No European defense without a new treaty

European defense is now a priority, an urgent matter, even an obsession.

Everyone agrees that it is essential in a context marked by major geopolitical upheavals, open hostility from Russia, and the gradual withdrawal of the US administration from the European theater.

A recent Eurobazooka poll, conducted by Le Grand Continent and Cluster 17, indicates that 60% of Europeans are in favor of a common European army and that 70% believe that European Union countries should be able to ensure their own security.

Furthermore, more than half of Europeans now consider the US president to be an enemy. Vice President J. D. Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference on February 14 shocked the Europeans who heard it. In particular, when he said: “We don’t think we should share the burden, but we do think it’s important for Europeans to take matters into their own hands, while America focuses on regions of the world that are in great danger.”

This new language, which has the merit of clarity, encourages Europe to consider defense issues as a top European priority. However, European defense faces several obstacles.

The European Commission, which has no explicit competence in this area, is doing what it can. It affirms its ambition to “build a European Defense Union” by offering to help Member States restructure their armed forces, promote the pooling of resources, and strengthen the single market for defense products and services. It is mobilizing funding through various initiatives, including EDIP (European Defense Industry Program), EDIRPA (European Defense Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act), and ASAP (Act in Support of Ammunition Production). The ReArm Europe plan, presented in March 2025, aims to strengthen European defense capabilities, in particular through the use of borrowing, budgetary flexibility granted to Member States, and the planning of “flagship” projects, and has made a strong impression with its ambition.

Faced with this flurry of initiatives from the Commission, Member States appear cautious. They do not want the Commission to interfere in an intergovernmental area. They want to retain control over their industrial programs and their sovereignty over military planning, the use of their funding, and the choice of equipment. Not to mention those who opposed the term “ReArm” (Austria, Spain, Ireland, Italy), leading the Commission to add the term “Readiness 2030” to the title of its proposal. In this context, it is difficult to say that the Member States have fully grasped the stakes. As the last European Council meeting on October 23 showed, heads of state and government prefer to settle for half-measures. They agreed to set up a “wall of drones,” strengthen border controls, and eventually develop an anti-aircraft and anti-space shield. This is a step forward. But they want to entrust the European Defense Agency, an intergovernmental body, with implementing this agenda. However, since its creation in 2004, the Agency, which has no financial resources of its own, has shown neither boldness nor efficiency. Finally, in the budget discussions for the period 2028-2034, all Member States want an increase in funding for the defense industry, but without increasing their contributions, creating new resources, or touching the major policies of the CAP and cohesion.

As we can see, the issue of funding, often cited as the main obstacle to the creation of a genuine European defense, is not really the issue. This is not only because of the sums accumulated by Member States for defense to appease the Trump administration, but also because the instruments proposed by the Commission would make it possible to mobilize several billion euros, not to mention the debt capacity proposed to the Council.

In fact, the real obstacles are of a different nature and will be more difficult to overcome.

Industrialists, supported by their governments, do not wish to pool their know-how, technologies, data, supply chains, and production methods, but rather to preserve their autonomy and their “catalog.” At the risk of not allowing for better interoperability, maintaining costly competition in the domestic market, and losing international markets, European cooperation in the field of armaments remains weak: eight manufacturers of frigates, seven of battle tanks, five of fighter jets, not to mention missiles and other weapons. The difficulties, and even the probable abandonment, of the mainly Franco-German program, the Future Air Combat System (SCAF), once again perfectly illustrate this reluctance of manufacturers and states to work together.

The priorities of the member states are far from identical, despite the adoption of a strategic compass in 2022. Cybersecurity, hybrid threats, and drones seem to be the subject of unanimous agreement. But some (Eastern Europe and the Baltic states) fear Russia above all else and favor land-based capabilities. Others (Italy, Greece, Spain, Malta) make migration their priority, while France, for example, remains focused on the African continent and the threats of Islamist terrorism.

Finally, how can we imagine developing a European defense without the involvement of one of its main players, the United Kingdom, which has not participated in the debates since Brexit, even though the current leaders are striving to maintain regular dialogue with most of the member states? The mention of the United Kingdom leads us to another very sensitive subject for European defense, that of France’s nuclear projection capability, a highly sensitive issue that has so far been discussed in extremely vague terms.

Thus, debates on European defense are likely to continue indefinitely until the question of sovereignty is resolved.

Fortunately, however, on other occasions and on other issues, Europeans have been able to transcend this question. They did so with regard to the single market in 1993. Above all, they did so with regard to the currency in 2002.

The same should be true of defense. Without a treaty and without a timetable, European defense will remain a pipe dream.

We need to return to Jacques Delors’ method, as Enrico Letta regularly points out. It was because Jacques Delors proposed the Single Act in 1986, with a deadline of January 1, 1993, that the internal market became a reality, even if it still needs to be completed today. It is because Jacques Delors worked for the Maastricht Treaty as early as 1992 that the euro was able to come into being in 2002.

For European defense to become a reality, we must therefore start working now on a new treaty setting a deadline. Member States, national armies, manufacturers, and all players in the arms sector will finally have to agree to share their expertise and put an end to the current balkanization of the European market, which weakens us in the face of our competitors. Admittedly, this will lead to a loss of national sovereignty in favor of shared sovereignty, which will not please everyone. But so much the better. Thanks to this clearly stated objective, the masks will come off.

Should we aim for 2030 or 2035? This may seem close, but at the same time, given the evolution of threats, and if everyone considers this a priority, there is an urgent need to act to respond to the expectations and concerns of European citizens.