[FR] Orbán’s triumph

Until the evening of the election on 3 April 2022, the prevailing image used to describe the parliamentary elections in Hungary was that of a ‘close race’. Almost all polls showed incumbent Prime Minister Viktor Orbán as the favourite, while suggesting that he would not win as easily as in the three previous elections (in 2010, 2014 and 2018). In the end, the results were better than expected. With more than 54% of the vote, they marked a real triumph for Fidesz (Table 1). The only downside was that, as in 2016 with the migration quotas, the referendum organised this time in parallel with the general election, on sex education for minors, particularly on issues of homosexuality and transgender identity, was not valid because it did not receive more than 50% of valid votes from registered voters.

However, a whole series of factors should, in theory, have made the task more difficult for Viktor Orbán. These include, among others, the outcome of the health crisis. An economic situation that is beginning to deteriorate, with the return of inflation and a weakening of the forint, against a backdrop of rather lacklustre long-term economic performance compared to other countries in the region (Table 2). Having been at the head of the government since 2010, one might also have expected Orbán’s power to have worn thin, against a backdrop of public perception of high levels of corruption. A number of scandals involving his entourage have been revealed in the press, ranging from allegations of embezzlement to sex scandals, notably the spectacular end to the political career of József Szajer. The increasingly conflictual relationship with the European Union, highlighted by the break with the EPP (European People’s Party, right wing) and Victor Orbán’s failure to create a European dynamic around him, was unlikely to help matters in the face of a predominantly pro-European public opinion. Add to this the fact that, for the first time, the Prime Minister was facing a united opposition – a key factor given the Hungarian electoral system – and the task seemed even more complex.

In light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, was it not reasonable to assume that Vladimir Putin’s deep discredit in the eyes of a very large proportion of Europeans would reflect badly on the European leader known to be close to the Kremlin? Wouldn’t the parallel between Ukraine in 2022 and Hungary in 1956 resonate with the Hungarian population, including and even especially among Fidesz voters? Would Viktor Orbán not pay dearly for his visit to Moscow just a few weeks before 24 February, where he once again championed a ‘Hungarian model’ that would consist of being a member of the EU and a friend of Vladimir Putin’s Russia?

In this context, how can his spectacular election results be explained? Let’s start with the most obvious explanation, put forward by the opposition and its supporters abroad. The fight was uneven from the outset: already in 2018, the OSCE observation mission concluded that the elections were ‘free, but not entirely fair’. Four years later, the OSCE considers that the Hungarian parliamentary elections were ‘marred by the absence of fair rules’. Let us mention the two most salient elements:

• A media landscape dominated by Fidesz, particularly in the public media, where it reigns supreme.
• A very unequal financial playing field between the government and the opposition, with a campaign spending system that does little to protect electoral fair play, with ‘opaque campaign financing’ and ‘a blurred line’ between government promotional messages, financed by the state budget, and those of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party (according to the OSCE).

Bolstered by the media and financial clout of the ‘Fidesz state’, Viktor Orbán was able to impose a number of narratives that drowned out the opposition’s criticism of the weaknesses in his record mentioned above. He has thus been able to make people forget the failures of his handling of the health crisis and “oversell” his economic successes by constantly emphasising the dire situation following the 2008 financial crisis, which he associates with the record of the Hungarian left, particularly that of former Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány. The latter remains, for many Hungarians, particularly for Fidesz’s electoral base, the object of absolute rejection.

In fact, under Orbán, the economic situation of many Hungarians has improved. Furthermore, while the onset of economic difficulties and, in particular, the return of inflation could have put the outgoing government in a difficult position, it has once again managed to turn the situation to its advantage by making use of the public resources at its disposal. Measures such as capping fuel prices and, above all, the prices of certain basic foodstuffs have become a powerful campaign tool for the government, with every retailer required to display a sign stating that ‘the government has decided to freeze the prices of basic foodstuffs’, thus helping to convey the idea of a proactive, socially sensitive and protective government, in stark contrast to the image at the beginning of its term of office, when the government had to deal with protests against the ‘slavery law’. More generally, the government did not hesitate to multiply ‘electoral gifts’, such as pay rises for various categories of public employees, a 19.5% increase in the minimum wage and income tax refunds. This was a range of social measures designed to win over the electorate, which the opposition could not compete with.

Finally, to complete the picture, let us cite another glaring example of electoral inequality: on the one hand, voting by Hungarians abroad belonging to the Hungarian minority in neighbouring countries, who vote overwhelmingly for Fidesz, is made very easy, notably through postal voting. On the other hand, nothing is done to facilitate voting for Hungarian citizens living abroad, a population that tends to vote against Fidesz.

However, these initial inequalities alone cannot explain the opposition’s defeat. It must be acknowledged that Viktor Orbán has, over the years, built up a broad and solid electoral base. Once again, he has demonstrated a great capacity for adaptation and an unparalleled sense of political communication, turning the international context to his advantage, even though it could have a priori put him in difficulty. He was able – admittedly aided by the aforementioned government communication juggernaut – to impose a narrative centred on peace and stability, of which he would be the guarantor, in the face of an opposition portrayed as irresponsible warmongers, preferring foreign interests to those of the Hungarian people.

Given the scale of the victory, it seems clear that this discourse largely prevailed over the opposition’s narrative, which called on Hungarians to ‘choose between Europe and Vladimir Putin’. While this may come as a surprise, particularly in light of the memory of the crushing of the 1956 revolution, there are a number of factors that undoubtedly explain the success of Orbán’s narrative. Unlike Poland or the Czech Republic, where there is a strong identification with the West in opposition to the East, embodied in particular by Russia, which is perceived as a threat, in Hungary – and particularly among Viktor Orbán’s electorate – the idea of Hungary as a bridge between the West and the East is quite popular, and is occasionally promoted by Fidesz leaders. Furthermore, we should remember the tensions between Hungary and Ukraine over the rights of the Hungarian minority, and the fact that media outlets close to Fidesz tend to reproduce, at least in part, the Russian narrative on Ukraine. All these factors help to explain why the discourse on neutrality and the priority of peace and security for Hungarians, whether they live in Hungary or Ukraine, has been able to convince a large proportion of voters.

Finally, the responsibilities of the opposition itself should not be overlooked. The choice of Péter Márki-Zay as the lead candidate was surprising, but it seemed relevant and capable of swaying part of the Fidesz electorate, betting on a conservative leader despite the strong presence of left-wing parties within the anti-Orbán alliance, elected from a small peripheral town – who, in 2018, managed to defeat an incumbent mayor in one of Fidesz’s reputedly impregnable strongholds. However, his lack of political experience was undoubtedly a handicap in the eyes of voters, especially in a context of crisis. A number of controversial statements may have unsettled his electoral base and provided ammunition for the Fidesz campaign. Doubts about the credibility of the opposition candidate were compounded by those about the motley coalition of six parties with very different political profiles that supported him: its ability to maintain unity beyond the elections and to govern, the sincerity of the ‘repositioning’ of Jobbik, a party that was clearly positioned on the far right just a few years ago, and the role of former Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány.

This is the crux of the problem for the Hungarian opposition: its inability to turn the page after the disastrous episode of the Gyurcsány government in 2006-09 and to produce, in twelve years, a figure capable of rivalling Viktor Orbán in terms of political talent and flair, as well as in terms of notoriety and credibility. Betting on an outsider unknown to the general public who only emerged a few months before the election, when access to the media and financial resources were severely limited compared to those of Fidesz, was undoubtedly the most fundamental cause of the failure – for which Péter Márki-Zay is not responsible, but rather the political parties that supported him. Fidesz strategists were not mistaken in waving the spectre of a possible victory for the opposition, equating it with a return of Ferenc Gyurcsany’s socialists, presenting Marki-Zay as a puppet in the hands of the latter, and systematically referring to the opposition coalition as ‘the left’.

Viktor Orbán’s electoral triumph forces his critics and opponents – both Hungarian and foreign – to admit a bitter truth: clearly, the issue of the erosion of democracy and the rule of law is not a priority for the majority of Hungarian citizens. At this stage, it is not on this ground that Fidesz can be defeated. The Slovakian scenario of 1998 or that of the last Czech parliamentary elections, where the issue of defending democracy, the rule of law and the country’s anchoring in the West was decisive in enabling a diverse alliance to defeat a controversial leader, is not materialising in Hungary.

In addition to the aforementioned shortcomings of the Hungarian opposition and Viktor Orbán’s undeniable political talent, other structural factors undoubtedly explain this Hungarian peculiarity: post-imperial nostalgia linked to the trauma of the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, the haunting question of the chances of survival of a non-Slavic people, the Hungarian people, surrounded by Slavs, a perception of their own specificity as a people who are both Western (thanks in particular to Christianity) and Eastern (thanks to their affinities with Turkic-speaking peoples, as well as the myth about their Hun origins). Finally, there is a particularly strong divide between the oversized capital, Budapest, which has become the sole bastion of opposition, and the rest of the country.

All this means that ‘Orbánism’ is not a mere parenthesis, and the European Union will have to continue to seek its path in order to deal with the ‘illiberal’ challenge within its ranks. Viktor Orbán is clearly reinvigorated by his triumph – his speech on election night made this very clear.

Nevertheless, despite this domestic victory, Orbán now appears more isolated and on the defensive on the European stage. His closest allies, the three other countries in the Visegrád Group (Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia), have distanced themselves. And unless there is a surprise breakthrough by the far right in the elections scheduled for 2022 in France, Sweden or Austria, it will not be easy for the Hungarian leader to change this situation. As a sign of this isolation, the von der Leyen Commission has just triggered the new mechanism of conditionality on respect for the rule of law for the payment of European funds. This raises the question of what political strategy Orbán will pursue during his fourth term: will he continue to escalate tensions and provoke his European partners, as he has done since his victory, or will he attempt to ‘calm the waters’ and regain his place in the European mainstream?