

2 State of play : an overview of Europe–focused think tanks in the E.U. and E.U. Member States

This section summarises the information collected – presented in detail on Notre Europe’s website – first through an overview of the E.U. situation (2.1), then by looking at the situation in individual E.U. Member States (2.2) and what is specific about the ten new Member States (2.3). We finally draw a few preliminary conclusions (2.4).

2.1 AN OVERVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN THE EU

The analysis provided in this section is based on the population of think tanks selected for this report. It is therefore a snapshot view, based on our own, somewhat subjective criteria. The Case Study on the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung illustrates how the reality of think tanks that deal with European policy matters is not straightforward. Although we acknowledge the limitations of such an exercise and that it is probably impossible to achieve totally uniform collection and presentation of data, we also believe that the categories and trends identified here will be of use to readers.

2.1.1 KEY FACTS

Our survey population of EU-focused think tanks in the 25 member states and in Brussels is presented in full on Notre Europe’s website. We have looked at 149 think tanks in the E.U. currently working on European issues. A quarter (36) are ‘Euro-specific’, the remaining 113 ‘Euro-oriented’ think tanks, as we call them, work on other issues besides Europe.

Table 2 below presents an overview of our findings. Germany has the largest number of think tanks operating in this sector : 23, including 4 Euro-specific. This reflects the fact that Germany has more think tanks in general than any other European country, a function of its population size and its greater think tank “tradition”. It also has some of the largest organisations with an average of 48.5 researchers per institute. The U.K. comes second with 16 (7 Euro-specific), and third is Austria, with 11 (3 Euro-specific), despite its smaller population (8.1m). We identified 10 EU/Brussels-based think tanks (7 Euro-specific), which we treated separately from Belgian organisations. Greece (population 10.6m) has 8 Euro-think tanks, i.e. more than France (7) and Italy (7). As the country reports indicate, these figures of course do not tell everything (Section 2.2).

Looking at staff figures – with due caution considering their relative lack of precision and the fact that not all recorded researchers always work on European policy issues – it would appear that Denmark, Germany, Austria, Hungary and Poland have larger-than-average research teams (E.U. average: 18). Euro-specific think tanks, which have appeared mostly in the last 20 years, tend to be younger than Euro-oriented think tanks. At the other end, countries such as Portugal, Spain, Slovenia, Slovakia, the Baltic States, Cyprus and the Czech Republic have relatively small teams of researchers. Overall, think tank teams in Brussels are also relatively small.

TABLE 2

Overview of the Euro-oriented think tanks surveyed

Member State	No. of think tanks surveyed	No. Euro-specific think tanks identified	Total number of 'Euro-think tank' staff	Total no. of researchers	Av. no. staff	Average no. permanent in-house researchers	Country population (m)	Nos. by McGann & Weaver type*				
								aca: academic think tank	adv: advocacy tank	con: contract researcher	par: party think tank	
EU. Brussels	10	7	175	100	17.5	10	-	4 aca	4 adv	2 con		
Austria	11	3	348	271	31.5	24.5	8.1	6 aca	5 con			
Belgium	2	0	34	19	17	9.5	10.3	2 aca				
Cyprus	3	1	68	15	22.5	5	0.78	1 aca	2 adv			
Czech Rep.	5	1	97	37 (in 4 TT)	19.5	9	10.3	2 aca	3 adv			
Denmark	1	0	118	78	118	78	5.3	1 aca				
Estonia	4	1	61	22 (in 3 TT)	15	7	1.4		2 adv	1 con	1 aca/con	
Finland	6	0	141 (in 5 TT)	72 (5 TT)	28	14.5	5.2	2 aca	4 adv			
France	7	5	145	82	21	12	58.8	1 aca	4 adv	2 con		
Germany	23	4	1925 (20 TT)	1065 (22 TT)	96	48.5	82.1	17 aca	1 adv	2 con	3 par	
Great Britain	16	7	366 (14 TT)	175 (14 TT)	23	11	59.7	5 aca	6 adv	5 con		
Greece	8	3	143 (5 TT)	Ap. 77 (5 TT)	28.5	15.5	10.6	5 aca	3 adv			
Hungary	5	0	140 (4 TT)	90 (4 TT)	35	22.5	10.0	2 aca	3 con			
Ireland	2	1	93	42	46.5	21	3.8		1 adv	1 con		
Italy	7	0	160	115	23	16.5	57.7	6 aca	1 con			
Latvia	5	1	105	55	21	11	2.3	1 aca	3 adv	1 con		
Lithuania	4	0	69 (3 TT)	48	23	12	3.6	1 aca	1 adv	1 con	1 aca/con	
Luxembourg			See country reports					0.4				-
Malta			See country reports					0.4				-
Netherlands	4	1	90	57	22	14	15.9	2 aca	2 con			
Poland	6	0	236	173	39	29	38.7	4 aca	2 adv			
Portugal	2	0	26	18	13	9	10.0	2 aca				
Slovakia	5	0	49 (4 TT)	27	12	6.75	5.4	4 aca	1 adv			
Slovenia	1	0	23	17	23	17	2.0	1 con				
Spain	7	0	155	55 (6 TT)	22	9	39.5	2 aca		2 par	1 aca/con	
Sweden	5	1	183	74	36.5	15	8.7			2 aca/adv		
E.U. total	149	36	4950 (139 TT)	2784 (140 TT)	31.5	18	453	71	37	26	5 par 5 other	

The case of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung : To what extent can German foundations be considered think tanks?

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung is the SPD's political foundation (German socialist party). There are seven political foundations in Germany: the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), close to the CDU, the Hans-Seidel-Stiftung (HSS), close to the CSU, the Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung (FNS), close to the FPD, the Hans-Böckler-Stiftung (HBS), close to the DGB, the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (HBS), linked to the Greens, and the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung (RSL), affiliated to the PDS. The two largest are the FES and the KAS, both created in the 1960s. The two most recent are the HBS (1996) and the RSL (1998).

The activities of the FES can be grouped in three concentric circles : international activities, political training, and scientific research. It also offers a scholarship programme and seminars for German and foreign students and academics.

Nearly half of the Foundation's current expenditures are dedicated to international activities. The FES has operations in developing countries aimed at promoting peace and understanding between nations, and, within partner countries, at furthering the democratisation of State and social institutions, strengthening civil society, improving political, economic, and social conditions, and enforcing human rights. To this end, the FES has offices in 70 countries in Africa, Asia, the Middle-East, and Latin America. Furthermore, some 70 associated workers oversee—with the help of local recruits—political and social development projects. Its international activities also seek to promote international dialogue. The FES thus has offices in 33 western and eastern European countries, CIS countries, as well as the United States and Japan. There the FES promotes dialogue between democratic forces in order to balance conflicting interests and formulate political options. In order to fulfil its various missions, it works in cooperation with different partners from civil society (unions, political parties, training and research institutes, administrations, municipalities).

Political training is the second area of the Foundation's activities. The objective is to help citizens from the German Federal Republic to react to changes in society and thereby to allow them to take part actively and critically to the political life of their country.

Finally, the FES has research and consulting activities. These are led by its teams of analysts on the economy, new technologies, employment and social policy, as well as contemporary history. It has a total of 60 permanent researchers and 40 temporary researchers.

Overall, only 10 to 15 per cent (20 per cent maximum) of its budget is thus allocated to research and analysis activities similar to other think tanks' activities. In this third type of activity, 20 to 25 per cent, in general, of its research efforts focus on Europe. The FES is also interested in Germany's role in the European Union and to the impact of the E.U. on Germany. It also has research projects on the E.U.'s foreign policy, on central and eastern Europe, and on the Union's policy-making process. This share is increasing though, because of the ever greater importance of the European dimension for topics of interest to the FES. Its various publications, analyses and policy options, devised through projects, seminars, conferences and debates, are made available to a wide audience of political, economic and scientific experts, as well as interested citizens. It is thus common to consider that the research activities of the FES justify considering it in part as a think tank.

However, it is also important to stress through this example how German political foundations are not just think tanks. Think tank activities, although performed internally, are in fact secondary for them. The funding they receive from federal and regional ministries must be allocated in priority to activities such as political training and the promotion of democracy in developing countries. Their think tank work should therefore neither be ignored, nor overestimated.

In some countries, we were also able to collect budgetary information. This information revealed again that Germany is an exception on the European think tank scene : outside foundations, which budgets are often ten times larger but which spending is not only on think tank activities, the average budget of German think tanks in our survey was €8.9m. By comparison, the average budget of Euro-think tanks in other countries is much smaller: for example, Austria: €2.2m; France: €2.3m; UK: €3.9m; Sweden: €3.3m.¹⁷

Finally, the table also presents the numbers of think tanks in each of the four McGann and Weaver categories. Putting each think tank into just one of these categories proved difficult because many think tanks display the characteristics of several categories. We can see that overall academic-type think tanks, typical of earlier American tanks such as the Brookings Institution and the Hoover Institute, seem to dominate. Then come advocacy tanks and contract researchers. There are few party-affiliated independent research institutes on European matters. Most countries have a mix of the first three types : academic, advocacy and contract research. Germany and Spain have a few party think tanks. Countries such as Germany, Austria and Sweden tend to have higher numbers of academic and contract research think tanks, and relatively few advocacy tanks. The U.K. and Brussels have larger numbers of advocacy tanks. This reveals an important difference between the Anglo-American think tank model – which also seems to have spread to Brussels – which is more typically advocacy-oriented, and the traditional model in continental Europe of an academic-type research institute.

The number of advocacy tanks seems to be increasing though : academic think tanks were on average created 25 years ago, contract research organisations 23 years ago, and advocacy tanks 16 years ago. While this average hides large differences, it indicates a trend that, if confirmed, would be similar to the U.S. situation since the early 1950s, as we shall explore more fully in Section 4.2.1.

2.1.2 WHY AND WHEN WERE THEY CREATED ?

The most common reasons cited by the Euro-specific think tanks for their creation in the first place are :

- To help prepare a country for its accession to the E.U.
- A government initiative to improve the level of analysis of E.U. policy in a country.
- To provide a forum for the analysis of a country's position within the E.U. (and/or its relationship with its regional neighbours).
- To examine a specific area of E.U. policy (e.g. environmental or social policy).
- To enhance the quality of debate on European issues.
- To create a platform for researchers and students to express their views on Europe.
- To provide support to European integration (or, more rarely, to oppose it).

- To promote economic reform in the E.U.;
- To promote interest from the corporate sector in E.U. political affairs.¹⁸

Many think tanks were set up in anticipation of a country's accession to the EU, or to study a country's position within the Union and the impact of E.U. policies on that country. This is best explained by the fact that all the nationally based institutes, i.e. the majority of those surveyed, need a domestic *raison d'être* and have to be seen as relevant by their own publics and policy-makers. Therefore they naturally focus on E.U. issues from a domestic perspective.¹⁹ The table below shows the growth in the number of Euro-specific think tanks created in each decade of the post-war period in the 25 Member States.

The growth seen in the 1980s – 10 new think tanks – was visible for three distinct types of 'thinking cells' : (1) new institutes focusing on expanding areas of EC competence (e.g. CEPR, 1983, economic policy ; IEEP, 1980, environmental policy; OSE, 1984, social policy) ; (2) think tanks seeking to join the steadily increasing number of interest groups present in Brussels (e.g. CEPS, 1983) ; and (3) institutes linked to their country's entry to the EC (e.g. EKEME, 1980 in Greece; the Institute for European Studies,²⁰ 1989 in Finland).

TABLE 3
Euro-specific think tanks : creation periods

Decade	Think tanks established *
1940s	1
1950s	1
1960s	1
1970s	2
1980s	10
1990s	24
2000-04	6

* i.e. only the first tier of think tanks covered in our survey that are dedicated to European policy issues. Figures only from 1989-90 for New Member States in Eastern Europe. These figures do not include think tanks which have disappeared, although where a think tank is the result of a merger of two or more previous institutes, the former institute – if it was Euro-specific – has been included.

This sudden growth turned into an outright explosion in the 1990s. Three main factors explain this. First, the democratic transition in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s created an entirely new political environment, which enabled think tanks there, for the first time since the war, to set up without fear of hindrance from the state.²¹ A second factor was the Nordic and Austrian accessions in 1995. This provided a spur for new think tanks in these countries which could explore and explain accession challenges and other E.U. themes, particularly in the immediate post-accession period (e.g. Austrian Institute for European Security Policy, 1996; SIEPS in Sweden, 2002). The third, and perhaps most important factor, already mentioned in section 1.2, was the considerable growth in the power and competences of the E.U. At each new stage in the development of the E.U.'s policy competences – the Single European Act (1986)


leading to the Single Market in 1992, the Maastricht Treaty (1992), Economic and Monetary Union, the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) – think tanks, along with policy elites and interest groups, became increasingly interested in E.U. policies. This is clear for instance in France, where five Euro-specific think tanks were established in the 1990s, but also in Britain and Germany.²² The growth in the legislative power of the E.U. also explains the rapid growth in Euro-specific think tanks in Brussels during both the 1990s and early 2000s (five in total²³).

2.1.3 MISSIONS

Missions clearly evolve with time. Today (see Figure 1 below), think tanks that deal with European affairs aim to, in order of priority :

- Promote better policy making through the spread of "best practices", "the practical application of research results", the promotion of "rationality in politics" and "decisions based on better analysis." CEPS's dedication to "producing sound policy research leading to constructive solutions to the challenges facing Europe today" is an example of this type of mission.
- Increase the level of awareness and involvement of citizens in politics, by "informing the public and other actors", "promoting better understanding", "fostering public debate", "improving the quality of the debate", "promoting participation of the public in the policy process", and more generally fostering "discussion." Europe 2020 in France or www.policy.lv in Latvia illustrate this type of approach. IFRI in Paris also wants to "structure the debate on international questions and contribute to the expansion of an informed and responsible society."
- Assist policy-makers in their work, usually through contacts with academics, and by providing a platform, "interface" or forum for discussion with experts, and through services such as training. Germany has a relatively larger share of such institutes : "Officially, the Stiftungen's main mission is to engage in what the Germans call 'politische Bildungsarbeit', a concept covering a wide range of political training activities generally targeting 'opinion-formers' and other citizens with an active political interest." (European Voice, 1998a)
- Promote the general interest : a significant share of the organisations surveyed have the ambition to contribute to "solving society's problems", for instance through "a better environment," security, peace, and conflict prevention, economic freedom, democracy, development, multilateralism, or social justice. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the Austrian Sustainable Europe Research Institute, which aims "to develop the concept of environmental space and show ways to sustainability", are examples of this type of mission.
- Support the E.U. project, in general or in relation to their own country's integration.
- A few specifically mention other communities they wish to cater for, in particular the business community (through contacts with decision-makers), academia (research outlet, platform, etc.), and NGOs (information, analysis).

FIGURE 1

Think tanks stated mission – EU 25

The previous and following pie charts present the different categories of stated missions. They do not reflect think tanks' actual research production, but what their claimed ambitions are. These categories, although somewhat subjective, cover all think tanks' stated missions apart from a few exceptions. Clearly some think tanks declare more than one type of mission; we have counted these accordingly and the figures below do not indicate the relative numbers of think tanks that have a particular mission, but the relative number of times a particular time of mission appears in think tanks' public statements.

Several intra-European differences can be identified within this general framework, in particular a tendency toward more advocacy in the former E.U. 15 than in the Member States that recently joined the Union. In the former E.U. 15, think tanks seek to support decision-making in a creative, proactive way, in particular by advocating specific policies or promoting a particular approach dealing with a specific problem, while think tanks in the new Central and Eastern European Member States tend to concentrate more on providing information and offering practical assistance. Examples of these two trends are the Institute for the Study of International Politics (ISPI) in Italy on the one hand and the Public Policy Centre Providus in Latvia or the Institute of Public Affairs in Poland, on the other hand. Similarly, research institutes interpret more often their role as "orienting the action" in Member States with an older and more diversified think tank population, such as the founding E.U. Member States. IWG Bonn for instance "tries, through the advice it gives, to orient the public policy choices in a free market direction." Think tanks show a greater inclination toward providing basic expertise and support for policy-makers in the new Member States that are confronted with the multiple new challenges of European integration.

FIGURE 2

Think tanks stated mission – Former EU 15





FIGURE 3

Think tanks stated mission – New Members states



2.1.4 POLICY RESEARCH TOPICS

Within their broad mission, some 54 per cent of the organisations surveyed are either multi-disciplinary think tanks dedicated to Europe without any specific focus (such as Notre Europe in France or the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels) or multi-issue institutes (i.e. concentrating on three or more research topics, such as ELIAMEP in Athens or the Instituto Elcano in Madrid). 46 per cent can be considered single-issue or specialised think tanks, even within a broad topic, such as E.U. macroeconomic policy in the case of the forthcoming European Centre for International Economics (EU) or the environment for the Institute for European Environmental Policy (UK).

In order to describe more precisely which research topics E.U. think tanks concentrate on, fifteen ad hoc categories were defined on the basis of the interviews conducted and the information encountered on the think tanks' websites : ²⁴

- Constitutional affairs (including Community law, European constitution, process of European construction)²⁵
- Enlargement
- External relations and trade policy
- Security and defence
- Economic, financial and monetary policy
- Environmental policy
- Social policy
- Development policy and human rights
- Cohesion policy and regional affairs
- Industrial policy
- Cultural and educational policy
- Transport policy
- Information society and technological development
- Reflection on the respective national role or interests within the community²⁶
- Others


At first glance, the topics listed correspond, broadly speaking but with significant differences, to policy areas of the E.U. Those familiar with European 'brain boxes' will be aware though that issues such as foreign policy or security and defence receive far more attention than could be justified simply in terms of E.U. competencies and legislative activity. Is this a sign that European think tanks go beyond simple policy analysis and seek to provide long-term policy options for the future of the Union? We do not have an answer to this question, but we have tried to analyse the relative incidence of every topic by measuring their recurrence

among the think tanks surveyed (a more precise analysis would require looking at the actual production of think tanks rather than simply declared intentions).

The two most important areas of research are economic, financial and monetary policy and external relations. They are considered core areas of research by more than 35 per cent and 30 per cent of think tanks respectively. Three subjects follow: enlargement (26.3 per cent), constitutional affairs (23.3 per cent) and national roles (24.8 per cent). A strong focus on national interests within the E.U. indeed characterises much of E.U. research, which explains to some extent why over 95 per cent of think tank researchers are based not in Brussels but in the Member States. Figure 4 below shows the areas of research which European think tanks declare concentrating on.

FIGURE 4

Areas of research which European think tanks declare concentrating on (%)



Distinguishing the ten new E.U. member countries from their peers provides further insights. Clearly, enlargement has been the priority and a major area of concentration (52.5 per cent) for research institutes in acceding Member States, whereas constitutional matters receive far more attention in the former E.U. 15 (30 per cent). Finally, research into a country's national role and interests within the E.U. is particularly strong in the new Member States, presumably as a consequence of their efforts to make the most of accession negotiations. It is also very present in the United Kingdom and Denmark, probably as a sign of their special and separate status within the Union. This national perspective is also apparent in Spain and Greece.

A third cluster includes Security and Defence (18 per cent), Social Policy (13.5 per cent) and Environmental policy (12 per cent), without any substantial difference between former and new Member States, although environmental policy receives more attention in the former 15 E.U. Member States, in particular in Scandinavian countries and Germany. The other categories follow with decreasing percentages.

Unsurprisingly, geography and history also affect think tanks' priorities. Apart from Europe and the enlarged European Union, which is obviously of primary interest to all, the United States and transatlantic relations stand out as a key research issue in France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Russia and neighbouring eastern countries such as Ukraine and Belarus are a priority for Poland and the Baltic States, as well as Finland and Sweden. The Mediterranean is a key research area for Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Cyprus. Spain and Portugal also look at relations with Latin America. Finally, the Middle East is a key topic for most think tanks that specialise in security matters. Africa (except for Portuguese institutes) and Asia on the other hand seem to be less covered.²⁷

Overall, there is a relative concentration of Euro-think tanks' research, reinforced by the fact that academic research is also strong in some think tanks' favourite areas, such as constitutional matters and foreign affairs. Other fields however, such as competition policy or external trade issues receive comparatively less attention despite their crucial importance for E.U. politics. Similarly, many issues for which co-decision applies, and therefore that are particularly relevant for Members of the European Parliament are the object of relatively little research by Euro-think tanks, for instance transport, research, and health policy, with exceptions obviously.

NEUTRAL, PRO-, OR ANTI-EU ?


Finally, a question many will have in mind : what is the share of think tanks that are pro-E.U. integration or Euro-sceptic? In our sample, the majority present a neutral or positive perspective vis-à-vis the process of E.U. integration, as shown in Figure 5 below. In our definition, 'pro-EU' think tanks seek to promote and / or facilitate the process of E.U. integration. This was usually made explicit in the organisation's mission, its statements to us, or the approach taken in its research. 'Neutral' and 'anti' can be understood by extension.

Traditionally euro-enthusiastic countries such as France, Spain and Italy show the highest percentages of pro-E.U. institutes. Dutch think tanks also seem to have a generally positive attitude. A second group of countries, including Belgium, Ireland and Greece, show more balanced figures, while most of the remaining countries have a more neutral think tank population. Significantly, the only country with a distinct community of anti-European think tanks seems to be the United Kingdom, although greater (see U.K. country report), the Eurosceptic think tanks operate more as lobbying organisations for a particular set of Eurosceptic U.K. politicians and as a result of this the objectivity of their research is seriously compromised. Perhaps because the interest in community affairs is much more recent in the new central and eastern European Member States (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia), positions are less clearly defined. Nevertheless, the general orientation seems to be rather neutral and overtly anti-E.U. think tanks are absent.

Overall therefore, it appears that there is a relative congruence of efforts both in terms of scope of research and in the approach taken by think tanks that focus on E.U. policy issues. While on average we found that the large majority of think tanks surveyed can be considered neutral (68 per cent), over 30 per cent show a clear bias in favour of E.U. integration.

FIGURE 5

Neutral – Pro – Anti – EU think tanks (%)



2.1.5 AUDIENCES


We asked the think tanks surveyed to identify their main target audiences. Figure 6 below presents data for think tanks in three key Member States and Brussels. The main target audience for think tanks in Italy, Germany, U.K. and Brussels appear to be policy-makers (98 per cent), followed by the media (61 per cent), the public, including NGOs and civil society groups (61 per cent), academia (44 per cent), business (34 per cent), and others (15 per cent), such as other think tanks and trade unions.

That think tanks should gravitate towards policy-makers is of course no surprise, it is in fact a key selection criterion. What is more interesting, however, is how clearly think tanks in these

countries seem to target policy-makers operating in the executive rather than national or E.U. legislatures. Thus the percentages shown in Figure 7 below indicate that, among the policy-makers targeted, greatest attention is given by think tanks in Germany, Italy and the U.K. to national governments (85 per cent) than to national parliaments and politicians (54 per cent). Think tanks also target the European Commission with a higher frequency than other E.U. institutions : 11 out of the 26 think tanks supplying this information cited the European Commission as an audience.

FIGURE N°6

Main audiences of 41 think tanks in UK, Germany, Italy and Brusselsⁱ
(% of think tanks mentioning audience type in interviews)




This presumably illustrates the fact that think tanks generally prefer to intervene in policy-making 'upstream', or at the policy initiation stage. They are less interested in scrutiny of existing policy, a role traditionally performed by other actors, such as national parliaments and pressure groups (see Section 2.1.6). The majority of the organisations studied declare that their priority is influencing policy formation upstream, before the European Commission drafts Green Papers or legislation, before Parliaments hold hearings and governments tackle issues. There is a clear bias toward forward-looking policies. Relatively few declare that they seek to monitor the implementation of policies.²⁸ This seems to indicate that, at least in terms of aspirations, the ambition to introduce new items on the policy agenda and shape

ⁱ Germany: IEP, SWP, DGAP, Internationales Institut für Politik und Wissenschaft, Bertelsmann Stiftung, FES, Hans-Siedel Stiftung, DIW, IfW, IFO, HWWA, CAP, ZEI, MZES, ZEW (15) - UK: E.U. Policy Network, EPF, Federal Trust, CER, IEEP, ODI, FPC, Policy Network, RIIA, CEPR, Stockholm Network (11) - Italy: IAI, CeSPI, SIOI, ISPI, CENSIS (5) - Brussels : CEPS, EPC, ETUI, Friends of Europe, OSE, Lisbon Council, ISIS Europe, MEDEA, EU-Asia Institute (10).

alternatives prevails over other types of services to policy-makers and over other audiences such as the media.

FIGURE 7

Main audiences of 41 think tanks in the U.K., Germany, Italy and Brussels²⁹
 (% of think tanks mentioning audience type in interviews)



In addition, it would appear that think tanks have an ambiguous stance when it comes to engaging with the public. Many institutes we surveyed said that public engagement was an important part of their work; but we often found that in reality such activities were limited in scope. Often a lack of resources was cited as a reason for this. It is no surprise that the best-funded think tanks, i.e. those in Germany, are also the ones that have the highest level of engagement with the public. We will come back to this in Section 4.2.2.


2.1.6 ACTIVITIES

'Thinking cells' are in the business of analysing policy issues and producing new policy options, but how do Euro-think tanks think? As mentioned before, creativity, innovation, originality, and 'added value' are characteristic of an effective think tank in the eyes of the market's representatives. This is a tall order in any economic sector. Our survey confirms that Euro-think tanks seek to promote the creation of ideas essentially through the following activities :

- Academic research : in order to produce added value, managers of think tanks generally seek to attract researchers with good academic credentials or, when they are more policy-oriented, researchers that combine an academic ability with a wealth of experience in policy making, including in some cases media work. While the reliance on expertise and formal methodologies of research derived from the social sciences might seem obvious to people from the think tank sector, one only needs to look at highly creative sectors such as design, architecture, marketing, art, or advertising to realise that relying to such a large extent on academic research and sectoral expertise to "think" is indeed very specific.

FIGURE 8

**Principal activities reported by think tanks in the EU-15 and the new Member States
(% of think tanks citing each activity)**



- Cross-fertilisation and dissemination through working groups, seminars, conferences, and meetings with decision-makers: a key component of think tanks' activities is to bring together people from different horizons.³⁰ This also gives them the opportunity to propagate their ideas. We found that, in addition to publishing and the media, seminars and conferences form the backbone of the discussion and dissemination work for the think tanks interviewed. Indeed conferences are the main source of funding for several think tanks. Over two-thirds of think tanks reported holding conferences in 2003. Over half reported holding seminars. Of course, the number of such events varies considerably between think tanks, ranging from none to upwards of a hundred per year for some of the large institutes that do not deal solely with Europe (e.g. RIIA : 140, IIPW in Hamburg : 130). Euro-specific think tanks, however, typically organise around 20 public events per year. Public lectures and meetings are held less frequently : slightly under one quarter of think tanks reported putting on events for the general public, which include discussion forums and guest speakers in front of an open audience. Interestingly, as Figure 8 shows, these events are significantly more common in the new Member States (reported by 47 per cent of think tanks there). This is perhaps a reflection of the fact that think tanks in the new Member States have less contact with government decision-makers and so devote more of their efforts to a public audience.³¹

Figure 8 below provides more detail of the type of activities which the think tanks in our survey are currently engaged in, both in the EU-15 and the new Member States.

MEETINGS WITH DECISION-MAKERS : after seminars and conferences, this was the third most reported activity among the EU-15 think tanks (56 per cent). They could include both one-to-one meetings with Government ministers and civil servants, and other meetings, such as 'closed-doors' discussions involving a range of policy experts. This type of activity was only reported by one in five of the think tanks surveyed in the new Member States.

CONSULTANCY : Many think tanks described an important part of their work as giving 'advice', particularly to officials, on different policy matters. Much of this advice is provided through the channels described above, i.e. seminars, meetings and so forth. However, a sizeable number of institutes in the survey (29 per cent in the EU-15, 26 per cent in the 10 new Member States) have gone one step further and are carrying out proper consultancy work for the Government, the private sector, or both. This finding is of significance because it shows that a good proportion of think tanks are dependent for their income on other activities besides research. Consultancy is particularly important for German think tanks, as 'Denkfabriken' offer a wide range of services to business, including forecasting and survey work. It is also an important ancillary activity for several organisations in Brussels such as EPC and CEPS. This phenomenon raises interesting questions about the future status of think tanks as non-profit actors without commercial interests, which we will explore further in Section 4.1.1.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE HEARINGS : a surprisingly low number of think tanks reported interacting with national parliaments in committee hearings—just one in ten of the think tanks in the EU-15 and none in the new Member States. This may reflect the fact that, as discussed above, think tanks' main audiences tend to be national executives rather than legislatures. However, this apparent lack of formal involvement in Parliamentary scrutiny of legislation does not mean that think tanks do not seek to influence individual MPs and political parties. They do, but more often through informal channels, for example at events, dinners and other policy meetings. Participation in committee work is however more frequent in Brussels, where think tanks are often called to contribute to European Parliament committee hearings, which even sometimes fund independent research. The absence of research institutes from committee hearings is particularly noticeable in the new Member States. Eastern European governments, perhaps because of the Soviet political legacy, are not yet fully prepared to integrate 'alien' input in their policy-making process. Civil society is still emerging and its role is not well defined to date. As a result, in Latvia for instance, "given the fact that policy making does not always take place in a well-planned, transparent fashion, think tanks often find themselves reacting to proposals already being examined at a later stage of the policy process." This is not to say that the think tanks covered do not exert influence in their national legislatures. They do, but more through less formal channels, such as meetings with individual politicians at public events and via the briefing material and updates which they send politicians on different issues.

THE OTHER PRINCIPAL ACTIVITIES reported by think tanks in the EU-15 were, in order of importance : working groups (27 per cent), research workshops (18 per cent), educational work (12 per cent), documentation centres (12 per cent), scholarships (11 per cent), the

training of government and E.U. officials and other professionals (10 per cent), and 'other' (9 per cent), including book launches, exhibitions, and survey and forecasting work.

Individuals within the think tanks surveyed also often pursue other 'public engagement' activities, sometimes on a pro bono basis, for example as experts and speakers at public conferences and training seminars. This is an informal part of many think tanks' 'public service' mission. It is also quite common for think tanks – in particular in Scandinavia – to have a documentation centre where the public can consult books on the think tank's area of expertise.³² However, only about one in eight of think tanks currently offer this facility. A number of the think tanks surveyed also give scholarships to students (e.g. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung), young economists (e.g. ODI in Britain), or academics for research on European questions (SIEPS in Sweden). Some think tanks, particularly the German ones, also run courses for members of the public interested in particular subjects, while others have produced educational material for schools in the past (e.g. The Federal Trust on international citizenship). A significant share of the think tanks we covered in the survey also provided places for interns within their organisation.

Overall, it can be observed that European research institutes tend to engage in cross-fertilisation efforts more with policy and decision-making elites in their vicinity than with less conventional types of actors or even the general public (see sections 2.1.5 and 4.2.2).³³ Most of the activities reported, such as seminars, conferences and meetings with decision-makers are designed to allow think tanks to get their particular message across to a fairly narrow circle of policy-makers and journalists. Public lectures and other types of engagement with the public tend to come a poor second, with the exception of the Scandinavian Member States and Germany where this role seems to be taken more seriously. One form of public engagement which does seem to be growing though are on-line discussion forums (e.g. E.U. Policy Network's "EPN Blog" in the UK ; and the objective of Europhilia, the forthcoming French think tank to organise "weblogs"). These fora are relatively cheap to run and enable a think tank to market itself as an open and inclusive organisation.

Quite legitimately, European 'thinking cells' do a lot more than just think. The name created by a couple of new actors—think and action tanks—is probably more reflective of many institutes' true nature. This corresponds to the dual mission think tanks have of producing and disseminating policy alternatives, and is therefore expected. A more surprising fact is that the think tank managers interviewed rarely had a clear answer when asked what methodologies their organisations use to stimulate maximum collective creativity, although a handful mentioned techniques such as scenario planning. This was particularly striking in the case of a prominent French think tank, the representative of which started the interview by insisting on the fact that true think tanks produce innovative concepts, whereas "fake" think tanks are more in the "compilation business." To the question "what processes have you put in place to promote the generation of new ideas in your institute," the same manager answered: "This is an interesting question, I've never thought about it..." This candid respondent, although head of one of the most productive and prestigious French institutes, believes that "few people can produce new ideas, even we are limited." He attributed this lack of creativity to insufficient

involvement of academics in applied policy research, State authorities' tendency in many countries to monopolise policy expertise, as well as think tanks' reluctance to recruit former high civil servants and public officials, unlike U.S. research centres. This lack of circulation "limits the ability to innovate, because cross-fertilisation is not happening."

Beyond this example, other converging signs indicate that the production of innovative policy perspectives within think tanks as organizations rests essentially on three components :

- Relatively isolated individuals who are recognised as particularly brilliant in their own field.
- A general process of research that relies mainly on academic research methods and increasing specialisation.
- A method of orchestrated exchange of views within relatively limited communities.

While bearing in mind the many constraints think tanks face in the production of viable policy alternatives, a valid question therefore is whether Euro-think tanks think or only isolated individuals within them? Unlike other creative industries such as design, architecture, marketing, art, and advertising, the range of systematic and collective methods to produce ideas within think tanks and their knowledge communities appears relatively limited.

2.1.7 MAIN PUBLICATION TYPES

The think tanks we surveyed publish a vast array of material, with each publication type carrying a different name depending on the think tank. We observed seven main types :

- Short and topical policy briefings, primarily aimed at politicians and government officials – and journalists – who have limited time for reading. These are usually produced in large numbers and often available on-line.
- Longer policy papers, called 'research reports', 'research papers', 'occasional papers', 'discussion papers', 'booklets' and 'pamphlets', which present the results of research and give recommendations for future action. These form the core research output for most of the organisations in the survey. The euro-specific think tanks usually produce these at a rate of 10-20 a year,³⁴ often in a series.
- Conference reports and event proceedings, usually published on an ad hoc basis.
- Books : if we exclude conference volumes and other larger reports from this category, the number of books published is actually relatively small. 'Euro-oriented' think tanks usually publish the most books because they tend to have greater financial resources. The Euro-specific think tanks on the other hand usually prefer to concentrate on producing policy papers. If they do publish books, it is often only at a rate of 1-2 per year.
- Journals : most of the journals are published, usually quarterly, by the 'Euro-oriented' think tanks (e.g. in the UK, ODI, Chatham House and IISS) although a number are also published by the Euro-specific think tanks.³⁵

- Opinion pieces and articles which appear in newspapers or on the web only and are penned by a range of contributors from both inside and outside the think tank.
- Newsletters : these tend to be either weekly or monthly, essentially informing members and other subscribers of events, publications and other relevant policy news.

Much of this material is available from think tanks' websites, for free or for a subscription fee. It is also used as a 'tie-in' to encourage subscribers to join up. Some supply briefing services to other institutions.³⁶ Publishing research is only the first stage in a strategy to influence decision-makers. The more successful think tanks have developed sophisticated dissemination strategies, including press releases and conferences, media appearances and launch events for publications (see CER Case Study).

2.1.8 FUNDING

The think tanks in our survey are financed from a wide variety of sources, both public and private, including the European Commission, foundations, universities, and individual donations. Funding is usually either for core activities or for specific research projects. Revenue is also often generated by the think tanks themselves through their own activities, including fees from events and conferences, training courses, and consultancy work. There is a considerable variance in the types of funding in each country, with broader regional patterns.

The information presented below is a summary of the findings from the survey related to principal funding sources. Readers should note that the percentages given here relate only to the number of times that a think tank reported a particular funding source and do not indicate the *proportion* of funding from each source either for individual think tanks, or for the think tanks as a whole. The main findings are:

- STATE FUNDING : core funding of think tanks by the State is most common in Scandinavia, Germany, Italy, Spain, Austria, and, to a lesser extent, France. The countries where think tanks appear least often dependent on state funding are the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands and Greece. It is also rare for Brussels-based E.U. think tanks to receive core state funding. In all, slightly under half of the think tanks surveyed (48 per cent) receive funding from state authorities. Such funding is of differing types: this can be a line in an individual ministry's budget (most often a country's ministry of foreign affairs, or the ministry of education/research); or money from a specific central government research fund (for example in Sweden this is a fund for policy research on labour markets); or again funding by a state-funded research council (e.g. the Economic and Social Research Council in the UK); or finally from the regional government level (most common for the German and Spanish think tanks).
- COMMISSION : in the 2004 European Commission budget there was a special budget line (15 06 01 03) "Grants to European think tanks and organisations advancing the idea of Europe" with appropriations of €2.4 million, another line (15 06 01 05) for

"European Think Tanks" with an allocation of €500.000, and one for *Notre Europe* (€600,000). This represents a total of €3.5 million out of total of almost €20 million for "dialogue with the citizens." 15 per cent of the think tanks surveyed declared receiving a share of this allocation for core funding, usually in the form of grants. In the EU-15 countries, we found twelve such think tanks. These think tanks are all focused on European policy research and / or the study of international affairs. The Commission also provides core funding for a number of Brussels-based think tanks, including CEPS. The core funding that is given by the Commission to research centres in the new Member States is usually support for capacity building, for example through the Phare programme.³⁷

- PRIVATE SECTOR : most common in Britain, Germany, and for the Brussels-based think tanks, this type of funding is one of the other major sources for Euro-focused think tanks. 44 per cent reported receiving *core* funding from the private sector, including 10 per cent from banks. The companies which fund independent policy research are very often large multi-nationals with a considerable share of their business in the E.U.
- FOUNDATION AND TRUST SUPPORT : this is another important source of income. Around one quarter of think tanks receive money this way, usually for core activities.³⁸
- RESEARCH CONTRACTS : a growing proportion of funding comes in the form of money for specific research projects. The most common funders of these projects are national and foreign governments, the European Commission, private business, and universities. Project funding is cited as a source of income by nearly 40 per cent of the think tanks surveyed, although the actual percentage figure could well be higher.
- OTHER SOURCES : these include publications sales (typically this is a low proportion of total revenue, rarely more than 20 per cent), events income, fees for training courses and consultancy work,³⁹ membership fees, and individual donations. The last category, donations, is obviously important for many think tanks. However, a more detailed analysis of think tanks' accounts—and indeed more openness on their part—would be required in order to estimate what proportion of funding this represents.

Whether we can talk of a 'European funding model' for think tanks is unclear because of the wide variation in funding patterns in each country (see Section 2.2). European think tanks, like their counterparts in other regions of the world, all seek however to have funding from as broad a range of sources as possible. It was very rare to find a think tank that relies either 100 per cent on the State or 100 per cent on the corporate sector for its funding. Even in countries where state funding is least expected, for example in Britain, most think tanks receive a significant amount of government and/or Commission money for research projects. Funding challenges and its consequences on think tank activity will be analysed in further detail in Section 4.1.1.

2.1.9 STAFF

The average staff numbers for Euro-think tanks operating in the 25 Member States and Brussels has already been discussed in section 2.1.1. We present here the information collected on the profile of think tank researchers (nationalities, professional and academic backgrounds).

First, Euro-think tank staffs are already very 'Europeanised' and, albeit to a lesser extent, internationalised, with many foreign researchers working in think tanks. These researchers are mostly from other European countries but there were also some from further afield, particularly Russia, the U.S. and Canada. Observing the national origin of staff in three think tanks demonstrates this point well: at ODI in the UK, researchers come from the UK, Ireland, Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Italy, Finland, India and Kenya. In ETUI in Brussels, we found French, German, Hungarian, Bulgarian, Belgian, Danish and Dutch researchers. And at SIPRI in Sweden, the director of the institute is British and is the former U.K. Ambassador to Finland. There is concern that such mobility does not apply uniformly (e.g. in the case of French researchers, Féat, 2004).

Euro-researchers usually hold either a Master's degree or a PhD. The more academic-type think tanks, such as those in Germany and Scandinavia, tend to have a higher proportion of researchers with post-doctorates. Indeed, researchers in Denmark must hold by law a PhD if they want to obtain a permanent research post with a policy institute.⁴⁰ The advocacy tanks in our study, on the other hand, were more likely to employ researchers with Master's or first degrees only. Here the focus is less on academic excellence of a researcher than his or her ability to repackage an idea and sell it to policy-makers (or ideally both skills!).

Unfortunately our research did not yield detailed figures on how many employees had previously held posts in government, or indeed how many researchers went from think tanks back into government. This process of exchange, the so-called 'revolving doors' process, is an interesting phenomenon because it shows the intimacy of the link between think tanks and authorities in power. What is clear from our survey, however, is that often the policy entrepreneurs who set up think tanks are themselves politicians, who may be looking for a way to enhance their own political standing domestically and possibly promote a particular cause.⁴¹

2.1.10 EURO-THINK TANKS PERCEPTION OF THEIR OWN WORK

Despite academic efforts to clarify the notion, 'think tanks' are a complex and evolving concept. We have therefore asked what the managers of European 'brain boxes' perceive to be the main features of their activities and of an effective, credible, and influential independent research centre. Based upon the results of our research and interviews of managers, the main features that characterise a think tank seem to be dominated by a traditional model of academic research centres, while evolving toward a more advocacy-oriented model :

- A strong – but diminishing – emphasis on **ACADEMIC CREDENTIALS** : think tank directors insist on the importance of an academic style of publications (books and articles), a rigorous methodology of research, and staff with a sound background in research or teaching at university level, in particular for senior researchers. We have also come across institutes which team includes more policy-oriented researchers (e.g. EPC, CER, ISIS). The EPC for instance emphasises its primary wish to be politically influential, to give "the right message, to the right people, at the right time" over academic-like research. A French observer of the E.U. scene confirmed that think tanks "are increasingly political."
- **INDEPENDENCE** : as will be analysed in greater detail below, this aspect of their activity and their institutions is considered crucial, although some research centres acknowledge that traditional standards of neutrality may impair their capacity to contribute to decision making processes. As one manager put it, "European think tanks have very little influence indeed, partly because they are not politicised." A minority group of European research institutes argue that being close to political circles and endorsing a clear political stance is a necessary evolution (the Case Study on the CER below is an illustration of this trend) that does not necessarily imply a loss of independence nor of the capacity of giving sound political advice.
- **THE PROMOTION OF DEBATE AND THE DISSEMINATION OF KNOWLEDGE** : this is seen as particularly important for European issues. As stated by a Czech research institute, "it is better for the decision making process to know more opinions and views before those in charge take decisions."⁴² Visibility, and more specifically media coverage, is also mentioned as attributes of think tanks, and in particular of the more influential ones.
- **PROVIDING TIMELY ADDED-VALUE** : for many sector leaders, "good" or even simply "real" think tanks are those capable of producing new policy options that tie in with the current political agenda. A debate emerges regarding the best approach in this respect, in particular whether 'thinking cells' should specialise or remain multi-disciplinary. A Dutch institute claims for instance: "generalist think tanks are a model on the way out... As democratic debate in Europe develops, you will need more specialised expertise (...)" Managers of multi-issue think tanks, although keen to advertise the broad range of skill of their staff, agree that a true, quality think tank requires very specialised researchers that can bring "real added value." Furthermore, what distinguishes think tanks from their academic peers in university research centres is their ability to react to new topics very fast. "Speed of reaction is essential to contribute to the debate, you need to be able to anticipate and react," according to the founder of a new think tank.⁴³
- **ACTING AS A PUBLIC SERVICE INSTITUTION** : this is a model most often seen in Scandinavian countries and in Germany.⁴⁴
- **BEING INNOVATIVE, AND FORWARD-LOOKING** : related to the previous point, think tanks help deal with emerging issues. A Portuguese director argues that the key task is "to produce information that anticipates the future needs of decision-makers."⁴⁵

- PROVIDING A FORUM FOR DEBATE AND NETWORKING ON EUROPEAN ISSUES : the IEA in Dublin, for instance, sees its role as a facilitator for discussion by bringing together under its roof different actors, Irish politicians, academics and journalists who otherwise might not meet.⁴⁶

The emphasis placed on qualities of speed, influence, and networking in parallel with what appears to be a diminishing emphasis on academic credentials and ideological independence probably reflect the emerging trend noted earlier towards greater 'advocacy'. We will come back to this issue and the questions it raises for the sector in Sections 4 and 5.

2.1.11 INDEPENDENCE, A CORE VALUE

INDEPENDENCE FROM WHOM AND WHAT ?

For all the 'Euro-think tanks' interviewed, independence is perceived both as a core value and an important factor of effectiveness.⁴⁷ This notion is, however, understood differently by managers of think tanks. It essentially rests on three pillars: intellectual, structural and ideological.

For most respondents, what counts above all is intellectual independence, which is founded in traditional notions of scientific research. A university professor and founder of a think tank which has gained a solid reputation for the quality of its research insists that what matters is the ability of researchers to conduct research, to define their own agenda, and to defend positions independently. If these criteria are fulfilled, then the fact that certain sources of funding are greater than others, or even a bias toward advocacy need not, according to him, contradict the organisation's research freedom. A key criterion for many think tanks is in fact that they determine their own agenda. And when the board or other authorities provide guidance, they insist that independence requires that nobody interferes with research conclusions. In fact, results of research should be reported independently, even when the research is conducted on behalf of, or paid for, by an external organisation. The IWE (Forschungsstelle für institutionellen Wandel & europäische Integration) based in Vienna, always discusses its conclusions with the people who commissioned its research, but stresses that it "never changes them."

Others insist also on organisational and financial autonomy, which are deemed necessary to protect a think tank's intellectual independence. Scholarly and material independence are therefore distinguished.

HOW IS INDEPENDENCE MAINTAINED ?

Overall, however, there is general agreement on the following key features of independence:

- The key factor of independence for nearly all think tanks interviewed is the diversity, balance and permanence of sources of funding. The forthcoming European Centre for International Economics, which will start its operations in Brussels in the fall of 2004 illustrates for instance this model, as it is currently trying to ensure that the funds provided by its twelve original participating Member States are matched by a wide

range of contributors from the private sector, which will be complemented with publications and event fees.⁴⁸ Finding a niche market, through specialised activities or topics is therefore an important strategy (see Section 4). Several respondents, such as Notre Europe, also highlighted the need for long-term funding that protects think tanks against the need to look constantly for new funding. What the ideal mix of funding sources should be varies however according to various think tanks' specific arrangements.⁴⁹ Interestingly, some think tanks argue that strong links with public authorities in fact protect them against the need to seek corporate funding and helps guarantee their independence.⁵⁰ Also revealing of this ambiguous relation to funding, a few contract research outfits, such as MESA 10 in Slovakia, seek to develop separate consulting activities that help finance research activities.

- Most think tanks adopt a legal status that provides protection against outside pressures. As associations, foundations, or otherwise, they seek to remain "independent", "non-profit", even "non-partisan." Independence is sometimes explicitly mentioned in their mission statement or statutes.⁵¹ No clear pattern emerges regarding the best type of structure to protect a think tank's independence, although several indicate that an academic environment is more favourable.
- Some have complex decision making "checks and balances" mechanisms designed to ensure that the directors and the different stakeholders of a research institute need the approval of other parties to make decisions, and that the members of the boards of executives or directors are carefully selected. The diversity of views represented on their board, the board's role in ensuring intellectual integrity, the ability to cultivate contacts with different political parties and professional sectors are important to prevent biased research. Several think tanks have a scientific committee.⁵²
- Unlike the Kiel Institute for World Economics (IfW) or ISPI in Milan (Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale), few make explicit reference to a "rigorous empirical methodology" or claim to "respect academic research criteria" (Observatoire Social Européen), "objective approach to research without political prejudice", or "academic-like criteria of research." Very few explain on their website whether and how research is reviewed and how standard criteria of academic research are met, although the IFO-Institut (Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung in Munich) explained to us that its research is "to some extent peer reviewed."
- A few think tanks explain that it is more generally the quality of their research, their "transparency", "competence," and "good work" that best protect their reputation in the long run and ensure that they "cannot easily be used." (IRI Europe)⁵³
- The reputation and prestige of the founders and the current executives of think tanks also play a role in guaranteeing an image of serious research. For many, it is vital to include "personalities beyond suspicion" on the board, as a German think tank put it. This is particularly emphasised in Italy.

- The fact that some think tanks have close links with public institutions (financial or organisational) are perceived by some as compromising independence and credibility, although none complained explicitly about decision-makers seeking to influence their work. Others however see such institutional links as reinforcing independence. Most, if not all think tanks perceive themselves as independent in fact, even when they have strong institutional links (e.g. the European Centre for Social Welfare Training and Research in Vienna) and depend on limited sources of funding, in some case, a single public source.⁵⁴ Many of the U.K. advocacy think tanks which are funded by the corporate sector argue, however, that the best way of maintaining independence is not to receive any funding from the State.
- Think tank managers feel however that the coordination and validation of their agenda by institutional partners does not imply control over the intellectual content of their research even when the research program is approved by an academy or the advocacy group to which think tanks are affiliated (e.g. Friends of the Earth's Sustainable Europe campaign in the case of the Sustainable Europe Research Institute in Vienna). Partnerships are not seen as affecting think tanks' ability to protect their independence. Even those that have strong links with political parties, such as some of the large German Stiftungen are careful to protect their image of independence by involving politicians from different sides. The Institut für europäische Politik (IEP) in Berlin "involves key policymakers in order not to be perceived as one-sided." (see also Section 2.4).⁵⁵

Several think tanks expressed how maintaining a research centre's independence is difficult, although "independence has never been an issue so far" for a handful.⁵⁶ We will take forward this discussion of independence in Section 4 (regarding the challenges which advocacy, financial pressures, and the proximity with decision-makers present).

2.1.12 PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

All the think tanks examined monitor and report their activities in more or less detail on their websites and through annual reports, presumably to promote their activities and guide their work. Beyond monitoring, most think tanks are interested in measuring the impact of their activities on the European agenda and the alternatives debated, but few have developed proper means to do so. A manager replied to our questionnaire: "No specific mechanism in place to measure performance; there is so much competition, a simple test is the ability to survive!"

More generally, "performance measurement" is usually limited to the identification of instances when an organisation's messages have shaped these two aspects of policy making. As outlined above (Section 2.1.3), the think tanks examined here indeed have a variety of missions and objectives, which fulfilment is challenging and, furthermore, particularly difficult to measure. Think tanks that seek to influence policy making usually seek to demonstrate the relevance of their work by identifying particular examples of ideas that have been promoted by the organisation and later debated or enacted by policy-makers. Even though "there

always is a difference between the research results and policies approved by the State, the contribution of a think tank may be observed anyway," according to one of the think tank managers interviewed. Many then advertise such purported achievements. An oft-cited example is CEPS and EMU in 1988 (see section 1.2). Those that seek to disseminate ideas more widely usually look at media coverage.

The perspective is usually short term, as think tanks hope for a rapid response to their efforts, although individual respondents insisted that it is necessary to adopt a long run perspective to influence the policy making process and public opinion. "Running a think tank is not like a restaurant where you can display your dishes on the menu and then people walk by and decide to eat there!" told us the head of a British think tank to illustrate his argument that changing minds can take a very long time. In the new Member States, where we were told repeatedly that think tanks created after the political changes of the 1990s have limited direct contact with public authorities, research institutes find it more difficult to measure their influence on the decision-making process, as their impact can only be largely indirect. Some nevertheless give examples of laws approved on the basis, they believe, of projects developed by their organisation. Besides circumstantial examples, the think tanks surveyed seek to measure their impact by looking mainly at :

- Membership trends: "if membership increases, it means my work is useful."
- Attendance figures for conferences and seminars.
- Trends in purchases of publications.
- Visits and downloads on their websites.⁵⁷
- Media coverage, although very few keep precise figures.

We were unable to obtain more precise detail that would have allowed us to understand what conclusions think tanks draw from such data, with regard both to opinion change and impact on policy making. The case study in Sections 4 on the Lithuanian Free Market Institute's efforts to measure its notoriety is somewhat exceptional. As will be further discussed (Section 5), one has to look beyond the E.U. to find think tanks that have researched and tried to implement more elaborate performance measurement mechanisms.

2.2. COUNTRY REPORTS

In this section we present the results of our survey by country, in order to give a deeper understanding of the specific institutional, political, and societal factors shaping Euro-think tanks' development in each country. All the 25 E.U. Member States are covered in the following order, with a separate report for the E.U. institutes in Brussels :

-
- | | | |
|----------------------------|-----------|------------------|
| ▪ European Union, Brussels | ▪ France | ▪ Portugal |
| ▪ Austria | ▪ Germany | ▪ Slovakia |
| ▪ The Baltic States | ▪ Greece | ▪ Slovenia |
| ▪ Benelux | ▪ Hungary | ▪ Spain |
| ▪ Cyprus | ▪ Ireland | ▪ Sweden |
| ▪ Czech Republic | ▪ Italy | ▪ United Kingdom |
| ▪ Denmark | ▪ Malta | |
| ▪ Finland | ▪ Poland | |
-

E.U. – BRUSSELS

E.U. THINK TANKS AT THE HEART OF THE EU

It is in Brussels, at the heart of the E.U. policy-making machine, that one finds some of the most influential and renowned transnational think tanks focused on European issues. Brussels currently hosts ten think tanks that meet all our criteria, including two of its most respected, CEPS (Centre for European Policy Studies) and the EPC (European Policy Centre), as well as a large number of organisations that perform similar functions.

A first group was established in the early days of E.U. integration (such as the European Trade Union Institute, in 1978, and CEPS, in 1983). Most, including the EPC (1996) are recent. Their number is likely to increase in the future. Some think tanks were in fact created very recently (e.g. the Lisbon Council for Economic Competitiveness, launched in the summer of 2003). More are yet to be formally launched (such as Jean Pisani-Ferry's European Centre for International Economics). While some may disappear, more are likely to emerge in the years to come.

Think tanks in Brussels tend to conform more to an Anglo-American model than their peers in the Member States. Nearly all are established as independent not-for-profit associations under Belgian law and offer similar services. Conferences, seminars and taskforces in particular are important platforms to network with other actors and discuss policy alternatives. They allow participants from the private sector to meet and think with individuals from E.U. institutions in a "neutral environment", as stressed by CEPS. As such, many in Brussels have members and seek in particular corporate memberships. Their audiences are also largely similar, as they all aim their work at E.U. decision-makers, first the Commission, increasingly the European Parliament, then national governments and the media. All have a neutral, or more frequently pro-European agenda, apart from the Euro-sceptic Centre for the New Europe. All, in one way or another, have the ambition to help bridge the democratic deficit between the E.U. and its citizens. All seek to diversify their funding base to preserve their independence and some organisations in Brussels have very sophisticated funding mechanisms. The EPC and CEPS have succeeded particularly well in this respect, with relatively large funds stemming from membership fees, fees for services, contracts, and subsidies. Others have different strategies, ranging from personal funds and private donations in the case of the Lisbon Council, to subscriptions from its state and corporate members in the case of the forthcoming European Centre for International Economics.

However, beyond these general similarities, competition is strong in Brussels and organisations seek to develop a niche market. While the largest think tanks tend to be multi-disciplinary, specialisation can be in Euro-think tanks' areas of research, for instance defence issues for the International Security Information Service (ISIS Europe), Asia for the European Institute for Asian Studies, and the "social implications of the building of Europe" for the Observatoire Social Européen. Think tanks also try to offer different approaches to E.U. matters. The EPC for instance takes pride in being first a "welcome platform for balanced

discussion" while CEPS seeks to produce "sound policy research" and "achieve high standards of academic excellence." They offer different activities, such as the EPC's forums. As a result, Brussels has a mix of academic, advocacy, and contract research think tanks.

Of course, competition in Brussels is increased by the huge number of organisations that may not have in-house research teams, but perform functions similar to those of think tanks. Providing an exhaustive list would be a daunting task. One should however mention well-regarded discussion forums such as Friends of Europe and Forum Europe, and innovative additions such as The Centre, a hybrid between a think tank and a consultancy created in early 2004. This type of organisation plays an important role as "incubators of ideas by hosting seminars, round-tables, book-launches, debates and a range of social events" and "instigators of ideas, by collaborating with think tanks, foundations and other thinking communities around Europe."⁵⁸ They also include networks such as TEPSA (Trans-European Policy Association), EPIN (European Policy Institutes Network), and the European Ideas Network ("an open pan-European think tank process sponsored by the EPP-ED [conservative] group, the largest political group in the European Parliament.") Created in 1998, the European Madariaga Foundation also brings together College of Europe Alumni "to place the research capacity of the College at the service of the European debate."

Brussels is of course also home to scores of diverse groups that have the capability to produce policy alternatives. The Commission has its own 'brain box', in the form of the Group of Policy Advisers, created in 1992 by former President Jacques Delors, not included in our survey because it is within the structures of the Commission. There are also scores of lobby group / think tank hybrids that contribute to E.U. policy making, such as the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT), the European Environmental Bureau (EEB), the International Crisis Group (ICG), the European Federation for Transport and Environment (T&E), and the European Citizen Action Service (ECAS), to name a few.⁵⁹ Industry lobby UNICE and trade union lobby ETUC, while not strictly speaking think tanks, also regularly produce detailed reports on how they feel the E.U.'s economy and labour markets should evolve.

One should also mention E.U. branches of U.S. think tanks, based in Brussels or around the EU, such as RAND Europe, the East West Institute (EWI), and the Aspen Institute. These are strong and getting stronger. EWI, which has an office in Brussels, is "an independent, not-for-profit, European-American institution working to address the most dangerous fault lines of the 21st century and to help build fair, prosperous and peaceful civil societies in those areas." It operates "long-term projects that create trust and understanding and seek to reduce tensions from Eurasia to the trans-Atlantic region using [its] unique network of private and public sector leaders in more than 40 nations." RAND Europe, which does essentially contract research, has no less than 56 full-time researchers in total in Leiden, Cambridge and Berlin helping "European governments, institutions, and firms with rigorous, impartial analysis of the hardest problems they face."⁶⁰ The Aspen Institute, with offices in Lyon, Berlin and Rome (and Milan), is especially active in promoting transatlantic and regional relations, examining the role of the home countries in Europe, and addressing important political, economic and ethical issues.

AUSTRIA

A VARIED LANDSCAPE OF YOUNG THINK TANKS

Austria hosts thirteen think tanks that have a significant interest in European matters. Among these, two deal exclusively with the European Union: the Forschungsstelle für institutionellen Wandel und europäische Integration (IWE-ICE) and the Österreichisches Institut für europäische Sicherheitspolitik (ÖIES), which focuses more specifically on issues related to the CFSP. Several think tanks were created and specialised in community issues, after Austria joined the European Union in 1995 and following the transfer of political competencies to Brussels, such as the IWE-ICE (created as an independent institute in April 2004) and the ÖIES (established in 1996).

There is also an important international politics institute in Austria, the Österreichisches Institut für internationale Politik (OIIP), which focuses mainly on the E.U.'s development policies. The Zentrum für angewandte Politikforschung (ZAP) is an applied policy research organisation which offers a comparative analysis of current trends within the main political and economic institutions in Austria and the Union. Austria also hosts two large economic research institutes, the Österreichisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (WIFO) and the Wiener Institut für internationale Wirtschaftsvergleich (WIIW), which has a research programme on European integration. A new think tank recently joined the ranks of these two economic institutes: Austria-Perspektiv, founded in 2002 to "remedy the lack of long term analyses and perspectives." According to this research centre, nobody in Austria, neither the parties' political academies (such as the Renner-Institut, which is close to the SPÖ, and Modern Politics, close to the ÖVP),⁶¹ nor the social partners takes a long-term perspective. Austria-Perspektiv argues that the consequences of political decisions have long been underestimated and its objective therefore is to forecast the possible impact of policy decisions. Finally, the Interdisciplinary Centre for Comparative Research in the Social Sciences (ICCR) hosts a think tank dedicated to Europe. It is called EURO: European Developments – Policies and Politics, and its activities focus, among other things, on enlargement.

Austrian think tanks are essentially funded by the federal and regional governments, to which can be added some European funding and project work from Ministries. Contracted research is a common means to diversify Austrian think tanks' sources of funding. The development of think tanks in Austria was made easier by the decline of the social partners, which for many years had monopoly control over governmental consultation. This created a gap which independent organisations were able to fill. Consultation institutes in the field of economics created in the 1960s and 1970s, such as the Österreichisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (WIFO), the Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS), and the Europäische Zentrum für Wohlfahrtspolitik und Sozialforschung, are now bodies which policy-makers are used to consulting.

Apart from the larger organisations just mentioned, which have teams of at least 20 researchers, most Austrian think tanks have very small research staffs, which usually do not exceed ten people. Contacts with decision-makers are very informal. Whereas in the United

States the President's advisors are known and each round of presidential appointments is reported on publicly, the names of political advisers in Austria are generally kept relatively quiet and discussions regarding political appointments take place behind the scenes. Such contacts are sometimes founded on a personal friendship between political advisers and decision-makers, which could be explained by the relatively small size of the country. Furthermore, the influence of think tanks is limited by the complexities of the Austrian federal system. A consensus at the federal level sometimes is blocked by the opposition of the Länder when these have the final say.

Overall, despite the recent creation of a number of research centres following Austria's accession to the E.U. and the fact that the policy-making process today is more flexible, pluralist and open to outside experts, Austria has relatively few think tanks dealing with European issues. Because of their size and influence, however, they are still taken seriously by decision-makers.

It is also worth mentioning an Internet-based quasi-think tank, the Sustainable Europe Research Institute, established in 1999. Pan-European, its objective is to explore sustainable development options for Europe. Its unusual structure – a network organisation without any in-house researchers – is an interesting addition to Austria's policy-making community, but does not fully meet our criteria.

THE BALTIC STATES

A SOCIETY AND POLITICAL ELITES IN TRANSITION

Four think tanks meet our criteria in ESTONIA, with only one that is dedicated specifically to European issues (the Institute for European Studies, affiliated to the Audientes University of Tallinn). Another has a research programme on European integration and enlargement (the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute), the remaining two look at specific European policy issues on an *ad hoc* basis (the Estonian Institute for Future Studies and the Praxis Centre for Policy Studies).⁶²

In LATVIA, we identified five Euro-think tanks: the Centre for European and Transition Studies that focuses exclusively on the European Union ; three other independent research centres (the Latvian Institute of International Affairs, the Institute of Economics - Academy of Science, and the Baltic International Centre for Economic Policy Studies - BICEPS) are 'Euro-oriented' think tanks, and the fifth, policy.lv, is a borderline case: it is an on-line think tank that regularly looks at European policy issues.

Four think tanks were listed in LITHUANIA : the Institute for International Relations and Political Science, the Lithuanian Regional Research Institute, the Lithuanian Free Market Institute, and the Institute of Labour and Social Research. None focuses exclusively on community matters.

The Baltic states have two main types of think tanks: (1) academic think tanks / universities without students, which are linked to universities, have academic staff, and receive part of their funding from universities, while remaining independent (they were often created by a

small group of academics with a common interest, but they remain separate from the universities which host them), and (2) independent centres which emerged spontaneously as early as 1991, sometimes thanks to governmental initiatives,⁶³ or with the help of foundations, such as the Soros foundation. The latter are often a hybrid of contract researchers and shapers of public opinion. All claim to be independent, without any links to political parties, even those created by parties.

Most were created in the 1990s, as a direct result of the fall of the Soviet empire, although with local nuances. The think tank community in Lithuania, strengthened by a stronger tradition of independence and as the country that first freed itself from Soviet control, developed in the early 1990s, while Latvia waited until 2000, probably in part because of its slower adaptation to the E.U. accession criteria. In the three Baltic States, however, at least one think tanks had been created by 1991, the official date of their independence. There was a marked growth in the sector between 1995 and 2000, during the accession negotiations with the E.U.

Euro-specific think tanks in the Baltic States indeed focus mainly on E.U. enlargement and European integration, at a general level or through country-specific issues (integration process for their home country, relations with countries outside the E.U., comparison of the three Baltic States in the run-up to accession, etc.). The other, 'Euro-oriented' centres focus on their specific research areas such as security in the Baltic region, regional cooperation, market development, economic forecasting, and social and environmental policies, in particular with regard to the adaptation to European norms. This is in part dictated by the many research contracts requested by ministries and other official bodies to assist them with the accession process.

Baltic Euro-think tanks usually have anywhere between a dozen and forty researchers. It is not unusual to find members of the government sitting on the board of independent research institutes, sometimes even as researchers. Staffing however is a major issue for think tanks in the Baltic States, because the pool of potential recruits is small on certain issues, and because of the language barrier. Budgetary constraints also prevent further recruitment, and researchers often perform many administrative tasks, which makes it harder for them to conduct research and organise projects.

Private donations are still very unusual in former communist countries. The think tank sector therefore has difficulties surviving and accessing funds for long-term projects. Developing a diversified portfolio of funders is therefore essential. Similarly, national budgetary difficulties prevent adequate funding of research and public financing is limited, except for think tanks created by the government and government-initiated studies. Foreign foundations, international organisations, and sometimes foreign governments provide the rest of their funding: the Soros Foundation, the European Commission, the World Bank, OECD, the government of Sweden. Think tanks in the Baltic States also cooperate regularly with Scandinavian and Finnish organisations, helped in this by their geographic, as well as linguistic and cultural proximity.

Euro-think tanks in the Baltic States tend to focus on national decision-makers, as all were created with the same goal of assisting their national governments with the post-Soviet transition and the accession to the European Union. The founders of today's think tanks felt in the early 1990s that mentalities needed to be adjusted in several areas (governance, institutional processes, market mechanisms, etc.) where Baltic politicians lacked experience, because the Soviet era had shaped society and governments so deeply. There was therefore a real need for better policy analysis and scientific expertise, which created new demand for think tanks. On the other hand, independence from Soviet tutelage and a centralised, even totalitarian political regime is still less than 15 years old. Civil society and mechanisms of public consultation and participation are therefore still very recent. Government is perceived not to be very keen to involve citizens and outside organisations in policy making. Think tanks that receive public funding often need to resist government attempts to use them for their own purposes, although things are apparently progressing as governments tend to use think tanks more and more as independent outside consultants, and try less than in the past to influence the results of research they finance. In any case, it is clear that the think tank sector in the Baltic States is emerging and is bound to develop further in the future.

BELGIUM, NETHERLANDS, LUXEMBOURG

A WELL-ESTABLISHED AND VARIED CONTRIBUTION TO EUROPEAN POLICIES

The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, geographically and historically at the heart of the European construction process, have six think tanks altogether with a significant interest in European affairs that meet our criteria. The Netherlands has always been open to the rest of the world and a supporter of E.U. integration, for historic and geopolitical reasons, which shows today in the strength of its think tanks specialised in E.U. and wider-European and international affairs.

One of the four Dutch think tanks listed, the Cicero Foundation, is a generalist E.U. research centre, three have specific research portfolios covering international relations, security and participatory democracy. Belgium has two relevant think tanks for our survey, one is an international relations research centre, and the other is focused on issues of peace and security. Luxembourg has no think tank that matches our criteria, although its Institute of European and International Studies performs some think tank functions.⁶⁴ Overall, the majority of Benelux think tanks and the ones described as more influential at the E.U. level, such as the prestigious Clingendael institute, are based in The Netherlands.

Although nearly all are independent, not-for-profit organisations, they paint a diverse picture.⁶⁵ Most are not typical of European-focused think tanks though, because of their specialised interest (e.g. IRI Europe which focuses on "the practice of initiative and referendum" throughout Europe) and their activities (e.g. Clingendael has important training activities).⁶⁶ Founded on average over 20 years ago, most Benelux think tanks are well established, though the latest (IRI Europe) was created as late as 2001. Heavyweight organisations have a large staff of permanent researchers (e.g. Clingendael, 25), while

smaller outfits have less than five researchers (e.g. Belgium's GRIP, the Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security). Several are very influential and work actively, in particular Clingendael, the Cicero Foundation, the Centre for European Security Studies, and GRIP, thanks in part to their geographic proximity, both with E.U. institutions and their national governments. All seek to get involved in the policy-making process upstream and at the higher levels of E.U. and national decision-makers.

Benelux think tanks operate in political environments already well endowed with influential party organisations, government bodies and academic centres. Indeed, other organisations not listed here perform important work. These include the Alfred Mozer Foundation, which focuses primarily on Eastern Europe, and the Netherlands Atlantic Association, which has no in-house research team but provides a useful forum to study questions regarding transatlantic security issues, NATO and European security. The main Dutch parties have foundations that, on occasion, work on E.U. matters, including the Christian Democrats, the Socialists' Anne Vondeling Foundation, the Liberals' Telders Foundation, and the Democrats 66's Scientific Institute.

The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR), "an independent think tank for Dutch government", writes occasionally about E.U. affairs. EIPA, the European Institute of Public Administration is an important organisation. Its core mission is not the conduct of research and it is tied to E.U. institutions, but it nonetheless has a very large research production.⁶⁷ The European Cultural Foundation conducts, on and off, influential policy research on issues related to European culture, notably recently on behalf of the Dutch presidency of the E.U.⁶⁸ In Belgium, GEPE (Groupe d'Etudes Politiques Européennes), a federation of university centres, and ULB and KUL (universities of Brussels and Leuven) complement independent Belgian think tanks' capacity on the E.U.

CYPRUS

A STRONG DEMAND DRIVING DEVELOPMENT

We recorded three 'Euro-think tanks' in Cyprus, including one specifically dedicated to Europe (the European Institute of Cyprus), and two with at least one significant programme on the E.U. (the Research and Development Centre – Intercollege and Civilitas Research). Relative to the size of the country, Cypriot research on Europe is therefore very dynamic.⁶⁹ Because of its history, society in Cyprus is highly politicised and informed of national and regional political debates.

The three organisations listed were created in the second half of the 1990s, ahead of accession negotiations, which officially started in November 1998. Their research focuses largely on the division of Cyprus, in particular in the light of the accession of the Greek part to the European Union and of the poor economic situation of the Turkish side, which contrasts sharply with the economic boom of the other part and creates tension on the island. In fact, one week before Cyprus' accession to the E.U. in May 2004, 75 per cent of Greek voters

rejected Kofi Annan's plan for reunification, even though 65 per cent of Turkish voters approved it.

Cyprus hosts three different types of think tanks: two independent research centres, including one that is more academic (the RDC is associated to Intercollege, the university with the highest reputation in Cyprus), and the other that is the result of a joint initiative of the E.U. and the Republic of Cyprus (the European Institute of Cyprus). The third institute is a private initiative (Civilitas Research). Despite different origins, all three provide high quality economic, political and social analyses to national and European decision-makers, both regarding the relations between Cyprus and the Mediterranean region and between Cyprus and the E.U. Consulting activities are commonplace, both for public and private contractors, even for the more prestigious centres such as Civilitas Research which has worked for the United Nations, the Romanian Foreign Ministry, the Economist Intelligence Unit, McKinsey & Co., British American Tobacco, Lukoil, BBC World and Barclays Bank. Cypriot think tanks are crucial interlocutors for many outside organisations, because of the specificity of the Cypriot issue, as well as the island's peculiar geographic and cultural position.

Cypriot Euro-think tanks are relatively large: they have between 15 and 50 permanent employees. They are funded essentially through private donations and their own activities. The Cypriot government and the European Commission fund massively the European Institute of Cyprus, which hopes to diversify its sources of funding in years to come. All benefit from a high degree of independence, as the first two do not depend on any particular donor, and the mission of the third institute is to be as objective and neutral as possible.

CZECH REPUBLIC

A YOUNG, GROWING, AND MILITANT COMMUNITY

European policy matters are covered by five think tanks in the Czech Republic. Europe is the core research area for Europeum-Institute for European Policy, while another institute, the Prague Institute for International Relations works on international relations in general, and the remaining three touch on European issues through sectoral policies: the Centre for Economics and Politics, the Civic Institute, and the Policy Centre for the Promotion of Democracy.

Most Czech think tanks are non-profit organisations and receive the bulk of their financial resources from private foundations, private sponsors, and private gifts and grants. Some of them self-finance part of their work through subscriptions, books, and consulting activities. Two research institutes also receive part of their funding from the State.

Most are quite young, as they were created after the political changes of the early 1990s. As the integration process is a very important matter in the Czech Republic, where Euroscepticism is now running particularly high, the activities of think tanks very often focus on the preparation of accession, as well as its consequences and the evolution of the legal and practical situation of the country. Besides, they also cover general and current European issues, such as the E.U. legal system or E.U. politics, European elections in June 2004, the

elaboration of the Constitutional Treaty, and the question of the new external border of the Union and its consequences for '3rd pillar' policies.

Czech think tanks usually have less than 10 full time researchers, although the Prague Institute for International Relations has nearly 30. Apart from the permanent ones, the think tanks also often co-operate with external researchers, whose number depends on projects currently realised.

Most Czech think tanks can be classified as "advocacy tanks." In most cases, public authorities at the national level constitute the main target group of Czech think tanks. However, the institutions are almost in all cases also interested in co-operating with journalists and informing society in general. Europeum, the only institution that can be classified as a 'Euro-specific' think tank, is particularly interested in university students because of its connection with Charles University.

DENMARK

THE MYSTERIOUS CASE OF THE DISAPPEARING THINK TANKS

Only one Danish think tank was included in our survey : the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), which, according to our definition, is not Euro-specific.

DIIS was formed in January 2003 following the controversial merger in 2002 by the Danish government of four existing international institutes: the Danish Institute of International Affairs (DUPI), the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI), the Danish Centre for Genocide and Holocaust Studies, and the Centre for Development Studies. DIIS is now one half of the Danish Centre for International Studies and Human Rights.⁷⁰ The move provoked controversy in Denmark because it was viewed as a political attack by the new right-wing government on the so-called "taste judgers" who ran these institutes and who had previously expressed their criticism of the government on various matters, including asylum policy and the Kosovo conflict. However, it was also no doubt an attempt by the new government to cut costs in the publicly funded research sector.

DIIS is a publicly funded, sector-specific research institute, similar to others existing in Denmark such as the National Institute of Social Research (SFI). About two-thirds of its 58m DKK budget comes from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the other third from different government ministries or the European Commission for specific projects. It has five main research departments, one of which is concerned with European policy. 14 out of its 78 researchers work in this department. Its current work includes: the E.U. as international actor; the relationship between Denmark and the E.U.; and changes in the international system post-September 11 and consequences for the E.U. DIIS organises on average about 75 seminars and conferences a year.

We were unable to interview the head of DIIS' European department, so it is difficult to estimate what influence it is currently having on the Danish policy-making scene. However, a former director of DUPI did say to us that DIIS is still in a process of readjustment following

the merger and that its influence has suffered as a result. They said that there is very little actual policy research currently being done by the department, and that since the merger the Danish Parliament had not officially requested any reports from DIIS on European matters, as had previously happened with DUPI, for instance on the Danish opt-out from the single currency. A number of factors explain the low number of think tanks working on European issues in Denmark:

THE LACK OF A CORPORATE FUNDING BASE TO SUPPORT NEW THINK TANK WORK : the currently limited availability of public funding for think tank activities in Denmark means that new think tanks have to look elsewhere for potential funding. There is however no real tradition of corporate sector funding of think tanks in Denmark.⁷¹ Therefore, an "ossification" of think tank structures has arguably taken place, whereby existing government-linked research institutes have monopolised both research space and government funding in their specific sector (e.g. DIIS in international affairs, SFI in social policy), but relatively few new think tanks can emerge because of the lack of other financial support mechanisms.⁷²

THE CONTINUING EFFECT OF THE 2002 MERGER : this reduced dramatically the number of think tanks working on international and European policy issues. For example, the Centre for Development Studies and COPRI had both previously carried out important European work in their respective sectors prior to the merger. Much of this expertise and research output has been lost as a result, and it will take time for DIIS to reproduce a similar level of work.⁷³

COMPETITION FROM THE UNIVERSITY SECTOR : there are a number of university centres in Denmark with an interest in European policy. An important example is the Centre for European Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. The Centre, in addition to its Master's programme, also produces research of a similar kind to think tanks (e.g. working papers), aimed at a similar audience (such as the public, business and policy-makers). Such work could also pose a challenge to any Euro-specific, academic-style think tank attempting to establish itself in Denmark the future. Another example is EPRU, a university-based policy research body (not a think tank according to our criteria). Founded in 1991 by a group of Danish economists at the Copenhagen Business School and the University of Copenhagen, EPRU undertakes research on international macroeconomic policy issues. One of the motivations for its creation was the change occurring at the time in the international economy and increasing European economic integration. Much of its work is relevant to E.U. policy-makers.⁷⁴

FINLAND

A MODERN AND VARIED COMMUNITY OF EURO-THINK TANKS

In 1997, McGann, Weaver (2000) had identified nine think tanks in Finland in different fields. Three were research centres affiliated to political parties (K.J. Stahlberg Foundation, Labour Institute for Economic Research, National Coalition Institute). Today, six think tanks (including five new institutes) examine European policy issues, either very closely (Pan-European Institute, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, The Research Institute for the Finnish

Economy - ETLA) or as part of a wider research remit (EVA - Finnish Business and Policy Forum, Pellervo Economic Research Centre - PTT, Labour Institute for Economic Research).

Finland has a strong think tank tradition. Out of the nine think tanks listed by McGann and Weaver, six had been established between 1945 and 1974 and one before 1945. Among our six 'Euro-think tanks', five date back to the 1960s and 1970s. The most recent (the Pan European Institute) is more specialised in Europe as a continent, including the E.U. as well as Eastern Europe (the new Member States) and E.U. neighbouring countries, especially Russia. Russia is indeed a major area of research for the majority of Finnish think tanks, in particular in the framework of the 'Northern Dimension' and Russian relations with the E.U.

Finland has three types of think tanks: academic institutes (Pan-European Institute), private and completely independent organisations with a clear sectoral focus (international trade, economics, agriculture/wood, food industry), and one think tank which is affiliated to the social-democratic party (the Labour Institute for Economic Research-PSTL, its role is to provide expertise, mainly economic, to Finnish policy-makers). Finnish think tanks' audiences vary largely according to the nature of their research. Besides policy-makers, Finnish think tanks have many other activities, including providing information to the public, consultancy services for the private sector, and *ad hoc* projects such as economic forecasts (PTT, EVA, ETLA).

Their sources of funding also depend largely on the public they cater for: academic institutes depend essentially on public subsidies and a share of the funds allocated to the universities they are affiliated to. More specialised centres are funded more through cooperatives or unions close to their areas of interest. The Finnish Ministry of Education remains a large and regular funder of Finnish think tanks.

Finland's think tanks are overall characterised by a modern and fairly specific approach to European studies. The discretion of the Finnish government, its relative absence in the funding of research groups, and the fact that public opinion is very politicised and active (80.2 per cent participation rate in the 2000 presidential elections) are also indications of what Finnish think tanks perceive as the modern nature of their policy making process. Independent research was long dominated in Northern European countries by institutional think tanks, established after World War II through national legislation and mainly funded by the State. They were required to provide objective and non-partisan research in their areas of expertise, with no State interference. This is the case in particular for the Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

Finnish 'Euro-think tanks' tend to be largely pro-European, which can be understood in the light of Finland's recent accession to the E.U. (January 1995) and strong public support for accession (57 per cent approval in a referendum conducted at the time).⁷⁵ According to the managers of Finnish think tanks, proportional representation in Finland also helps them remain as objective as possible, as it forces broad governmental coalitions: a left-to-right coalition included the communists and the conservatives in 1999, another brought together the social-democrats, the conservatives and the greens after the legislative elections in 2000, and the Centre Party, which won the legislative elections in 2003 joined forces with the social-

democrats and a party representing the Swedish minority. Because all political forces have a chance to be represented in the government, Finnish think tanks feel that they do not need to develop particular links with any party.

Furthermore, Prime Minister Urho Kaleva Kekkonen's policy of developing good contacts with Finland's neighbouring countries, led from 1956 to 1981, is still very much alive. A key component of Finland's foreign policy has in fact always been to maintain strict neutrality and good relations with the USSR. As early as 1991, Finland started developing its relations with former Soviet republics. This is visible today in the large number of research programmes that focus on regional collaboration, in particular with the Baltic States.

FRANCE

EXPERIENCING ANOTHER REVOLUTION?

Currently, only seven French organisations qualify as think tanks with an explicit focus on European policy matters, according to the criteria of this survey. Five are Euro-specific think tanks : Confrontations Europe, which seeks to generate new and more "conflicting" ideas about Europe by bringing together representatives from different sectors ; Europe 2020, which seeks to promote greater democracy through prospective studies ; the Fondation Robert Schuman that strives for the reunification of the European continent ; and Notre Europe, which acts in "the spirit of a closer European union comprising a common defence and a common currency, respecting community assets, and resting on common policies that support full employment, competitiveness, and solidarity." The European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) is a borderline case as it is an autonomous E.U. agency specialised in security matters.⁷⁶ The two remaining are international affairs institutes with significant programmes dedicated to Europe: the Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI), with a broad research portfolio, and the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), more focused on military and defence matters. Many more organisations besides these seven organisations perform a similar role in terms of research and policy planning on European affairs. France also expects to welcome a new generalist Euro-think tank in the autumn of 2004.

Nearly all French E.U. think tanks are organised as non-profit associations under a flexible, catch-all French statute dating back to 1901, except for two: one is a foundation and the other a European agency. They are all based in Paris. Most are largely dependent on public funds, European, but also French. Apart from IFRI, which has experienced recent reductions in public funding but is large and well established, few have succeeded in developing sustainable private sources of funding. Despite France's long-time intellectual investment in the E.U. construction process, the seven organisations listed are very recent. Except again for IFRI, which recently celebrated its 25th anniversary and is considered one of France's first think tanks created on the Anglo-American model, the remaining six are on average only nine years of age.⁷⁷ French 'boîtes à idées' also tend to be relatively small. In-house research teams working on European issues usually have less than ten researchers and budgets are fairly

limited. France does not have Euro-sceptic think tanks. Approximately half in fact advocate greater E.U. integration and involvement of citizens in E.U. affairs, as will Europhilia, to be created later this year. The remaining think tanks are more academic in nature.

The impact of France on the E.U. scene is considered insufficient, as highlighted recently by French Deputy Jacques Floch (2004), by the French Permanent Representation to the E.U. (Féat, 2004) and by Foreign Affairs Minister Michel Barnier (August 2004). French think tanks publish too often only in French and not systematically in English or other E.U. languages. They have developed very close links with their official French interlocutors in French and E.U. institutions and have strong work programmes with German institutes, but still have difficulties reaching beyond their traditional networks of influence. They are not very visible in the E.U. media. One think tank, Confrontations Europe, has a permanent office in Brussels (since May of this year), another, the Fondation Robert Schuman, will follow in Confrontations' step later in 2005. This lack of visibility and presence on the ground explains, according to France's PermRep, why French think tanks cannot test and disseminate their ideas as effectively as their English or German counterparts, even though the seven think tanks dedicated to E.U. affairs listed represent a significant share of the 70 think tanks identified in total by McGann and Weaver in 2000.

However, France's "intellectual diplomacy" also relies on a significant number of active organisations that make a significant contribution to French research and communication efforts on E.U. policies :

- Government and E.U. institutional bodies such as the 'Centre d'Analyse et de Prévision', the in-house, official think tank of the foreign affairs ministry.
- Recent quasi-think tanks / forums for debate, such as A Gauche, en Europe and Europartenaires, which are very active in the formation and dissemination of ideas at a European level, but that do not have an in-house research team.
- Influential and active academic centres that touch on European affairs regularly, including the Centre d'Etudes des Relations Internationales (CERI), the Centre Interdisciplinaire de Recherches sur la Paix et d'Etudes Stratégiques (CIRPES), the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII); and the Institut de l'Europe, based at the French business school HEC and managed by former European Affairs Minister (turned professor) Noëlle Lenoir. These academic centres are getting increasingly involved, as discussed in Section 4.1.
- Many associations, either pro-European, such as the Association Jean Monnet; Association Française d'Etudes pour l'Union européenne; and Europe et Sociétés; or more critical, such as anti-world-trade group Attac.
- Foundations : the Fondation Jean Jaurès for instance, although not dedicated to Europe, often includes the E.U. dimension in its studies.
- Other more generalist think tanks, such as Polemia, the Institut Montaigne, and Prométhée (French branch of an international think tank), look at E.U. issues and increasingly so. They were not included however because Europe is not an explicit

research topic. Two think tanks in the fields of international relations and strategy studies besides IFRI and FRS generate strong policy research related to European affairs: IRIS (Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques), and the Institut Choiseul.⁷⁸

Clearly, put together, these different complementary research bodies significantly counterbalance the relative paucity of French Euro-think tanks. On the other hand, the fact that so many structures, in particular ministerial cabinets, political clubs, national research institutes, and policy research groups play a similar role to think tanks in the French political landscape, also prevents the emergence of strong independent research centres, according to Fieschi and Gaffney (in Stone, Denham, Garnett, 1998). Overall, it is assumed that France does not have a strong think tank culture. Gadault (2004) links this situation to the general under investment in research in France. According to a French professor of European affairs, French public authorities, traditionally very centralised, are also not open to outside input. "In France," he argues, "everyone believes she or he has all the answers. Bercy [the Finance Ministry] has its own think tank, and they only trust what they produce internally. Some countries are more open (...), their bureaucracies tend to think less that they do not need external support." Another researcher adds that this is "a cultural problem of French elites."

There are however encouraging signs that this culture is changing. "We understand the problem fast, although it takes a lot of time to find the solution," observes a French official. There is increased realisation of the importance of Europe among decision-makers, and younger generations of students and leaders of the corporate sector are finding their place on the European and international stage.

GERMANY

AN EXCEPTION ON THE EUROPEAN THINK TANK SCENE

The system of think tanks in Germany is characterised by a large number of independent organisations, which are located outside the structures of government but are nonetheless supported, financed and sometimes even operated by these same structures. There are about 20 think tanks in Germany which display an interest for European questions and which are therefore included in this study.

The system of think tanks in Germany is unusual in the European context. The types of think tank are extremely varied. There are, firstly, a large number of "universities without students", which main activity is academic research. This category includes the major institutes dealing with foreign policy, peace and security issues, such as the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (DGAP). Their mission is international and therefore a large part of their activities relates to Europe. The SWP and DGAP both have research programmes on the European Union. This is focused for SWP on European integration, the E.U.'s external relations and security policy, and for DGAP on Franco-German relations and Central and Eastern Europe. In contrast to SWP, which main mission is to advise the Federal Government, DGAP is an independent, non-partisan

organisation similar to the Council for Foreign Relations in New York and the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London.

Also counted as “universities without students” are the six large economic research institutes (DIW in Berlin (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung), IFO-Institut, HWWA in Hamburg (Hamburgischen Welt-Wirtschafts Archiv), RWI in Essen (Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung), IFW in Kiel (Institut für Weltwirtschaft) and IWH in Halle). Their academic research on Europe focuses on the economic aspects of European integration, with the exception of RWI, which does not undertake European research. For instance, these institutes seek to place in a European perspective the results of their research on the German economy. The financing of these economic think tanks, which comes both from the Federal and *Länder* Governments, is a reflection of the federal structure of the country.

There exists moreover another group of think tanks, characteristic of Germany’s political structures: the political foundations or “Stiftungen”. According to Martin Thunert (interview), they have no real equivalent in any other country, with the possible exception of Austria, Holland and, to a lesser extent, France. They are essentially “idea laboratories” which defend particular interests and ideologies. Today there are seven such political foundations, of which the two main ones are the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (close to the SPD) and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (close to the CDU). These foundations were established in the 1960s, except for two which are more recent, the Heinrich Boll Stiftung (1996), linked to the Greens, and the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, linked to the left-wing PDS.⁷⁹ These foundations are very active abroad, for example one of their main roles is to promote democracy in Africa and Latin America. Their research work does not in fact represent much more than 20 per cent of their total activities. They are therefore only “partial” think tanks. They are financed wholly by the State and are linked to the political parties represented in the Bundestag. However, in no sense are they instruments of the party leaderships, nor extensions of parties’ internal research departments.

Until the 1970s the development of think tanks was closely linked to the needs of the State or of corporatist organisations linked to it. For instance, a number of peace research institutes were created by Social-Democratic *Länder* governments, such as the Hessische Stiftung für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (HFSK), established in Frankfurt in 1970, and the Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik (IFSH), established in 1971 at Hamburg University. IFSH concentrates exclusively on the E.U.’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Even today, the Federal and *Länder* Governments are still the main source of funding and infrastructure support for the majority of think tanks.

In Germany, large companies also undertake research on future scenarios, or assist in setting up foundations. The latter in turn hire external bodies (often university research centres) to carry out studies and forecasting, particularly on European questions. The best known of these foundations is the Bertelsmann Stiftung, which includes among its six principal fields of activity international relations, and thus Europe. In the 1990s, the Bertelsmann Stiftung came to be seen as one of the most important of the research organisations receiving private funding. It had at its disposal even greater resources than the largest of the state-financed

policy institutes. Even though the Bertelsmann Stiftung is above all an organisation which distributes grants for research, its mode of operation also resembles that of a think tank. It organises its work on its own initiative, determines its own research priorities, and actively participates in projects, which it itself initiates. Its activities are both national and international, with a particular interest in European integration.

Since Germany has a strong university tradition, we also find a large number of think tanks linked to universities. Many are affiliated to universities or act within a semi-academic environment, like the Max Planck Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, which conducts research on different aspects of European integration. In the 1990s, some institutes went further and created policy research units at universities, such as the Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) and the Centrum für angewandte Politikforschung (CAP), which main sponsor is the Bertelsmann Stiftung. One of the most recent university-based think tanks is the Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (ZEI), established in 1995 at Bonn University. The German Government gave a large grant so that ZEI could be set up, as part of a wider policy of compensating Bonn after the Federal capital moved to Berlin.

Although all the German think tanks in this survey were founded after the Second World War, the origins of some of the economic research institutes reach back as far as the Weimar Republic and even Imperial Germany. For instance, four of the six main economic institutes, HWWA (created in 1908), IFW (1914), DIW (1925), as well as the RWI (created in 1926, but not included in our survey because of its purely national focus) were re-launched after the war but already existed before. Certain political foundations, such as the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, also existed before the Nazi period.

German think tanks are not only large in terms of their staff numbers but also in terms of the scope of their activities. Only two think tanks work exclusively on European questions: IEP (Institut für europäisches Politik) and ZEI. All the others undertake research which is oriented towards international questions in general, and therefore only one part is on Europe.

We can observe several trends concerning the development of think tanks in Germany. They are becoming, in general, more and more visible. The transfer of the capital to Berlin has given think tanks a new audience which did not exist in Bonn. The German media are relying more than ever on think tanks for expert comment, to the detriment of university professors. Moreover, private sector actors are increasingly interested in think tanks and are funding them more than before. The Bertelsmann Stiftung is the main one, but the existence of a group of smaller foundations enables German research institutes to be no longer dependent solely on public funds. Think tanks are welcoming in addition a growing number of young, dynamic entrepreneurs who sometimes try to create their own research centres, for example, the BerlinPolis or the Global Public Policy Initiative. German think tanks are also becoming less ideological and more pragmatic. For instance, the political foundations underline that they do not support a single point of view or source of ideas in spite of their links with the political parties. Finally, policy-makers expect now think tanks not only to produce novel political ideas, but also a strategy for communicating these ideas to a wider audience. We are therefore witnessing a coming together of the worlds of consultancy and policy advice.

Germany houses a rich community of think tanks working on European questions, one which is in many ways atypical in the European context. Despite their links with numerous institutes across the world and the international scope of their activities, German think tanks are very much a product of the German federal and parliamentary system and are deeply anchored in the national political culture and its structures.

GREECE

RELEVANT THINK TANKS, READY FOR GLOBAL CHALLENGES

According to the most recent study, there are 16 think tanks in Greece (McGann & Weaver, 2000). The first ones were created between 1945 and 1974. The end of the military regime of 1967-73 stimulated their development further, as did Greece's accession to the European Community in 1981. The main areas of interest for Greek think tanks focused on Europe are Greece's future position within the EU, as well as its relations with Turkey and the wider "Hellenistic community"⁸⁰ (McGann, Weaver, 2000). Even though some think tanks receive public funding, independent research in the political sphere remains relatively undeveloped but it is nonetheless rapidly growing. The current state of think tanks in Greece can be considered to represent the "first wave" in their development, with the creation of academic, non-partisan research institutes. Other think tanks are affiliated to political parties, like the Institute of Strategic and Development Studies Andreas Papandreou established in 1995.

Eight Euro-think tanks have been surveyed in Greece in total: three are interested exclusively in European questions (Hellenic Center for European Studies – EKEM, Greek Center of European Studies and Research – EKEME, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy – ELIAMEP); three others concentrate more particularly on economic and legal issues at an international and European level (Institute for International Economic Relations, Centre for European Constitutional Law – CECL, and the Centre for International and European Economic Law – CIEEL); and two target more specific subjects, such as the free market, while also integrating the European dimension (Research Institute for European and American Studies – RIEAS, Society for Social and Economic Studies – EKOME).

The three Euro-specific think tanks were established in the 1980s to make up for a lack of expertise on European questions and to respond to a need for independent research centres (ELIAMEP interview). At the time of Greece's candidacy for membership of the EC, the public debate on Europe was often Manichean and divided between those in favour and those against integration, with little consideration of the real questions which membership raised. The research of these institutes is centred on E.U. enlargement and the process of European integration (the application of Community law by Greek public administration, the impact of enlargement, etc). Their objective is to propose an evaluation of the future outlook for Greece within the EU, to respond to the specific needs and interests of policy-makers, and to participate in the formulation of national policies.

EKEM operates under the institutional supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and receives a regular grant from it. It is therefore only semi-independent. However, even though

research priorities are set by the Ministry, it does not interfere, in theory, in the conduct and results of EKEM's work. The other think tanks covered here are, for the most part, of the contract research type. Moreover, they depend on E.U. or international grants, as well as on donations from their members (EKEME) and the sale of their publications (ELIAMEP). Government grants are given only on a one-off basis, within the framework of the work requested by various ministries (Foreign Affairs, Defence). Shaped by a national history punctuated by instability and political upheavals, it seems logical and legitimate that these institutions should seek a maximum degree of independence vis-à-vis their government. In the same way, the geographical position of Greece, located at a crossroads of civilisations and at the centre of many strategic questions (NATO, the Cyprus question, Turkey and the Balkans), could explain the proliferation of research centres focused on legal, economic and strategic issues (CECL, CIEEL, RIEAS, EKOME).

HUNGARY

FROM FOREIGN DEPENDENCY TO THE E.U. MARKET : AN ATYPICAL LANDSCAPE FOR AN EMERGING LEADER

We have identified five "Euro-oriented" think tanks in Hungary that have a significant and current research activity on Europe, mostly from an economic perspective. Two were founded pre-1989 : the Institute of Economics (1954) of Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the prestigious Institute for World Economics (1973) of Hungarian Academy of Sciences, then a centre of propaganda for Soviet ideology. Three are more recently created, independent research centres: the ICEG European Center (research and network center) was created in 1998, the Századvég Foundation's Centre for Political Analysis in 1996, and the Foundation for a Market Economy in 1992.

All five focus on economic issues at a national, regional or international level: economic developments of Central and Eastern Europe, including all issues related to E.U. accession and economic transition, management of key issues for the benefit of Hungary's economy and public, analysis of the contemporary market economy and the transformation of the Hungarian economy, underlying trends and factors behind global and regional economic developments, and their present and future impact on the Hungarian economy, etc.. As for Euro-oriented research, it is focused on E.U. integration, the enlargement process, and EMU, in the framework of Hungary's economic and political relations with the E.U. and neighbouring states.

The ICEG, the Századvég Foundation and the Foundation for a Market Economy are small organisations with limited staff (6-7), whereas the two academic think tanks enjoy much larger research teams (average of 38 in-house researchers). It is due to their status as academic or contract research tanks. Indeed, between 45 and 55 per cent of the funding for the two organisations linked to the Academy of Sciences comes from state institutions, while the three other think tanks depend on contract research and project funding, which implies a much more unstable budget, often resulting in smaller structures.

Think tanks in Hungary were usually created by the previous regime. Today, most Hungarian think tanks are still funded via direct budgetary allocations or contracts for services. They were also often the early recipients of grants from the European Union's PHARE programme. However, Western funding has increasingly sought think tanks independent from governmental institutions. This has proved more difficult than in any other country in the region, since state funding has continued to be a major financial source. Indeed, most influential thinkers remained in state-financed organisations instead of creating their own independent, non-profit think tanks. Today, most Hungarian think tanks not associated with government institutions have some form of for-profit activities, contract research and consulting having become a key part of their work (Kimball, in McGann & Weaver, 2000). Hungarian think tanks which had secured substantial funds from Western Europe and the United States in recent years might be affected by the withdrawal of this support. In fact, according to Kimball, "market forces will no doubt thin the field, but the consulting activities that have developed in the 1990s will ensure the survival of the most advanced organisations."

The significant development of Hungarian EU-oriented think tanks in the nineties probably derives from the fact that Hungary was the first Central European country to join the Council of Europe (in 1990), as well as the first Central European country to apply for E.U. accession. Hungary then had a leading role to play in terms of EU-oriented research for the whole region, all the more since it was selected by the NATO summit of July 1997 to join the Alliance in 1999. Furthermore, the socialist Prime Minister Peter Medgyessy set Hungary's accession to the E.U. as its main goal in 2002. In this he succeeded, as Hungary was granted the status of most advanced nation in terms of reforms by the European Commission in 2002, which invited Hungary to join the E.U. in 2004, all of which provided a favourable environment for the development of Hungarian 'Euro-think tanks'. Furthermore, 83.76 per cent of Hungarians sanctioned their country's adhesion to the E.U. during the referendum on April 2003. It would be interesting to understand to what extent Hungarian think tanks and other local players played a role in this successful outcome.⁸¹

IRELAND

GRADUALLY CATCHING-UP?

Two think tanks in Ireland have been included in our survey: the Institute of European Affairs (IEA) and the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI). Both have their homes in Dublin. The IEA is a Euro-specific think tank while ESRI has a research agenda which includes European affairs.

IEA is the only Euro-specific think tank operating in Ireland. Founded in Dublin in 1991 by former MEP and Irish Labour Party chair, Brendan Halligan, it provides a forum where Irish decision-makers can meet and discuss European issues. It is a relatively small organisation with only 10 full-time members of staff, although it has up to 100 occasional contributors to its work.⁸² It compensates for its lack of size by maintaining very close ties to the Irish

political establishment. For example, it hosts official-type events in partnership with the Irish government when foreign dignitaries visit Dublin – for example during the Irish Presidency of the E.U. in the first half of 2004. And it regularly briefs the Irish Parliament on European matters. Its main audience is domestic and E.U. policy-makers, for example the Taoiseach's office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Irish officials working in the European institutions.⁸³ Recent work by the IEA has focused particularly on the Nice Treaty and the Future of Europe debate.

It has been able to exert influence for two main reasons: firstly, because it operates at the centre of a fairly small network of policy-makers in Ireland who are regularly dealing with European affairs. Its co-ordinating role in policy discussion in this sector has enabled it to establish close personal relationships with key politicians and business people in Ireland, who themselves rely on the institute as a source of information on Europe. And secondly, its activities are given good coverage by the Irish media, which the IEA considers to be relatively 'switched on' to European questions.

ESRI is the other think tank covered in our survey. Established in 1960 with the support of the Ford Foundation, ESRI is similar to the old guard, government-linked research institutes found in Germany, the U.S. and Britain. A large proportion of its work is contract research and consultancy work for Irish government departments, and also the European Commission and its specialized agencies (including Eurostat and the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions in Dublin). Its EU-oriented areas of work include its programmes on labour markets and labour migration, industrial development and macroeconomics. Some of its most influential work in the past has been its provision of frameworks in which to evaluate Structural Fund investments, and on Ireland's participation in EMU.

There are also a number of other bodies in Ireland which conduct research on European affairs but which were not included in our survey (because they did not come under our definition of an independent think tank, as defined in the introduction). One such body is the Dublin European Institute (DEI), which is part of University College Dublin. The DEI organises visiting speakers, research roundtables, and two annual lectures on European themes. It also participates in Framework V research projects. Another is the National Committee for the Study of International Affairs, based at the Royal Irish Academy. The committee, whose members includes the Irish Foreign Minister, university academics, and IEA and ESRI staff, is currently in the process of re-organising its structures and intends to increase the amount of policy-relevant research which it does in the future.

Harvey (2001) notes the relatively small number of think tanks in Ireland – just five according to his estimate.⁸⁴ One of the reasons for this is the lack of funding available for such organisations. There are only small numbers of domestic and foreign trusts supporting think tank work in the country (Harvey, 2001). There is though some corporate sector funding of think tanks, most notably for the ESRI and IEA, and this will probably be the most likely source of funding for new think tanks here in the future.

ITALY

A STRIKING LACK OF EURO-THINK TANKS CONSIDERING ITALY'S HISTORIC ROLE IN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Considering that Italy was one of the "Founding Fathers" of the E.U. project, the absence of a single think tank that has the word "Europe" or the adjective "European" in its name is surprising.⁸⁵ Currently, there are six relatively large think tanks in Italy with a significant interest in European matters: Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI); Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI); Società per l'Organizzazione Internazionale (SIOI); Centro Studi Politica Internazionale (CeSPI); Centro Studi Investimenti Sociali (CENSIS); Fondazione Rosselli and other two ones (Centro Einaudi e Istituto di Ricerca Cattaneo) which deal with Europe as a smaller part of their work. Four are based in Rome, two in Turin, one in Milan and one in Bologna. They all deal with European issues as an increasingly relevant part of their work and enlargement has influenced them all. However, as previously mentioned, none of them focuses exclusively on Europe.

Some are organised as non-profit associations (SIOI, CeSPI), others are private institutes (CENSIS, ISPI); all of them are legally recognised as "persone giuridiche" (including IAI and Fondazione Rosselli). Almost all of them, apart from CENSIS, receive public support from the Government and, in particular, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, although the size of the subsidy allocated varies quite heavily from one institute to another. They all stressed the fact that this portion of their sources is slowly but progressively decreasing and that they are relying more and more on private research contracts or other forms of funding. For example, ISPI, CeSPI and SIOI organise a well-known range of classes and courses that prepare students for public exams or for administrative careers. The IAI does the same with one or two day workshops and seminars. CENSIS is the only one which has always based its resources on its own forces and its capacity to answer market demand. In this regard, they are all concerned about a recent trend; they pointed out that if on the one hand, less dependence on Government funding may enhance the independence of research institutes, the restriction of public sources also implies that they are forced to rely more on private contracts, which they view as constraining their independence and research freedom.

Italy has no Euro-sceptic think tank, all welcome the development of the EU, support further integration and welcome the opportunities that this process offers them: a broader dissemination of their work, more opportunities for collaboration with other organisations, universities and research centres. For example, IAI is currently leading a project with other foreign institutes on the possible consequences of the non-ratification of the Constitutional Treaty by some Member States.

Several common features of independent Italian research centres deserve to be mentioned. The first one, as several studies have previously indicated, is the near absence of political commitment (Lucarelli, Radaelli, in Stone, Denham, Garnett, 2003). None of the institutes interviewed seems politically biased nor wishes to be considered so. They are actually weary of being perceived as supporting a specific political party or coalition. In fact, it is interesting

to note how two of the latest and most successful entities in the European policy community—the so-called “policy clubs”—dedicated more to the promotion of political debate and discussion than to produce research on a regular basis (Fondazione Italianeuropei e Fondazione Liberal) are very openly politically biased. A third club, Limes, is considered more ideologically neutral.⁸⁶ It remains to be seen, however, whether they will evolve into proper think tanks, and, if so, whether they will keep a strong ideological position.

The second common feature is the importance which Italian think tanks give to the prestige of their founders and to the personal charisma of their current directors. Traditionally, the links with the academic world have been burdensome. Even today, having a well-known founder or being directed by a famous leader is considered as vitally important, almost at the same level as the quality of their research and the organisation of their activities.

Despite the publicity and debate on European issues generated recently by the “policy clubs”, the state of Euro-think tanks in Italy today paints a somewhat gloomy picture, in particular compared to the countries like the U.K. and Germany and considering the absence of a single institute dedicated to European policy issues (although some like the IAI have large research programmes on the EU). Although a leading Italian journalist claims that “the problem is not the lack of think tanks but the lack of popular interest and the self-centredness of many governments,” we believe that the presence of easily recognisable groups of “thinking heads” supporting government decisions and the opposition would improve Italian policy making and give greater legitimacy to the political debate.

In fact, the public profile of these institutions is rather low. Consequently, their role as promoters of public debate needs to be enhanced through increased media coverage. To this end, some organisations may aspire in the future to a clearer and more institutionalised role in the policy-making process. Some may even reconsider their traditional ideological neutrality through more clear-cut positions on important issues.

Other institutions, such as the Fondazione Agnelli, Centro di Ricerca Einaudi, Il Mulino (with its Istituto di Studi e Ricerche Carlo Cattaneo), and the Istituto per la Ricerca Sociale, perform some of the activities of a think tank, but only look marginally at European issues within broader research areas (international political economy, Italian public policies, Italian culture and communities, Italian trade, etc.).

MALTA

MUCH STILL TO BE DONE

There are currently no think tanks in Malta interested specifically in European questions. In fact, only one think tank was counted there in 1997 (McGann & Weaver, 2000), and that was a relatively new one. The only organisations which activities can be said to be close to those of a think tank (using our definition) are two university research institutes, which are part of the University of Malta: the European Documentation and Research Centre (ERDC) and the Foundation for International Studies. ERDC houses the Malta European Studies Association

(MESA), which is the Centre's research body on the E.U. Re-opened in 2001, MESA previously suffered from a lack of official recognition in Brussels, something which had threatened its existence. However, in 2002 it received from the European Commission a Jean Monnet Project grant.⁸⁷ The absence of think tanks in Malta is not due to a lack of interest in European questions as the research programmes of the university institutes demonstrates.⁸⁸ As a Maltese journalist explains, the small population of the island (c. 400,000) is not particularly conducive to the development of think tanks. The market of ideas is too small and there is no one either willing or capable of setting up and financing such organisations. Finally, the currently very conservative political context leaves little room for really independent research, with most research centres being affiliated to political parties.

POLAND

AN EMERGING CENTRE LIMITED BY FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS

In this new Member State which can lay claim "to the most developed, independent, and diverse think tank community in the region," (Kimball, in McGann, Weaver, 2000), six think tanks have a significant interest in European matters. None works exclusively on European policy questions however. Two are generalist research centres, four are specialised in economic matters.

There are two principal types of think tank organisations in Poland: the older, more "traditional" ones (e.g. the Foreign Trade Research Institute, 1928) and those created after the system changes in 1989: Adam Smith Research Centre, Centre for Social and Economic Research, Centre for International Relations, Gdansk Institute for Market Economics (the only think tank in Poland with its main office outside Warsaw), Institute of Public Affairs.

The research institutes surveyed focus on general aspects of E.U. integration. Accession to the E.U. and its consequences have naturally dominated the agenda in recent years. Logically, their size is usually linked to their age. The older organisations are in most cases much larger: their research teams exceed 20 to 30 researchers, whereas the younger institutes are much smaller, with at the most 20 people, often less than 10 permanent staff. All therefore cooperate extensively with external researchers. All can be classified as advocacy tanks, though some of them have the characteristics of contract researchers.

In most cases, public authorities at the national level constitute the main target group of Polish think tanks. However, we found that there is often little direct contact between think tanks and national authorities, which is attributed to decision-makers' unwillingness to cooperate. Some think tanks though host former officials, such as the Centre for Social and Economic Research which often works for the Polish government thanks to its strong relation with Professor Leszek Balcerowicz, former minister of finance, deputy prime minister, and currently the director of the Central Bank (Przybylski, 2004). Many therefore also target journalists and Polish society in general to try to influence their target groups. They usually keep good and frequent contact with the media, by providing opinions, information and advice

on current events. "There is therefore a natural interest in approaching and appearing on television and in newspapers," confirms Przybylski (2004).

The main problems faced by Polish think tanks are financial. They are most commonly organised as foundations or non-profit associations, with a significant share of their financial resources coming from foundations (usually foreign), as well as private sponsors, but it is apparently increasingly difficult to obtain financial assistance from important foreign foundations. Financing seldom comes from the state, except for a few organisations such as the Polish Institute of International Affairs. This, according to Przybylski (2004), probably explains Polish think tanks' freedom to criticise the government. Many institutes have consequently developed contracting capabilities and contracts constitute their main source of income.⁸⁹ European Community money, although available in theory since the introduction of the Phare programme and more easily accessible since May 1, is usually difficult to obtain, as the administrative process is long and cumbersome. European funding does not therefore account for an important part of Polish think tanks' budget.

Beyond the independent research centres selected here, several organisations provide valuable services, including the Centre for Eastern Studies. Created in 1990, it is financed from the state budget and looks at E.U. integration in connection with issues in Central and Eastern European countries. The Centre for Political Thought, a forum for public debate, also organises some activities on Polish foreign policy and even has an academic course on E.U. integration. The Institute of Strategic Studies does some occasional work on E.U. matters, as well as the Polish Economic Society and, most significantly, the Polish Institute of International Affairs, a State body.⁹⁰

PORTUGAL

LESS INFLUENTIAL, BUT COMPLEMENTARY THINK TANKS

According to our survey results, Portugal is characterised by a relatively low development of think tanks, as seems to be the case for the Iberian Peninsula in general. There is still a relative lack of organisations corresponding to our think tank criteria and the concept of 'think tanks' itself is often hardly understood. According to Freres et al. (2000), this situation is due to a "recent experience of democratisation," a "relatively underdeveloped" civil society, and "political systems that are heavily dominated by the central governments" (Freres, Seabra, de Moraes, in McGann, Weaver, 2000). However, an increasing number of organisations presenting the basic features of think tanks appeared in the 1980s, first thanks to the end of dictatorship and the beginning of the transition, respectively in 1974 and 1975 in Portugal and Spain, and subsequently thanks to the process of E.U. integration, which, starting in the second half of the 1970s, was completed in 1986. As a result, academic-style institutions dominate today's think tank scene in the Iberian Peninsula, with a relative lack of "mature" advocacy think tanks (Day, in McGann, Weaver, 2000).

Moreover, it is difficult to identify Euro-specific think tanks in Portugal (and in fact also in Spain) that are solely dedicated to E.U. issues. In most cases, the research centres' field of

work includes one or several issues within the international relations area, including usually security, environment, international politics, law and economics. In this framework, relevant references are regularly made to E.U. policies, further integration, the process of enlargement, and regional co-operation. Significantly, such references are often related, or even conditioned, by the desire to identify and promote national interests in Europe and at the same time promote and improve the image of the centres' own country.

Portuguese, as well as Spanish think tanks do, however, provide a distinctly valuable complement to other think tanks within the E.U. by offering a strong connection with Latin America, the Mediterranean area, and in the case of Portugal, Africa. This geographic focus shapes the research priorities of the organisations taken into consideration. In this respect, Iberian think tanks not only provide a rich pool of specific knowledge, but they also create a concrete connection with political, cultural and international organisations active in these areas.

Portugal is a relative newcomer to the E.U. think tank scene. With only two international think tanks with an interest in European affairs, out of a total of about twenty-five independent national research centres, this country represents today a small player on the E.U. think tank scene.

The two organisations analysed here are the Institute of International Strategic Studies (IEEI) and the Portuguese Institute of International Relations (IPRI). The former, founded in 1980, is one of Portugal's first think tanks, while the latter is one of its most recent. Both are private, independent, non-profit institutions, relatively academic, and roughly similar in size.

They target mainly Portuguese and European decision-makers, as well as the media and civil society organisations, through publications, conferences and journals. They depend financially on public funding and occasionally initiate research projects on behalf of Portuguese public authorities, mostly on matters of E.U. integration and foreign policy. The IEEI and IPRI are reflective of the relatively limited role played by think tanks in Portugal compared to university institutes.

SLOVAKIA

A NASCENT BUT DETERMINED GROUP OF CONTRIBUTORS

Slovakia, which "think tank community is by far the most politicised in Central Europe," (Kimball, in McGann, Weaver, 2000) has five think tanks with a particular interest in European policy matters. One, the Centre for European Policy, is specialised in European issues, another, the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, is a multi-disciplinary international relations think tank, the remaining three include Europe as a significant part of their overall activities: Institute for Public Affairs IVO, the Centre for Economic Development, and the Centre for Economic and Social Analyses M.E.S.A. 10.

As is generally the case in other new Central European Member States, Slovak think tanks are non-profit foundations or non-governmental organisations. Usually they receive their financial

resources from private foundations (very often the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and the Ford Foundation) and from private sponsors. Besides, some are partially self-financed by their consulting activities, others get part of their finance resources from the State.

Almost all the think tank organisations in the Slovak Republic are young. They were created after and as a result of the political changes in the beginning of the 90s. As a result of the process of the integration of the Republic into the E.U. structures, their research and other activities usually deal with general aspects of E.U. integration, most often the preparations for integration and the evolution of the legal and practical situation of the country. Besides, they also cover current European issues, for instance the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty and the first European parliamentary elections after enlargement. Slovak think tanks usually have less than ten full time researchers. Apart from the permanent ones, they often co-operate with external researchers, whose number depends on projects carried out. Like most other independent research centres in new Central European Member States, they can be classified as "advocacy tanks."

In most cases, public authorities at the national level are Slovak think tanks' main target group. They are also interested in co-operating with journalists and informing Slovak society in general. The last aspect makes the presence in media very important from their point of view. On the other hand, working through the media, as well as the organising conferences and seminars and publishing remain the most important ways of influencing their first target group, as quite often there are no direct contacts between the think tanks and the authorities, or at least such contacts are not frequent.

As is again the case for other Central Europe Member States, Slovak think tanks' main problems are financial. As a result of the process of E.U. integration, it is increasingly difficult to get financial assistance from foreign foundations, as these gradually move their focus of attention eastwards, to Ukraine, Belarus and other former Soviet Union and non-E.U. Republics. On the other hand, the procedures of applying for E.U. grants are long and complex. Consequently, seeking financial resources elsewhere creates problems of independence. For that reason, some of the interviewed organisations openly refuse State funding.

SLOVENIA

JOINING THE CLUB

Despite the relatively small size of the country (a little under 2 million inhabitants), we found one think tank in Slovenia that meets our criteria, the Institute of Economic Research, established in 1995 as a non-governmental organisation. It focuses specifically on economic issues. It describes itself as an "autonomous non-governmental research organisation with a long tradition in the field of macroeconomics and microeconomics analysis." More recently, research has been carried out on specific policy issues regarding Europe, for instance the readiness and the timing of Slovenia's inclusion in the E.U. and EMU.

SPAIN

RECENT THINK TANKS IN A DEVELOPING SECTOR

As is also visible in Portugal, the think tank scene in the Iberian Peninsula is relatively recent and underdeveloped in Spain. The representatives of the think tanks whom we interviewed confirmed this situation, and actually mentioned this lack of think tanks as one of the key-reasons for the creation of their institute. There are indications however from interviews with observers of the sector that things are evolving and that, despite severe constraints, many think tanks are seeking to innovate.

We have identified seven independent research institutes in Spain with a significant European research programme. Five are in the capital Madrid, two in Barcelona. None is 'Euro-specific', the European Union is only one research issue within a wider complex of international topics. A common feature is the special attention paid to Spanish interests within the European Union. The majority of the think tanks taken into consideration are organised as private non-profit associations, except for IEMED (European Institute for the Mediterranean), which is a mixed consortium of public and private actors. Nevertheless, most of them receive a substantial part of public financing at the regional, national or community level. A special case is the Instituto Elcano, which limits its public contribution to 15 per cent.

All the think tanks analysed were created after 1978, shortly after the death of Franco and the adoption of a new democratic constitution. The majority are therefore recent, and were formed between 1989 and 2001. Most think tanks were created to encourage a public debate on international and European issues and Spain's ever-closer integration within the EU, with a marked positive evaluation of such a process. Their resources are usually relatively limited. Their staff is between 15 and 20 persons, including academics and administrative staff. Elcano here also is the exception, with more than 40 regular employees and an extended network of external collaborators.

In terms of audience, all the think tanks surveyed seek to target the general public through a wide range of publications. Some are more oriented toward the academic community (CIDOB), while others clearly aspire to influence more the decision-making community (IPAE, IEMED, Elcano). Moreover, a third clearly show a definite political orientation and therefore work more closely with certain political groups (Fundación FAES and Fundación Pablo Iglesias). All the organisations taken into consideration promote research and release publications. Nearly all organise public events, such as conferences and seminars. Two offer also teaching programmes on a regular basis, mainly in the form of postgraduate studies (FOG, CIDOB), whereas the others (IPAE, IEMED, Elcano) focus on monographic seminars and direct contact with decision-makers. According to McGann and Weaver categories, two are "Academic Think tanks / Universities without students;" three are borderline, between academic and advocacy tanks; two focus on contract research in cooperation with public authorities. The remaining two are more typical of "Party Think Tanks", linked to the Peoples' Party (PP) and the Socialist Party (PSOE).

Finally, it is important to mention the existence of Spanish organisations that have think tank-like activities and exert significant influence. Some University departments develop important research activities on the EU, such as the Fundación Ortega y Gasset (a non profit private association and well-known cultural foundation with branches in Spain and abroad and does research on European law, economics, and trade); IDEE (Institute of European studies, Universidad San Pablo CEU); UNISCI (Research Unit on Security and International Cooperation, Universidad Complutense de Madrid); and IUEE (University Institute for European Studies, Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona). Two bank foundations (BBVA and La Caixa) yield significant influence over the national scientific community. They do not perform internal research, but sponsor other institutes, offer scholarships and promote publications. They organise purely non-profit activities that are research and development-oriented. They use their own financial resources and do not depend therefore on any public institution or political party. Also, we did not include the Instituto para la Política Ambiental Europea (IPAE), although it contributes to research on European environmental law and policy because it does not have a website.

SWEDEN

FACING DOWN THE FUNDING CHALLENGE

Five think tanks in Sweden were included in our survey of Euro-think tanks: one, the Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS) was Euro-specific, the other four were Euro-oriented. These were the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Timbro, and the Centre for Business and Policy Studies (SNS).⁹¹

All the Swedish think tank directors interviewed for the study said that there was not a 'think tank tradition' in Sweden. However, we did find five institutes working on European questions and this was certainly a higher figure than for their Scandinavian neighbour, Denmark.

SIEPS, the only Euro-specific think tank, was set up in 2002 on the initiative of the Swedish Government, who believed that there was too little public policy research being conducted in Sweden on European questions. They therefore sought to remedy this by establishing an independent research agency charged with looking at European policy. SIEPS is government funded and its management board includes representatives from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance and the Prime Ministers Office. It acts as a bridge between the academic sector and policy-makers and one of its roles is to commission research by academics into European questions (it gives out grants for this purpose.) However, it also has an in-house research team of its own (see below).

Two other, larger government-funded research institutes also operate in this sector. These are SIIA (1938) and SIPRI (1966). Their role differs significantly to that of an advocacy think tank in the British or American mould. For example, in addition to their research, they also fulfil an important public service function, which includes distributing information to the public via schools, bookshops and their specialist research libraries, as well as organising a number of

public lectures. However, other think tanks in this survey have also developed close ties to Swedish civil society: for instance, SNS has an impressive grassroots membership base and its local branches – found throughout Sweden and abroad – hold an average of 150 meetings a year for SNS members.

The history and organisational structures of SIIA and SIPRI are revealing in that they illustrate the close links which have always existed between think tanks and the Swedish state.⁹² Both SIIA and SIPRI were created by Acts of Parliament. Typically, 50 per cent or more of their funding comes directly from the state: SIPRI, which was set up in the 1960s in part “to commemorate Sweden’s 150 years of unbroken peace”, is an independent foundation and receives an annual grant from the Swedish Parliament; and SIIA receives funding from the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The government also appoints SIPRI’s governing board and director. However, both are able to maintain their scholarly independence. SIIA by law must be politically independent and it is owned by the Swedish Foreign Policy Assembly, a non-government body composed of journalists, academics and other figures from Swedish public life. SIPRI also insists that in spite of the aforementioned links, no attempt is made by the government to influence its research agenda.

Privately funded think tanks are rare in Sweden. There are, however, some examples: SNS, a relatively old think tank founded in 1948 by a group of Swedish businessmen keen to improve the business community’s understanding of and input to public policy, relies on a mix of public and private support for its research; and Timbro (1978), an advocacy think tank with a free market philosophy, is part of the Free Enterprise Foundation, an organisation financed by the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise.

Regarding their European research, SIEPS produces research on both internal and external aspects of the European Union and is also interested in the draft Constitution. Both SIPRI and SIIA conduct important work on European security issues, with a particular focus on the EU-NATO relationship. SIIA’s research programmes also cover EU-Russia relations, security and enlargement questions in the Baltic region, and international environmental and trade policy. SNS’s focus mainly on comparative aspects of economic and business policy in Sweden and the rest of Europe, while Timbro’s European work is focused on promoting liberal economic solutions in policy areas such as international trade, CAP and the welfare state.

As to the influence which these institutes exert, this varies according to the different missions they have. SIPRI’s main audience is the international diplomatic community (particularly in less developed countries) and international civil society. This is illustrated by the fact that many of its staff, 90 per cent of its governing board, and the current director are foreigners, and that the majority of its publications are in English. SIIA, on the other hand, publishes mainly in Swedish and its work gets a considerable amount of coverage in the national and regional press.⁹³ It sees one of its main roles as transmitting new ideas from abroad on foreign policy to the Swedish public as a whole. SIEPS is more influential within government circles and the university sector: for example, it takes part in government consultation exercises and it also is involved in Framework VI research projects with universities both in Sweden and abroad. Finally, SNS, which espouses “reasonable” free market views, also seeks to maintain

a good dialogue with whichever government is in power in Sweden, regardless of their political orientation.

The think tanks interviewed for the survey said that they face a number of important challenges for the future: the first is the question of funding. The Swedish government has been keen to limit spending on the established research institutes in recent years. And it has been encouraging the larger institutes to search for more corporate funding in future. However, these institutes face difficulties adapting because corporate funders usually have a preference for financing think tanks with an ideology rather than non-partisan bodies such as themselves, which can appear to outsiders like government agencies. This dilemma has the potential to threaten the long-term viability and organisational capacity of the larger research institutes, such as SIIA and SIPRI, particularly if the government decides to cut their budgets significantly in future.

A second challenge facing the Euro-think tanks is the apparently low level of public interest in Sweden for European issues. This is indicated by the fact that it was the government who took the initiative to create a Euro-specific think tank in 2002. Also the media is not always supportive of these think tanks. For example, one think tank director said: "The poor knowledge among most journalists means that it is difficult to get across with more nuanced or subtle views on Europe."

One of the causes is undoubtedly the deep divide in Sweden between those broadly supportive of the EU, and those who are hostile to further integration because of fears about a loss of political and economic sovereignty. As in the UK, this leads the government to adopt a cautious stance on European issues, which may have an important impact on the relative influence of Euro-think tanks. Hence, the same director complained that the Swedish debate on European issues "is still, almost ten years after the Swedish accession to the [EU] structured along the same old yes/no divide... the legacy of the two referenda held in 1994 (on accession) and 2003 (the euro) is still evident." He argued that the result of this was "a strong tendency from the government's side to defend the status quo". The success of the Eurosceptic list in the June European Parliament elections had merely served to reinforce this tendency.

A third challenge comes from the university sector. There are a number of university centres already carrying out significant work on the EU, for instance the Jean Monnet Centres at the universities of Lund and Gothenburg. Swedish universities have traditionally viewed think tanks as a threat rather than as potential partners. One think tank director hoped that this might change and there could be more collaboration between the two sectors in future, with a greater exchange of staff and expertise occurring between them.

UNITED KINGDOM

THINK TANKS SHAPED BY TRADITIONAL POLITICAL FAULT LINES ON EUROPE

The survey found 16 Euro-think tanks currently operating in the UK; seven are Europe-specific, the remaining nine are Euro-oriented. Many other domestically-oriented think tanks (e.g. Civitas, Centre for Reform, Demos, Fabian Society) do look at the European Union from time to time but they are excluded here because their work on Europe tends to be only an occasional paper or project – for example on the draft Constitution – and not a systematic treatment of the subject.⁹⁴ A think tank network called the Stockholm Network is also included. It is a partnership of free market think tanks with members in the UK, Scandinavia and France, operated from London (see Annex 2).

Think tanks covered in the survey are usually one of three organisational types: a charity, a non-profit company limited by guarantee, or a registered company. Sometimes they are both a charity and a company limited by guarantee (CLG). The majority are membership organisations and have a wide range of both corporate and individual supporters.

Broadly speaking, the second-tier, Euro-oriented think tanks tend to be longer-established organisations than the Euro-specific think tanks, which are a relatively recent phenomenon. For instance, the Royal Institute for International Affairs (RIIA) was founded in 1920 and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in 1958. These think tanks were established to examine questions of foreign policy and nuclear weapons respectively but both now have quite important European programmes - for example IISS has focused recently on the strategic implications of NATO and E.U. enlargement to Eastern Europe. Another think tank which original *raison d'être* is not the study of the E.U. but which nonetheless does important European work is the Overseas Development Institute (ODI, 1960).

The development of the Euro-specific think tanks in the U.K. mirrors in many ways the different phases in the E.U.'s history. The Federal Trust was created in 1945 at a time when the debate on the need for a new, unified structure of governance for Europe after the war was at its height. The Institute for European Environmental Policy (IEEP), set up in 1980, appeared at a time when environmental questions were gaining more political salience in Europe. And the newer Euro-specific think tanks like the Centre for European Reform (as well as the second-tier Foreign Policy Centre (FPC)) have tended to focus mostly on questions of E.U. institutional and economic reform (including Britain's possible entry to the single currency) – the main political debate in the E.U. in the 1990s and early 2000s.

The Euro-specific think tanks are smaller organisations than the others in the survey, never having a core staff of more than about 20 people. Budgets are not as large as in the American or German think tanks and the emphasis is usually on maintaining a small but dynamic team of researchers capable of 'punching above their weight' and using their good contacts in the media and government circles to compensate for their small size. The Euro-oriented think tanks are often much larger organisations: ODI, for instance, has 80 staff and 45 researchers, RIIA has a staff of 66, and the IISS has a staff of 46 including 25 researchers.

Regarding transnational structures, only one of the think tanks has a second office in Brussels, that is IEEP, and this was only set up in 2001. IISS – which is one of the few truly global think tanks, with offices in the U.S. and Singapore – also runs joint events with CEPS in Brussels on European defence and security issues via its 'European Security Forum'. This does not mean that the other think tanks are not focused on Brussels: for example, half of the Centre for European Reform's (CER) seminars are held in the Belgian capital. But limited funding is a big constraint for think tanks wanting to expand in this direction.

Wider pressures in the U.K. think tank market shape euro-think tanks' research activities. The market is very congested and space for new and original research is limited. Therefore, in response to this competition the Euro-specific think tanks either carry out general research on the E.U. (e.g. CER, FPC, Federal Trust) or they develop a particular research 'niche' in which to operate. The Centre for Economic Policy Research is a good example of the latter type: it operates in the sphere of economic policy research. Founded in 1983, it is different from a traditional think tank in that it has no in-house researchers. Instead, for its research output it relies on a loose network of 650 economists based in universities across Europe. Despite being funded by U.K. bodies, its outlook is therefore essentially international and much of its work is on macroeconomics at the E.U. level. Other examples of 'niche' operators would be the British Institute of International Comparative Law (E.U. and international law), the European Policy Forum (regulatory politics), and the IEEP (E.U. environmental policy).

The large number of institutes dealing with defence and strategic studies (at the national and international level) has probably also prevented the emergence of any think tank working exclusively on the European angle of these questions. RIIA, IISS, and the Centre for Defence Studies at King's College (the only university-based U.K. think tank in this study) all have substantial programmes and/or projects on European defence matters.

As regards funding, none of the think tanks surveyed receive core funding from the State. On the other hand, many do receive funding for specific projects from government departments and the European Commission. This includes the Federal Trust, FPC, and IEEP. All the think tanks in the survey rely on a mix of foundation, corporate support, and private donations for their financing. Some of the most important foundations supporting European research are the Joseph Rowntree Trust, the Cadbury Trust and the James Maddison Trust. The Economic and Social Research Council also finances at least one Euro-specific think tank. Corporate sponsorship often comes from large US, British, or European multinationals with a pro-European outlook, such as Unilever, BT, GlaxoSmithKline and Tesco.

Despite an often heavy reliance on corporate funding, all the think tanks maintain that this does not affect their editorial independence. In the view of a number of directors, the key to this is ensuring a diverse funding base. As one said, "the fact that we have 35 corporate funders means that if one tried to interfere in any way with what we were doing, we could simply sack them." However, while in most cases funders are well aware of the need to maintain an arms-length relationship with their think tank, many of the think tanks also accept private money for specific projects. As previously mentioned, the U.K. Government and the European Commission only give project funding to U.K. think tanks. In both cases a think

tank is likely to design project at least partly to meet a funder's requirements. This raises questions about the long-term research autonomy of British think tanks. In fact, the director of one think tank even said that he believed that think tanks were becoming increasingly like consultancies, "providing unpalatable advice or conclusions so that the government doesn't have to".

The influence which these think tanks have varies according to a number of factors. An important one is a *perceived* closeness of a think tank to the Government. For example, both CER's views on Europe (pro-European but also in favour of E.U. reform) and FPC's (pro-European but with an essentially intergovernmental outlook) match those of the Blair Government. The origins of both are also closely linked to the rise to power of the New Labour political elite in the mid- to late 1990s.⁹⁵ They have therefore been more successful at exerting influence than the Federal Trust in recent years, whose views on Europe are currently outside the political mainstream. However, this was not the only factor determining influence. A successful media strategy, the pragmatism of its policy proposals, and the quality of the research output all appeared to be important factors of influence too (see CER case study).

Other think tanks in this field, such as IEEP and ODI, can also be considered influential but their influence is mainly exerted within a distinct "epistemic" community. In IEEP's case, this would be with the U.K. Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, green legislators in Brussels, and the wider environmental think tank and NGO sector.

Two further observations can be made about the think tank sector in the U.K. of relevance to this study. The first is the trend toward more coverage of international and European themes. This is particularly visible in some of the larger, domestic policy think tanks. For example, the Institute for Public Policy Research is currently in the process of building up a new international programme. This could be explained by the increasing Europeanisation of the domestic policy debate in the UK: more policy sectors are influenced by E.U. legislation than before and the domestic think tanks are probably adapting their work to reflect this.

Secondly, think tanks are also affected by the polarisation of the political debate on Europe in Great Britain. The debate in the media and party politics is often of the "pro- or anti-EU" variety and this limits the potential for think tanks to engage with other political actors in a more nuanced debate on European themes. For example, because of the Government's cautious approach in public on questions such as the euro, or the draft Constitution, it has been hard for think tanks to gain support from the Government for a pro-European policy platform. This will not, however, prevent pro-European think tanks like the Federal Trust from backing the new Constitution in the run-up to the referendum planned for next year.⁹⁶

Eurosceptic organisations now claim they hold the initiative in this debate since the Government's decision in 2003 to postpone any decision on joining the euro until after the next election. A number of Eurosceptic groups and organisations opposed outright to Britain's membership of the E.U. have emerged in recent years on the political scene, often backed by Conservative politicians and wealthy businessmen. One such organisation included in our survey because it has an in-house research capacity is the European Foundation, founded by Tory MP Bill Cash after the Maastricht Treaty debate.⁹⁷

In addition, some of the domestically oriented, right wing think tanks, such as Civitas, have recently used the debate on the draft E.U. Constitution to publish papers which are thinly veiled attacks on the European Union and British membership. The referendum on the Constitution could therefore prove a watershed for the pro-European think tanks because they may be called upon to rebut more vigorously the claims of the anti-E.U. camp.⁹⁸

2.3 SPECIFICITIES OF THINK TANKS IN THE TEN NEW MEMBER STATES

A key factor specific to think tank expansion in the new Member States has been the lack of institutions that could, until recently, undertake policy research and analysis. Most Central European think tanks were created after 1989 with foreign support.⁹⁹ Apart from Malta and Cyprus, the great majority of independent research institutes were indeed created after the system changes, with only a handful that were in existence prior to 1990 (e.g. the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Science, Latvia, 1946). The older institutions were generally government agencies until budget cuts forced them to find alternative sources of funding.

As a result, the majority have less than 20 or even 10 researchers, although a couple have nearly 80 researchers. Research is often not even the only activity for people who work for Euro-think tanks. University professors for instance only dedicate part of their attention to think tank activities. Research institutes very rarely have the means to open offices outside their home capital and none is present in Brussels. There is also a smaller proportion of Euro-specific think tanks in the ten new members states, as most are general international affairs or economic research institutes, though for some with a very strong interest in E.U. affairs and apparently significant influence in this field.

Most reported that they encounter difficulties in their direct contact with authorities. Many concentrate on indirect, public-oriented activities. This may be a result of their relative youth, but also of the authorities' lack of receptiveness to external advice and expertise. Indeed, "given the absence of independent research institutes during communism, think tanks face the formidable task of teaching government who they are and how they can help." (Johnson, 1996)

In addition to all European think tanks' financial worries, certain sources of money specific to this region, such as U.S. and other foreign foundations, have started moving eastwards, to former USSR and non-E.U. countries (see Kimball, in McGann, Weaver, 2000). Yet think tanks have not fully succeeded so far in tapping into E.U. sources of funding, as they are learning the mechanisms and networks required to access such funds. It also appears that public funding is less available than in the other 15 E.U. Member States and that private funding is not yet sufficient. Foreign funders include the European Union, other national governments, and foreign banks, foundations and companies (often from the U.S. and Germany).¹⁰⁰ Universities, private businesses, banks, and occasionally foundations from the home country are another significant source of funding. Many think tanks therefore undertake consultancy work.

Think tanks in this region tend to focus on issues of direct interest to their governments and countries, mostly enlargement and general questions of E.U. integration to assist officials and increase the level of public awareness. Although young, the think tanks monitored display a healthy network of contacts with their peers around Europe and the world, in particular through the organisation of joint events. Think tanks in the Baltic States have been particularly close to Scandinavian and Finnish organisations, some even receiving material support from these countries.

According to Johnson (1996), "despite the numerous challenges facing Central Europe's think tanks, their capacity to adapt to changing conditions is impressive." The future will likely put this flexibility to test, with increasing financial pressure.

2.4 PROVISIONAL CONCLUSION : A LACK OF SUPPLY RELATIVE TO EUROPE'S NEEDS ?

It has been noted elsewhere that, compared to the United States, Europe's think tank community is insufficiently developed (Gadault, 2004). The contrast is particularly strong when one compares this community with the media and the lobbying industry specialised in European affairs (Féat, 2004). There are more accredited journalists in Brussels than in Washington and the interest group community in Brussels is at least as large as the number of civil servants working for the European Commission (Greenwood, 1997). Yet, if one pools together the total capacity of the think tanks surveyed here, we find an approximate total of researchers working more or less closely on European policy issues of nearly 3,000.¹⁰¹

Furthermore, it is important to stress again the fact that many organisations complement the activities of the think tanks listed: universities, networks of university research centres,¹⁰² public bodies, etc. Some are mentioned in the country reports above. Many others were not listed here, such as specialised agencies of the European Union, (e.g. the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions), to name just one example. These organisations also undertake significant policy research. All would deserve further analysis than this survey allowed in order to understand fully the contribution of think tanks to European policy-making in relation to fellow organisations. Think tanks networks, briefly presented in Annex 2, as well as academic research communities also offer some useful additions to the organisations described here.

On the other hand, the new European Union has a population since 1st May 2004 of over 450 million. Its institutions are responsible for drafting many of the laws which matter most today at the national level. Considering how much is at stake, do European think tanks do a sufficient amount of "thinking" which contributes to the E.U. decision-making process? And what measures can be taken to develop further their output? These are the two main questions which we will address in the following sections.

¹⁷ Not all the think tanks in these countries gave details of their annual budgets. However, a sufficient number did for us to be able to give an average figure.

¹⁸ a) Preparing a country for accession: European Institute of Cyprus; Institute for European Studies (Finland); EKEME (Greece); Center for European and Transition Studies (Latvia) b) Government initiative to improve the level of E.U. analysis: IWE-ICE (Austria); EKEM (Greece); SIEPS (Sweden) c) Forum for the analysis of a country's position within the EU: ELIAMEP (Greece); IEA (Ireland); European Documentation and Research Center (Malta) d) Examining specific area of E.U. policy (e.g. environmental or social policy): IPAE (Spain); IEEP (UK); OSE (Brussels) e) Enhancing quality of debate: Europe 2020 (France); Friends of Europe (Brussels) f) New platform for researchers and students to express their views on Europe: EUROPEUM (Czech Republic); g) Supporting European integration: IAI (Italy); Fondation Robert Schuman (France); Polish Robert Schuman Foundation; Federal Trust (UK); Notre Europe (France) h) Opposing further integration: Bruges Group (UK) i) Economic reform: Lisbon Council (Brussels) j) Interest from the corporate sector: EPC (Brussels).

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- ¹⁹ For example, ELIAMEP in Greece was established in 1988 to examine Greece's relationship with other states in the Mediterranean, Balkan and Black Sea regions and the Center for European and Transition Studies in Latvia was founded in 2000 "to respond to the challenges of E.U. enlargement."
- ²⁰ Now part of the Pan-European Institute.
- ²¹ Think tank numbers grew rapidly in these states, together with the number of other civil society organisations, often with support of foreign donors and foundations (e.g. the Polish Robert Schuman Foundation, 1991). It was natural for many of these new think tanks to orient themselves toward European questions because Europe was of central importance to their country's security and future economic prosperity. Also, as these countries applied to join the E.U. from the mid-1990s onwards, the need for analysis of E.U. policies—and how their country could adapt to them—grew even further.
- ²² France: Confrontations Europe (1991); Europartenaires (1994); Europe 2020 (1992); Fondation Robert Schuman (1991); Notre Europe (1996). Britain : EPF (1992) ; Centre for European Reform (1997) ; Foreign Policy Centre (1998). Germany: ZEI (1995); Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (1990)
- ²³ Brussels: Centre for New Europe (1993); EPC (1996); Friends of Europe (1999); Lisbon Council (2003); The Centre (2004).
- ²⁴ This is clearly not an exhaustive classification, but it reflects as accurately as possible the complex and diverse range of research areas covered by the think tanks surveyed (i.e. not individual research products). The list has been constructed using all the themes defined as core research areas by the single think tanks and subsequently by aggregating them in this simplified range of categories. The difference between single-issue and multi-issue organisations must be taken into account here : in the first case the identification of the topic is easier, whereas in the second it is sometimes necessary to select only a few core subjects within a scope which at first sight seems to cover the entire European political panorama.
- ²⁵ This definition of "Constitutional affairs", in which we have chosen to insert all references to community law studies and to the process of "European construction" or "deepening" of the Union, is very broad. There is indeed an obvious difference between classical Community law studies, which distinguish between these two categories and the think tanks analysed which do not make this distinction.
- ²⁶ We have created this category as certain think tanks refer to the role of their country or their national interests within the community system. With such a formula, we intend to summarise all references made by think tanks to measures taken in order to improve the position or the image of their respective country in the E.U. The Greek Centre of European Studies and Research (EKEME) for instance constantly monitors the Greek membership of the Union. The Spanish Real Instituto Elcano tries to identify and promote the Spanish position regarding major international issues; and several Central-Eastern European institutes concentrate on assisting their governments in overcoming difficulties related to the enlargement.
- ²⁷ With rare exceptions, such as the European Institute for Asian Studies in Brussels.
- ²⁸ Few organisations declared being involved with parliamentary scrutiny of legislation for instance.
- ²⁹ Germany: IEP, SWP, DGAP, Internationales Institut für Politik und Wissenschaft, Bertelsmann Stiftung, FES, Hans-Siedel Stiftung, DIW, IfW, IFO, HWWA, CAP, ZEI, MZES, ZEW (15) - UK: E.U. Policy Network, EPF, Federal Trust, CER, IEEP, ODI, FPC, Policy Network, RIIA, CEPR, Stockholm Network (11) - Italy: IAI, CeSPI, SIOI, ISPI, CENSIS (5) - Brussels : CEPS, EPC, ETUI, Friends of Europe, OSE, Lisbon Council, ISIS Europe, MEDEA, EU-Asia Institute (10).
- ³⁰ CEPS for instance takes pride in providing a meeting place where representatives from the Commission and the European Parliament can meet corporate members, NGO activists, and others to reflect in a neutral environment. Such CEPS 'taskforces' are meant to allow ideas to emerge from different fields of activity.
- ³¹ The popularity of such events is not surprising as this activity has the value of enabling a franker exchange of views between Governments and think tanks than the more formal and open setting of a seminar or conference and allow think tank researchers to conduct more in-depth discussions.
- ³² For example at the Danish Centre for International Studies and Human Rights in Copenhagen or at SIPRI's library in Solna, near Stockholm.
- ³³ A Commission official argues for instance about think tanks' research and debating activities: "Il y a toujours les mêmes, on tourne en rond. Il faut par exemple aller parler d'Europe dans les zones d'éducation prioritaire, pas pour faire gadget, mais pour écouter ce qu'ils ont à dire sur l'Europe." A U.K. grassroots activist agrees that EU-specific think tanks in Great Britain "are influential, but only within the 'Westminster village'."
- ³⁴ One exception was CEPR, which produced 500+ discussion papers per annum.
- ³⁵ Because of the nature of our study, it is difficult to assess the overall research value of these in-house journals.
- ³⁶ E.g. the IEEP in the U.K. provides this for the U.K. Environment Agency.

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- ³⁷ E.g. Centre for European and Transition Studies, Latvia.
- ³⁸ Examples of foundations were the Joseph Rowntree Trust in the U.K. and Ireland, and the Ford Foundation and the Open Society Foundation in Eastern Europe.
- ³⁹ These activities were particularly important for Italian think tanks.
- ⁴⁰ In the DIIS, for example, researchers with only Master's degrees are employed on temporary contracts lasting one to two years.
- ⁴¹ E.g. see details in table of Policy Network in UK, IAI in Italy and, in the country reports, Progressivt Centrum in Denmark.
- ⁴² Through various public events. It is also possible to detect a minority of think tanks aware of the influential role they can have for policy-makers; the Finland Pan European Institute claims that it generates information on new phenomena "for the use of decision-makers in government and business communities." Here also think tanks appear more policy-oriented.
- ⁴³ This is what would distinguish for example the IIRI (Institut Royal des Relations Internationales) in Belgium from its more academic peer, the GEPE (Groupe d'Etude des Politiques Européennes).
- ⁴⁴ The think tank directors interviewed in Sweden, for example, saw one of their roles as providing certain services to the public. This could include ensuring public access to their library, publishing part of their work for school and university students, educational courses, and the organising of meetings of local membership branches both across Sweden and abroad.
- ⁴⁵ A prominent Dutch institute agrees that a think tank "has to be innovative, to have new ideas and to find support for its action on them." Another, talking about two of the most influential tanks in Europe claims that "what we like about them is that they go on unexplored paths, they think about issues that are not on the agenda yet and therefore they influence policy-makers." Such views can be linked to the agenda of the first advocacy tanks in the United States, where "thinking the unthinkable" was a must after World War II.
- ⁴⁶ This networking aspect is much appreciated by an Irish journalist we interviewed, because it gave him access through the think tank to knowledge about the latest policy developments and also to people and organisations working in politics in different countries. He also believed that think tank events give politicians the chance to engage in debate with an informed audience in a way that is no longer possible in the media (for example, on television). This dialogue is important for democracy in his view. One of the IEA's directors believes that this type of facilitating and mediating role is becoming more important now for many European think tanks. For example, many of the Brussels think tanks, such as CEPS, also provide this service.
- ⁴⁷ Some insist on the need to be independent "of any organisation, movement or private or public institution" (the GRIP in Belgium), others that an organisation should be "in no way dependent on an exclusive public or private partner", that it should carry out all its research tasks "in a spirit of total academic freedom," (IRRI, Belgium), and finally others that think tanks should not have political party affiliations (e.g. the Polish Centre for International Relations). CEPS's website claims its "complete independence to set its own priorities and freedom from any outside influence."
- ⁴⁸ Many think tanks, such as ISIS Europe, mentioned to us that they were also in the process of diversifying their sources of funding.
- ⁴⁹ The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in Berlin, illustrates a dilemma which many other think tanks face. For the FES, independence "is sometimes a bit difficult because 95 per cent of our money comes from the government, but part of our deal is that we have to account for the funds we get but do not have to report on what we are going to do. We report only after the research has been completed."
- ⁵⁰ This view was expressed by the European Union Institute for Strategic Studies in Paris (EUISS), a European Agency totally financed through the E.U. budget. For several German think tanks, being affiliated to a university is also a safeguard against party influence. CESS, the Dutch Centre for European Security Studies similarly "stays away from corporate funding." On the other hand, others such as the Pan-European Institute in Finland seek to protect their independence by relying mostly on private funds, or argue that contract research better helps them manage their independence. The Centre for European Policy in Slovakia declares that it is "a highly independent and critical think tank," and therefore refuses money from the State (which it also admits the government would not want to give it anyway).
- ⁵¹ This is the case for instance for the Prague Institute of International Relations, or the Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik at the University of Hamburg
- ⁵² At the SWP in Berlin, all important decisions are taken by a two-thirds majority of the Board of Trustees, which specific role is to guarantee the SWP's independence. The members of the Board include leading scientists, economists and other public figures as well as representatives of various federal ministries and parties in the Bundestag. Those from the "political side" cannot numerically form a two-thirds majority of their own. At the MZES (Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung) at the University of Mannheim, the researchers submit proposals, which are evaluated by an external scientific advisory board. In the Scandinavian research

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- institutes there is often a board or council responsible for overseeing the work of the institute. Such a body is often composed of a mix of civil servants, academics, journalists and other public figures. Even if the government is present on these boards, the involvement of other actors here usually enables the institute to maintain an arms-length relationship with the former.
- ⁵³ The Institut Royal des Relations Internationales in Brussels tries to prevent external pressure by targeting its research work at a variety of audiences and by always providing sound practical recommendations "so that even those who may be against what we say can see the practical merits of our research." "Recruiting among the best researchers" is part of ELIAMEP's strategy in Greece.
- ⁵⁴ The EUISS sees itself as the only true E.U. think tank *thanks* to its official status. In the UK, "perceived closeness to government" is often clearly stated as an effective way of being influential and effective, not as a threat to the independence and credibility of an institute. The Hellenic Centre for European Studies indicated that independence vis-à-vis public authorities was "a matter of good relations. Nobody gives orders, the government asks questions, but does not influence the answer. The government has its priorities, but respects our independence regarding the results of our analysis."
- ⁵⁵ The European Trade Union Institute also collaborates with actors coming from the employers' side. For instance, it has worked on joint projects with the Hans Boeckler Foundation, which is a foundation supported by the Deutsche Gesellschafts Bund (the German Confederation of Industry)
- ⁵⁶ The Estonian Foreign Policy Institute described to us how it seeks to maintain a certain distance with the state which provides a significant share of its budget and commissions studies. The Belgian Institut Royal des Relations Internationales said that preserving independence is "complicated," others that their independence is "always fragile." For the Internationales Institut für Politik und Wirtschaft in Hamburg it is "an everyday struggle."
- ⁵⁷ CEPS (2003 Annual Report) describes an Online Survey it conducted on its homepage between July and December 2003. This survey revealed who visits its website (academia : 23 per cent; professional occupations : 19 per cent; national governments : 16 per cent; research : 15 per cent); their country of origin (the largest group is based in Belgium, followed by the U.K. and the USA); and principal areas of interest (future of Europe; economic policy; wider Europe; and security). "Publications are the most wanted item, followed by CEPS commentaries and analysis. An additional 13 per cent of CEPS website visitors are on their way to the CEPS online bookshop to purchase or download publications."
- ⁵⁸ Taken from the website of The Centre, which was not included in our list because it does not conduct in-house research.
- ⁵⁹ Organisations such as WWF Europe which are sometimes identified as "E.U. think tanks" confirmed to us that they do not regard their Brussels office as a think tank, but as a lobbying team that does some research and advice for the WWF network.
- ⁶⁰ There may be other branches of US think tanks in Europe, which were not included in our research.
- ⁶¹ These two institutes are not think tanks according to our criteria, in the sense that they do not have permanent in-house researchers and do not produce research themselves.
- ⁶² Another think tank, the Jaan Tonisson Institute, had initially been included in this survey, but it seems to have ceased all activity in early July 2004.
- ⁶³ For example, the Ministry for Social Security and Employment, the Supreme Council for the Liberation of Lithuania, the Soviet politburo which created the Academy of Sciences which the IEAS in Latvia is affiliated to, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Estonia.
- ⁶⁴ The Institute defines itself "perhaps partially" as a think tank. Luxembourg also hosts the Robert Schuman Centre (Centre d'Études et de Recherches Européennes Robert Schuman), which focuses mainly on the historical study of European integration. Although it conducts research and contributes to knowledge about Europe, it is therefore not policy-oriented and does not target policy-makers.
- ⁶⁵ Dutch think tanks are all foundations ('stichtingen'), but not in the traditional sense of organisations dedicated to managing and allocating an endowment fund. This status explains why Dutch think tanks do not have members, although they have different options for developing *de facto* membership.
- ⁶⁶ Clingendael is different from the French IFRI, the German DGAP, or the British RIIA in that it has a very substantial training programme. It even offers a Master's Programme in International Relations and Diplomacy. Although one of our nine criteria for a think tank is that it should not be a degree-granting organisation, we have nonetheless kept Clingendael and EIPA in our list, as excluding them from the Dutch think tank scene would clearly have been perceived as artificially strict.
- ⁶⁷ Created to stimulate cooperation between administrations and administrative training institutes across Member States, EIPA is supported by the E.U. administrations and the Commission. The institute carries out training and research on public administration and European policies, and provides a variety of services to the administrations of the Member States and the candidate countries as well as to the E.U. institutions in support

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of their tasks and responsibilities related to European integration. It defines itself primarily as "a European instrument for training public officials (...) 'to support the European Union and its Member States and the countries associated with EIPA by providing relevant and high quality services to develop the capacities of public officials in dealing with E.U. affairs."

⁶⁸ We have not included the ECF because its research work is not permanent, and it does not have an in-house research team. It does not appear therefore to be primarily a think tank.

⁶⁹ As the survey is focused on think tanks based in E.U. Member States, organisations not based in the Greek part of Cyprus were not included.

⁷⁰ The Danish Institute for Human Rights makes up the other half.

⁷¹ Libertas, a free market think tank, and CEPOS, a newly-formed think tank also on the right of the political spectrum, are the only two think tanks we found which have private sector funding.

⁷² Cf. Day, p.108, in McGann and Weaver, 2000. The Danish National Research Foundation funds the activities of 30 different research centres in the science and arts field. It currently has a budget of 250m DKK but the only centre that it funds which conducts European work is EPRU – and their work is just on one narrow area of E.U. policy, macroeconomics.

⁷³ COPRI was one of the institutes which fought hardest against the merger. It organised an international coalition of over 300 high-profile academics to oppose it.

⁷⁴ For instance, it publishes research on institutions and the formation of economic policy; international monetary economics and European economic integration; and international trade theory and policy. Now based at the Institute of Economics at Copenhagen University, EPRU is funded by a grant from the Danish National Research Foundation and two Danish government ministries.⁷⁴ It currently has a staff of 24. EPRU also co-operates with other foreign institutes in the field of international economics. Its partners include the National Bureau of Economic Research in the US, CEPR in London, CEPS in Brussels, and the *Institut für Höheren Studien* in Vienna. It also receives a large number of academics from abroad as visitors.

⁷⁵ The country's excellent rate of economic growth at the end of the 1990s (after the 1990-93 recession) testifies to the country's strong desire to join the E.U. Finland was in fact selected in May 1998 to join the Euro.

⁷⁶ Its research production however is highly regarded and its statute and decision-making structures protect its independence.

⁷⁷ More generally, think tanks are a recent phenomenon in France. They appeared timidly in the 1980s and a fairly large number was created in recent years: see *Le Journal du Management*, 2004.

⁷⁸ The Institute of International and Strategic Relations (www.iris-france.org), created in 1990 with the support of Pierre Joxe, then Minister of Defence, offers different degrees and training programs, but also has a research programme, which covers in part E.U. matters (e.g. 8 books out of the past 31 since 2000); The Institut Choiseul (www.choiseul.info/institut/index.php), besides general research and strategic consulting, "vise aussi à favoriser l'émergence d'une vision européenne des affaires mondiales dans l'espoir de voir l'Union mener une politique étrangère efficace et cohérente." This institute, created in 1999, already has a budget of half a million euros and a team of 6 permanent and 20 occasional researchers. Its research is focused on international relations and economic questions, and it publishes four journals, on geoeconomics, Latin America, North Africa and the Middle East, and China.

⁷⁹ Of these seven foundations, we have only retained the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and the Hanns Siedel Stiftung. The other four (the Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, Heinrich Boll Stiftung, Hans Boeckler Stiftung and Rosa Luxembourg Stiftung) either do not carry out research on Europe, or do not have an in-house research team (two of the most important criteria for our survey).

⁸⁰ In 1994, six major Greek research institutes joined the Cyprus Research Institute (KYKEM) and other Australian, Canadian and U.S. think tanks to create a coordinating committee of research institutes specialised in Hellenism.

⁸¹ Complementary organisations include the Lajos Batthyany Foundation, which research arm does some research on E.U. integration. The Regional Environmental Centre for Central and Eastern Europe, which works on behalf of Hungary and international institutional actors to "assist in solving environmental problems in Central and Eastern Europe." It is a "non-partisan, non-advocacy, non-profit international organisation legally based on a charter signed by the governments of 28 countries and the European Commission, and on an international agreement with the government of Hungary." The Hungarian Institute of International Affairs no longer seems to be in existence. Its website (a basic criterion for our survey) was not in operation at the time of this study. For similar reasons, the Institute for Strategic and Defense Studies was not included, although it is known for having conducted research on the European security environment.

⁸² Although it maintains a large number of projects on European issues: 20

⁸³ IEA has a branch in Brussels comprised of Irish officials working in the E.U.'s institutions. The branch holds regular events in order to keep these officials informed on broader Irish policy towards the E.U.

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- ⁸⁴ This goes up to six if we include the Economic and Social Council
- ⁸⁵ In fact, we came across the Centro Europa Ricerche (CER), which however does not appear to have a website and seems to have had very few initiatives.
- ⁸⁶ See www.italianieuropei.it, www.liberalfondazione.it, www.limesonline.it for further information. Policy clubs are considered "fora of discussion among like-minded politicians and intellectuals more than organisations producing research on a regular basis". (Lucarelli, Radaelli, 2003)
- ⁸⁷ The purpose of this grant is to establish a transnational research group to study the integration process and the future prospects for the Mediterranean region within the enlarged Union. The project runs for two years, from 2002 to 2004.
- ⁸⁸ Perhaps this absence reflects the controversy which divided the population and the Government on the question of Malta's entry to the E.U. (those opposing entry gained 47.6 per cent of votes, and 31 seats in Parliament; compared to 51.7 per cent and 34 seats for the pro-European party).
- ⁸⁹ A recent law allows citizens to donate 1 per cent of their personal income tax to non-profit, non-governmental organisations, but few people are aware of this possibility.
- ⁹⁰ See www.osw.waw.pl; www.omp.org.pl/indexang.html; and <http://iss.krakow.pl> for further information.
- ⁹¹ Three borderline cases in Sweden were the Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI) (which has published work recently on topics such as E.U. foreign direct investment flows but which does not appear to have a large number of publications or indeed a distinct programme on the EU), the Stockholm Environment Institute (whose research is not EU-focused), and the Bertil Ohlin Institute (a small Liberal Party think tank which does occasionally look at European questions but does not seem to publish regularly enough on the E.U. to be included).
- ⁹² Day (2001) refers to these institutes as 'establishment' think tanks because of their longevity and close ties to the state.
- ⁹³ On average, 15-20 quotations per month.
- ⁹⁴ Other borderline cases in our study were: the Centre for Local Economic Strategies and the Institute of Welsh Affairs (both had looked in the past at E.U. regional fund spending); the Labour Research Department (which provides information services to U.K. trade unions, including on E.U. legislation, but which does not appear to be currently conducting policy research on Europe); and the Eurosceptic, pseudo-think tanks, the Bruges Group and New Frontiers Foundation.
- ⁹⁵ CER was founded by a group which included influential Labour Party advisors, such as David Miliband, David Clark and Wendy Alexander (Miliband later became an MP and government minister and Alexander an MSP and Scottish minister). FPC was launched under the patronage of Tony Blair in 1998.
- ⁹⁶ In the past the media has preferred the views of other, more 'objective' think tanks, such as the National Institute for Economic and Social Research (NIESR), when reporting on European debates, for example in the one that took place on the euro.
- ⁹⁷ Other groups label themselves think tanks, such as the Bruges Group and New Frontiers Foundation, but because they are essentially lobbying organisations with no in-house research capacity, they are not included in our list of Euro-think tanks.
- ⁹⁸ Think tanks with a charitable status in the U.K. are however not allowed to engage directly in political campaigning.
- ⁹⁹ "Perhaps the strongest impetus was the exodus of often underpaid researchers from academia. (...) Opposition groups such as the Solidarity movement in Poland also provided fertile ground for the growth of new institutions such as the Gdansk Institute for Market Economics, arguably that country's premier think tank. As in other countries, another strong motivation behind the formation of think tanks has been the departure of frustrated or replaced officials (...). Despite the strength of their convictions, most of Central Europe's think tanks could not have been established without substantial foreign assistance from grant-making institutions such as CIPE, the Pew Charitable trusts, and the MacArthur Foundation in the United States, the German party foundations, and the British Know How Fund," (Johnson, 1996), to which one should add the Open Society Institute, which has massively funded think tanks and brought together research institutes in the region.
- ¹⁰⁰ E.g. Bertelsmann Foundation, Ford Foundation, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Soros-Open Society Foundation; German Marshall Fund of the US; Robert Schuman Foundation.
- ¹⁰¹ These figures can be compared with, for instance, the 16 researchers at the Center for the United States and Europe of the Brookings Institution, the 6 researchers on Europe of the Cato Institute's foreign policy programme, the Council on Foreign Relations' 5 experts on Europe, or the RAND Corporation's 56 researchers based in Europe.
- ¹⁰² To mention just one example, the University Association for Contemporary European Studies "bringing together academics involved in researching Europe with practitioners active in European affairs." www.uaces.org