EU: necessary indulgence, indispensable ambition
Many observers are surprised, ironic or despairing at the European Union’s difficulties in playing a decisive role in the Ukrainian crisis. I too am sometimes guilty of excessive impatience. However, we cannot overemphasise the radical, historic and colossal strategic revolution that is currently shaking up the EU. We must take stock of this revolution before succumbing to increasingly negative judgements.
This strategic revolution is fuelled by at least three factors, which I analyse in my latest essay, “Fractures in the West[1] “.
The first is historical. Let us remember. In 1950, when the ECSC was created, European integration was subject to three prohibitions: no more thinking about or waging war; placing complete trust in America for defence; and trading to enrich itself and pacify its neighbours. These three rules enabled Europe to build itself and prosper with phenomenal success. However, after eight decades of this regime, Europeans are suddenly being asked to do exactly the opposite: to think about war and geopolitics and rearm; to mistrust American inconsistency and aim for strategic autonomy; to revise the rules of world trade towards less freedom and openness. In other words, in order to survive, they must transform old prohibitions into rules of action, taboos into virtues, and all within three years. We would be lost, confused, indecisive and powerless if we did not!
The second factor is strategic. For the first time in the history of the Atlantic Alliance, a threat to Europe is no longer perceived by America as an equal threat. The Euro-Atlantic community of destiny has effectively disappeared: Donald Trump is not afraid of Russia, while Europeans are becoming increasingly concerned about Vladimir Putin’s aggressiveness. It is this unprecedented difference in the perception of the threat that increases the EU’s desperate dependence on the United States: to convince them to remain our ally and defender, Europeans must make much greater efforts and concessions towards Washington than when the threat was common to the entire Alliance.
The third factor fuelling the revolution in the European order lies within America itself. Donald Trump is not only a weak-willed, unpredictable and even dangerous protector: there is no reason to believe that his casual attitude towards Ukraine and NATO could not lead him to strategically betray the Europeans. But the difficulty also stems from the fact that he is the bearer of a genuine political counter-revolution, hostile to democracy itself, which leads some of his collaborators to openly support the worst of the authoritarian far right in Europe. In other words, Donald Trump represents a double threat to us, of strategic and political betrayal, at a time when the military threat from the East, of Russian aggression and subversion, is growing. This coincidence of two threats, in the West and in the East, is also a first for Europeans. It confronts them with a difficult dilemma: how can we defend our democracies against possible Russian aggression, knowing that our historical military protector has also become an adversary of democracy?
In reality, however, for most Europeans, Putin appears to be significantly more dangerous than Trump, because war is indeed a tragic outcome that must be avoided at all costs. Responding to the Russian threat is therefore a priority for the EU, both militarily, financially, industrially and, above all, in terms of its Atlantic alliance: it is essential to keep Washington involved in the protection and defence of Europe, even if it means swallowing whatever the United States wants to impose on us in order to stay. This is where the problem lies: defending democracy should not be a secondary objective, because that is precisely the goal defined in the preamble to the NATO treaty. In other words, just as they organise themselves for defence in the East, Europeans should seriously question what is undermining the democratic spirit in the United States and within their own societies: responding to the populism that is flourishing everywhere, by questioning the dismay of the European middle classes who are tempted by other solutions, whether authoritarian or violent. Whether we like it or not, this democratic malaise has a lot to do with the explosion of social inequalities in our rich countries. Responding to it must be the major political ambition, as much as the strategic response to Russia. Deterring the Russian threat and dismantling the illiberal illusion: these are the only two possible and necessary paths for Europe’s survival and, no doubt, victory.
[1] Fractures in the West: How did we get here, and how can we get out of it? Odile Jacob, October 2025
