

THE EU AND ITS NEIGHBOURHOOD: HOW TO STABILISE THE RING OF FIRE?

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The increasing instability in the European Union's neighbourhood is a major concern for both national governments and European political leaders. The collapse of several countries in the Mediterranean region, refugee flows, the development of terrorist networks which threaten Europeans with deadly attacks, frozen conflicts in the Eastern neighbourhood and challenging relations with Russia have a profound impact on the entire EU. Understanding the turmoil in neighbouring states requires us to make full use of a range of areas of expertise, in order to see the bigger picture regarding current challenges. For this purpose, the Jacques Delors Institute brought together researchers, practitioners and political leaders from different backgrounds to debate the resources required to stabilise the EU's neighbouring states during the 7th European Think Tanks Forum. Dedicated to the EU and its neighbourhood, this forum was held in Valletta, on 27 and 28 February 2017, with the support of the Maltese Presidency of the EU Council (programme in the appendix). This summary provides the main points of this group discussion, opened with keynote speeches by Enrico Letta, President of the Jacques Delors Institute, and Joseph Muscat, Prime Minister of Malta, and subsequently conducted under the Chatham House Rule.



The European Union cannot engage more actively in the stabilisation of its neighbourhood without tackling in advance its own internal dysfunctions.

A lack of implementation of decisions

The European response to crises requires improved monitoring. In managing the financial crisis, Heads of State and the representatives of the EU institutions announced successive rescue and investment plans, without any satisfactory implementation of the adopted measures. Public opinion and the financial markets were expecting concrete actions, and yet

the lack of implementation delayed economic recovery. The idea of appointing a commissioner tasked with monitoring decisions made by the European Council stems from this.

The same issue arose for the management of migration challenges, which were particularly significant for Malta, located in the middle of the Mediterranean. The bold decision to create European border and coast guards has only resulted in a slow and patchy implementation since September 2016, while public opinion was strongly calling for border controls.

More political leadership as a response to the rise in populism

To overcome the current crises, strong leadership must be in place across EU Member States, with national leaders willing to become European leaders rather than championing the stigmatisation of “Brussels”.

The 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, celebrated in March 2017, should be seen less as a mere commemoration and more as a turning point in the EU’s history, characterised by a highly politicised European agenda and a stabilisation of the EU’s neighbourhood. The internal dynamics of EU Member States make this a delicate task as the forces which politicise European issues are mostly hostile to the EU. These populist groups attack Europe and all forms of supranational integration, calling for a strengthening of national sovereignty and for border control to revert to Member States. Being part of the EU does not entail abandoning sovereignty, but rather attempting to recover it, at a time when various challenges and the backdrop of globalisation mean that it is no longer possible for a country to act alone. This politicisation, which currently focuses on challenges such as migration, security and defence, is therefore an opportunity that must be seized in order to anticipate the major changes taking place worldwide and to demonstrate Europe’s added value for our fellow citizens.

A proper understanding of European solidarity

In recent years, Europeans have failed to use the opportunity to emphasise the EU’s two fundamental values on which their collective sovereignty is based: solidarity and responsibility. With solidarity, it is not possible to pick and choose. It must work both ways. It cannot be requested when needed if one is not willing to help when others request assistance. While it is one of the EU Member States with the highest exposure of the migration crisis over the last decade, Malta has taken the decision to welcome asylum seekers from Greece and Italy. While some countries asked Germany to show its solidarity following the 2008 economic crisis, it lacked solidarity in return when Berlin asked its partners to take action due to the emergency hosting of one million refugees in the country. Given the major impact of this issue on the EU’s future, a spirit of cooperation must be developed between Member States and with their third country neighbours. This dialogue with the neighbourhood must be open and inclusive, in particular with North African and Eastern Mediterranean countries.

Protecting without protectionism

Today, Europe must choose between protection and protectionism in fields ranging from the economy, to security and social policy. When people asked to be protected from the excesses of an open trade system, the only solutions proposed are for tariff barriers and walls to keep foreigners out. Citizens need as well to feel safe where they live, and yet their request for protection has only been met so far with a protectionist response. The legitimate demand for protection must be met so that extremists do not become the only ones to provide a response.

A differentiated Europe

It is essential that when Europe speaks, a single voice is heard. Yet seeking unity at any cost cannot be the only roadmap. With regard to migration issues, we cannot look for unity on external aspects without aiming for convergence on internal management questions. If the only way of staying united is to take no action, it is then preferable to be a little less united and to take action, without being taken hostage by the lowest common denominator. The EU’s current composition obliges it to move forward with differentiated integration on subjects such as defence or the social pillar in order to achieve greater results.

There are many neighbourhood challenges, which vary greatly between the Eastern and Mediterranean neighbourhood and between countries and sectors. Three focuses for discussion were proposed to the participants of this European Think Tanks Forum to analyse how the EU can contribute more effectively to the stabilisation of its neighbourhood: the reform of security systems and institutions, economic cooperation and migration issues.

1. The consolidation of the rule of law and the reform of security systems: two preconditions for neighbourhood stabilisation

How should the new priorities of European commitment to the Mediterranean and Eastern neighbourhoods be viewed since the revision of the Neighbourhood Policy in 2015?

1.1. Between rupture and continuity

This revision marks two departures from the previous approach:

- Europeans are more cautious in the definition of normative objectives and are more likely to commit to pragmatic initiatives. The European Union is no longer presented as a reforming power which can exert a strong influence on its neighbours. While the challenges are not the

same in the South and the East, Europeans are aware of the limits of their actions.

- There is debate as to the extent of neighbourhood to be taken into consideration, which varies according to Member States' national interests. Whether it is a broad area or a more limited strategic area, sub-regions and interconnections within the neighbourhood must be considered (North Africa and Sahel, Levant and Gulf region, Caucasus, etc.) and less Eurocentric policies adopted.

In addition, several principles, while not new, are gaining importance:

- **Stabilisation versus democratisation.** Stabilisation has become the key priority of the EU's Neighbourhood Policy, to the detriment of democratisation.
- **Differentiation.** In addition to a distinction between the issues concerning the Southern and Eastern neighbourhoods, emphasis is placed on differentiation per country and ad hoc political action in line with the local situation.
- **Ownership.** Ownership of the policies set up is a challenge not only for third countries but for EU Member States.
- **Interests versus values.** The new Neighbourhood Policy focuses on defending the EU's interests, but leaves unanswered the question of the extent to which the EU's interests and values can be reconciled.

Out of the great powers, the EU enjoys a unique position with regard to partners in the region, that of a "non-threatening" stakeholder. This enables the EU to develop relationships based on trust which are more likely to foster cooperation. The downside is that its neighbours are not always convinced by the EU's contribution to security. The absence of "uniformed Europeans" visibly cooperating with local army soldiers makes it more difficult to see the European mantra in action: "No development without security, no security without development".

While Europeans are renowned for their investments and expertise in good governance and social programmes, it is not always easy to prove to partners how these policies provide security. European influence in the neighbourhood is on the decline, a fact that has less to do with Russia or a US withdrawal and more to do with the EU's struggle to assert itself. Furthermore, how the negative impact of Brexit, the rising tensions in transatlantic relations and the

internal developments in some Member States affect the EU's credibility as a firm and serious partner should not be underestimated.

1.2. A critical review of the Neighbourhood Policy

The 2015 revision of the European Neighbourhood Policy also highlighted a lack of expertise within EU institutions, an excessively technocratic approach, a lack of attention paid to local requirements and the need to show citizens in neighbouring countries the advantages of the reforms being encouraged.

Previous European programmes were insufficiently adapted to each country's specific needs. There should be an improved assessment of the local situation to calibrate European intervention. The local citizens do not take sufficient ownership of these reforms and European leaders lack the commitment to ensure their application.

There is also a lack of coherence between EU Member States and European institutions. Mapping the EU's activities and those of Member States would provide a clear view of what each stakeholder is doing. The creation of a taskforce focusing on the Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Brussels would provide improved supervision of these activities, better coordination and would favour a firm long-term commitment which would strengthen the EU's credibility. This would contribute to a greater degree of European accountability with regard to commitments and a common understanding of security which would act as a bridge between internal and external affairs in compliance with the rule of law and the protection of human rights as the starting point for sustainable security.

1.3. The lack of emphasis on the legal system reform

Europeans have neglected the reform of their neighbours' legal systems. Human rights protection contributes directly to improved security. Judges, who are generally relatively isolated from the outside world, have often been conservative forces and an obstacle to democratic transition. Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) which require regulatory convergence must be used to highlight this modernisation of legal systems.

1.4. Underestimated transnational criminal networks

The link between internal and external security is now well established. However, action taken to reduce illegal immigration and to stabilise the neighbourhood does not consider the issue of transnational criminal networks which are increasingly connected to counter-terrorism, human trafficking and

smuggling network issues. The reduction of migratory flows towards Europe is not in itself a vehicle for neighbourhood stabilisation.

1.5. Neglected democratisation?

The priority given to stabilisation over democratisation also has its shortcomings. In West Africa, particularly in the coastal regions, dynamics similar to the “Arab Spring” are in play: an increasingly young population with genuine democratic aspirations. The EU must not overlook that there is a sincere demand for more democracy in these countries – or at least a higher demand than that which is currently proposed to citizens there. Making democratisation secondary to stabilisation could therefore prove counterproductive. Stabilisation is often considered a response to a crisis, when the technical measures put into place on a temporary basis should be followed up with more in-depth reforms in order to achieve long-term objectives.

1.6. States in conflict, authoritarian states and reforming states: finding an appropriate response

With a view to an ad hoc neighbourhood policy, it is also important that a clear typology of partners and situations is established. States can be placed into one of three groups: states in conflict, authoritarian states and reforming states.

The EU’s approach to stabilising states in conflict often involves favouring the broadest and most inclusive national unity agreement, based on a principle of sharing power, mediation and a unity agreement. This was the aim during the three major open conflicts in the EU’s neighbourhood: Libya, Syria and Ukraine. However, this approach tends to show results in the very short term, but is often doomed to failure over time. These agreements entail the inclusion of the elites of the factions in conflict, without providing for grassroots participation : a horizontal inclusion, without any vertical inclusion.

Authoritarian states, of which there are many in the EU’s immediate vicinity, are partners with whom it is difficult to conduct governance reforms and strengthen the rule of law. In this case, the EU encourages and supports a greater participation from civil society. In Turkey, the EU has chosen to reallocate some funds intended for government institutions to civil society stakeholders. In Azerbaijan and Egypt, it continues to work on governance issues within government institutions without the country’s resilience or stabilisation appearing to be strengthened.

Civil society organisations which receive foreign funds are often targeted in campaigns to discredit them. While it is necessary to find other models than

the intergovernmental reform funding model, the pressure placed on non-governmental bodies and the risks they take in accepting European funding should not be underestimated.

In reforming states such as Tunisia, Georgia and Moldova, the impact of reforms and progress are at their greatest level. This is mostly due to the common desire to implement reforms and the mutual ownership of the reform roadmap. However, the EU must still ensure that their non-application or political changeovers do not become factors of destabilisation. It should be kept in mind that the EU’s internal affairs have an impact on our credibility as a champion of the rule of law when some European Member States do not comply with this rule themselves.

1.7. The intervention of other powers

While the EU strives to promote the rule of law in its neighbourhood, other players on the periphery, such as Russia and Turkey, are favouring an agenda based on security. Founded to end confrontations and the warlike approach to geopolitics, the EU is dealing with the return of regional players who do not share the European soft power approach, based on the opening up of markets and the support of civil society. Some conflicts even involve increasing competition between regional powers, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia who clash in Syria. Russia is also more strongly involved in regions exceeding its traditional sphere of influence. It has even become a key player in the Syrian conflict. Europe and the West are no longer the only players in this highly unstable region. Diplomatic initiatives, even under UN mandate, are increasingly contested.

Though more discreet, China is also present. With 60% of its oil coming from the Gulf, China has very strong interests in the region and the tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia can only be detrimental to China. It is also more involved in Africa, taking part in peacekeeping missions in the Sahel or in South Sudan, the construction of a naval base in Djibouti and the construction of the new Suez Canal. China is a player which remains very much focused on status quo and stability, without the EU’s normative connotation. Faced with the resurgence of tensions between regional powers, the EU should start to consider China as a potential partner more seriously.

The security and migration issues which dominate public debate on the EU’s neighbourhood must not overshadow other issues in North-South dialogue, first and foremost the economic and financial problems hitting the South Mediterranean.



2. Investing in the EU's neighbourhood: economic cooperation incentives

EU efforts to stabilise the region will be compromised if economic and financial cooperation does not become a key focus of debate. Boosting institutions in troubled Southern Mediterranean countries will not be enough to bring stability to the region. Basic requirements of housing, food and work must be satisfied, failing which tensions will escalate and result in conflicts.

The regionalisation of globalisation comes together with a shortening of value chains. During the latest globalisation phase, European companies looked to far-away countries such as Vietnam or Brazil for production sites. The change in production conditions in these countries and the 2008 economic crisis have, however, resulted in a contraction of these value chains: companies no longer wish to produce in distant countries due to costs, exchange rate instability and sometimes quality concerns, and prefer to concentrate their value chains within a region.

Coproduction is therefore being developed with the EU's southern neighbours. The focus is more on production in these countries rather than on exporting to them. With the development of the middle classes, North African countries wish to replace imports with domestic production. DCFTAs have been set up as part of this drive, which fosters trade and coproduction with the EU's neighbours.

2.1. The advantages and disadvantages of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements

These agreements aim to implement the EU acquis in the countries concerned and to gradually open up trade of goods and services. Some arrangements are temporary, allowing the signatory countries to adopt EU regulation over a ten-year period and to gradually remove customs duties. The EU does however retain tariff quotas set by the European Commission for the imports of certain products from signatory countries. In excess of these quotas, the usual customs duties apply. It is a step in the opening of trade, but it is not free trade.

DCFTAs are limited by the lack of prospects of EU membership, which was the most effective means of initiating reforms and ensuring their sustainability, and the fact that the financial assistance received is much less than that received by candidate countries for EU membership.

In addition, the advantages of DCFTAs are observed in the mid- and long-term, and are highly dependent on the implementation of these agreements. They have not been in place for a sufficient amount of time for their actual impact on trade and economic restructuring to be assessed in signatory countries. It is possible, however, to analyse these countries' trade specialisation and to assess their potential, in particular for countries in the Eastern neighbourhood.

Limited foreign direct investment

As regards foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology and knowledge transfers, levels are much lower in the Southern neighbourhood than in the new EU Member States. Private sector investment rates in the Middle East and North Africa region are limited to 15% of GDP when they are normally around 30% of GDP in developing countries (particularly in Eastern countries). In 2017, these levels only account for 50% of their 2008 level. They represent less than 1% of GDP, against a general figure of 2.5% of GDP in emerging countries, partly due to the crisis and partly owing to the loss of competitiveness in these countries.

In addition to the volume of these flows, the type of FDI must also be considered. In Ukraine, FDI often represents the recycling of Ukrainian capital flight and does not really contribute to modernising the country's economic fabric.

In theory, trade is considered to be a vehicle for peace between two countries through common interests which reduce the possibility of tensions and make conflicts a costly endeavour. Yet it remains to be seen whether the DCFTAs will improve the situation, confirm the status quo or stir up tensions in the three countries of the Eastern partnership (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia), where 15% of the population is affected by frozen conflicts.

To the South, countries can be placed into two groups: those who have never attempted to become part of the global market (such as Algeria, which is not a member of the WTO and for which oil and gas account for 99% of exports. The country imports 90% of what it consumes, including its foodstuffs), and those who have entered into a free trade agreement with the EU. For these countries, the agreements signed in the 1990s resulted in fifteen years of free trade for manufactured goods and an increasing share for agricultural products. The export capacity of countries in the region is, however, limited as the large volume of water required to produce agricultural goods cannot be met by the region's water reserves.

Population growth

Population growth is another key factor for the Southern neighbourhood. Egypt's population increases by 2.4 to 2.8% each year, i.e. roughly 2 million new Egyptians per year. This trend is the same across the region, including in Tunisia.

In addition, per capita income continues to stagnate or even decrease. In the immediate future, low investment resulting in less job creation and technology transfer, combined with high population

increase make an inclusive economic growth more challenging to achieve.

Yet, the birth rates in various countries are decreasing. This major demographic transition will come to an end in the next 30 years. While today, there are more people of working age than there are children and the elderly, this demographic window of one generation must be used to restore prosperity before this working population becomes elderly. Otherwise the situation will become increasingly more difficult to manage.

2.2. Uncertain convergence

After 1973 and the oil crisis, the European Commission negotiated cooperation agreements with all Southern Mediterranean countries with the exception of Libya. The markets gradually opened to European light industry (pharmaceutical and textile industries). These agreements were not imposed by the EU and require an endorsement of the strategy by partner countries, while that has sometimes caused indifference or concerns that the EU enjoys greater benefits from the strategy.

Until 2015, Morocco sought regulatory convergence with the EU. The country wished to follow in the footsteps of Eastern countries and to become a Norway in the South – a member of the European Economic Area. Yet since the ruling of the EU Court of Justice on the food and agriculture agreement, and particularly its opinion on Western Sahara, relations with Morocco have cooled and the country has turned to other African nations for partnerships. It has renewed its membership of the African Union and it is uncertain whether trade integration and regulatory convergence with the EU are still on the agenda or whether alternatives have become more prominent.

Similarly, Algeria has expressed the desire to diversify its economy, without any significant steps to implement this. The legal framework of ownership discourages foreign investment, in particular in SMEs which could play a key role in modernising and diversifying the Algerian economy. In Egypt, the role of the army in the economy limits investment. In Tunisia, the market is even more closed than it was prior to the revolution. These countries are also suffering from the fact that they remain small markets, particularly in terms of purchasing power.

There is unquestionably a lack of ownership of association agreements in Southern Mediterranean countries while, conversely, the stalled negotiations on the association agreement with Ukraine resulted in the Euromaidan riots to call for a signature of the agreement.

DCFTAs must be considered as an admission ticket for the global market. When a neighbouring country has stronger trade ties with the EU than those of France or Germany with other Member States, either it is attempting – like Norway or Switzerland – to ensure greater penetration of the single market, or it is diversifying with other countries in the world (with China, Brazil or in Africa, etc.). Today, Tunisia is the neighbouring country that is the most integrated in the global market, although 60 to 70% of its trade is conducted with the European market. To the East, the EU also remains the leading trade partner of its neighbours. This is also the case with Israel (ahead of the USA), but the market shares are around 35 to 40%.

2.3. Towards a vertical organisation of production for Europe- Mediterranean- Africa?

For the EU, one card to play would be an industrialisation of North Africa, from Egypt to Mauritania, developing in particular heavy industry in the chemical sector and the engineering industry. Large European groups are currently opening sites in North Africa and could subsequently create sites in sub-Saharan Africa. This Europe- Mediterranean-Africa vertical organisation could be seen as a means of countering Chinese competitiveness.

2.4. The inertia of economic development in the Mediterranean neighbourhood

Most companies in the Middle East and North Africa region do not struggle to access financing, not because there is abundant financing, but rather owing to their reluctance to take out loans. They fear growing to a size which would require them to give up a family-run ethic and would be obliged to keep more transparent accounts. Strengthening the rule of law and combatting corruption would boost companies' trust in financing systems.

In addition, horizontal trade between countries in the region only accounts for 5% of total exchanges in these countries. In absolute terms, this figure is on the rise, but in relative terms, it is stagnating. Twelve years on from the EU's promotion of the Agadir Agreement (free trade agreement between MENA and the EU, including North-South cooperation and also South-South cooperation), the agreement has not yet been implemented.

3. Migration challenges and the prospect of a mobility partnership

Before being perceived as a risk, migration is first and foremost a flow of people. It concerns around 3% of

the world's population. In the EU, it is estimated that two thirds of the 57 million immigrant people within its Member States are citizens from countries outside the EU. There are 2 million new legal migrants per year, mainly due to family reunification. Some 200,000 people enter the EU illegally, accounting for only 10% of those entering. In general terms, illegal migrants enter the EU legally, with a Schengen visa, and they stay once the visa has expired. The Mediterranean route remains an exception. Yet the massive influx in 2015 of people from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan drew attention and weakened European cohesion.

3.1. A security-oriented approach to migration

Consensus on migration issues is so limited within the EU that is restricted to the fight against illegal immigration, without a real European border control policy or understanding of the deep-rooted causes of immigration. Europe experienced the same debates during the Yugoslavia crisis.

Today, host countries wish to project an image of controlling their borders to thwart anti-European xenophobic movements which seize the opportunity to exploit the situation and make it a toxic issue. The outlook shaped in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), which created a link between terrorism, drugs, asylum and immigration, still dominates debate. Entrusting the management of the migration issue to ministries of the interior and the Commission's DG Migration and Home Affairs also creates a link between migration and security issues from the outset. This is why we have a security-oriented approach to migration.

3.2. Towards a tripartite management of migration?

The EU's main objective remains stemming the flow, based on a tripartite management of migration by EU Member States, third countries and European institutions. Some EU Member States, such as Spain, have already entered into bilateral cooperation agreements with the country of origin and transit countries (particularly with Mauritania, Senegal and Morocco) in order to implement readmission agreements. Spain has even posted its military police (Guardia Civil) at the borders to deal with the security aspects of migration. With a 20% unemployment rate due to the economic crisis, the Spanish government considered that legal immigration is not a priority. To combat illegal immigration, Madrid has made Morocco the main guard of the border of Spain and the Schengen Area.

The reduction of migratory flows achieved through these unofficial memoranda of understanding based on personal relations should be studied in depth to



assess whether they could be used as models for the EU. However, while Spain is now Morocco's main partner for trade and security and the leading champion of Moroccan interests with regard to the EU, these relations remain fragile and any incident may result in renewed attempts to cross the border. The success of this bilateral cooperation is relative.

In addition, the economic situation in transit countries means that it is not always possible to stabilise these migrants, who come from further away, in their territory. Partner countries such as Morocco also have a history as a former country of emigration which has become a country of immigration and transit. These countries are not the original country of departure and are facing the same migration-related challenges within their societies as European nations. An improved management of these migrations therefore requires a better understanding of the situation as experienced by the EU's neighbours.

3.3. Searching for a migration management policy

Under any circumstances, we cannot stand by a security policy and/or a development policy to achieve a migration management policy. Security issues only account for a very small proportion of the challenges raised by migration. In addition, job creation changes migration flows, but a more in-depth analysis demonstrates that developing countries also produce their own migration models by providing the necessary resources and information to some people in order to create their own migration project.

As stated earlier, the pressure of population growth is not set to fall over the coming decades. Economic growth in the sub-Saharan region will remain well below its population growth. Europe is very familiar with this situation. It has managed its population growth for centuries, in particular via colonisation and emigration to America at the end of the 19th and start of the 20th century, taking advantage of the twofold effect of the prosperity achieved: for the person who emigrated and for their family remaining in the country of origin via financial transfers. It takes forty to fifty years to reverse a country's migratory flows, as is demonstrated by the Ivory Coast which has good economic growth, but which is still one of the African countries that send the highest number of migrants to Europe: the quickest path to personal prosperity and development remains immigration.

These developments must be anticipated more actively, with real consideration given to a mobility partnership. The implementation of work visas could be explored, on the condition that there is greater monitoring of returns to the country of origin upon expiry of the visas in order to prevent a brain drain of African nations.

Mobility can act as a driver for upward social mobility, but this requires virtuous mobility cycles bringing together all partners. Return and readmission agreements are paltry and insufficient: the readmission procedure is highly bureaucratic and statistics show that readmission remains limited.

Migration management is a transnational challenge which requires the deep-rooted causes of immigration to be tackled. Border control is an insufficient solution. The challenge also entails successfully implementing a mobility policy which is productive for migrants' countries of origin and acceptable for European societies.

3.4. Acceptance from European societies

The perception of migration by European host societies is fundamental. Some, such as Viktor Orban in Hungary, do not make any distinction between refugees and migrants; although out of the total number of migrants arriving in the EU today, it is mainly the 25% of migrants from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq who could apply for asylum, while the remaining 75% come from Africa. When Angela Merkel unilaterally accepted the opening of Germany's borders to a massive influx of refugees, the lack of solidarity expressed by other European nations was striking; and this situation could not be managed on the basis of the Geneva Conventions, drafted against a backdrop of colonialism and out of touch with the current situation.

While the hosting of people who are persecuted is conventionally promoted in Europe, the current organisation of immigration is coming up against Europeans' national narratives. Political leaders cannot, however, conform and follow public opinion. Their role in the

construction of a new narrative is key if migrants are not to be made into easy scapegoats.

Achieving a gradual stabilisation of the EU's entire neighbourhood requires Europeans to focus their strategic considerations on the coordination of short-term initiatives, the identification of suitable partners and the guarantee of a sufficient level of commitment from both European and local stakeholders. Furthermore the lines of approach which have emerged from the debates of this Forum have demonstrated the extent to which the stabilisation of the EU's neighbourhood requires a continued spirit of cooperation between Europeans and their neighbours, going beyond any defensive approach. The pressure that migration is putting on transit countries, which border onto the EU, is an additional factor of destabilisation. It calls for broader European commitment further away from those close neighbours, in the main countries of origin of migratory flows, in order to develop both a better understanding of the reasons for departure and appropriate measures which promote the stabilisation of these populations.

ANNEX : “THE EU’S NEIGHBOURHOOD: HOW TO STABILISE THE RING OF FIRE?”

PROGRAMME DU 7^E FORUM DES THINK-TANK

Monday 27 February – Tuesday 28 February 2017, The National Museum of Archaeology - Auberge de Provence, Republic Street - Valletta

Monday 27 February 2017

3 pm > 3.10 pm – Introduction

- **Yves BERTONCINI**, Director of the Jacques Delors Institute
- **Ian BORG**, Parliamentary Secretary for the EU Presidency 2017

3.10 pm > 4 pm – Keynote speeches

- **Enrico LETTA**, President of the Jacques Delors Institute
- **Joseph MUSCAT**, Prime Minister of Malta

Discussion with the participants

4 pm > 6.30 pm – First session – Rule of law, institutional consolidation and security sector reform as preconditions for stabilisation

What support can Europeans bring in terms of good governance practices and the development of security and defence capabilities? How can they pave the way for Human rights promotion? What kind of cooperation is needed between the EU and other major powers in the EU’s neighbourhood?

- **Giovanni GREVI**, Senior Fellow, European Policy Centre
- **James MORAN**, Ambassador, MENA Principal Advisor, European External Action Service
- **Judith VORRATH**, Research Fellow, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
- **Richard YOUNGS**, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Europe

Moderator: **Claire SPENCER**, Senior Research Fellow, Chatham House

Tuesday 28 February 2017

9.30 am > 12 am – Second session – Investing in the EU’s neighbourhood: Incentives for economic cooperation

How can youth employment and local entrepreneurship be sustained to promote economic growth? Are we realising the full potential of DCFTAs? How can Europeans contribute to increasing the attractiveness of the neighbourhood for foreign investors?

- **Jean-Louis GUIGOU**, President, Ipemed
- **Peter HAVLIK**, Senior Economist, The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
- **Michael KÖHLER**, Director Neighbourhood South, DG NEAR,

European Commission

- **Guillaume Van der LOO**, Researcher, CEPS

Moderator: **Jean-Pierre CHAUFFOUR**, Lead Country Economist for Morocco and MENA Regional Trade Coordinator, The World Bank
2 pm > 4.30 pm – Third session – Addressing the migration challenges and prospect for a mobility partnership

The current migratory “crisis” has reinforced the trend to address the external dimension of the migration phenomenon through a security angle. However, cooperation with third countries cannot be limited to this sole topic and should embed legal migration issues in the framework of so-called “mobility partnerships”. What should such partnerships comprise as policy initiatives to contribute addressing the migration challenges? Can new mobility initiatives like the creation of a jobseekers’ visa be the new landmark for cooperation?

- **Carmen GONZALEZ ENRIQUEZ**, Senior Analyst, Real Instituto Elcano
- **Rainer MUNZ**, Adviser on Migration and Demography, EPSC
- **Roderick PACE**, Professor, Institute for European Studies, University of Malta
- **Anna TERRÓN CUSÍ**, President of Instrategies and Chair of the Advisory Board of the Institute on Globalisation, Culture and Mobility, United Nations University

Moderator: **Yves PASCOU**, Associate Research Fellow, JDI

1.30 pm > 4.45 pm – Conclusions

- **Elvire Fabry**, Senior Research Fellow, JDI
- **Radosław SIKORSKI**, Senior Fellow, Center for European Studies, Harvard



MALTA EU 2017

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WHAT POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTIONS FOR THE EU AND THE EMU?

Martina Menghi, Synthesis, Jacques Delors Institute, October 2014

EUROPEAN INFLUENCE: THE NEED FOR A PARADIGM SHIFT

Elvire Fabry, Synthesis, Jacques Delors Institute, October 2012

EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY : WHERE DO WE STAND? SHOULD WE FOSTER IT AND HOW?

Elvire Fabry, Synthesis, Jacques Delors Institute, June 2011

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Cyrille Bret and Florent Parmentier, Policy Paper No.170, Jacques Delors Institute, July 2016

TAKING THE ENP BEYOND THE CONCEPTION-PERFORMANCE GAP

Nicole Koenig, Policy Paper No.160, Jacques Delors Institute - Berlin, March 2016

SUPPORTING UKRAINE'S DIFFICULT PATH TOWARDS REFORMS

Jan Jakub Chromiec and Nicole Koenig, Policy Paper No.143, Jacques Delors Institute - Berlin, October 2015

NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY: MORE OR NO MORE?

Eneko Landaburu, Tribune, Jacques Delors Institute, May 2015

THE EU'S NEIGHBOURHOOD AS AN OPPORTUNITY?

Elvire Fabry and Chiara Rosselli, Synthesis, Jacques Delors Institute, November 2012

TRADE POLICY IN THE EU'S NEIGHBOURHOOD: WAYS FORWARD FOR THE DEEP AND COMPREHENSIVE FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS

Iana Dreyer and Eneko Landaburu, Study, Jacques Delors Institute, May 2012

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