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Couteau, B., Bechev, D., Gjoni, I, Nič, M., Xaviereff, N., Zweers, W. “North Macedonia’s EU path: Challenges and opportunities in 2025”, Blogpost, Jacques Delors Institute, December 2024

This paper outlines the main findings of a fact-finding mission to Skopje that was jointly conducted by experts from four European think tanks – Jacques Delors Institute, DGAP, The Clingendael Institute, and Carnegie Europe – from September 23 to 25, 2024. It was organised with the assistance of the think tank Institute for Democracy (IDSCS) and funded by the Open Society Foundations.

Despite decades of demanding challenges along its EU path, North Macedonia has yet to see tangible progress toward its historic goal. Therefore, the government led by Hristijan Mickoski following the 8 May 2024 parliamentary elections may be reluctant to push for further EU-aligned reforms without a convincing signal of commitment from the EU. For its part, the EU has offered a potential resolution to the deadlock caused by Bulgaria’s veto through a constitutional reform that would pave the way to the opening of the country’s first negotiating cluster with the EU (see box below). The EU train is in motion — but North Macedonia must be convinced it is more than a mirage.

The EU has recently approved a Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans1 providing substantial funding, though the attached political conditions can be doubted. Indeed, since Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU’s geopolitical push for enlargement has further shifted the process away from a strictly merit-based approach, favouring political considerations instead. With this shift in mind, the current Macedonian government appears more comfortable to broaden its strategic alliances, including with illiberal figures like Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and U.S. President-elect Donald Trump. Should prospects for progress in EU accession negotiations fade, North Macedonia’s leadership could pivot towards domestic power consolidation, supported by these alternative partnerships.

The responsibility now lies largely with North Macedonia’s government to break the deadlock it faces on its EU path. Yet, almost 6 months into office, it has not actively supported the necessary constitutional reform recognising a Bulgarian community in the country. This constitutes a critical requirement by the EU to move towards a second intergovernmental conference (IGC), where the country would open its first negotiating cluster. While the EU sees this requirement as an integral part of the accession process, the Macedonian government continues to downplay it as merely a proposal. Without a bold move from both sides, North Macedonia risks falling behind other Western Balkan candidates. That is evidenced by its recent decoupling from Albania, which has just begun negotiations on its first cluster. This stall could in turn jeopardise the EU’s broader geopolitical and transformative aims for the region.