The American enemy

Major global geopolitical ruptures can be counted on the fingers of one hand. There was 26 December 1991, which saw the collapse and disappearance of the USSR; 11 September 2001, when the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center stunned the world; 20 March 2003, when the United States attacked and invaded Iraq without a UN mandate; and 24 February 2022, the day of Russia’s massive armed aggression against Ukraine. Other tragic events have also continued to scar the world with violence—among them the Hamas attacks against Israel in 2023, yet another war in Lebanon, the advance of Islamist terrorist groups in West Africa, etc.—but they do not carry the same value of a brutal rupture of the international order.

What happened on the night of 3 January 2026 in Venezuela constitutes the fifth fracture, and undoubtedly the most important since the end of the Second World War: the world’s greatest democracy, America—which fought Hitler and Stalin in the name of freedom, which invented the United Nations and the primacy of law over force—has joined the camp of aggressors, predators, authoritarians, and those proud to be so. If this strategy of “strategic abduction” were to be repeated in Greenland, it would definitively mark the end of a world, of the Atlantic Alliance, of a Western community, and of a global democratic dream.

From this new strategic earthquake, ten initial lessons can already be drawn.

1. Trump is strong with the weak and weak with the strong. Europe belongs to the weak, so he will attack us. He has already begun to do so in trade and may continue, as he himself says, with our resources—starting with Greenland. By contrast, until now he has taken care to spare China and Russia.
2. The American operation in Venezuela is a blank cheque for other potential aggressors worldwide. China may feel freed to act on Taiwan and the coveted islands. Russia can congratulate itself for having attacked Ukraine to defend its “own interests” and may even go so far as to believe that reclaiming the Baltic states could become possible. In Africa, the strongest will give free rein to their ambitions, not to mention Israel against Lebanon, the West Bank, Syria, and above all Iran—which itself may be tempted into a forward flight against Israel as soon as it has the means. In other words, may the strongest win, without fear of reprisals other than from an even stronger power: a vast strategic regression now looms over the planet.
3. America is granting itself all rights: to seize, attack, and exploit for its own benefit the countries it believes it needs within its sphere of influence. But what is that sphere? The Monroe Doctrine confined it to the two American continents. It seems the Trump doctrine extends U.S. imperial control to the entire Euro-Atlantic area as well—Europe, and even Canada. The aim is to assert exclusive American ownership over subsoil resources in the Americas and those of European allies: a kind of technological colonialism within NATO, freed from the always risky occupation of coveted territory. It is also a return to the great tradition of American territorial expansion through conquest, appropriation, expulsion, or purchase.
4. The confusion of values is staggering, and we must beware of it. The world is indeed splitting into two camps: those who first applaud the end of a dictatorship, believing that the end justifies the means and even wishing Trump would continue elsewhere—for example in Cuba or Iran; and those who first condemn the method—the rejection of international law and the use of force—because it is the entire edifice of international security that would be called into question if such policies were to prevail everywhere (China in Taiwan, Japan on its islands, Russia in Estonia, Israel in the West Bank, etc.). Yet these two principles—democracy and the rule of law—are not separable options.
5. The fight in favor of international law must take priority, not the struggle against dictatorships, because law is the foundation of peace just as much as of democracy. It is precisely this law we defend when we defend Ukraine (the right to sovereignty and territorial integrity of states). How can we continue to invoke it in Europe while remaining silent when it comes to Venezuela? How can we denounce Russian imperialism attacking Ukraine without condemning with equal vigor American aggression against another sovereign country?
6. Trump and Putin are the same fight. Because they are objectively allied in violating international law, they should be fought equally. Explaining the restraint of certain European leaders in condemning the United States—particularly Emmanuel Macron—by the need to placate Trump so that he helps us defend Ukraine is sheer blindness: it is like calling in the family of arsonist firefighters to put out a blaze.
7. The time has probably come for Europeans to reassess the war in Ukraine. This observation will make many people howl. But the world is changing fast—much faster than the Ukrainian conflict and the state of the Atlantic relationship. As long as Russia represented a common threat to Ukraine and the EU, defending Ukraine was rightly Europe’s priority, because defending one meant defending the other. But when it is the United States that threatens Europe, the equation changes: it becomes just as vital to defend Ukraine against Russia as to defend Europe against America.
8. If nothing is put in place to counter this strategy of deliberate spoliation, Trump will not hesitate to take Greenland (for its resources), or even French Guiana (for its gold and its space base), or half of Ukraine, which he would share with Russia. Only his interests and his fortune matter. Appeasing him no longer makes sense—unless we play more cynically than he does: let us make an EU offer to exploit Greenland before it is too late.
9. Who is capable of resisting this new imperial-colonialism of America? In the Global South, two scenarios are theoretically possible. The first is resistance, if Brazil, India, and China in particular become concerned about their security in a world without rules, dominated solely by American force—the largest by far, but also the most unpredictable. Even Putin might worry about an American reversal to his detriment. Conversely, the second scenario would be collusion among the great predators, with a Russo-Sino-American condominium over the planet, even if these empires eventually devour one another—and humanity be damned. The division of the world into spheres of influence indeed resembles a fool’s bargain, with America as the sole winner: it is unlikely Trump would renounce Asia and leave its control and exploitation to China alone.
10. And Europe? What can it do? Europe feels incapable of confronting Trump—whether on trade, digital issues, or, even less so, politically and militarily. It believes it needs him too much against Russia, while Donald Trump’s United States feels bound by no moral, political, or strategic obligation toward Europe. It is more than urgent to abandon these illusions, to face this America head-on with its new fascistic expansionism, to seek allies elsewhere—certainly in the South, perhaps even in China (at least to preserve the rules of nuclear deterrence)—and to arm itself, arm itself again, and always arm itself in order to defend itself. With European weapons, a European industry, and European courage. Otherwise, the disappearance of this European adventure—ironically blessed by the United States in 1950—is assured.
11. History is rich in lessons. In December 1967, General Ailleret, then Chief of Staff under the de Gaulle government, used the concept of “all-azimuth deterrence” to describe French nuclear doctrine. At the time, the outcry and indignation among allies were unanimous. Sixty years later, it is precisely the modernity of this European conception of defense that we should now put into practice.