are detention centres. In this respect the Cutro Law (dubbed after a deadly shipwreck off Calabria in February 2023), modified the Italian legislation notably to provide for the possibility to detain for the purpose of carrying out the border procedure, as allowed by the EU Reception Conditions Directive. The precise grounds that will be used in application of the Protocol are not indicated in the ratification law, but retention aims at preventing absconding to Albania and further EU countries.
- The management of the centres and all procedures related to the processing of asylum claim, appeal and return fall under the jurisdiction of Italy, ie the Italian law apply, with the same provisions and under the same conditions as in Italy.
- The procedure is the accelerated procedure foreseen in the Italian law. And should not take more than 28 days. Asylum seekers have access to legal advice.
- The centre can host some 3000 persons and according to the Italian authorities 36000 asylum claims could be treated yearly.
- Those who would be granted asylum would be transferred to Italy. The others would be returned to their country of origin by the Italian authorities under Italian law.

The cost of the centres was born by Italy and was estimated at 47,7 million euros. The Protocol between Italy and Albania established a financial support of 89 million for 2024 and 118 million per each year between 2025 and 2028.

This scheme is different from the UK Rwanda scheme in the sense that Italy does not transfer its legal responsibility to a third country, but instead, offshores it. While in the UK Rwanda scheme Rwanda would process asylum claims and host the refugees brought there permanently, in the Italy Albania Protocol those with legal asylum claims, processed under Italian law, will be brought to Italy. But the objective remains the same, i.e. to deter people to undertake unsafe journeys to Italy and to reduce the number of arrivals.

The scheme has immediately been challenged first on the proportionality of the financial guarantee requested to applicants who do not hand over their passport or equivalent document.

Then some national courts challenged the list of safe third countries, in particular the inclusion of countries such as Bangladesh and Egypt. In October and November 2024, the Tribunal of Rome invalidated the detention of some migrants on the basis that the Asylum Procedure Directive must be interpreted as precluding a third country from being designated as a safe country of origin where certain parts of its territory do not satisfy the material conditions for such designation⁷. The Tribunal also requested a preliminary ruling of the European Court of Justice.

In February 2025, a third transfer of 43 persons (also Bangladeshi and Egyptians) was also invalidated with the detention orders suspended by the Court of Appeal of Rome, who decided to submit a new request for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ on the concept of safe countries of origin. The Court of Appeal of Rome followed overall the same line as the Tribunal of Rome asking the ECJ if EU law and notably the Asylum Procedure Directive prevents from considering a third country as safe if there are one or more categories of people for which the criteria established by the APD to designate a country as safe are not satisfied.

Finally In March 2025, the government revised the legislation to include new provisions for the use of the centres in Albania: one modification deletes the limitation to transfer only people rescued at sea and the second one will allow to use the centres in Albania as Italian pre-return centre in which persons with a return order will be placed.

The change does not exclude that once and if the current stalemate of the accelerated border procedure will be solved, the centres will be used for their original purpose.

RETURN HUBS

The new draft legislation adopted by the European Commission on March 2025 pertaining to a Common European System for Returns⁸ introduces the legal possibility to return individuals who are illegally staying in the EU and have received a final return decision, to a third country, based on an agreement or arrangement concluded bilaterally or at EU level. Such an agreement or arrangement can be concluded with a third country that respects international human rights standards and principles in accordance with international law, including the principle of non-refoulement. Families with minors and unaccompanied minors are excluded and the implementation of such agreements or arrangements must be subject to monitoring.

The draft Regulation does not go further then introducing the possibility to create the hubs. The modalities will need to be agreed in an agreement or arrangement with a third country either bilaterally with a Member State or at EU level. The agreement or arrangement will also need to include guarantees including a monitoring mechanism to ensure that the necessary safeguards are respected.

It remains to be seen how the co-legislators will receive and amend the Commission proposal.

⁷ The Asylum Procedure Directive is applicable until it will be replaced by the Asylum Procedure Regulation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum in June 2026. In the APR, the designation of a third country as a safe country of origin both at Union and national level may be made with exceptions for specific parts of its territory or clearly identifiable categories of persons.

⁸ <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025PC0101>

I COMPREHENSIVE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS WITH COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN AND/OR TRANSIT.

Faced with the difficulty to return irregular migrants that were not granted international protection, the European Commission and several Member States in parallel, have negotiated readmission agreements with countries of transit and/or origin to facilitate and organise returns. It should be underlined that readmitting its own national is an obligation under international law, but in practice countries are often very reluctant to take their nationals back. These agreements usually define the practical and administrative aspects linked to the returning procedures and propose a reference framework agreed by both sides to organise softer and faster readmissions.

So far 18 agreements and 6 arrangements have been concluded at EU level. These agreements have been very cumbersome to negotiate and to implement for the following reasons:

- There is an uneven competition between Member States and the Commission in terms of swiftness of negotiation, financial compensation and privileged relations with some third countries (Spain/Morocco, France/Algeria. Italy/Tunisia etc...)
- The limited capacity of the Commission to offer an attractive package of measures to mitigate the unwillingness of countries of origin (and even more of transit) to readmit irregular migrants.
- The very few leverage possibilities available in case of noncompliance (limited restrictions on visa facilitation measures in the framework of the Visa Code).
- They are limited to return and readmission and cannot include measures related to border management or the fight against smuggling networks, nor any support to national asylum management system.

To address these shortcomings and building on the experience of the EU-Turkey Statement, the European Commission proposed to integrate migration related issues into more comprehensive partnership agreements, covering different areas:

- Economic, development and trade ties
- Sectoral partnerships (energy, green transition, digital etc...)
- Mobility (visa, studies, work permit etc...)
- Migration and border management

So far, such agreements have been signed with Tunisia, Egypt, Mauritania. Others are under negotiation, notably with Morocco and Jordan.

The migration and border management chapter usually includes cooperation and support measures to reinforce border management and ensure an effective control of irregular departures, cooperation in the fight against migrants smuggling, readmission of national and in case of transit support to the return to the country of origin, improvement of the national migration and asylum system, legal migration pathways (humanitarian, resettlement or work), visa facilitation and enhanced mobility measures.

Their financial counterpart is also comprehensive including budget support, loans, trade provisions and specific grants for migration (220 million for Egypt, 105 million for Tunisia).

These agreements have also raised concerns about the respect of human rights and the non-refoulement principle. In terms of efficiency the combined actions of Member States and the EU under their respective partnerships with countries like Morocco, Tunisia or Egypt have certainly contributed to contain the irregular arrivals to the EU, though it may not be the only factor. In 2024 the arrivals via the Mediterranean Central route (Tunisia and Libya) decreased by 60% and the Western Balkan route by 78%. But the flows and the smugglers are adjusting to new patterns and in the same year the arrivals via the Atlantic route to the Canary Islands increased by 18% and the Eastern Mediterranean by 14%.

V • Conclusion

The first conclusion that can be drawn is that the externalisation of migration may be politically attractive (although the risk of instrumentalisation by the other side should not be underestimated), but it is legally and economically rather challenging.

It is understandable that countries want to better control and regulate who arrives at their borders and prevent uncontrolled arrivals of irregular migrants that overload asylum and reception structures and who will be very difficult to return to their country of origin. There needs to be an improvement in the return of people who have not been granted the right to stay.

Having a better management of the irregular arrivals is what many citizens request. But this cannot be at the cost of lowering the access to safe procedures for people in need of international protection, nor of disregarding international obligations about fundamental rights.

The various experiments described above show that a good outsourcing of some aspects of migration management need to fulfil several requirements:

- First it cannot be a complete transfer to a third country like in the Australian or UK Rwanda examples. Unless the country of transfer has the exact same level of adequacy of international protection in its national order, it raises too many issues in terms of respect of human rights.
- The model proposed by the Italy/Albania Protocol is more interesting in the sense that it would function under the law of the offshoring country. The opinion of the ECJ will hopefully provide useful indications as to the conditions necessary for such a scheme to be legally sound.
- The implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum may also contribute to reinforce its legality. The Asylum Procedure Regulation (APR) and the Return Border Regulation⁹ introduce a swifter
- mandatory asylum border procedure, notably for applicants that are nationals of a third country for which the proportion of decisions granting international protection is 20% or lower. The Asylum Procedure Regulation also clarifies the criteria and the conditions of application of the safe third country concept. Member States will be able to avail themselves of both EU and national lists of safe third countries or to apply this concept individually, i.e. consider that a third country that is not on the EU or national list fulfils the criteria for being considered a safe third country in relation to a specific applicant.
- The accelerated procedure proposed in the Italy/Albania Protocol could be considered as an offshore border procedure if it complies with the same conditions and requirements as those foreseen for the APR border procedure, and if the criteria used to qualify a country as safe third country are aligned with those in the APR. The proposal of the Commission of 16 April 2025 to accelerate the implementation of the Pact by frontloading precisely these two aspects and to establish a first ever EU list of safe third countries of origin maybe seen as a step into this direction.
- The return hubs are a midway option that might be easier to implement legally and politically as it does not encompass the whole asylum application process but starts once a return order has been issued. But the draft Regulation on Returns adopted by the Commission in March is too unspecified to allow a thorough assessment of the feasibility and sustainability of the return hubs, as it leaves the details to the negotiations of the agreement with the third country. To ringfence their legality the co-legislators will need to address several important issues such as:
 - Which law would apply?
 - Who should be sent?
 - What about people who cannot be returned despite the return order?
 - How long persons ordered to return will stay in the hub, if their country of origin continues to refuse taking them back?

9 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401348
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401349

- What kind of monitoring mechanism will be elaborated and who would monitor it?
 - How to assess the costs/benefits not only in financial terms but also of vulnerability and accountability?
 - Which third countries will be ready to host them?
 - Will they be part of a more comprehensive partnership agreement?
- Migration needs to be managed in a holistic and comprehensive way, addressing above and foremost the very and many reasons that drive people away from their home place and push them to undertake perilous journeys and be the prey of smugglers. Well balanced and efficient partnerships encompassing all sectors of interest to both parties, offering legal work opportunities both inside and outside the country as well as long term sustainable economic development perspectives may be a better option.

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Institut Jacques Delors

Penser l'Europe • Thinking Europe • Europa Denken
18 rue de Londres 75009 Paris, France • www.delorsinstitute.eu
T +33 (0)1 44 58 97 97 • info@delorsinstitute.eu



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