Climate Europe: heading for a major break-up?

One hour and one minute. In France, that is how long the new European political balance resulting from the 9 June elections was actually discussed.

So much for the declining influence (Renaissance, the Ecologists, Les Républicains) or rising influence (Rassemblement National, Parti Socialiste/Place Publique, la France Insoumise, Reconquête) of French MEPs. Gone too is the question of what kind of priorities France could have usefully pushed for in the future European strategic agenda to be adopted on 27 and 28 June. By drawing national conclusions from a European election when he had declared that ‘the conclusion [of the elections] will therefore be primarily European’, Emmanuel Macron has contradicted himself. Above all, by dissolving the National Assembly, the President has contributed to making the European political agenda invisible. This is ironic for a President who is openly pro-European. This is an act that is not without consequences, particularly for a Europe that is increasingly vulnerable to climate change.

Contrary to what it promised, the rise of the far right in Europe, symbolised by the historic score of the National Rally (to which must be added that of Reconquête), will not lead to the ‘repeal’ of the European Green Deal. This is demonstrated by our legal analysis, which examines the feasibility of completely dismantling the climate ambitions contained in the European Green Deal. Nevertheless, on the climate issue, the rise of conservative and radical right-wing parties in the European Parliament could lead to the formation of ad hoc, lowest-bid majorities (on a text-by-text basis), as has been observed during the current term of office with the Nature Restoration Law and the Pesticides Regulation. This would confirm a fundamental trend that sees the political cursor shifting to the right within parliamentary groups themselves, particularly among liberals and, to a lesser extent, among social democrats.

As a driving force behind the European target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 55% by 2030 (compared to 1990) and the legislative measures (European Green Deal) to achieve this, France is seeing its voice considerably weakened. This situation would be exacerbated if the French far right came to power, which could deal a fatal blow to European climate ambitions. Indeed, obtaining a progressive majority within the Council of the European Union (at least 55% of Member States representing at least 65% of the population) would be extremely complicated, if not impossible, in the event of a government dominated by the National Rally. At the same time, the implementation of the Green Deal measures in France would likely be delayed, as would the roll-out of renewable energies and the energy renovation of buildings. This could also encourage other European partners governed by the conservative right to follow suit (Italy, Sweden, the Netherlands), jeopardising the European transition.

The exploitation of the “farmers” anger’ episode during the European elections attests to this: the far right has succeeded in dictating the terms of the political debate on the issue of ecological transition. The future of the European Green Deal will depend on the ability of progressive forces to frame it within a broader narrative that links the fight against climate change with gains in purchasing power.

In 2019, France’s action helped to spread the ideology supporting the European Green Deal like a progressive wave. In 2024, the reach of its voice could be reduced to that of a standing wave, torn between two opposing forces depending on the results of the election. For although the election is national, it will have European repercussions.