[FR] European Green Deal: continuation or end?

There is no such thing as a pure and perfect ecological transition. It has been, is and will continue to be the result of political power struggles. In this sense, the political balance that emerges from the European elections on 9 June will determine much of the European Union’s climate ambition for the coming years.

Over the past five years, this power struggle has played out in the negotiations on the European Green Deal. By setting extremely ambitious targets in the transport, industry, energy production and buildings sectors, the EU has set itself a course for the rest of the decade. This course must be maintained, even as the far right calls for a return to the past in order to unravel this new green acquis communautaire. However, contrary to what these electoral promises claim, an analysis of the review clauses contained in the main Green Deal dossiers (FitFor55) leads to the following conclusion: the legal feasibility of completely dismantling the climate ambition contained in the European Green Deal has not been demonstrated, in addition to being politically unachievable. Legally, because these review clauses grant the European Commission discretionary power to reopen a dossier, and the conservative and radical right has no legal means of compelling the Commission to do so. Politically, since the National Rally (RN) and its allies will be unable to exert any political pressure on the European Commission, as it is out of the question that their political group in the European Parliament will participate in a coalition agreement concerning the election of the future President of the European Commission.

Nevertheless, certain issues could still be reopened under pressure from Member States. The RN will have no influence over this pressure, as it is not in power in France. In this sense, the recent negotiations on the Nature and Restoration Law reflect the growing divisions between, but also within, the European institutions and foreshadow what a breakthrough by these right-wing parties hostile to the Green Deal could lead to. If an issue is reopened, ad hoc majorities, i.e. on a text-by-text basis, could be formed in order to reduce climate ambitions. They would bring together the right-wing forces of the European People’s Party (EPP), European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and Identity and Democracy (ID), but also a potential fraction of the liberals (Renew) and some social democrats (S&D). Indeed, a shift to the right in the European Parliament could reinforce an underlying trend that would shift the political cursor to the right within the European political groups themselves. This is a worrying trend because, given the systemic nature of the Green Deal, a reduction in ambition on one issue (e.g. the end of sales of new combustion engine vehicles in 2035) could trigger a chain reaction on other issues (regulation on charging stations, renewable energy directive).

To avoid such a scenario, we recommend the formation of a ‘broad grand coalition’ comprising the EPP, S&D, Renew and the European Greens. By making their support conditional on obtaining guarantees regarding the objectives set out in the Green Deal, the European Greens would help to safeguard European climate ambition. For its part, the EPP would see its official candidate approved, a result that would not be guaranteed if Ursula von der Leyen were to form an alliance with Italian Prime Minister Meloni (ECR), as S&D and Renew might not be willing to support such a shift to the right.

Finally, a victory for the European right would also run the risk of European families and political leaders conflating mistrust of certain environmental policies (e.g. farmers’ anger) with a more general mistrust of climate policy, with the consequence of delaying the implementation of the Green Deal at national level. The European elections and the negotiations that will follow must therefore serve to give renewed democratic legitimacy to the European Green Deal, by questioning not only the financial resources to be mobilised for its implementation, but also the follow-up to be given to it. As it is incomplete (in terms of agriculture, food and biodiversity), the question is not one of a ‘Green Deal 2.0’ but rather of its future. This implies a logic of transformation and evolution towards a broader dimension, rather than thinking about a potential second iteration of the Green Deal. This future must be linked to the economy (competitiveness) and strategic autonomy (security), as outlined by heads of state and government during discussions on the future European strategic agenda, but it must not overlook social issues. Furthermore, these discussions must not lead to the European Green Deal being sidelined or the fight against climate change being diluted within a larger whole, at the risk of reintroducing the tired logic of the ‘energy trilemma’: the success of the European energy transition will depend on the ability to not only coexist but also reconcile sustainability, competitiveness and security.