[FR] Trump to the rescue of European defence?

Must the worst happen in the United States for the best to be built in Europe? This is what recent statements by two traditionally Atlanticist partners, the Netherlands and Sweden, in favour of increased spending and European defence, suggest. When asked about a possible victory for Donald Trump in the United States in the 2024 presidential elections, the two defence ministers argued that European defence was a necessary alternative to a possible ‘abandonment’ by the United States.

Should we rejoice? Of course. In the geopolitical turmoil that has gripped the world for a decade, awareness of the strategic role that the European Union could play is welcome: for years, the French were alone in arguing for the Union’s political and military rise. The suspicion, recurrent since de Gaulle, of a French desire to weaken NATO, prevented most of our partners from going too far in implementing the common security and defence policy. The war in Ukraine had certainly awakened Europe’s geopolitical consciousness, but above all it had reinforced expectations and dependencies on NATO. The scene changes radically when the United States itself becomes suspect, when it appears possible that it may disinvest from NATO: this is when European defence is relaunched. How can we defend ourselves against Russia if not by playing the card of collective European defence?

Should we believe it? It is difficult to forget that Donald Trump’s first term did not spark a wave of support for the Union’s strategic autonomy. It was rather Brexit, in June 2016, that really boosted European defence. But let’s assume that the second time will be the charm: now is the time to think, particularly on the French and Franco-German side, about new and decisive steps in terms of common defence. However, this plea for greater European defence is based solely on circumstantial and opportunistic considerations: if Trump loses the election to a new Democratic administration, it is likely that these favourable dispositions towards a strategic Europe will disappear in an instant, with a huge sigh of relief. The question therefore remains: how can Europeans be brought together, not only in response to external threats, but also around a major political project? How can the ambition of a Europe that is a major, credible, proactive and therefore respected strategic player be made desirable, regardless of developments in American policy, or in Russia, or… Burkina Faso? How can we unite a political Europe for its own merits, and not to compensate for America’s perceived failings? The answer has been elusive for decades. Will it remain so in the new world order that is emerging from one catastrophe to the next?

The end of NATO, assuming that such a catastrophe is desired by an American president, will in any case leave two options open. The first will effectively consist of the urgent creation of a common defence. But with which Europe? The 27? The 34? The 27 plus Great Britain? And under whose command? It should not be too early to think about it and prepare for it. The second option has long been on everyone’s mind: a race for bilateral defence treaties between individual European countries and the US. This would mean every country for itself, leaving more than one European state strategically behind. It is not too late to consider the consequences of this major strategic fragmentation of the European continent.