Is Trump’s election, paradoxically, beneficial for European defence?

Donald Trump’s election to a second term in the White House is not good news for the European Union, but could it, paradoxically, be beneficial? This could be the case in the field of defence, where there is a growing call for the Europeans to become independent, having been under American protection for too long.

The creation of the Atlantic Alliance in 1949 had effectively placed European states, weakened by the Second World War, in a relationship of strong dependence on the United States. The transatlantic relationship then became an essential element of European defence policies. With the end of the Cold War, the Balkan conflicts led to expressions of a desire to break free from this dependence, but no one really believed that a European defence policy could be credible without the Americans. Moreover, dependence was widely perceived as an integral part of the transatlantic link and of maintaining the American presence in Europe.

More recently, the war in Ukraine has confirmed the vulnerability of Europeans, who devote only a small part of their wealth and strategic vision to their defence and who would undoubtedly be unable to defend themselves (against Russia?) without political and military support from the United States. But denial has not disappeared. Europeans remain reluctant to distance themselves from the United States in order to build a credible European defence policy.

But will they have a choice if Donald Trump decides, insidiously or radically, to call into question the American commitment to defend Europe? Some texts produced by conservative American institutions speak of a ‘radical reorientation’ of NATO and American policy within it, while candidate Trump has repeatedly expressed his contempt for the Atlantic Alliance and its member states. The worst is certainly not certain, but the fact remains that Europeans have never been in such a precarious situation as they are today, caught between an ally that is withdrawing and an enemy – Russia – that threatens them and therefore creates the need for a common defence.

In this context, at least three strategic objectives are appropriate. First, it is necessary to return to an ambitious narrative on European sovereignty, which must be translated in the field of defence into a clear vision of what Europeans must be able to do together, both within the European Union and outside it, so as not to exclude the British. Secondly, Europeans must affirm their support for Ukraine regardless of the American position on this issue, by making it clear that the defence of Europe begins in the Donbass, and that a defeat for Ukraine would be disastrous for the security of Europe as a whole. Thirdly, the utmost pragmatism must prevail in building collective defence capabilities and establishing a European defence industrial base. The efforts made so far fall short of what is needed, while financial resources are not going to increase. But no European state can today afford to think about its defence outside the European framework. Without the Americans, there may be no alternative to the defence of Europe by Europeans.