[FR] Migration: A look back at the February 9 European Council

After a prolonged absence since 2019, with the exception of specific references to Belarus’s exploitation of the situation and, above all, the reception of displaced persons from Ukraine benefiting from temporary protection, migration was put back on the European Council’s agenda on 9 February at the express request of some of its members. For the better? It is to be feared that this is not the case.

On a highly divisive issue, faced with polarised positions reflecting tense national debates, and after apparently long and difficult deliberations, the conclusions adopted seem to have been drafted to avoid the worst. They deserve a nuanced reading.

Firstly, it is positive to note that the European Council has spoken out for the first time, nearly two and a half years after its presentation by the Commission, on the Pact on Migration and Asylum, inviting the co-legislators to continue their work in accordance with a joint roadmap leading to the end of the European Parliament and Commission’s term of office in the first half of 2024. However, no guidance is given on how to build on the progress made in 2022. At least modest tribute is paid to the message conveyed both by the Commission in its initial contribution and by the European Parliament in its deliberations, namely that the only real structural solution to the migration challenge facing Europe lies in the adoption of this Pact.

For the rest, it is difficult to avoid taking a critical stance.

Firstly, the European Council’s conclusions aim to consolidate policies that have so far shown little evidence of effectiveness. This is evidenced by the repetition of classic language from the Union’s thesaurus. Thus, the ‘global approach to migration’, the need to ‘avoid loss of life’ and to ‘address the root causes of migration’ by using ‘all EU policies, instruments and tools as leverage’ ‘to ensure effective returns’ are repeated at length in a text that, like most of the conclusions, breaks with the discipline of brevity that the European Council had fortunately imposed on itself in recent years.
Whether it is a question of strengthening cooperation on return and readmission or controlling external borders, the conclusions are above all an invitation to continue and intensify initiatives that have been on the European Council’s agenda since 2018/2019, even though the sharp increase in irregular entries and asylum applications recorded in 2022, both of which rose by around 50%, demonstrate their inadequacy in the face of what remains, more than ever, a European challenge requiring a European response. Only the encouragement to develop instruments for a common assessment of the situation appears here to be a rare and interesting innovation. But sooner or later, the question of the relevance of investing ever-increasing financial, human and political resources in these policies will have to be asked.

Especially if the paragraph dedicated to strengthening external action inspires the same feeling of ‘déjà vu’, it also risks having damaging consequences for the European Union’s role in the world, particularly with regard to its partners in the South, with whom it has long had a unique relationship. Amplified by the highly publicised debate on the construction of ‘walls’ subsidised by the Community budget, the general message sent by the 27 Member States to countries of origin and transit risks being counterproductive in relation to the objective pursued and is at odds with the geopolitical challenges facing the European Union today.

Struggling to develop a coherent internal policy, the EU appears to have little legitimacy to impose its demands on third countries described as ‘partners’, or even to convince them, through the virtuous ‘Brussels effect’, to adopt standards that have proven their worth within the EU. But more fundamentally, when it comes to migration flows, the Union and its Member States appear to be convinced that they will succeed in imposing their “global approach” through the skilful use of all available levers, i.e. by subordinating a large number of external policy instruments to the sole purpose of controlling these flows.

Such an illusion is striking at a time when repeated shocks and the worsening of global threats are making the EU aware of its dependencies (which is, incidentally, a welcome first step towards achieving ‘open strategic autonomy’). Europe must understand the ongoing redefinition of geopolitical balances in order to adopt policies that will prevent it from being relegated to the periphery.

This challenge was perfectly summed up by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Josep Borrell, in his speech at the recent Munich conference in February: noting, like President Macron, the strong resentment expressed in many southern countries, he stressed that the Union will only be able to maintain its status as a global player by understanding the reasons for this resentment, beyond the classic arguments of propaganda and disinformation, and by reassuring its partners of its firm commitment to stand by them in the face of economic, social and climate challenges.

It is difficult to find any trace of such a vision in the conclusions of the February European Council. No doubt prepared too hastily under the pressure of the security emergencies felt on the migration routes of the Mediterranean and the Western Balkans, these conclusions are worrying in that, like many similar texts adopted by the interior ministers of the 27 Member States, they show a loss of the capacity for synthesis and strategic vision that one would normally expect from heads of state and government. Is this an accident to be forgotten as quickly as possible? It will be possible to verify this, as the European Council has once again committed to returning to this issue on a regular basis.

In October 2020, we expressed our support for the initiative of the Pact on Migration and Asylum designed by the Commission after extensive consultations with all Member States. Despite its obvious limitations, the aim was to break the deadlock created by the fiction of the Dublin Regulation by organising on new bases the reciprocity of commitments made in terms of responsibility by the countries of first entry and in terms of solidarity by those in the second line, which nevertheless receive the majority of first-time immigrants. In November 2021, we expressed our doubts about the chances of success, as there seemed to be a lack of political will within the EU Council of Ministers to achieve this. This lack has not been remedied by the conclusions of the European Council of 9 February, despite the undeniable progress made under the French and Czech presidencies in implementing a more effective ‘gradual’ approach.

There is still hope that negotiations on the Migration and Asylum Pact will be concluded before the end of the legislative term, even if there are justified doubts about both the timetable and the substance of the hoped-for agreements. If the pessimistic scenario prevails, it will inevitably be up to the European Council to take up the issue of migration and mobility and redefine its parameters from scratch. There will be no more rush, and deliberations will have to be prepared through in-depth consultations at the highest level, bearing in mind that it was this same European Council that laid the foundations for a truly comprehensive European policy linking free movement and asylum, the management of legal migration, border security and the international role of the European Union.