[FR] Europe: the need for action

There is now a wealth of literature on the ten years of crises that Europe has had to face, but much less on their political implications for the Union. Now is the time to consider the political lessons that can be learned from these events today. This is the aim of Luuk van Middelaar’s latest book, Quand l’Europe improvise (When Europe Improvises), published in the Netherlands in 2017 and recently translated into French by Gallimard: ‘Under the pressure of events, a new Union is taking shape. It is time to sketch out its contours’ (p. 18); it is a question of ‘shedding light on what is happening. No final judgements, no ready-made “solutions”, no academic polemics: offering explanations and analyses based on stories, images and concepts to enable readers to better judge events for themselves and act accordingly’ (p. 8).. The main interest of the book is that it was written by a ‘committed actor/spectator’ of part of this period (2010-2015), as the author, a historian and philosopher, was the speechwriter for the first President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy. He made a name for himself with the highly acclaimed Passage à l’Europe (Gallimard, 2012).

The book consists of two parts – the first devoted to the four major crises that have affected the Union over the past 10 years: the eurozone crisis; the Ukrainian crisis; the migrant crisis and the “Atlantic crisis” with the British referendum on Brexit and the election of Donald Trump in the United States. The author’s argument here is to show that these various crises should make Europeans aware of their finitude and historical vulnerability. In other words, these trials lead to self-awareness and bring Europe into a “Machiavellian moment”, a true “existential moment”: ‘Knowing that we are mortal leads us to think of ourselves as a fortuitous unit in the flow of time and to arm ourselves accordingly. This is indeed a new awareness of Europe’s Machiavellian moment‘ (pp. 190 and 323).

The second part of the book criticises the limitations of the “classical” functionalist method (the ’supranational theology” according to the expression of former French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville quoted by the author) and the Community software on the basis of which European integration has been legitimised and has functioned since its inception. This critique is based on an analysis of the implications of functionalism in terms of depoliticisation, which the author presents in various forms: technical, constitutional and procedural, but also ‘teleological or evangelical’ and executive power (pp. 332-365). The author rightly seeks to show that the change in the nature of European integration since 1989 – the transformation of the Community into a Union (a veritable “second foundation”, pp. 229-259) – implies a radical change in method: the technocratic and “legal-rational” mode of legitimisation through projects and results must be replaced by a mode of political legitimisation, and the “politics of rules” by a “politics of events”, which is essential in the face of crises. Politics and democracy fundamentally consist of the expression and management of conflicts of interest and disputes; in societies marked by inequalities, differences of opinion and uncertainties about the future, choices must be made and decisions taken between interests, and this is the essential field of politics that must be brought to life within the EU. This is an essential part of political life, and replacing conflicts of ideas or interests with the “politics of rules” of independent institutions and specialised technocracies is illusory and even dangerous, as it reinforces the divide between populism and technocracy.

This is the core of Luuk van Middelaar’s analysis in his book, as evidenced by the “interlude” between the two parts entitled “Acting in time”: the effort to consider the conditions that need to be met, in the wake of crises, in order to answer the key questions at the heart of Europe’s political situation. Firstly, that of authority and genuine executive power, which give the capacity to act, i.e. to make decisions in exceptional circumstances; secondly, that of legitimacy through the politicisation of its functioning by staging the ‘classic’ oppositions that already exist within the EU (chapter 7), unless the ‘principled’ oppositions promoted by populist and/or extremist political forces outside the Union are maintained and threaten the very existence of the Union (p. 384). Europe is facing multiple crises that require resolution, decision-making power and the capacity for legitimate action, and it is this fundamental question that lies at the heart of Luuk van Middelaar’s thinking.

The answer to these two fundamental questions, which the author draws from ten years of recent crises, lies in the role played by heads of state and government and in the European authority (‘focus of authority’ according to the expression used by Edward Heath, quoted by the author) that they embody at Union level. This thesis is attractive at first glance insofar as it theorises a posteriori the pre-eminence of national governments in decision-making, a pre-eminence based on the fact that only heads of state and government have the ultimate political legitimacy to take strategic decisions in the face of political challenges that take the form of “sovereignty shocks”, whether in the areas of currency, borders, war and peace, etc.

However, after reading this highly stimulating book, a number of questions arise.

The first concerns the distinction between ‘rule-based politics’ and ‘event-based politics’. The author’s argument seems convincing at first glance, and one can agree with him that the transformation of the EU and the political nature of the challenges it faces require a change in the way decisions are conceived, as well as a redefinition of the balance between ‘rules’ and discretionary ‘choices’: while the management of certain common policies naturally calls for regulation (the fight against anti-competitive practices, for example), the political nature of the challenges facing the Union is such that a large number of urgent issues of a sovereign nature are more a matter of “government” (as a “visible authority”) than of simple ‘governance “ (and its ‘anonymous administration”, p. 27), for example in the areas of the budget, external border control and the defence of common European interests, where “discretionary” power is essential.

However, it is also possible to point out that the crises have revealed that independent institutions whose prerogatives place them more on the side of ‘rule-based politics’ can exercise decision-making power that places them more on the side of ‘event-based politics’. For example, the European Central Bank (ECB) – which is a federal institution but whose legitimacy is based on independence – has demonstrated its ability to react quickly and manage crises in exceptional circumstances. It is also noteworthy that the crisis has strengthened the role of the ECB, which is the only European institution with a countercyclical instrument that can be mobilised immediately. Only its role as lender of last resort was able to reassure the markets, despite the constraints imposed by its mandate. Another example: the European Commission used its powers in the area of competition (the prohibition of State aid, including tax aid, under Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty) to effectively combat unfair tax competition: Ireland was ordered to demand 13 billion in taxes from Apple alone.

The second question concerns the effectiveness of the European ‘authority’ embodied by the European Council. Admittedly, in exceptional circumstances, crises can have positive effects for Europe, to the point of lending credence to the idea that ‘European integration often progresses thanks to crises’. This potentially favourable nature of crises stems from the fact that they give rise to extraordinary political mobilisation at the highest level of Member States. It also stems from the fact that the urgency of the situation requires decisions to be taken that would have been more difficult to take under normal circumstances and procedures. However, the pre-eminence of national governments in decision-making also has ambivalent consequences for European governance in the face of crises[10]. In other words, while “improvisation” can certainly have a “positive, creative aspect” and provide an opportunity for freedom to decide and act, it can also reveal “clumsiness and flaws” (p. 40).

The prevalence of diplomatic logic can indeed have negative consequences that are all the more damaging in times of crisis: difficulty for the Union to speak with one voice and act effectively and responsively; neutralisation of Member States, creating uncertainty whose effects are very dangerous in times of crisis. Furthermore, there is an increasing gap between the current functioning of the European institutions and the demands of the crisis: diplomatic negotiations take too long (which the author himself acknowledges; see p. 56) and a feeling has gradually developed that Europe is always one crisis behind. Finally, this mode of operation is anxiety-provoking and destabilising: the outcome of negotiations is always uncertain, the positions of different governments seem to be regularly subject to national (or even regional) electoral calendars, and decisions taken by governments can then be challenged at national level, especially in a context where many governments are politically very fragile in their own countries. Thus, a fragmented or pluralistic executive power is not optimal from the point of view of efficiency.

The third question concerns the legitimacy of such ‘governance’. The current mode of operation, which gives primacy to the European Council, poses a problem of clarity and legitimacy for European citizens. Admittedly, political action always lies at the ‘boundary between constraint and freedom’ (p. 41); but for the past ten years, it has been clear that decisions have only been taken at national or European level when under the pressure of urgency. This constraint has a considerable economic cost, as the eurozone crisis has shown, but also a political cost, as it reduces the scope for political choice and responsibility. Outside of emergencies, decision-making capacity also appears to be extremely limited: repeated, protracted and contentious negotiations have highlighted the limitations of the intergovernmental model, in which diplomacy takes precedence over democracy. More precisely, each Member State asserts its national democratic legitimacy without European democratic legitimacy being able to resolve conflicts between national democratic mandates, the sum of which does not produce a European democratic mandate. The result is growing frustration, which fuels Euroscepticism. And, in a vicious circle, this frustration makes it more difficult to achieve the political union that would create the conditions for more legitimate integration.

Furthermore, still on the subject of legitimacy, a democratic system presupposes the ability to answer the question “who does what?”, which is a prerequisite for the political accountability of those in power (pp. 310-314). The author himself defines the European Council as a ‘collective’ executive power, as a ‘kind of multi-headed head of state, working around a round table rather than in an oval office’ (p. 245). However, such polyarchy and fragmentation (exemplified by terms such as ‘European Council’, ‘Eurogroup’, but also “troika”, ‘task force’, or even ‘group of 4’, etc. – referring to the Presidents of the European Council, the European Commission, the Eurogroup and the European Central Bank – provide a striking illustration) can only lead to a dilution of political responsibility, which must therefore be clarified. On this point, it is striking to recall the terms in which the founding fathers of American democracy already referred to this risk. They emphasised that not only can a plural executive neither act nor decide effectively, but it also prevents the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms: ‘one of the most powerful objections raised against plurality in the executive (…) is its tendency to conceal faults and destroy accountability’.

Finally, a fourth observation. The author’s argument on the necessary politicisation of the EU – an argument we share – leads to a combination of politicisation and intergovernmentalism or ‘confederalism’ (i.e. the ‘direct contribution of Heads of State and Government’, p. 357). However, the two are not necessarily linked. This vision, embodied in the history of European integration, notably by General de Gaulle, is based on the assumption that the only ‘producers of politics’ are the national political elites. The politicisation of European integration would therefore require the strengthening of intergovernmentalism, as Community institutions are by definition technocratic.

This approach is potentially contradictory, based on a confusion between the different meanings of the word “politique” in French: instead of allowing the establishment of a European policy (politics), it prevents it by asserting a monopoly of national policies (politics) on the formulation of European policies (policies). However, it is precisely the emergence of a genuine European political representation space that should be encouraged, in other words a European policy (politics) as a space for the formation of Community policies (policies). To put it another way, and in terms of democratic legitimacy, accepting the idea that strengthening intergovernmentalism would be a lever for the politicisation of the EU would be tantamount to considering that the juxtaposition and addition of national democratic legitimacies would produce European democratic legitimacy, which is not the case (see above).

However, this does not mean that politicisation should necessarily lead to the federalisation of the European Union. Indeed, it is possible to conceive of a European policy (politics) without postulating an evolution of the European Union towards a European federal state. It is therefore essential to avoid confusion between these two concepts and these two debates. If the European Union were to become more politicised, with autonomous political representation and confident in its democratic legitimacy, this development could remain, at least in the medium term, far removed from the federal model. Indeed, federalisation would require a redefinition of the Union’s competences, a significant increase in its budget and a clear weakening of the intergovernmental dimension in decision-making processes. However, it is by no means certain that the current political context in Europe allows for such developments to be envisaged today.

Making the EU more ‘political’ so that it becomes a genuine political space of choice, rather than merely a technocratic regulatory space whose legitimacy is based solely on the results it produces, would mean breaking with the idea that the choices made at European level are limited to the three options that currently structure European ‘politics’: on the one hand, a European technocracy composed of depoliticised experts and, on the other, nationalist populism; between the two, European political life would be reduced to diplomatic negotiations between heads of state and government, with the negative consequences that this has in terms of accountability and legitimacy. However, in all three cases, the idea conveyed is that there is no functioning system of political representation, which is very dangerous! Such a situation must lead us to consider popular sovereignty at the level of the Union, which can be expressed through a parliamentary framework. What is important is to establish and make visible the institutional arrangements that enable people to participate directly in the European democratic process, through a clear and transparent system of political representation, and thus to have a legitimate sense of exercising their political influence.

Such increased politicisation of the EU institutions should enable them to rely more on a democratic mandate and to operate more in line with partisan logic. This is a delicate shift to make, but if we try to avoid it, we risk veering off course. This implies a rebalancing of the culture of consensus that dominates at European level, the introduction of majority/opposition polarisation and the descent of expertise from its pedestal into the political arena, without necessarily leading to a transition to federalism. Indeed, politicising the European decision-making level does not mean conferring sovereignty on it at the expense of the Member States.

Despite these questions and comments, we can only agree with Luuk van Middelaar’s general thesis that Europe needs to equip itself with a truly legitimate political authority capable of responding to events. Faced with internal and external challenges that constitute real ‘sovereignty shocks’, the EU is faced with challenges for which it was not designed (migration, security challenges, but also trade ‘defence’, etc.). Can the pressure of events (Italy, US policy, etc.) promote European cohesion and accelerate the changes needed to respond to these challenges? In a context where the logic of power relations is paramount, Europeans must think and act strategically in order to develop the capacity to influence these power relations and defend not only their values but also their common strategic interests. This implies a “shift” from peace to power, from the forum to the arena, from the ethics of conviction to practical and political responsibility, etc. Crises are forcing Europeans to act as a political body, which means breaking a number of taboos and unspoken assumptions in order to take certain fundamental political requirements seriously, notably those relating to borders and identity.

However, “historically, Europe is only half prepared for such a mission. The founders pursued two objectives in parallel. Was the unification of Europe a project of peace or a project of power? (…) In the context of the peace project, Europe is “eminently a moral act” supported by the desire for reconciliation and idealism. In the context of the power project, European integration is a political act based on judgement and involving the redefinition of the participants’ own interests. In the first case, national citizens must become stateless citizens of the world (or depoliticised consumers). In the second case, they must become committed Europeans, even proud of their identity. In other words, the peace project requires the sacrifice of national identities in favour of universal values, while the power project requires the development of a European identity.