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# WHAT POLITICAL BALANCE OF POWER IN THE NEXT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT?

Yves Bertoncini | *Director of* Notre Europe - Jacques Delors Institute Valentin Kreilinger | *Research Fellow at* Notre Europe - Jacques Delors Institute

### SUMMARY

The political balance of power in the next European Parliament (EP) is the great unknown six months before the May 2014 elections. There are, however, many elements of expertise and information available which allow carefully conducting an exercise of foresight while being well-aware of all developments that can still affect the picture drawn in this Policy Paper, based on three series of analyses:

### 1. The internal cohesion of political forces: a key factor of influence in the EP (see pages 4 to 8)

The internal cohesion of political families and groups determines their influence in the EP. Publicly available data from VoteWatch Europe and research undertaken by its team allow showing that:

- some political families (socialists, radical left and greens) are more united than others (conservatives, and, above all, "populists");
- some political groups (EPP, S&D, ALDE, Greens/EFA) are more cohesive than others, especially the groups gathering populist MEPs;
- the "actual power" of the united political family and groups will be even bigger than the "nominal power" they will get in terms of seats in May 2014.

### 2. The possible shifts between the European political forces after May 2014 (see pages 8 to 17)

On the basis of the 2009 results and recent opinion polls for the eight most populated countries (i.e. "swing states"), the following observations can be made for the composition of the next European Parliament:

- the race between the European People's Party (EPP) and the Socialists and Democrats (S&D) could be very tight: both of them could be around 28% of the seats (+3 points for S&D and -7 for EPP, compared to 2009);
- both the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) and the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) might face losses while European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) and Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) are likely to remain stable or have slightly better scores;
- the so-called "populist" forces (mainly from the right but also from the radical left) might garner a bit more than 200 seats in May 2014 (against around 140 today), then progressing from a bit less than 20% of the seats to a bit more than 25%.

### 3. The logics of majority dynamics: who will govern the next EP? (see pages 17 to 23)

The real challenge in the EP, as the assembly of a separated powers system, lies in forming a majority:

- three coalitions were able to do so in 2009-14: a "grand coalition": EPP, S&D, with or without ALDE; a "centre-left coalition" (S&D, ALDE, Greens/EFA, GUE/NGL) and a "centre-right coalition" (EPP, ALDE, ECR);
- the next winning coalition(s) will determine both the election of the Commission president for 2014-19 and the work of the European Parliament as a co-legislator. The likely rise in the share of "populist" MEPs will make a grand coalition even more likely: The estimations for 2014 put forward here see a "centre-left coalition" at 48% of the seats and a "centre-right coalition" at 44%;
- the political game is then very open at this stage, and the major issue in terms of balance of power in the next EP is to know who will finally take the lead between the left and the right (a populist victory being out of reach in terms of seats).

### **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

INTRODUCTION: THE KEY ISSUE OF THE NEXT EUROPEAN ELECTIONS	3
1. The internal cohesion of political forces: a key factor of influence in the EP	4
1.1. Are forces of the same political family within the same group?	4
1.2. The internal cohesion of the political groups: from seats to "actual power"	5
2. The possible shifts between the European political forces	8
2.1. A possible shift based on the situation of eight "swing states" and the results of 2009	8
2.2. Scores and seats: what prospects for June 2014?	12
3. The logics of majority dynamics: who will govern the next EP?	17
3.1. The majority dynamics between 2009 and 2013	17
3.2. The winning coalitions in the next European Parliament	21
CONCLUSION – AN ELECTION WITH QUITE AN UNCERTAIN POLITICAL OUTCOME	23
ON THE SAME THEMES	24

### INTRODUCTION: THE KEY ISSUE OF THE NEXT EUROPEAN ELECTIONS

he next European elections, which are scheduled to take place from 22 to 25 May 2014, are already arousing concern in connection with the two challenges they traditionally face, namely low voter turnout and the often considerable results chalked up by the protest vote personified, in this instance, by "populist" parties<sup>1</sup>. These legitimate concerns should not make the observers and actors forget what will be the main issue at stake in May 2014, namely choosing the members of one of the three main EU institutions while determining what will be the new balance of power between the various political forces represented in the European Parliament (EP). The key question is to try to know who is likely to constitute the political majorities able to adopt the major policy decisions the EU will have to make during the period 2014-2019, and which will affect not only the pace and nature of the European construction, but also the EU members states and citizens.

WHO IS LIKELY TO CONSTITUTE THE POLITICAL MAJORITIES ABLE TO ADOPT THE MAJOR POLICY DECISIONS IN THE EU?"

It is naturally not easy to rely on the available forecasts and to take a clear stand on this point six months before the elections, given the possible evolution of the political, economic and social context at the EU and national levels, not to mention the striking events that could take place during the next semester. But it is possible to recall that the balance of power in the EP is and will be structured by political and institutional dynamics that are already quite perceivable, and that can then feed an enlightening analysis. It is all the more tempting to elaborate such an analysis to feed and stimulate the public debate on the next European elections, so as to try and shape it on accurate

bases and to give citizens and stake holders a better perception of the May 2014 "rendez-vous".

In this perspective, we will assess the possible influence of the European political forces in the next European Parliament on the basis of the three main criteria to be taken into account<sup>2</sup>:

- first the cohesion of the political families and groups represented in the European Parliament;
- second the number of seats won, and then the scores political parties are likely to obtain;
- and last but not least their ability to forge majority coalitions with other political forces.

It's on this threefold basis that we are able to give a first insight on the possible evolution of the balance of power within the European Parliament after May 2014, and then to pave the way for further and updated analyses, but also political actions, on this topic.

<sup>1.</sup> On these two challenges, see Yves Bertoncini, "European Elections: less abstention, more populism?", Tribune, Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute, November 2013.

See http://www.votewatch.eu/, the work done by the London School of Economics (under the guidance of Simon Hix), and Doru Frantescu, "The balance of power in the current European Parliament is crucial for understanding the issues at stake in the 2014 European elections", LSE European Politics and Policy Blog (EUROPP), 24 October 2013.

WHAT POLITICAL BALANCE OF POWER IN THE NEXT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT?

# 1. The internal cohesion of political forces: a key factor of influence in the EP

Given the functioning of the European Parliament (EP), largely based on the political groups, the actual influence of the political forces derives from two key elements:

- the ability of a political family to get united in a *single* political group;
- the internal cohesion of that political group.

### **1.1.** Are forces of the same political family within the same group?

THE FIRST KEY FACTOR OF INFLUENCE OF A "POLITICAL FAMILY" IN THE EP IS ITS ABILITY TO GET UNITED IN A *SINGLE* POLITICAL GROUP" The first key factor on which is based the influence of a "political family" in the EP is its ability to get united in a *single* political group. If around 180 political parties have members elected in the EP, it is indeed possible to classify them in the different "political families" which structure the electoral games and the public debates at the national and EU levels, namely the Conservatives, the Socialists, the Liberals, the Greens, etc. In the perspective of the next European elections there is also the need to mention the "Populists", whose role and score are often mentioned, before trying to assess the internal cohesion of all the "political families" competing in the EP. We also need to recall

that the political parties get united in the same group first and foremost for ideological reasons, but also in some case for material reasons<sup>3</sup> (so to obtain resources from the EP for their political activities).

A rapid analysis of the current situation of the EP first shows that three "classical" political families are rather united with the same political groups, i.e. the Greens, the Socialists and the Radical Left. Even if the title of the "European United Left/Nordic Green Left" could make believe that it includes Nordic Greens, almost all the Greens MEPs are in reality members of the Green Group: the main political problem for the influence of this political family is not to be disunited, but not to have MEPs in more than half of the member states, including big ones as Italy, Poland and Romania. The same situation can be observed among the "Radical Left" family, whose anchor group is the "EUL/NGL" one: almost all the MEPs belonging to this family are members of this group (i.e. MEPs from Die Linke, the Czech Communist Party, the French Front de Gauche, Syriza, Izquierda Unida, etc.), even if the Danish Socialist People's Party MEP is member of the Green group. Finally, while the word "Socialism" can stand both for "social-democrat" and "communist", we can see that the "Socialists" and "Social democrats" MEPs are almost all in the "S&D" group, with some very limited defections here and there.

The situation is quite diverse as regard the "Conservative" family, which is split into two political groups, namely the "European People's Party" (EPP) and the "European Conservative and Reformists" (ECR) ones. While the former includes government parties from the right, for example the German CDU/CSU or the French UMP, the latter gathers other right-wing parties including the British Conservative Party, Vaclav Klaus' ODS from the Czech Republic, the Polish PiS and PJN, and so forth. This division is largely based on an ideological divergence as regards the European construction, given the fact that the ECR group comprises more eurosceptic or downright europhobic MEPs than the EPP group (with the exception of the Hungarian FIDESZ, member of the EPP). Such a division affects the influence of the Conservative family in the EP.

The Liberal family is globally more united, in the framework of the ALDE group. But some liberal or centrists are members of the EPP, for example the French members of the UDI party, who could be tempted to join the "ALDE" group, given their recent alliance with the MODEM (whose MEPs are already members of the ALDE).

<sup>3.</sup> To form a political group in the European Parliament requires the participation of 25 MEPS elected in at least a quarter of the EU member states (thus seven countries).

However that may be, the EPP could have difficulties to keep within the same political group MEPs from the FIDESZ and from the UDI.

But the most divided political family is the "populist" one<sup>6</sup>, whose presumed members currently belong to four different political groups in the EP. First of all, the "Europe of Freedom and Democracy" (EFD) group which one might describe as containing those MEPs from the "autonomist right" such as the UKIP, the Northern League, the Danish Peoples' Party and the True Finns. Then there are the "non-attached", comprising far right MEPs mainly from the French Front national, the Austrian FPÖ, Geert Wilders' Party for Freedom and the Hungarian Jobbik party. Many observers of the so-called "populist family" also include the parties of the above mentioned "Radical left" group, as well as members of the "ECR" group, especially from the Vaclav Klaus' ODS, the Polish PiS and PJN and so forth. In this context, the only noticeable change which might occur after May 2014 is the formation of a political grouping gathering the far right MEPs, who would thus abandon their present non-attached status<sup>5</sup>, and would become united again, as between 1985 and 1994<sup>6</sup>. But the "populist" family which includes quite diverse and sometimes opposed political forces (example of the Radical Left versus the Far Right) would remain seated in four different political groups, and then largely disunited.

### **1.2.** The internal cohesion of the political groups: from seats to "actual power"

Publicly available data from VoteWatch Europe and research undertaken by its team allow showing that some political groups (EPP, S&D, ALDE, Greens/EFA) are more cohesive than others, their internal cohesion varies by policy area, and that the "actual power" of the political groups is not the same as their "nominal power" in terms of seats obtained at the last election".
 NOMINAL POWER" IN
 TERMS OF SEATS OBTAINED
 AT THE LAST ELECTION"

making, this system is beneficial to everybody<sup>8</sup>.

The overall cohesion rate of political groups in the EP (meaning that x% of the members of the political group vote the same way) stands at a remarkable 90%: the groups are not subject to the kind of majority discipline that a government would demand, thus it relies only on genuine ideological convergence. Interestingly, the cohesion rates vary between the political groups and across policy areas (see Graphs 1 and 2):

- the Greens/EFA, the S&D and the EPP tend to be the most cohesive with cohesion rates between 92 and 95%;
- ALDE and ECR are slightly less cohesive;
- GUE/NGL has a cohesion rate of 79% while EFD cohesion reaches 49%;
- by definition, the non-attached MEPs do not have a party line to follow and thus they are not "cohesive" or not. If they were taken as one political group, their cohesion would be below EFD.

<sup>4.</sup> Yves Bertocini, "European Elections: less abstention, more populism?", *Tribune, Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute*, November 2013.


<sup>5.</sup> This evolution could lead the Spanish non-attached MEPs from "Union, Progreso y democracia" to join the EUL or the S&D groups, and then to reinforce the organised left in the EP.

A group of far right MEPs known as the "Group of the European Right" did exist from 1985 to 1989, symbolically rechristened the "Technical Group of the European Right" between 1989 and 1994. A fresh attempt was made in 2007 (under the name "Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty"), but the experiment was abandoned after only a few months on account of internal divergences.
 Doru Frantescu. "The balance of power in the current European Parliament is crucial for understanding the issues at stake in the 2014 European elections". LSE European Politics and Policy.

<sup>7.</sup> Doru Frantescu, ine balance of power in the current European Parliament is crucial for understanding the issues at stake in the 2014 European elections, LSE European Politics and Policy Blog (EUROPP), 24 October 2013.
8. Simped by Amic Krangel and Adul Neury. "The Party System in the European Parliament". Collusive or Competitive?", *Journal of Common Market Studies (1/2)* 2003, pp. 309-331, here: pp. 313-314.

Simon Hix, Amie Kreppel and Abdul Noury, "The Party System in the European Parliament: Collusive or Competitive?", Journal of Common Market Studies 41(2), 2003, pp. 309-331, here: pp. 313-314. Simon Hix, Abdul Noury and Gérard Roland, Democratic Politics in the European Parliament, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 89.





Data: VoteWatch Europe, Graph: Yves Bertoncini and Valentin Kreilinger.

The internal cohesion of the political groups varies by policy area (see Graph 2).

Despite growing powers of the EP with the entry-into-force of the Lisbon treaty, agriculture remains a policy area where cohesion is low: both the Socialists and the Liberals are significantly below their "normal" cohesion rates. VoteWatch Europe explains that the EPP's real share goes from 35% up to 41% due to higher cohesion and participation in this policy area<sup>9</sup>.

The centre-right tends to be less cohesive on employment and social affairs as well as on environment and public health, but in the policy area of gender equality there is a real breakdown of cohesion. The ECR group also faces problems with its cohesion when the budget and agriculture are concerned.


It is also interesting to see that GUE/NGL MEPs are not united on constitutional and inter-institutional affairs, but when other policy areas (where it is possible to adopt a "left" position) are concerned, this group also achieves high cohesion rates (between 87 and 90% on employment and social affairs, environment and public health, gender equality).

The populists organised in the EFD have a lower cohesion than any other political group which – together with their 78% participation in roll-call votes that is below the average – reduces their effective influence.

<sup>9.</sup> VoteWatch Europe: Presentation given at the Report launch event "10 votes that shaped the 7th European Parliament: positions of the European political groups and national party delegations", 10 July 2013.

### Graph 2 - Internal cohesion of the political groups in selected policy areas 2009-2013

### Internal cohesion of the political groups in selected policy areas (2009-2013)



Data: VoteWatch Europe, Graph: Yves Bertoncini and Valentin Kreilinger.

The effect of a high cohesion rate of some political groups is that it boosts the relative influence of these united groups (see Table 1).

Table 1 - The shift from number of seats to real political influence between 2009 and 2013: nominal and actual power of the political groups
in the European Parliament

	GUE/NGL	GREENS/EFA	S&D	ALDE	EPP	ECR	EFD	NI
Nominal power (% of seats)	4.6%	7.7%	25.9%	11.3%	36.5%	7.4%	4.2%	4.0%
Actual power <sup>1</sup>	4.1%	8.4%	26.8%	11.2%	38.7%	7.0%	2.2%	1.7%
"Factor for political influence" <sup>2</sup>	0.89	1.09	1.03	0.99	1.06	0.95	0.52	0.43

Data: VoteWatch Europe, Table and calculation of the "factor for political influence": Yves Bertoncini and Valentin Kreilinger.

1. Calculated by VoteWatch Europe: Actual power = Seats x Cohesion x Participation

2. Calculated by Yves Bertoncini and Valentin Kreilinger: Factor for political influence = Actual power / Nominal power

Thus the influence wielded by the EPP, which has 36% of the overall number of seats in Strasbourg, has recently resulted in a weighting around 39% of the voting. The GUE/NGL and the European Conservatives and Reformists, for their part, have an internal cohesion rate that allows them to wield decision-making influence equal to their relative clout in terms of the number of seats they have. Yet the same cannot be said of the "populist" MEPs: their influence is considerably lower than their numerical importance would suggest. The populist parties' influence on the EP is likely to be structurally limited by their difficulty in uniting and by their weak cohesion, whatever the number of additional MEPs these parties may succeed in sending to the EP after the elections in May 2014<sup>10</sup>.

## 2. The possible shifts between the European political forces

SPACE AND TIME ARE THE TWO KEY FACTORS TO UNDERSTAND THE MAGNITUDE OF THE POSSIBLE SHIFTS TO TAKE PLACE BETWEEN POLITICAL FORCES"

In order for us to analyse the consequences of the May 2014 European elections on the balance of powers within the EP, we are first naturally tempted to look at opinion polls currently available, even if one needs to handle them with caution given that there are still six months until the election. Before examining these forecasts and conducting this exercise of foresight, it is necessary to take two key factors into account so as to understand the magnitude of the possible shifts to take place between political forces, i.e. space and time.

### 2.1. A possible shift based on the situation of eight "swing states" and the results of 2009

1.1.1. Space is the first key factor to be taken into account if we are to accurately assess the likely changes to the balance of power within the next EP: the increase or decrease in votes for the parties will have a numerically important impact if it occurs in countries that account for a large number of seats in the EP, thus basically in the eight EU countries with the largest populations (see Table 2).

<sup>10.</sup> For a more detailed analysis see Yves Bertoncini, "European Elections: less abstention, more populism?", Tribune, Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute, November 2013.

### Table 2 - Population per member state and number of MEPs

MEMBER STATE	MEPS TO BE ELECTED IN 2014 <sup>3</sup>	POPULATION IN 2012
Germany*	96	81 843 743
France*	74	65 397 912
United Kingdom*	73	62 989 550
Italy*	73	60 820 764
Spain*	54	46 196 276
Poland*	51	38 538 447
Romania*	32	21 355 849
Netherlands*	26	16 730 348
Greece	21	11 290 935
Belgium	21	11 041 266
Portugal	21	10 541 840
Czech Republic	21	10 505 445
Hungary	21	9 957 731
Sweden	20	9 482 855
Austria	18	8 443 018
Bulgaria	17	7 327 224
Denmark	13	5 580 516
Slovakia	13	5 404 322
Finland	13	5 401 267
Ireland	11	4 582 769
Croatia	11	4 398 150
Lithuania	11	3 007 758
Slovenia	8	2 055 496
Latvia	8	2 041 763
Estonia	6	1 339 662
Cyprus	6	862 011
Luxembourg	6	524 853
Malta	6	416 110
EU-28	751	508 077 880
8 "Swing States" (*)	479	393 872 889
%	63.8%	77.5%

Data: Wikipedia, Table and Calculations: Yves Bertoncini and Valentin Kreilinger.

3. European Council Decision of 28 June 2013 establishing the composition of the European Parliament.


WHAT POLITICAL BALANCE OF POWER IN THE NEXT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT?

It will of course be enlightening to note those countries where political forces have or have not progressed in the ballot box, in order to discover whether or not they constitute a majority sentiment in the EU as a whole and to draw lessons for the European construction's evolution. But as regards the next balance of power in the next EP, we should look more closely at the results of the vote in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain and the United Kingdom, because these eight countries together account for more than three-quarters of the electorate and for around two thirds of the seats in parliament<sup>11</sup>. Thus what happens in these eight countries will allow

us to draw the main conclusions and consequences of the elections in May 2014, even though it is of course necessary for observers and for the players in these elections to consider the EU as a whole.

1.1.2. The second factor to take in consideration to assess the likely changes to the balance of power within the next EP is time: there is indeed a need to base our analysis and forecasts not only on the possible number of voters and seats the political forces may obtain in May 2014, but also on what is their starting point on this two aspects, i.e. the 2009 results (see Graphs 3 and 4).






Data: European Parliament, Graph: Yves Bertoncini and Valentin Kreilinger.

In this perspective, it is possible to underline that many striking scores, already commented by many media and observers, will actually have a very diverse impact in terms of number of seats and then in terms of balance of power within the EP (see Table 3).

On the one hand, some political forces could obtain high or even very high scores in May 2014, with almost no impact in terms of seats because they had already obtained scores of the same magnitude in 2009 (for example the CDU/CSU in Germany or UKIP in the United Kingdom). Conversely, the low score of some other parties would not have a deep impact either, given the fact that it was already low at the latest elections (example of the French socialist party).

<sup>11.</sup> The 8 most populated countries of the EU (our sample of 8 "swing states") account for 77.5% of the EU population and 63.8% of the seats respectively.

#### Graph 4 > Seats obtained after the European Parliament elections in 2009 in the whole EU



Data: European Parliament, Graph: Yves Bertoncini and Valentin Kreilinger.

#### Table 3 - Some striking scores from the "swing states" with very diverse impact on the number of seats

	SCORE IN 2009	POSSIBLE SCORE In 2014	SEATS IN 2009	POSSIBLE Seats in 2014
	Scores with a limited i	mpact on the number of	seats	
CDU-CSU (Germany, EPP)	37.9%	41.5%	42	43
PVV (NL, non-attached)	17.0%	17.1%	4	5
UKIP (United Kingdom, EFD)	16.1%	22.0%	13	16
PS (France, S&D)	16.5%	20.0%	14	17
PNL (Romania, ALDE)	14.5%	20.0%	5	7
	Scores with a substan	tial impact on the numbe	er of seats	
PO-PSL (Poland, EPP)	51.0%	27.0%	28	19
Front national (France, non-attached)	6.3%	21.0%	3	17
Labour (United Kingdom, S&D)	15.3%	35.0%	13	26
Izquierda Unida (Spain, EUL)	2.9%	11.9%	1	8
5 Stelle (Italy, to be determined)	-	21.5%	-	19


Data on 2009: European Parliament, Forecasts for 2014: the 8 most populated countries of the EU (our sample of 8 "swing states") account for 77.5% of the EU population and 63.8% of the seats respectively, Table and Calculations: Yves Bertoncini and Valentin Kreilinger.

On the other hand, it is correct to underline that some of the striking evolution in terms of number of voters would logically have a substantial impact in terms of seats. The progression of the French Front national number of seats could be very impressive (x 6), as well of the one of the radical left Union, Progresso y Democracia Spanish Party (from 1 to 8), not to mention the brand new 5 Stelle movement, which could obtain 19 seats. Other striking examples, the British Labour Party could double the number of its MEPs, while the Polish coalition formed by the Civic Platform (PO) and the Polish Peasants Party (PSL) could lose one third of their seats.

### 2.2. Scores and seats: what prospects for June 2014?


If we look more globally at the opinion polls currently available for the eight "swing states"<sup>12</sup>, which of course we need to handle with caution given that there are still six months to go before the election, what do we see?<sup>13</sup>

Among the two biggest established political groups (see Graphs 5 and 6), we see significant losses for the EPP (around 50 seats less), namely due to the estimations for France, Italy and Poland which are not compensated elsewhere. Conversely, after a weak result in 2009, S&D can expect some gains in these 8 swing states, especially in the UK, which could currently give them more the 20 additional seats.



Graph 5 - Composition of the EPP group: 2009 results and 2014 estimations from the 8 "swing states"

Graph 6 - Composition of the S&D group: 2009 results and 2014 estimations from the 8 "swing states" "Socialists"





Data on 2009: European Parliament, Graph and Calculations: Yves Bertoncini and Valentin Kreilinger.

<sup>12.</sup> The following opinion polls were used: France: Ifop/Nouvel Observateur, Haris/LCP (October 2013 and May 2013, both specifically for the European Parliament elections; Germany: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, EMNID, Infratest dimap, Forsa (between 7/11/2013 and 13/11/2013); Italy: 14-day average (retrieved 15/11/2013); Poland: CBOS (13/11/2013); Romania: CSCI (October 2013, specifically for the European Parliament elections); Spain: Celeste-Tel, Invymark, My Word, DYM (retrieved 15/11/2013); United Kingdom: Survation/Mail on Sunday (October 2013, specifically for the European Parliament elections).


<sup>13.</sup> If these calculations are used for each member state, a deviation of up to one MEP from the number of "national" MEPs is possible. This is for arithmetic reasons. The purpose of the Policy Paper is to look at the overall trend, not individual member states.


Both ALDE and the Greens/EFA might face losses (see Graphs 7 and 8). The Liberals suffer from their weak polls in Germany, which might change once the new government has taken office, while the Greens/EFA face a similar situation in France where they will not be able to repeat their 16% result of last time. This means that the two "natural" coalition partners for the two largest political groups are very likely to be weaker after the May 2014 elections than they are today.





Data on 2009: European Parliament, Graph and Calculations: Yves Bertoncini and Valentin Kreilinger.






Data on 2009: European Parliament, Graph and Calculations: Yves Bertoncini and Valentin Kreilinger.

In strictly numerical terms, the populist MEPs' influence in the EP is highly likely to increase after the elections in May 2014, which would be logical in view of the mistrust which – rightly or wrongly – surrounds the EU today.

Following the latest elections, the various parties grouped together under the "populist"<sup>14</sup> label currently account for approximately one hundred and forty MEPs (see Graph 3). Roughly thirty of them are in the EFD group and another thirty or so are "non-attached", which makes about sixty MEPs for the "automistic right" and "far right". The other current MEPs labelled "populist" are divided into roughly thirty from the "radical left" (in the GUE/NGL group) and just over fifty "eurosceptics" in the ECR. Thus this populist galaxy today holds just under 20% of seats in the EP as a whole.


<sup>14.</sup> See Yves Bertoncini, "European Elections: less abstention, more populism?", *Tribune, Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute*, November 2013.



### Graph 10 ► Composition of the EFD group: 2009 results and 2014 estimations from the 8 "swing states"

Data on 2009: European Parliament, Graph and Calculations: Yves Bertoncini and Valentin Kreilinger.






Non-aligned MEPs

Data on 2009: European Parliament, Graph and Calculations: Yves Bertoncini and Valentin Kreilinger.

If we look at the current polls in the 8 EU biggest member states (see Graphs 9 to 12), we can see that the major populist thrusts in numerical terms are likely to be seen in five of them:


- in France, where the Front National could treble its 2009 result (6.4%) and garner from ten to fifteen additional seats (it only has three today);
- in Spain, where the Radical Left could also progress from 1 to 9 seats;
- in Poland, where the "populists" could gain around 8 seats but their progression within the "EFD" group could be compensated by the decline of the UK conservatives;
- in Italy, where Beppe Grillo's new Five Star Movement, despite its current slow-down, could well garner from fifteen to twenty seats, also to the detriment of the Northern League;
- and in Germany, where the Alternative für Deutschland party is set to enter the EP, given that it will need only 3% of the overall vote to win seats.



#### Graph 12 ► Composition of the EUL group: 2009 results and 2014 estimations from the 8 "swing states"

Data on 2009: European Parliament, Graph and Calculations: Yves Bertoncini and Valentin Kreilinger.





#### European Conservatives and Reformists

Data on 2009: European Parliament, Graph and Calculations: Yves Bertoncini and Valentin Kreilinger.

Over and above these 8 "heavyweights", a few additional seats may be won by the radical left in Greece, while the far right may make progress in Finland and in Austria, and possibly in Greece.

Consequently, the so-called "populist" parties in the broadest sense of the term are likely to garner a bit more than two hundred seats in the EP, in other words a bit more than a quarter of the overall number (as opposed to just under 20% today), if we include in their number the British Conservatives (who are likely to continue to hover around the twenty to thirty seat mark).

This numerical increase is basically likely to be seen on the far right (possibly twenty to thirty additional seats, as opposed to the current number of thirty) but also in the ranks of populist forces which are difficult to categorise in this phase and could then be part of the "Non-attached MEPs", namely the Five Star Movement and Alternative für Deutschland. In other words, it is not because the far right seems to be currently in the lead in several of countries that we need to conclude from that that the same balance of forces is going to be repeated in the EP as a whole.

We now choose to project the results observed in the 8 "swing states" to the EU28. First because we can consider that the trends in these states are more or less representative of the global European trends: after all, these 8 swing states include such diverse countries as Germany and Romania, Italy and the Netherlands, Spain and the UK, or Poland and France. Second because for the quantitative reasons we have exposed (they

account for 3/4 of the population and 2/3 of the seats), their weight in the final balance of power is substantial. By doing so, we also consider that most of the political groups are represented at the EU28 level in the same proportion as they are represented at the swing states level, even if it's not completely true for the ALDE (with MEP's from 21 out of 28 EU countries, versus 7/8 in the swing states) and for the ECR (with MEP's from 9 out of 28 EU countries, versus 3/8 in the swing states, whose number of seats are then probably overestimated by this projection) (see Table 4)<sup>15</sup>.

	SEATS IN THE EP: 2014 ESTIMATIONS <sup>4</sup>						
PROJECTIONS EU 28	8 SWING STATES	EU28	EU28				
Groups	Estimated seats <sup>5</sup>	Estimated seats	Seats (% of the total)				
EPP	133	209	28%				
S&D	136	213	28%				
ALDE	39	62	8%				
Greens/EFA	24	38	5%				
ECR	39	61	8%				
GUE/NGL	30	47	6%				
EFD	20	32	4%				
NA	57	89	12%				
Total	479	751	100%				

#### Table 4 - Estimated number of seats of the political groups after the May 2014 elections on the basis of opinion polls in the eight "swing states"

Data on 2009: European Parliament, Graph and Calculations: Yves Bertoncini and Valentin Kreilinger.


4. Multiplier = 1.57

5. They account for 63.78% of the seats: 1/0.6378 = 1.5679.

On this basis, what observations can we make (see Graph 13)?

- the race between EPP (estimation: 209 seats) and S&D (213 seats) could be very tight: they are both around 28% of the MEP's (+3 points for S&D and -7 points for EPP, compared to 2009);
- both ALDE and the Greens/EFA might face losses: they could obtain 8% (-3) and 5% (-2) of the MEP's respectively and have 62 and 38 of the 751 seats;
- the remaining political groups are likely to remain stable or have slightly better scores: 8% of the MEP's (+1) for ECR (61 seats), 6% (+1) for GUE/NGL (47 seats) and 4% (+/-0) for EFD (32 seats);
- at this stage, national parties that are not attached to a political group or not yet represented in the European Parliament could account for up to 12% of the MEPs (89 seats). Some of them might join one of the existing political groups or indeed try to form a new political group (at least 25 MEPs from at least seven member states) and a reconfiguration of the political groups is also possible.

<sup>15.</sup> For a projection directly based on the available polls, see the Italian website "Studi e Projezioni Elettorali"; it did a 2014 European elections simulation of the composition of the new parliament, published on 11 November 2013 and based on opinion polls for all 28 member states. Their estimations are as follows: 30.1% for EPP (226 seats), 28.4% for S&D (213 seats), 10.4% for ALDE (78 seats), 7.9% for EUL/NGL (59 seats), 5.3% for Greens/EFA (40 seats), 5.3% for ECR (40 seats), 4.4% for the "Far Right" (33 seats), 3.6% for EFD (27 seats) and 4.7% of non-attached MEPs (35 seats).



#### Graph 14 - Estimation of the strength of the political groups in the next EP on the basis of opinion polls in the eight "swing states"

Data on 2009: European Parliament, Graph and Calculations: Yves Bertoncini and Valentin Kreilinger.

# 3. The logics of majority dynamics: who will govern the next EP?

So as to know what political forces will "govern" the next EP, we need to base our assessment of political groups' real influence not only on their internal cohesion and their "actual power", but also on their ability to form part of majority-forging coalitions when it comes to voting.

### 3.1. The majority dynamics between 2009 and 2013


3.1.1. The analysis of roll-call votes between 2009 and 2013 has revealed three different co-existing winning coalitions in the EP that vary by policy area, but are relatively stable over time<sup>16</sup>:

- first, a "grand coalition" between EPP and S&D, often together with ALDE (in total in about 70% of the cases);
- second, a "centre-right" of EPP, ALDE and ECR, the main group to the right of the EPP (also in 15% of the cases);
- third, a "centre-left" coalition of S&D, ALDE and the two groups to the left of S&D, Greens/ALE and GUE/ NGL (in 15% of the cases).

This means that ALDE plays a pivotal role in the EP, probably because "the EU produces a particular set of policy outcomes that is close to the preferences of many European liberal parties and centrist voters: free-market economic policies (such as deregulation of the single market) and liberal social policies (such as open immigration policies, high environmental standards, and gender equality)."<sup>17</sup>

Simon Hix and Bjørn Høyland, "Empowerment of the European Parliament", Annual Review of Political Science 16, 2013, pp. 171-189. VoteWatch Europe, "Mid-term Evaluation of the 2009-14 European Parliament: Legislative activity and decision-making dynamics", CEPS Special Reports, 2012.

<sup>17.</sup> Simon Hix and Bjørn Høyland, "Empowerment of the European Parliament", Annual Review of Political Science 16, 2013, pp. 171-189, here: p. 181.



#### Graph 14 - Percentage of votes won by each of the political groups in the current European Parliament, all policy areas

It is interesting to see that the EPP wins votes in the EP about 7% more often than S&D. This 7%-difference leads to policies that let the centre-left claim that the centre-right has been running the EU in the current legislative term. Further qualitative research is needed in order to examine how precisely policy outcomes in the European Union change when the balance of power within the EP changes, taking into account that the balance of power within the Council, the other co-legislator, could remain unchanged.

3.1.2. What do specific votes on legislative texts of current legislative term tell us in that connection? We have selected three key votes between 2010 and 2013 from different policy areas with each vote standing for one of the three possible winning coalitions:

• **Transatlantic trade and investment partnership (TTIP)**<sup>10</sup>: Trade agreements between the EU and third countries must be ratified by a majority vote in the EP after having been negotiated by the European Commission on behalf of all EU member states, based on a negotiating mandate adopted by the Council. This means that the EP can approve or not approve such an agreement and thus has a 'take it or leave it' option. In order to make its voice heard before the negotiations, the EP adopted a resolution on 23 May 2013. A large majority of MEPs (460 to 105; 28 abstentions), based on a grand coalition of EPP, S&D and ALDE (joined by ECR and a majority of MEPs from EFD on the right side of the political spectrum) voted in favour of negotiations and asked the Commission and the Council to exclude cultural and audio-visual services from the negotiating mandate. Only the GUE/NGL, Greens/EFA and most non-attached MEPs, voted against the resolution. (On 14 June 2013, the ministers of Trade in the Council of the EU mandated the Commission to negotiate a "transatlantic trade and investment partnership". At the request of France, the Council agreed that the mandate does not cover audiovisual services, but that the Commission would have the opportunity to make recommendations for further negotiation mandates.)

Source: VoteWatch Europe

<sup>18.</sup> For more information, please see the VoteWatch Europe 2013 Annual Report, "10 votes that shaped the 7th European Parliament: positions of the European political groups and national party delegations", p. 26.

- "Six-pack" A "centre-right coalition" vote: The key instrument for fiscal policy co-ordination and surveillance is the Stability and growth pact which implements the treaty provisions on budgetary discipline. This regulation of the EP and of the Council reformed of the preventive part of the Stability and growth pact. It is part of legislative package comprising six texts<sup>19</sup>. The EP approved the regulation (under the ordinary legislative procedure, formerly known as co-decision). An absolute majority of MEPs (354 to 269; 34 abstentions), voted in favour, mainly from the EPP and ALDE groups, while both the left (S&D, Greens-ALE, GUE/NGL) and the groups on the right that do not support more integration (ECR and EFD) as well as most non-attached MEPs voted against.
- **Maternity leave A "centre-left coalition"vote:** "In October 2010, the European Parliament adopted by a narrow majority its first reading position on the directive on maternity leave. The text provided for the extension of maternity leave from 14 to 20 weeks on full pay, and contained a number of other measures favourable to mothers and pregnant women, as well as more generous paternity leave. [...] The key vote [...] was on amendment 12=38, regarding the extension of maternity leave on full pay from 14 to 20 weeks. The vote passed with 327 MEPs in favour to 320 against. The centre-left groups Socialists and Democrats (S&D), Greens/EFA and the radical left (GUE/NGL) succeeded in gathering a majority with the help of 82 MEPs from the EPP, primarily from Poland, Italy, Hungary and Lithuania"<sup>20</sup>.

Dossier	Vote	GUE/NGL	Greens/ EFA	S&D	ALDE	EPP	ECR	EFD	NI	Total
Six-pack <sup>6</sup>	Yes	0	7	12	75	243	12	3	2	354 (54%)
	No	29	40	139	3	0	25	13	20	269 (41%)
	Abstention	0	4	12	0	0	7	11	0	34 (5%)
Maternity leave <sup>7</sup>	Yes No Abstention	30 0 0	47 2 3	138 30 5	13 67 2	82 147 15	0 47 1	12 11 2	5 16 2	327 (48%) 320 (47%) 30 (4%)
TTIP <sup>8</sup>	Yes	0	3	126	59	205	42	18	7	460 (78%)
	No	30	43	9	2	3	0	2	16	105 (18%)
	Abstention	0	1	9	5	10	0	3	0	28 (5%)

Table 5 - The voting behaviour of the political groups on Six-Pack, maternity leave and TTIP

Data: VoteWatch Europe, Table: Yves Bertoncini and Valentin Kreilinger

6. Surveillance of budgetary positions and surveillance and coordination of economic policies - legislative resolution (text as a whole) (COM(2010)0526 - C7-0300/2010 - 2010/0280(COD)).

 Amendment 12=38 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 92/85/EEC on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding (COM(2008)0637 – C6-0340/2008 – 2008/0193(COD)).

8. Resolution of the European Parliament on EU trade and investment agreement negotiations with the US, (2013/2558(RSP))

It is worth pointing out in passing that the "populist" MEPs can also play a role in the adoption of the European Parliament's decisions and often vote in the same way as the "established" political groups.

<sup>19. 1)</sup> A Regulation amending the legislative underpinning of the preventive part of the Stability and Growth Pact (Regulation 1466/97);

<sup>2)</sup> A Regulation amending the legislative underpinning of the corrective part of the Stability and Growth Pact (Regulation 1467/97);


<sup>3)</sup> A Regulation on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area;

<sup>4)</sup> A new Council Directive on requirements for the budgetary framework of the member states;

<sup>5)</sup> A new Regulation on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances;


<sup>6)</sup> A Regulation on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area.

<sup>20.</sup> For a projection directly based on the available polls, see the Italian website "Studi e Projezioni Electorali"; it did a 2014 European Elections simulation of the composition of the new Parliament, published on 11 November 2013 and based on opinion polls for all 28 member states. Their estimations are as follows: 30.1% for EPP (226 seats), 28.4% for S&D (213 seats), 10.4% for ALDE (78 seats), 7.9% for EUL/NGL (59 seats), 5.3% for Greens/EFA (40 seats), 5.3% for ECR (40 seats), 4.4% for the "Far Right" (33 seats), 3.6% for EFD (27 seats) and 4.7% of non-attached MEPs (35 seats).



#### Graph 15 - Percentage of votes in which EFD votes the same way as the other political groups in the current European Parliament

Graph 16 - Percentage of votes in which GUE/NGL votes the same way as the other political groups in the current European Parliament



Source: VoteWatch Europe

An example of an issue where "populist" MEPs from both sides of the political spectrum joined a solid left majority supported by 58 MEPs who defected from the EPP group line, was a vote on the possibility for member states to restrict or prohibit the cultivation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in their territory. The key vote was on Article 26b, paragraph 1, point a, amendment 41 (see Table 6).

#### Table 6 - The voting behaviour of the political groups: Should the cultivation of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) in the EU be made more restrictive ? GREENS/ DOSSIER VOTE **GUE/NGL** S&D EPP ECR NI TOTAL 53 13 GMOs<sup>9</sup> Yes 28 160 80 57 15 18 424 (64%)

0

1

181

4

38

0

6

1

231 (35%)

9 (1%)

5

0

	Abstention	0	0	3	
Data: VoteWatc	h Europe, Table: Yve	s Bertoncini an	d Valentin Kre	ilinger.	

Λ

No

8. Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2001/18/EC as regards the possibility for

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the member states to restrict or prohibit the cultivation of GMOs in their territory (COM(2010)0375 - C7-0178/2010 - 2010/0208(COD))

### **3.2.** The winning coalitions in the next European Parliament

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The coalition dynamics in the next EP will first be active for the appointment of the new president of the Commission even if, right after, there will be no need to adopt a majority-based discipline to support a government, as at the national level. The coalition dynamics will then go on varying according to the issues at stake, on the basis of the global balance of power established by the May 2014 elections.

3.2.1. What coalition could appoint the president of the next Commission? The EP is right to highlight the fact that the elections in May 2014 are going to have a more direct impact than previous elections on the European Council's nomination of the Commission president, because the measures in the treaty on European Union (Article 17.7 and declaration n°11) which have been in force since the approval of the Lisbon treaty state explicitly that the heads of state and government have to propose a candidate for the post who will then require a vote of investiture from the new MEPs "taking into account the elections to the EP". This link between the outcome of the European elections and the leadership of the team in Brussels will be all the stronger if all the European political parties nominate their candidate to the presidency of the Commission ahead of time and overtly back that candidacy during the election campaign. The designation of these nominees - which is underway - will make a positive contribution to personalising the European election campaigns and will also help to put "faces to the divides" at work at the Community level.

The European Council is under no legal obligation to appoint one or another of the aforesaid nominees; its primary obligation is to conform to the new EP's majority political inclination and to propose a candidate reflecting that inclination, whether or not he or she was a candidate in the first place. But the heads of state and government will have to choose a candidate to the presidency who looks likely to gather the support of whatever coalition holds a majority in the Strasbourg assembly (for example EPP-S&D, or EPP-ALDE-ECR, or S&D-ALDE-Greens). Even if they compete with each other on a more personalised basis, the political groups of the next EP will then have to form a coalition able to vote the investiture of the candidate proposed by the European Council, i.e. to reach the absolute majority of the members of the European Parliament, and not of the voters only (at least 376 votes will then be needed).

	Grand coalition with ALDE	Grand coalition	Centre-left coalition	Centre-right coalition
S&D	213	213	213	
EPP	209	209		209
ALDE	62		62	62
Greens/ALE			38	
GUE/NGL			47	
CR				61
Total	484 (64%)	422 (56%)	360 (48%)	332 (44%)

Table 7	The pessible winning	a coolitione hetweer	201/ and 2010
Table / 🛌	The possible winning	a coalitions detweer	1 ZU 14 ANG ZU 19

Calculations: Yves Bertoncini and Valentin Kreilinger

If we look at the projections made on the basis of our calculations (see Table 7) and of the current polls, only two types of winning coalitions are likely to be formed at this stage:

- a "grand coalition with ALDE" based on the participation of the MEPs from the S&D, the EPP and the ALDE groups: it could choose to support a candidate proposed by the political group having the biggest number of seats, or a candidate proposed by the ALDE, given its central position in such a coalition. In the two cases, the candidates could be the one appointed to run for the presidency of the Commission through the election campaign or another candidate, identified to ease the formation of a compromise between the political groups on the one hand, the EP and the European Council on the other hand.
- a "grand coalition" based on the participation of the MEPs from the S&D and the EPP groups: again, it could choose to support a candidate proposed by the political group having the biggest number of seats, be (s)he the one appointed to run for the presidency of the Commission through the election campaign or another candidate.

The scores and number of seats we can foresee at this stage seem to make it rather difficult to form a winning coalition based on MEPs coming only from the centre-left, or only from the centre-right, even if the first hypothesis seems a little bit less out of reach than the second one.

3.2.2. Forming the winning coalition(s) for the day-to-day votes will be another issue for the next EP. The converging majorities traditionally formed in the EP for the day-to-day votes will probably continue to function after May 2014 as in the recent past, on the basis of the issues at stake, as described in section 3.1.

THE IRONIC RESULT OF A "POPULIST" UPSWING WILL BE TO BOLSTER THE INFLUENCE OF MEPS IN THE MAINSTREAM POLITICAL GROUPINGS"

If populist MEPs as a whole succeed in winning some two hundred seats in the EP, it will be necessary for the other 550 MEPs to prove capable of forming majorities amongst themselves. Thus the ironic result of a "populist" upswing will be to bolster the influence of MEPs in the mainstream political groupings, especially in the EPP, the S&D, the ALDE (or even the Greens), because that upswing will give them a stronger incentive than ever before to thrash out agreements in order to achieve the majority required in any given vote. Indeed, that may be one of the negative collateral effects of this populist thrust, because from a democratic point of view it would be preferable for the

dominant political groups in the EP to be in position to debate with each other on the basis of clear alternatives, left versus right, rather than having to tailor their positions a priori to the simplistic pro- or anti-EU cleavage.

The balance of forces we can foresee within the "non-populist" forces tends to show that, in numerical terms, the winning coalitions based on the S&D and EPP groups, with the very frequent support of the ALDE, could remain the key driving political force in the next EP. As during the current legislature, a winning coalition could still be led by the Left in some cases, if there are defections of MEPs from the EPP and/or the ECR; the same would be true for winning coalitions led by the Right, if there are defections of MEPs from the S&D or other groups.

Given the fact that the internal cohesion of the political groups can be lower according to the issues at stake, the two hypotheses of centre-left or centre-right coalitions winning vote could be less likely if they are based on only 48% and 44% of the MEPs respectively (see Table 6). The same could be true for a "grand coalition" which would have only forty seats more than the absolute majority required in some cases (418/376), even if the actual power (see Table 7) of these two groups would be slightly higher that their nominal power (with a possible shift from 56% to 59% of the total). The need to include a third political group on all winning coalition may then well require the dominant groups to make much more substantial concessions: it would not be a that substantial change if this third group was the ALDE, already part of many winning coalitions; but the concessions to be made would be more substantial if there is a need to include more systematically votes from the Greens/EFA or the ECR, not to forget the members of the EFD group.

	GUE/NGL	Greens/EFA	S&D	ALDE	EPP	ECR	EFD	NI
Estimation of nominal power (% of seats)	6%	5%	28%	9%	28%	8%	4%	13%
"Factor for political influence" <sup>10</sup>	0.89	1.09	1.03	0.99	1.06	0.95	0.52	0.43
Estimation of actual power <sup>11</sup>	5%	5%	29%	8%	30%	8%	2%	5%

# Table 8 - The shift from number of seats to real political influence after May 2014: nominal and actual power of the political groups in the next European Parliament

Data, calculations and table: Yves Bertoncini and Valentin Kreilinger.

10. Calculated by Yves Bertoncini and Valentin Kreilinger for the current European Parliament: Factor for political influence = Actual power / Nominal power

11. Calculated by VoteWatch Europe: actual power = seats x cohesion x participation

### **CONCLUSION – AN ELECTION WITH QUITE AN UNCERTAIN POLITICAL OUTCOME**

This analysis of the possible changes to the balance of power in the next EP suggests that we need to put in a broader perspective the most frequent observations and forecasts currently being formulated, while underlining the certainties and uncertainties ahead of us, six months before the May 2014 elections.

THE POLITICAL GAME SHOULD PROMPT ALL THE PLAYERS TO ENGAGE IN A VIGOROUS DEFENCE AND PROMOTION OF THEIR PROPOSALS FOR THE EU" As regards the certainties, it is highly likely that parties grouped together under the "populist" label will make fairly substantive numerical gains, building on the European man in the street's current dissatisfaction with the EU. But their numerical increase will not affect notably the functioning of the EP, which will remain largely based on the compromises built by the dominant political groups, reflecting the positions of the overwhelming majority of the EU citizens. Whether these political groups and parties may embrace the analyses and recommendations formulated by the populist forces is more uncer-

tain: this uncertainty is probably the most serious political threat for the EU as a whole.

As regards the other uncertainties ahead of us, we should recall once again that the scores and number of seats presented in this Policy Paper are based on opinion polls realised more than six months before the elections, in a context which could be quite different of the one of the electoral campaign(s) of Spring 2014. This uncertainty is all the bigger that we have focused our analysis on the eight big "swing states", while extrapolating the lessons drawn to the entire EU.

Having said this, the most striking uncertainty arousing from this summary analysis concerns the final outcome of the May 2014 elections: the current trends show that the EPP could lose an important part of its seats, while the S&D will probably reinforce its presence in Strasbourg. Our analysis concludes at this point in time that these two leading political groups could be almost exactly at the same level. It's naturally difficult to foresee the real changes to the balance of power which will finally occur in six months' time, but one thing is sure: the political game is very open at this stage, and this should prompt all the players concerned, whether political or otherwise, to engage in a vigorous defence and promotion of their alternative vision and proposals for the EU.

#### WHAT POLITICAL BALANCE OF POWER IN THE NEXT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT?

NOTRE

EUROPEAN ELECTIONS: LESS ABSTENTION, MORE POPULISM? Yves Bertoncini, *Tribune, Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute*, November 2013

IS THE EU REALLY DEMOCRATIC?

Yves Bertoncini and Malo Mofakhami (presented by Claire Bauchard), Stand Alone Media & Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute, November 2013

EUROPEAN ELECTIONS: THE DEBATE IS NOW! Podcast of the conference on 16 September 2013, *Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute*, EuroCité and Europartenaires, September 2013

EUROPE AT THE POLLS. LESSONS FROM THE 2013 ITALIAN ELECTIONS Renaud Dehousse, *Policy Paper No 92, Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute,* May 2013

EUROPE'S PARLIAMENT: PEOPLE, PLACES, POLITICS Valentin Kreilinger, *Synthesis, Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute,* April 2013

IS THE EUROPEAN PARTY SYSTEM READY FOR "2014"? Yves Bertoncini and Valentin Kreilinger, *Synthesis, Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute,* March 2013

FROM INSTITUTIONAL REFORM TO MASS POLITICS OR HOW TO ENGAGE CITIZENS IN THE UNION OF LISBON Goran von Sydow and Gaëtane Ricard-Nihoul, *Policy Brief No 18, Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute,* November 2010

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