



**GROUPEMENT D'ÉTUDES ET DE RECHERCHES  
NOTRE EUROPE**

President : Jacques Delors

# REUNITING EUROPE

OR

## EUROPE'S QUEST FOR IDENTITY/IES

Seminar organised by the Groupement d'études et de recherches  
"Notre Europe" and  
the Greek centre for European studies EKEM  
Athens, 13-14 November 1998

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## **Notre Europe**

Notre Europe is an independent research and policy unit focusing on Europe – its history and civilisations, process of integration and future prospects. The association was founded in autumn 1996. It has a small international team of in-house researchers

Notre Europe contributes to public debate in two ways. Firstly, by publishing internal research papers and, secondly, by commissioning contributions to the European debate from outside researchers and academics. These documents are intended for a relatively small readership of decision-makers, politicians, socio-professionals, academics and diplomats in the various EU countries.

The association also organises meetings and seminars in association with other institutions and the media.

In accordance with the statutes of the Association, the "European Steering Committee" meets at least three times a year. The members of the Committee are of various nationalities and diverse political and professional origin.

The Committee is a forum for reflection, debate and proposition, notably through the adoption of public proposals, such as the call to "politicise the European debate".

## **EKEM**

Founded in 1988, the Hellenic Centre of European Studies (EKEM) aims to promote links between government, academia and the private sector in Greece to formulate and implement a coherent European policy. EKEM is an independent research institute and platform for a pluralist debate about European integration as well as being a point of contact between Greece and other European countries. Through public debate, EKEM contributes to policy-making and also increases public awareness of European issues. Research and scientific debate, both fundamental objectives of EKEM, provide academic support in adapting to the process of European integration and encourage initiatives which strengthen Greece's position in the European Union. EKEM also has a particular interest in the Balkan and Black Sea regions. The Centre organises public debates, scientific workshops and international conferences and also publishes numerous documents.

## **FOREWORD**

With the start of enlargement negotiations between the European Union and the countries of central and Eastern Europe, it is time, more than ever before, for a vast offensive on perceptions of Europe and its identities. How can we ensure that diversity thrives in a pluralist society for our mutual benefit and the common good ? Is there a 'European model' which distinguishes us from the rest of the world ? These are the sort of questions being posed today. This is why the Research and Policy Unit, "Notre Europe" and the Greek Centre for European Studies (EKEM) decided to organise a seminar in Athens on 13-14 November 1998 addressing the diverse political, sociological and cultural facets of European identity.

About thirty participants from political, intellectual and academic circles from West, East and central Europe gathered together. As you will see in reading this summary report, the discussions were lively, indeed passionate. So much the better. For it is only through a frank and open dialogue that a common political conscience will develop and this always occasions tensions between varying interests, opinions, points of view and cultures. For a common political project to exist, European integration needs to confront - albeit it in a civilised manner - its divergences, whether they are artificial constructs or passive assumptions. It is a complex task at a time when the Balkans are once more experiencing tragedy. In order to build a lasting peace, they will have to rediscover shared values and learn to live together once again in mutual understanding and respect. Has this not been the aim of European integration from the very beginning ?

Jacques Delors  
Paris, May 1999

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## Introduction

In seeking to establish a common identity, Europeans are forever coming up against their differences and the climatic, ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity and patchwork of legal and political systems, lifestyles and value systems in general that are Europe. In short, against the very things that are the source of their strength and greatness and at the same time their shared history and – very often – their shared misfortune.

At this seminar, organised by the Association "Notre Europe" and EKEM, the Greek centre for European studies, we considered whether these obstacles are insurmountable, or whether, as the seminar title implies, it is sufficient to interpret "identity" in the plural, ignoring the implicit contradiction. This report gives an account of two days of discussions on this subject at a meeting in Athens between 26 academics and policy-makers from 12 European countries, six of which – Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Czech Republic and Slovenia – are waiting, with varying degrees of impatience, to join the European Union.

### **An explosive subject**

Greek Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos opened the debate by welcoming the pan-European nature of the seminar, "going beyond the narrow confines of the current European Union and reflecting the dynamism of Europe as a whole." He went on to express the hope that the present Member States would show "more sincerity and openness towards the candidate countries" and "appreciate both the cost of enlargement and the extent of the changes needed to move in that direction." In particular, Pangalos suggested that the issue of federal institutions should be discussed openly and that debate should not be limited to "institutional arithmetic on the functioning of the Council and the Commission."

"It is a highly explosive subject we are going to be addressing", Jacques Delors added, going on to ask: "Does the slogan 'united in diversity' still mean anything in the age of globalisation? Will our differences and identities not be crushed by the twin forces of globalisation and European integration?" he probed, and urged the participants to draw on historical and geographical references, extending their analysis of identity into the dimensions of time and space to ensure a comprehensive view.

It is traditional to contrast eastern and western Europe (and more broadly East and West), and northern and southern. How many Europes have there been since the first nations formed over the last millennium? How many remain today? These questions formed the backdrop to the debate.

Those concerned to look forward rather than backward were reminded that a people that has forgotten its past cannot consider its future, to borrow an image from Bronislaw Geremek, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, who had been due to close the seminar but was unable to attend. Delors stressed the importance of valuing an understanding of the past and of how European society developed. Academics, he said, were essential to that process and should become more closely involved, to ensure that the lessons of the past were never forgotten. "We have work to do if we want to pave the way for mutual understanding," he added, "and that is the aim of this seminar: to help establish a European network of thinkers to pool ideas from across Europe."

### **What do we want to achieve together?**

To those who hold that any identity which exists can be found in the "European project", Delors pointed out that European integration is not an end in itself. "What matters is to decide what we want to achieve," he continued, urging participants from central and eastern Europe in particular to provide an explicit answer to that question. We know what the six original members were seeking to achieve when they founded the European Community some time after the second world war: to put an end to the wars that had ravaged Europe, support democracy and foster economic recovery. But as the Community has grown, its common aims have become ever less clear. The situation changed as soon as the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland joined. The more recent addition of Austria, Finland and Sweden, with their concern for "neutrality", was arguably an even more substantial change.

With 13 candidate countries now knocking at the door, answering the question of common aims is beginning to look like a precondition of membership. Is it NATO that most interests them, or economic and monetary union? Is it an American model of economic and social development that attracts them or a European one (if such a thing exists)? These questions are all the more sensitive in that they are rooted in the division of Europe by borders of one kind or another in the recent and more distant past.

Just how determined are the candidate countries and how far does the current Member States' solidarity extend? Should the applicants have a say in Europe's future even before they sign up to all the obligations that bind the existing members? Or is it only the latter that can reform the Community institutions to adapt them to the needs of an enlarged Europe? What do the two sides expect from enlargement? What price are they prepared to pay, and what benefits are they entitled to expect? Just framing the questions indicates what a potentially explosive issue identity is.

The first detonation was not long in coming. Sparks flew from the outset, with the opening presentations by Henri Mendras and Norman Davies, designed to introduce the subject and stimulate debate. On the latter point they more than fulfilled their brief, with Mendras lighting the touchpaper of polemic by distinguishing between western Europe and "the Other Europe" and

offering a model that was quickly interpreted as a value judgement. The resulting battle forms the subject of our first chapter.

What aspect of their personality do Europeans feel is fundamental to their identity? Their political philosophy, based on the concepts of nationhood, sovereignty and democracy? Their economic system? Their civil society? The discussions were structured by three round table debates, which are covered in the following three chapters:

The veil of nationhood

The need for an economic model

Elusive civil society

We end with a final chapter on the expectations voiced by the representatives of "middle Europe" (Mendras's term) in response to Jacques Delors's urgent question: what do we want to achieve together?

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# 1 - A wind of controversy

Understanding differences was the stated aim of Henri Mendras, French sociologist and author of "L'Europe des Européens"<sup>1</sup>, in putting forward a "model" for the specific characteristics of western European society which could be contrasted with another applicable to middle or eastern Europe. He explained that the models were based on a comparison between France and Russia.

"It is a model, not a description," he stressed, and one he expected to be challenged and refined not only by Norman Davies, who was scheduled to reply (and who, Mendras remarked, coming from across the Channel, was not entirely European in his eyes), but especially by the many representatives of middle Europe present at the seminar. As we shall see, the scale of the challenge greatly exceeded his expectations.

Mendras asserted that the dividing line between the two Europes ran precisely along the 1948 Iron Curtain, with the exception of two "errors of history" – East Germany and Bohemia, which were part of western Europe. He identified four fundamental traits as characterising the civilisation of western Europe thus defined: individualism, the nation-State, industrial capitalism, and the legitimacy of democratic majority rule. That did not exclude historical, national and even regional differences. It was true, for instance, that British individualism was different from French individualism, and German and Italian individualism were both different again, but in Mendras's view each of these traits contrasted with the situation in the Other Europe.

## **Quite scandalous**

Mendras traced western individualism back to biblical teachings, firmly entrenched in Roman law, which had the distinction of establishing individual property rights, particularly over land. "That", he noted, "seemed quite scandalous in most other societies, where land was thought to belong to God, just possibly to the community, but never to a single individual."

The nation-State, meanwhile, took a variety of forms in the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands and Germany. In Denmark, it was unusual in that it was based on a national religion and Church and a tradition of defence against continental Europe. Nonetheless, unlike the rest of the continent, with its imperial tradition, western Europe was undoubtedly the Europe of the nation-State.

The concepts of nationhood and natural borders, said Mendras, were closely linked to a stable and sedentary peasant culture. While the idea of nationhood was dear to the peoples of

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<sup>1</sup> See Appendix 1 for a summary of the book, published by Gallimard, Folio collection, 1997.

eastern Europe, he claimed, the diverse and geographically heterogeneous ethnic make-up of the region had always prevented them from putting it into practice.

Mendras detailed the differences between the Colbertian capitalism – centralised and State-dominated – of France, the profoundly individualistic capitalism of the British, Germany's social capitalism and the networked capitalism of northern Italy. But above all he pointed to the long-standing separation in western Europe between the economic sphere on the one hand and the political and religious on the other, if only to "render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's", stating that in the Other Europe that separation had never been made.

He further stressed that majority rule – legitimacy at 50.1% – had never been accepted outside western Europe (except, by extension, in the United States). In the Russian peasant culture of the *mir*, the refusal of one head of a family was enough to block a joint decision. The Other Europe had never known anything but rule by unanimity, he said. It had always been torn between unanimity and anarchy, and all the region's democracies except Czechoslovakia had given in to authoritarian rule before 1939.

Should Europe's identity be considered in the singular or the plural? On the basis of his analysis, Mendras observed that, while there was probably a general sentiment that society was becoming more homogeneous, closer inspection revealed increasing contrast and diversity. He emphasised in particular that differences between models of the family had grown considerably more stark in the space of a generation. 30 years ago, 2.5 children per family was the average in almost all countries. Two-children families were now widespread in northern Europe and France. In northern Italy and Spain and southern Germany, however, the only child had become the rule. "The development of a European identity", he concluded, "can only increase the diversity of regional and racial identities, and perhaps national identities as well."

### **An allergy to models**

British historian Norman Davies, author of "Europe, A History"<sup>2</sup>, took a very different view: "I am allergic to stereotypical, pseudo-scientific models used oversimplistically to propound generalisations about European civilisation," he said, announcing that his own demonstration was based on three fundamental principles:

- the need for a European ideal and mystique to place European affairs on a plane beyond sociology or the price of butter;
- the various traditions of what used to be West and East Europe;
- the pluralist nature of European civilisation.

First of all, Davies criticised Mendras for constructing his model on the basis of France in the west and above all Russia alone in the east, and protested that his comments on the organisation of the Russian *mir* could not be extended wholesale to all of the eastern half of Europe. He pointed out

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<sup>2</sup> See Appendix 2 for a summary of the introduction to the book, published by Pimlico, 1997.

that Roman law not only had never been applied in Britain, but had been the model for the development of Poland's legal system. Nor had there ever been a collectivist tradition in Polish farming, any more than there had in a number of other countries in central and eastern Europe, parts of the former Yugoslavia in particular.

Davies noted that that there had been industry in Poland, and also in the Don basin in the Ukraine, from the early part of the 20th century, and none across broad stretches of western Europe, including Portugal, Ireland and Lozère in France. He challenged Mendras's remarks on the absence of a democratic tradition in eastern Europe and the authoritarian regimes that had flourished there in the interwar period, citing British military rule in Ireland, Mussolini's rise to power in Italy as early as 1922, that of General Primo de Rivera in Spain and Salazar's dictatorship in Portugal, not to mention Hitler from 1933 in Germany. "If the East Europeans did something wrong," he commented drily, "was it not that they followed the bad example set by the best West Europeans?"

### **Five or six Europes**

Davies contested the geographical and cultural division drawn by Mendras. Instead he suggested a view of Europe's cultural legacy as composed of five or six overlapping and interlocking circles. For over five centuries, he remarked, one of the essential problems in defining Europe had centred on whether or not to include Russia. While their western neighbours ceaselessly sought reasons to exclude them, the Russians themselves had problems deciding whether they wanted in or out. Davies emphasised that Britain's European credentials were no less ambiguous than Russia's. "Just like the Russians," he said, "the British were clearly European, but their priority interests lay outside Europe."

In the traditional division between East and West, he detected a tendency to denigrate the East. And he saw expressions such as "the Other Europe" or "the Balkans" as part of that trend – western Europeans looking down on their neighbours in much the same way as they displayed contempt for Islam and the Arab world.

Davies maintained that the search for a European identity could more usefully focus on culture rather than on the economic or social spheres, while recognising that the three components form part of a whole. "A sense of belonging to Europe is not incompatible with national patriotism," he stated. "We have multilayered identities: you can be a good Greek or French national, and at the same time a good European."

The historian, sociologist and political scientist Ronald Dore of the London School of Economics endeavoured to bridge the gap between Mendras and Davies. "I have the impression that the disagreement between the two speakers has less to do with discipline and command of the facts, and more with sympathy towards one or other form of identity," he suggested, defending the use of generalisations as a necessary tool of sociology, and one he used himself, as could be seen from his own subsequent comments on nationhood, statehood and democracy.

## **Indivisible xenophobia**

Other speakers were less moderate in their criticism of Mendras. The first was the Greek sociologist Constantin Tsoukalas, professor at the University of Athens, who suggested that his colleague's reasoning would exclude Greece from the European Union. "Yet Greece is and we hope will remain a full member," he said, going on to plead for an end to all forms and manifestations of xenophobia, whether directed against Europeans or non-Europeans.

"Xenophobia is indivisible", he asserted, and where there was xenophobia against Algerians in France, for example, there would also be xenophobia against Greeks, Russians and others. "If we leave Europe to its political systems, languages and religions, we have lost before we have even begun," he concluded, calling for "a common European consciousness and a common political identity that provides the political and social justification for coming together."

Yves Mény, French legal expert and political scientist and director of the Robert Schuman Centre at the European University Institute in Florence, was reluctant to oppose western and eastern Europe or dissociate one from the other. He voiced concern at the rigidity of Mendras's proposed model, criticising the absence of a time dimension. Mény argued that neither West nor East has a monopoly on individualism, the nation-State, industrial capitalism or majority rule. "They are principles which every State in the world is now confronting, each at its own pace and in its own cultural forms," he declared, and suggested that the model would be "less aggressive" if "the dimension of universality" was reintroduced.

For Mény, the real danger – not of Mendras's making, but which could result from the use of his model – was of a shift from analysis to prescription. "And nothing could be easier", he added, "than to cross that line. Contrasting East with West can be a salutary exercise for understanding both societies better, but it could be dangerous if it were to slide insidiously towards a prescription about ourselves and others."

He suggested that, in endeavouring to develop a democratic community in a territory whose contours were still ill defined, we would do better to "build bridges" than to "dissociate". "You contrast nation-States with empires," he told Mendras, "but you are forgetting the trading towns of central Europe, a focus of civic identity and a forum for trade that lasted into the 20th century and belonged to neither western nor eastern Europe."

## **Majority and unanimity**

Mény traced the concept of majority rule from Britain, where it was first developed, to France, where it became widespread after the revolution. It faced strong resistance there, however, because it conflicted with two distinctly French principles of unanimity: the monarchical model of a people united under the king's authority, and the revolutionary refusal of freedom to the

enemies of freedom. That, he suggested, explained why political parties have difficulty becoming established in France: if unanimity is an article of faith, parties can only be seen as divisive.

There had also been other forms of hostility to majority rule, Mény observed, from the Catholic church to Marxists, but it had slowly but surely spread across the continent to reach southern Europe just a few decades ago. "There is nothing to stop it extending into eastern Europe and other parts of the world in the same way."

The principle had itself evolved, he observed. In the Netherlands, for example, "where in reality it is consensus that operates", and to some extent in Italy as well. And certainly in the European Community, he remarked, decisions are taken by consensus far more than by a majority vote.

Nikiforos Diamandouros, professor of comparative politics at the University of Athens and ombudsman for Greece, approved of such analyses over time, highlighting change and transition. "Dichotomies are helpful for simplification, but the problem is that they oversimplify," he said. He went on to point out that the North-South divide, dating back to antiquity in the Mediterranean region, had preceded and for a long time prevailed over the issue of East and West.

Senator Josef Jarab of the Czech Republic was also wary of dichotomies, and of being swayed by others' subjective assessments in analysing how Europe's societies function. He did not mince his words: "What we are hearing", he said, "reflects the Europeans' ignorance of other cultures and lack of education about Europe as a whole... The fault lies with the 50 years of division imposed by the cold war." He could see no other remedy but a concerted effort to educate the population, going beyond formal schooling to the media and political practice. He spoke of introducing "active tolerance" into this educational process, meaning "a willingness to learn not only about my own but also about other cultures, and to recognise, respect and learn from the differences between them."

Dichotomies held no fear for Nikos Mouzelis, sociologist and professor at the London School of Economics. "There are good ones and bad ones, but there is no getting away from them," he said in defence of Mendras's model. What was crucial was to address the differences that existed within Europe, and for that they had to be identified. He argued that distinguishing between description and prescription was equally important. Talk of the "other" Europe did not imply that it had to remain outside, he noted, and comparing the current development of the Balkan economies with western economies did not mean ejecting Greece from the Union. Democracy was not defined by majority rule alone. In western Europe, the development of capitalism preceded the emergence of party political systems. Elsewhere in Europe, political openness preceded industrialisation. It should not be forgotten, Mouzelis suggested, that the pace of change varies.

## **Leader of the Balkans**

Stéfan Tafrov and István Szent-Ivány, both born in 1958, were the seminar's youngest participants. Tafrov, formerly a journalist, and vice-minister of foreign affairs from 1991 to

1992, is currently Bulgaria's ambassador to Paris. As a Bulgarian, he felt subject to double discrimination: he was not only from "the Other Europe", but from "the other Other Europe", the south-east and the Balkans, which he said was the object of a mass of prejudices. However, it was some consolation to find himself in Greece, which he applauded for leading the way in demonstrating that the region's "Europeanness" needed no qualification. He accused Mendras of "factual inexactitudes", pointing out that the farming communities of south-eastern Europe had very little in common with those in Russia and suggesting that Bulgaria had its own highly distinctive brand of individualism and that the British had no lessons to give them in that respect.

He argued that Europe was "missing a historic opportunity in failing to engage in debate with people such as Vaclav Havel, whose unique experience of fighting communism under Soviet domination forced them to rethink the individual's relationship with politics and the State – not only intellectually, but sometimes at the cost of physical suffering."

Tafrov himself expressed surprise at the democratic maturity of his compatriots, in circumstances that were "not always easy". Proof, he suggested, that democratic institutions have taken root. The settlement of minority problems in his own country and in Romania was another promising sign. "Bulgaria", he said, "is one of the small countries in the region that has found a civilised solution to ethnic tensions in integrating Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin into the life of the country. This has been done by accommodating expressions of political identity within what is essentially a uninational State." Tafrov drew attention to Bulgaria's policy of reconciliation towards its neighbours, particularly Greece, with which it had often warred in the past, comparing the situation with that of France and Germany. He concluded with a call for the debate to move beyond economics or indeed politics to the "European dream", adding: "The transition from communism to democracy is an excellent occasion for Europe as a whole to build further on that dream."

An ethnographer by training, Szent-Ivany chairs the foreign affairs committee in the Hungarian parliament. He disputed Mendras's choice of the nation-state as one of the fundamentals of his model for western Europe. The nation-state was a fairly recent invention, he asserted, just three or four centuries old, and not a very convincing one, at least not in the case of such countries as Britain – home to the Welsh, Irish and Scots nations as well as English – and Spain. "The legacy of the cold war weighs far more heavily than we think; what matters is to bring down the mental barriers", he said, citing the case of Austria, now much closer to western Europe than to the other successors to the Austro-Hungarian Empire: Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. He agreed with Delors that academics had a vital part to play, and that it was for them to demonstrate that the unjust division between East and West is over and we are now entering a new era.

### **Neither inequality nor exclusion**

Delors invited Mendras to offer a defence. The latter was stung by some of the criticisms voiced, and began by explaining that the word "difference" was not pejorative, and implied

neither inequality nor exclusion. "Unity and diversity are two sides of the same coin," he argued, stating that the boundary to which he alluded was simply one of the initial findings on which his analysis had been based, not one of its conclusions.

"I am prepared to accept that all of middle Europe conforms to my model, and I am certainly not saying that the Westerners are individualists and that the others are not," Mendras explained, adding: "Models always distort reality to some extent; the question is whether my model is a useful tool." He contested claims that the model was static. "On the contrary, it is eminently dynamic, and adapts to various rates of development. In western Europe, it is, at least in part, being destroyed. If constructing the model helps us to understand what we are destroying, and consequently what we want to build in its place, then that is progress."

## 2 - The veil of nationhood

**W**hat role do nationhood, sovereignty and democracy play in the typology of European society? Ronald Dore discussed each aspect with a very British pragmatism, point by point.

"One approach is to use static generalisations and classify nation-States by such criteria as the trauma of having executed a monarch or the fact of being born of a struggle for liberation from an invader, as in the case of Greece and Poland. We should note the necessary condition of a common language or religion. We can identify the various meanings of nationalism: political doctrine, the right to self-determination and national sentiment. We can measure its strength by popular attachment to such symbols as the flag or the national anthem. We might observe that 'nationalism' is often used pejoratively, while 'patriotism' is a term of praise. Hence: 'I am a patriot, he is a nationalist and the other guy is a chauvinist.'"

Dore had a special mention for Japan. "Few States combine so many factors conducive to a sense of national identity," he remarked: insularity, a common language, a literary culture isolated from the neighbouring cultures for thousands of years, 120 years' concentration on a single national objective – catching up with the most industrialised countries – and a racial consciousness combining feelings of inferiority and superiority.

### **Nationalism and the railway**

"If, on the other hand, we are to base our analysis on dynamic generalisations, we will focus on the stages of change and development. First a military power carves out the frontiers, but as long as parochialism prevails the majority of the population will not have a sense of being part of a nation. Things start to change with the advent of economic growth and mobility. That brings us to the 19th century and "a Europe where the sense of national identity grew with the expansion of the railway networks, with increased mobility, access to education, military training, etc."

It was a shift from a culture of submission to a culture of participation. "A growing demand for egalitarianism accompanied economic growth, and individual mobility destroyed ties of dependency, as Tocqueville described in his comparison of France and the United States," Dore noted, while observing that dictatorships could be considered a form of participation, "because they require leaders to provide a populist response."

Next came the contemporary era of technological change and a situation where the nation-State was under threat from both above and below: by globalisation on the one hand and the

disintegration of nationalism on the other. "We are witnessing an egalitarian demand for participation beyond the scope of the nation-State, focused far more on regional identities," Dore remarked.

Is the aim to create a supranational State in Europe? If so, we might wonder with Dore whether the day will come when French and German hearts will beat faster to see a European team on the pitch than they do to see their national teams today. "That will depend in part on external factors," he replied, "and specifically, in the economic field, on competition between the euro zone and the dollar zone. It will also hinge on what happens in Russia, depending on whether or not its military potential is viewed as an external threat, encouraging the Europeans to display greater unity."

### **The language of power**

Dore added that this process might be hampered by the fact that the Europeans' common language was his own, English. This he described as the language of "the world ruler, in other words the United States, the source of current day economic and political doctrine." This was a view a number of participants were to dispute, or at least qualify. Dusan Sidjanski, for example, founder and director of the political science department at the University of Geneva, warned that judgements on culture always carried a subtext. He accepted that English might be a "common language of communication" for Europe, "but not a common language of culture, nor a mother tongue." Hungarian historian Pierre Kende, meanwhile, although he did not "altogether agree" with Dore's comment, nonetheless accepted it, pointing out that using English signified identification not with Europe, but with a larger grouping, be it NATO, the Western world or the international community as a whole.

Former Commission vice-president Filippo Pandolfi, on the other hand, who has also held the finance, industry and agriculture portfolios in a number of Italian governments, professed himself "strongly opposed to the idea of a universal language: Europe's cultural reality demands the preservation of the linguistic identities that are the wealth of nations, while wisdom suggests the use of *linguae francae*," he claimed, pointing out that in Rome at the time of Trajan many more people spoke Greek than Latin.

"Should we see neo-liberalism as a step backwards?" Dore continued, observing that this movement, which had thrived in the United States and Britain for the last 15 years, not only abandoned any form of socialist management but sought to reduce the scope of State intervention. He noted that there was some intellectual justification for linking the free market and democracy: "The consumer is king," he said, "and everyone shares in that power." However, "while all consumers are equal, some are richer than others; and while it is true that all voters are equal, some have a much greater capacity for intervention than others." In addition, he commented that the 1992 sterling crisis had prompted criticisms of the free trade doctrine and talk of reinstating controls on capital movements.

## **Old nations, young States**

For the countries of the Other Europe, the advent of democracy and sovereignty is indissociably linked to the end of totalitarian rule in 1989, and the restoration of popular sovereignty is bound up with that of national sovereignty. That was the opening remark of French historian Jacques Rupnik, professor and researcher at the Fondation des Sciences politiques in Paris, who recalled how, between October and November 1989, just after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the slogan of the East Germans had changed from "Wir sind das Volk" (we are the people) to "Wir sind ein Volk" (we are one people). "The semantic shift from 'people' to 'nation', from the issue of democracy to that of unification," he suggested, "is a good illustration of how closely the two issues were connected in 1989."

Rupnik described central and eastern Europe as a region of ancient nations and young States, where the nation-State was the main, if not the only, seat of democracy and discontinuity was a key feature of regional history. Witness Hungary in the 16th century, Bohemia in the 17th, after the Battle of White Mountain, and Poland's partitions in the late 18th century. South-eastern Europe – Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia – last saw stability in the 14th century...

Another problem was the existence and integration of national minorities: "The ethnic and political boundaries do not coincide and, from Transylvania to Kosovo, there is no shortage of examples of disputed sovereignty," said Rupnik. However, he warned against subscribing to the simplistic stereotype of established nation-States in the west and fragmentation in the east. He recalled the title of a conference held in Paris in early 1992: "Europe and the Tribes". This suggested a simplistic perspective, with the Europe of Maastricht marching towards a supranational future without borders on the one side, and on the other the eastern tribes regressing to the ideologies of the early 19th century: integration for the former, disintegration for the latter.

Rupnik, with some justification, read the term "tribe" as suggesting that the countries of central and eastern Europe were not fully-fledged nations, and stood outside western European history. "That is also forgetting that the crisis of the nation-State is not specific to central Europe, but affects the whole continent," he added. Witness Belgium, Padania in Italy, the Basque country, Ireland and Corsica. Moreover, it ignored the fact that central Europe had become much more homogeneous than it had been in the interwar period. For the first time in its history, Poland was a homogeneous nation-State, albeit through the intervention of Hitler and Stalin... Bohemia no longer had either a German or a Jewish population, and the Czechs and Slovaks had gone their separate ways. Meanwhile, western Europe, as a result of immigration, was discovering the problems of multiculturalism and the difficulty of reconciling a host of identities and nationalities.

## **A recipe for disaster**

"The true problem", Rupnik claimed, "is not the size or number of States but their nature. In central and eastern Europe, a cultural or ethno-linguistic conception of the nation prevailed. As there were stateless nations, cultural and linguistic identity took precedence over, or predated, political identity. These countries are much closer to the German model of nationhood. When they establish a State, however, they tend to turn instead to France's centralised, Jacobin model." He argued that an area where a number of races and cultures coexist calls for a federal, decentralised form of government, and described the combination of a German-style nation and a French-style State as "a recipe for disaster".

The second focus of Rupnik's remarks was that, having shaken off Soviet tutelage and the doctrine of limited sovereignty, these countries were reluctant to risk losing their hard-won sovereignty again. Rupnik observed:

- that these countries wanted to enter Europe as States, and were very wary of any regional integration;
- that, in contrast, delegating or relinquishing power within NATO presented no problems.

Rupnik's provisional assessment of the first 10 years of democratic transition – the formation of democratic institutions, changeovers of political power, the party system, and legitimate States – was that, overall, the process had been smoother in central Europe than in the east and south-east. Could there be a correlation between a relatively successful transition and the relative ethnic homogeneity of the central European States, he wondered, or should we interpret it as the legacy of the rule of law going back to their shared period of Austrian rule – what might be termed the "Hapsburg effect"? In the case of Catholic Poland, where religious practice remained strong, should we see a link between Catholicism and the successful establishment of economic and political liberalism? Rupnik confined himself to mentioning these hypotheses, but refused to ignore certain issues on the grounds of political correctness.

## **Multicultural or multinational**

Dimitrij Rupel, sociologist and Slovenia's ambassador to Washington, focused on the combination of the two forms of integration simultaneously beckoning to European countries: a truly European area to be achieved through the enlargement of the Union, and also the American or Atlantic area, with the idea of a transatlantic structure. "Two principles are coming face to face, and two different worlds," he said, adding that "the United States is a nation of States, and Europe will perhaps one day be a State of nations."

For the time being, Rupel's concern was that it was the Americans who were in fact managing some of Europe's most complex problems, witness Bosnia and Kosovo. "The Dayton agreements are based on the American concept of multiculturalism, rather than on the European concept of a multinational society."

He continued: "We are talking not only about integration, but also about disintegration. What should concern us are the problems of forced integration and managing diversity, the right to national life which is the substance and consequence of self-determination yet is not recognised in Kosovo, encircled as it is by Serbs acting for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the direct successor to the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia."

Rupel explained that the former Yugoslavia had collapsed not because it was a multinational State but because it was badly governed. He argued that it was not internal disintegration that had brought about collapse, either there or in the Soviet Union, but forced integration and the refusal to recognise the right to self-determination. He called for the multicultural debate to be stepped up and for Europeans to use their experience of diversity to manage crises in Europe.

### **Recognising other cultures**

Dusan Sidjanski agreed that the European Union had a part to play in handling crises such as that in Kosovo, which he suggested illustrated all the issues covered by the seminar, and all their contradictions: majority/minority relations, the desire for an identity, and the desire to exclude others. "Neither group can survive entirely independently," he said, and called for the Union to make use of the very powerful points of interdependence. He also emphasised the problem of tolerance and recognition: "the ability to recognise others as being as worthy of the same respect we consider our due."

On the theme of diversity and unity, Sidjanski forcefully put the question: "What are the factors that unite us?" – a point he saw as just as fundamental as the question of diversity. "We can see from our immediate history", he said, "that developments overtook us and we did not foresee what would happen." That should encourage us to be prepared for new changes. He did not personally see the European Union as a potential State. "Whether it is a Community or a Union," he concluded, "they are innovations, and need to provide reconciliation and unity throughout Europe."

Nikiforos Diamandouros suggested that territorial integrity was a precondition for any democracy, and questioned whether a democracy could exist unless the territory of the State to be governed by democratic rule was first defined. However, he too was interested in new forms of transition to modernity. He was joined in this by his compatriot Constantin Tsoukalas, for whom the old categories were no longer valid. Democracy must be founded on a new basis, leaving behind the nation and the State, said Tsoukalas, asserting that "politically, ours must be a post-national and post-sovereign era."

The Czech Ivan Gabal is a sociologist by training, and headed President Vaclav Havel's political analysis department in 1991. He currently runs a consultancy. "The essential focus of our analysis", he said, "is not only historical development, but the impact of that development on our countries' ability to prompt change and make the necessary adjustments without jeopardising the stability or prosperity of those already part of the movement towards European integration. For now,

in methodological terms, what matters most is not the size of the Czech and Hungarian economies, but the capacity of those societies to accommodate change.

"We are at different stages in our lives, and at a time of great change," he concluded. "We must recognise that the capacity to absorb change varies, and that the countries of central and eastern Europe will have to adapt at least twice as much as those in western Europe, as there is a gap of at least 40 years between us."

### **The soluble and the insoluble**

Where does Europe end? The answer remains unclear: is Poland not a natural candidate for the Union, but Ukraine far less so? The border issue was without solution, argued Jean-Louis Bourlanges, liberal MEP and chairman of the European Movement group in France, and the question of Europe's identity equally insoluble. "But that should not allow us to sidestep the issue of the identity of the European Union, which, while not easy, is more within our grasp."

He defined that identity as "a combination of a set of geographical, historical and political factors, and an emerging political and institutional response." What is the context in which the Union is developing, and what features mark it out from its environment? Bourlanges suggested four:

- A peninsular relationship with the world: in its geographical situation as a peninsula, Europe was affected, harmed or threatened by everything that happens in the world. "There is a fundamental vulnerability about Europe which contrasts with America's insularity," he said. "That should give the European Union a global role in diplomacy and intervention, favouring cooperation rather than confrontation."
- A horror of violence: the sentiment of "never again!" after the ravages of two world wars, "with the ambiguity of all pacifism, which does not want war but does not put up sufficient resistance to those that do want it."
- An ambivalence towards nationhood, "because the nation-States are both the building blocks of the Union and a threat to its unity. 'We speak of European citizenship and civic duty, but it is first and foremost the States that must behave as good citizens and refrain from uncivic action,'" said Bourlanges, quoting the French diplomat Gilles Andréani.
- A disenchantment with politics, "meaning not only that the temporal order and the spiritual order are separate, but also that, while politics cannot create meaning, it does have a function of establishing a framework within which each person, each family, each entity can give meaning to their lives.

"So our identity is to be found by looking forward, not back," concluded Bourlanges. "It is still being developed. Borders cannot form the basis for the European 'project', but the project will form the basis for the Union's borders, as the factor that will determine its geographical structure."

## **Great rivalry**

Yes, nationhood really is Europe's great rival, observed the Hungarian historian Pierre Kende. "Not because the European nations are incapable of uniting; they are perfectly capable of it," he affirmed, "but because they have become the main focus of political identification."

Kende described the individual nation as "a microcosm of universality, a universe closed in on itself, which for its citizens represents all of humanity." He preferred to discuss identification with Europe rather than Europe's identity, "as that identity is elusive; there are far too many European identities for anything stable to be built upon them." The problem was therefore whether identification with the nation could be transferred to a larger entity, in this case Europe. But because its borders are not clearly drawn, and in contrast to its constituent nations, he argued, Europe is wide open. It is not a closed universe. "On the contrary, it can be seen as a subdivision of a larger world grouping, and that is the fundamental reason why it is so difficult to say where it ends or where enlargement should stop," Kende maintained. He did not disguise his pessimism: he did not see how a limitless Europe could expect its inhabitants "to identify with an entity which is not a genuine whole."

## **Red cards**

"Where does Europe begin and where does it end?" former French culture minister Jack Lang – now chairman of France's parliamentary foreign affairs committee – asked in turn. "We want a broad-based Europe", he commented, "but at the same time we want to take certain precautions." The main issue for him was less a strict geographical definition than a shared civilisation and value system. His view on Turkey, for example, with one foot in Asia and the other in Europe, was therefore that "until it has a fully established democracy, it cannot be a real candidate for membership of the European Union."

Lang argued that Europe as a political entity must coincide with its geographical and historical boundaries, and criticised EU heads of government for clearly suggesting a few years ago that the applicant countries of central and eastern Europe might be able to join as early as 2000 or 2001, and then slamming the door and telling them to wait until 2005, 2006 or 2007. He also expressed regret that the French idea of a European confederation – first mooted when François Mitterrand visited Prague in 1990 – had come to nothing, as he believed a political, cultural and ethical construct of that kind would have given the two sides an interim stage during which to get to know each other and learn to work together. (The initiative had failed because it had been poorly prepared, Delors interjected.) "Although the name Gorbachev is no longer fashionable," Lang added, "I continue to believe that the idea of a common European home he once suggested remains valid."

Lang did not see European diversity as a problem. "That is Europe's genius and its soul," he declared. "It is what gives it the highest concentration of treasures, languages and lifestyles of any continent. European unity should serve and preserve that plurality."

As a former lecturer in public law, Lang argued that the importance of the integration of legal systems in fostering diversity should not be underestimated. "European integration has been a matter of political will," he said. "Indeed some complain that it has often been a top-down process. The fact remains that it is the legal superstructure that has given it meaning." Taking the example of France, where the State had preceded the nation, he added: "The European institutions must move to facilitate the emergence of this common European consciousness. Our collective duty, at every level, is to galvanise Europe into action and out of its current complacency and inertia," he continued. "From the upper echelons, where the paralysed institutional machinery needs reforming, to the grassroots, where we need fresh impetus and vision to build not only a community of interests but a community of shared hopes and dreams."

## **Ode to youth**

Lang was convinced that the younger generation held the key to progress. "Too many governments are cut off from young people", he said. The younger generation "are not hostile to European integration, but neither are they enthused by a Europe that seems rather grey, lifeless, distant and sometimes arrogant. We need not only to give that Europe a human face, but to harness the inventiveness and creative potential of young people." He called for the groundwork to be laid in 1999 for a Europe of youth, culture and education, and criticised the indifference of political leaders towards these issues. "That is the main obstacle," he claimed, "not threats from across the Atlantic.

"Europe cannot succeed unless it wins the hearts and minds of the younger generation," he added. That required cultural and educational projects bringing together young people from the various countries of Europe, and in particular the establishment of European universities, multilingualism and the compulsory learning of two foreign languages. Lang called for a summit focusing exclusively on education, culture and research to be held in 1999, the year of the new Parliament and Commission, perhaps preceded by "a broad gathering of academics, historians and young people."

10 years ago, discontinuity had made its irruption into the course of history. "A happy break with the past that political observers, politicians and intelligence services alike had failed to anticipate," observed Filippo Pandolfi, before going on to examine its impact on European identity – or identities. It had posed huge problems: German unification, the Balkanisation of the most vulnerable section of south-eastern Europe, and direct transition from the command economy to the free market. But what particularly interested Pandolfi was that, for the first time since Robert Schuman's initiative came into being in 1950, the European Community had had to shoulder pan-European responsibilities, putting its institutional model to the test.

He saw this as an invitation to develop the "functional federalism" which went with the atypical structure the Union had inherited from the Community, and whose three dimensions he identified as follows: first horizontal, with the powers explicitly assigned to the Union by what is now

Article 5 of the treaty; then evolutive, with the scope for new policies – on the environment, technology and culture – created under Article 235; and lastly modular, in line with the provisions for "closer cooperation" under Title VII of the Treaty of Amsterdam.

### 3 - The need for an economic model

**D**oes the economic and social order of the countries of western Europe conform to a sufficiently similar model to justify talk of a European identity? The first speaker in this round table debate was German sociologist Wolfgang Streeck, Director of the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne. He prefaced his analysis with comments on the concept of identity. "All identities are based on similarities but at the same time imply differences," he said. "We have borders marking the differences between the system and its environment. Inclusion on one side and exclusion on the other.

"Everything depends on the points of similarity chosen to define a given identity," he explained, "where other parameters would reveal substantial variations. The issue of inclusion or exclusion is decided on the basis of certain variables at a given point in time. After all, the distinction is generally gradual, rarely categorical."

#### **Great diversity**

"When we ask ourselves whether all the western European countries share a socioeconomic identity, what becomes apparent is the great internal diversity," said Streeck, "such as between Austria and the United Kingdom. It is not always easy to see where the European system ends or where the differences between the British and American systems lie."

He stressed that this specifically western European issue was extremely important for constructing a European identity, if only because the countries of central and eastern Europe could use it as a model for their own socioeconomic systems. Streeck sketched out the characteristics that could be identified.

- First the role of the State. Europeans had accepted the idea that the State was no longer a giver of orders or a planner, but instead facilitated and supported the workings of the economy by enforcing competition rules, with a legal system which helped economic operators to realise their full potential. The State cooperated but did not intervene unilaterally. In a number of countries, the State was becoming part of civil society. Instead of directing society, it was becoming one of its resources.
- Then the market: in contrast to the Anglo-American model, Streeck called for an institutionalised marketplace which was not outside the reach of policy intervention. An economy governed by certain rules and in which organised civil society, major social groups and the two sides of industry played their part. A socioeconomic order which accommodated negotiations led by trade unions and trade associations, harnessed solidarity between social groups, encouraged their potential for self-government, delivered public services and recognised the functions of the State.

## **The dream**

"We would like this system to combine the private and public sectors," added Streeck, "by maintaining a public sphere where individuals, social groups and government could share responsibility for public services such as education and training or access to infrastructure. Private-sector firms would be prepared to pay high taxes to finance that infrastructure as an essential business resource."

Streeck recognised that this vision was not altogether realistic, and that much remained to be done to establish such a system in Europe.

- "There is a single currency", he said, "but no organised civil society as yet, except perhaps in a rudimentary sense. In comparison with dealings within the nation-States, relations between trade unions, employers and indeed governments at European level remain very underdeveloped."

- The individual western European countries all had their own view of this socioeconomic order. The countries within the euro zone were converging on certain points, with the 3% ceiling on budget deficits, but diverged on collective bargaining, the role of the social partners and training methods.

- The influence of the trade unions was waning in many countries and employers were tending towards less social cohesion rather than more. On the other hand, efforts to develop new means of withstanding growing market pressures were visible everywhere.

Is Europe capable of preventing the erosion of its traditional institutions? Will it be able to develop a suitable system to operate Europe-wide? "The jury is still out," Streeck concluded, "but it will depend to a great extent on political decisions."

Delors remarked that this model in the German mould contained "a very important, specifically European element that marks it out from the American model." That was the fact that it was "founded on an essentially open market subject to certain controls, where the State is an active partner and at the same time attentive to the needs of both sides of industry, which, despite the erosion of industrial relations systems, continue to have an important regulatory function within the economy and the social system."

Pandolfi observed that economic and monetary union was improving Europe's present and future competitiveness and had produced substantial changes on the situation of a few years before. He also drew attention to the convergence of European social models, although differences remained: The variation on taxation remained immense, for instance – from 45% of GNP in Denmark to 37% in the United Kingdom –, but it had been reduced by half.

## **A barbarian in Europe**

Elemer Hankiss, lecturer in political science at the University of Budapest, was asked to present middle Europe's viewpoint on the economic and social order. He responded with typically

Hungarian directness. "I am a barbarian from an eastern tribe descended from the Austro-Hungarian kingdom", he announced, informing his listeners that those particular barbarians there were more European than the Europeans; that the Christian kingdoms of Poland and Hungary, which had lasted over 1,000 years, were more ancient than the Belgian, Dutch, Italian and German kingdoms or States; that the corridor between East and West from which he came had been part of Charlemagne's empire; and that the region's civilisation and culture (in which he bracketed together Swabians, Bohemians, Hungarians, Croats and Bosnians) were truly European.

Hankiss implied that what was most lacking between western Europeans and the inhabitants of central and eastern Europe was dialogue, without which no identity could be forged. "If one side admonishes and lectures the other, who listens timidly without responding, there will never be real communication between the two," he said, calling for both sides to show far more responsiveness to their own and the other's concerns.

"I have every right to be critical," he continued. "While it is true that Europe and in particular the European Union have already helped us – and we are very grateful to them – I would like to remind you that the ancient Romans were wiser than today's Europeans: they listened to what the barbarians had to say and learned a great deal from them, such as new equestrian skills and how to make more powerful bows. They gained by adopting many of the barbarians' ideas and any number of gods. Yet the European Union has imported little or no ideas – and certainly no gods, although it is true that we have none to offer!"

Is the United States a latter-day Rome? One might think so to hear Hankiss, who suggested the Americans were wiser in this area than the Europeans, since they gained by importing ideas and gods from all over the world.

Hankiss assessed the problems and needs of the countries which had moved from communism to capitalism and democracy, observing:

- Eastern Europeans have a love-hate relationship with the State. They hate it because it has oppressed them for centuries but love it because they increasingly rely on it. In central Europe the position is more balanced but the problems are the same, and Hankiss suggested that western Europeans could join their neighbours in determining the attitude to adopt towards the State and in particular how to develop and strengthen the rule of law without violating individual freedoms.
- It has been claimed that democracy works only in countries with a per capita GNP of over \$10,000. Nonsense, said Hankiss, who put the figure at \$5,000-6,000. "It would be more difficult without EU help," he acknowledged, "but in a European context we can be as democratic as Spain and Greece."
- On the level at which democracy should operate, he argued that "for our countries, as for those in western Europe, the point is to link local to regional democracy, regional to national, and national democracy to the European and world levels. Cooperation between institutions at all these levels does not work very well, either in the West or in the East, so we need to talk and to learn together."

## **Privatising the Parthenon**

"Where I come from, there is immense prestige attached to property," said Hankiss. "Everyone wants to own property. In Hungary, 76% of people favour capitalism over any other system. We are the country with the highest degree of privatisation. If we were Greece, we would have privatised the Parthenon!

"It has been a swift transition, but the social cost has been high – higher than it should have been," he said, "with a degree of social breakdown and breakdown in our social institutions." In economic terms eastern Europe is still a long way behind the west, but it will close the gap: "Our educational system is one of the best in Europe, and we have just as rich a culture as western Europe. There is no problem there," asserted Hankiss. In contrast, he stressed that the social security system remained dangerously underdeveloped, and assistance was urgently needed.

Is Europe aware that the civilisation it is so proud of has changed dramatically? Hankiss very much doubted it, observing that the Europeans were planning for the future as if their society had not changed in 50 years. "But it has changed, and in some cases it has become the opposite of what it once was," he said, remarking that for 2,000 years we had learnt in church, at school and at home that we should love our neighbour – one of the fundamentals of Judaeo-Christian culture. And what did we hear now? Love yourself! Look out for No. 1! Don't be a martyr! Don't conform, revolt!

## **A culture of innocence**

"So here we are, faced with rules that contradict those inculcated into us for 2,000 years," he said. "Is it the consumer society? American influence? I don't know, but we cannot dismiss this new factor as superficial and pretend our civilisation, built on the concepts of guilt, redemption and forgiveness, is not affected. We are advancing towards a culture of innocence. Perhaps it is a good thing. It is certainly different."

Hankiss wondered whether we could talk about a European identity. "It is easy to identify with Venice, Beethoven or Florence," he observed. "It is easy to identify with Europe, but very difficult to have a western European vision of the world and learn to live in a changing civilisation." He continued: "We need to relearn how to behave in a cultured and civilised manner, in this new situation. Learning offers answers to the questions of human existence: where did we come from? Where are we going? What is right? What is wrong? Who am I? At the moment we have no answers to these questions. The old ones have been demolished, and the new ones are not yet in place.

"In a superficial way television soaps, films and musicals do provide the first fragments, but the European community of nations as a whole has not yet formulated new answers." Hankiss concluded: "That is what we have to look into and work on together, with young people, in schools and the media. That is just as important as what we are going to do about the economic and social

institutions in our shared Europe."

### **The cherry and the cake**

In Jack Lang's case, at least, Hankiss's words did not fall on deaf ears. "Fascinating!" he exclaimed. "A real invitation to debate. We do not look at these questions enough in terms of the collective imagination. What goes on in the minds of Italian, German and French youngsters of 15, 10 or 12? How do they see the world? What myths do they carry around in their heads? What are their hopes and fears?"

"My intuitive feeling", continued Lang, "is that the culture of the average 15 year old is a blend of standardised, largely American images – and not the best – and a form of populist, chauvinistic local culture. Sadly, there is not enough openness to other cultures and the outside world in the education system. We absolutely must find remedies for this kind of acculturation. That is not the cherry on the cake, it is the cake itself: it is of fundamental importance."

Speaking a little later, historian Jerzy Jedlicki, who lectures at the historical institute of Poland's Academy of Sciences, was quite indulgent towards this peaceful invasion of American culture and entertainment. "Every nation on the earth hopes to be invaded, and willingly opens its doors," he said, recalling that political isolation had not prevented the spread of foreign cultural models to the European periphery, long before 1989. The lifting of borders and the influx of Western technology could only reinforce that trend, he observed, while appreciating the success of a culture open on the world thanks to modern technology.

### **A dying film industry**

Owing to the great popularity of this mass culture among young people, however, the cultures and folk traditions of eastern Europe, already weakened by socialist industrialisation, had practically disappeared. And they were gone forever, overtaken by the same discos and films that had appeared everywhere. On this point, Jedlicki expressed regret for the decline of the Polish, Czech and Hungarian film schools, in the unequal contest against American films and the television. Not to mention the theatre, "which was once a source of national pride but had already begun to falter under communist control", or indeed publishing or poetry.

"Should we leave market forces free play in this area, or should we support the vitality of national cultures? And how far, if they cannot survive alone?" asked Jedlicki. He would be happy to see not only private institutions and local authorities but also the European Union putting up specific financing. And he ended abruptly with the admonition that "Europe should be a union of creative communities, not a sack of potatoes!"

Dusan Sidjanski agreed with Hankiss's assessment that a certain self-centredness had developed in contemporary society, but suggested that the emergence of voluntary associations and

networks pointed to a movement in the opposite direction and should not be forgotten. To Wolfgang Streeck he answered that governments were now accepting the State function of promotion, which ought to be acknowledged. Above national level he pointed to the European Union's functions of innovation and coordination, which, he argued, depend far more on participation and involvement than on the capacity for compulsion which has traditionally characterised government power.

Yves Mény remarked that there was something positive and stimulating about the diversity of welfare systems in Europe that it would be a pity to abandon. He recognised that the system was experiencing "a degree of breakdown, in terms of its present organisation at least, if not its legitimacy." In his view, massive State intervention in the economy had been justified to compensate for the market breakdowns of the 1930s and the post-war period. "Today", he said, "there is perhaps a less urgent need for intervention, and above all it can take different forms. In that sense, despite the problems it created, the neo-liberal challenge had the merit of forcing a rethink of the division between public and private sector." He remarked that in France, where there was strong support for what is termed public service, most of the routine services available to the population – refuse collection, water supply, etc. – were provided under (sometimes scant) local authority control but by private-sector firms. There was, he noted, "a form of public-private mix".

### **The golden triangle**

Mény, who supported Lang's comments on young people, welcomed the fact that more French students were now studying and taking examinations at European universities outside France. He thought it unfortunate, however, that those who then embarked on an academic career should have their best chance of finding employment in the "golden triangle" of Oxford, London and Cambridge. "In that respect the European mainland is unfortunately much less open than the United Kingdom, and it is ironic that it is easier for French, Spanish and German students to find work in one of those three universities than in their own countries."

Italian sociologist Arnaldo Bagnasco commented that few young European graduates, particularly in France and Germany, venture to set up innovative firms – an unhelpful "lack of an enterprise culture", in his view, which caused young people to take "the safe course of a career in the public sector or big companies."

How much emphasis should there be on individual responsibility in the reform of the social security systems? Streeck remarked that social democrats everywhere, in Europe and elsewhere, faced this question, and had to explain to voters that society has to accept a share of the risk. In his view, however, "the greatest problem remains safeguarding the European systems' traditional standard of equality, which is what marks them out from the welfare system in the United States." Since each country was different, he felt that answers should be sought at national level, but he suggested that Europe could contribute in an information and coordination capacity. However, he did not rule out the possibility that "in 10 or 15 years' time, our societies may experience much the

same levels of inequality as the United Kingdom and United States. The gap between richest and poorest has already widened," he noted, "and it is showing no signs of narrowing."

"Are market forces and investment sufficient defence against American dynamism?" asked French journalist Jean Daniéŕ. "If so, is there any option but to Americanise in order to resist the inexorable logic of American hegemony? And if Americanisation cannot be avoided, what use is Europe?" he added. "In other words, does European identity not consist in the final analysis, even if we do not like to admit it, of constructing a sort of autonomous province within the *pax americana* and the American empire?"

### **The dynamism of the English-speaking world**

The transition to a market economy in central Europe had not followed the western European lead, Rupnik pointed out. "On the contrary, everything that has just been described here was seen as a tired and broken model, with zero growth and unemployment of over 10%, while the economic dynamism of the English-speaking world exerted a powerful attraction."

That had been the case in Poland and Czechoslovakia in particular, where ministers such as Balserovicz and Vaclav Klaus looked to Milton Friedman and the Chicago school, Rupnik insisted. He hammered his point home with the examples of Romania and Bulgaria, where "pseudo-reforms or no reform at all turned out to be more costly in economic and social terms than shock therapy." Poland, meanwhile, had experienced neither strikes nor social upheaval, and for over five years had achieved the highest growth rates in Europe and among the highest in the world.

For the transition to democracy, on the other hand, Rupnik remarked that the same countries had been spoilt for choice between the American, British, French and German models. But for the reform of the welfare State there was no ready-made solution. "They are reinventing the welfare State at the same time as us," he said: "a clear opportunity for cooperation and interaction."

Bourlanges too predicted that eastern Europe, like the west, would have to devise mechanisms to reconcile market values with collective solidarity. He suggested that the ideology of economic ultra-liberalism which had gripped those countries at a point in their transition was "a natural counterreaction: people seeking to free themselves from a collective system by adopting its opposite, trying to liberalise the economy without stopping to think about the welfare State and solidarity."

Having said that, Bourlanges felt that if there was a split between two halves of Europe it was between north and south, because in the east a new system had yet to be devised, and the options were still open. On the one side the North, with a social democratic model in which the State mediated between social partners empowered to conclude agreements which were then complied with – the Dutch model, in fact. On the other the South, where European mechanisms requiring

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<sup>3</sup> Jean Daniel, manager of the *Nouvel Observateur*, was unavoidably detained in Paris but sent a message to the seminar.

negotiation were hamstrung by employers' resistance to what they saw as an "infernal machine" that would rob the southern States of their one competitive advantage.

Can the European model preserve its specific character in relation to the rest of the world for much longer? Bourlanges doubted it. It would not resist the forces of globalisation, he argued. While predicting some kind of balance between individual freedoms and public solidarity, he felt alignment on global models was inevitable, as it was hard to imagine a European system operating "in an appealing but vulnerable kind of cultural insularity".

## **Self-styled**

### **Padania**

Mény too expressed concern at some regions' moves to improve their comparative advantage. "There are a thousand and one ways of doing it," he said. "You can be better technologically, or more inventive. You can also be cheaper, and one option is precisely to lower social costs and resort to social dumping. That is, to some extent, the logical conclusion of the Thatcherite strategy, which initially made the United Kingdom so attractive to foreign investors. It is also what underlies the revolt of self-styled Padania, where the business community feels the Mezzogiorno is making it less competitive within Europe, and wants the region to go its own way."

This is where the issue of identity joins that of competitiveness and comparative advantage. "In the space of a few years, they have succeeded in creating a Padanian identity which is pure fabrication on the part of an enterprising leader," said Mény. He described this hijacking of social policy to gain an advantage over one's neighbour as a "dangerous threat to the European social model", and cited the case of north-east Italy's growing trade with neighbouring Slovenia, where labour costs are incomparably lower, which he blamed on a destructive – or at least highly dangerous – side-effect of Europe's welfare system.

"Regional action has become a force to be reckoned with, at the same level as that of the State," observed Delors. Nor should the role of towns and cities – often underestimated by regional development experts – be forgotten, he argued.

Mény replied: "But are the States, regions and towns of Europe socially and ideologically capable of accepting the kind of phenomenon that has long been seen in the United States, where population changes in the hundreds of thousands are recorded from one census to the next – a situation unlike any in Europe?"

"All right," said Delors, "but a European city is more than just an economic centre. It is unique in the world in having an identity and a character which ensure that it retains its attraction even in periods of economic decline." This specific urban character, as we shall see, was identified as a strong indicator of identity during the third round table discussion.

## 4 - Elusive civil society

Curiously, what is termed civil society has no existence by itself; only in relation to the State, explained Arnaldo Bagnasco in his introduction to the theme of the last round table discussion. He defined civil society as "the mass of social relations and institutions which are not directly dependent on politics or the State." While there is often talk of the "return" of civil society, he remarked, it is with the idea that politics retreats to make way for that society, suggesting that it has been stifled by an over-expansive State, but that remains a paradox in that, at the very time when the space assigned to it increases, it appears weakened.

This debate was especially lively in the United States, noted Bagnasco, where civil society was strongest. He recalled Tocqueville's comparison: what stands as a counterweight to a powerful company? In France it is the State, in England a lord, and in the United States an association. Bagnasco's analysis would therefore focus on the health of this civil society in Europe, where traditionally politics greatly influenced the social order.

### **Family circles**

In terms of the family, Bagnasco observed that the tide of uniformisation had reached its peak in the 1960s (with a strong nuclear family, low numbers of women in the labour market, a high incidence of couples marrying young, a low divorce rate and few births outside marriage). Subsequently, however, the situation in Europe had diversified. The Mediterranean countries – Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal –, where the family tradition is strongest, have a high rate of female employment and the lowest birth rates in Europe. Further north, in Belgium and Germany, where crèche and nursery provision is relatively rare, there is still a strong tendency for mothers to stay at home with their children, and it is common to have just one child. In Britain and the Nordic countries, meanwhile, the birth rate is rising. Rather than a breakdown in family values, Bagnasco suggested this was a time of experimentation, with new trends emerging and family ties being strengthened in the areas of sociability, support and even inheritance.

As regards religion, statistics show that in the Netherlands 54% of the population never attend a religious service; in the United Kingdom the figure is 36%. Germany at 21% and Italy at 12.5% (just below the United States' 13.5%) are at the other end of the scale. Religion, which had always been a strong source of identity in Europe, especially when linked to the State, was becoming a purely private affair, Bagnasco remarked. Was this clear sign of secularisation confounded by other indications, such as the crowds attracted by papal visits or the religious aspect of some forms of

voluntary activity? Not in Bagnasco's reading, which was that that traditional institutionalised religion had broken up into its four constituent parts: culture, ethics, sentiment, and world vision, which were now open to new combinations, such as participation without religious belief and religious belief without participation.

In a similar vein, Diamandouros later observed that "secularisation does not necessarily imply marginalisation or the gradual extinction of religion, but a reformulation and reorganisation of religion's place within civil society."

"With secularisation, religion is losing its ability to define a society's identity, but it retains some influence, for example, over political ideologies," Bagnasco continued. He did not believe there would be "a new fundamentalist backlash seeking to reconstruct the institutional unity of religious phenomenon by authoritarian means."

### **The fascination of the city**

In Europe, towns and cities are omnipresent. Throughout their history, neither political changes nor movements of borders have succeeded in tearing the urban fabric. The average distance between two European towns is 16 km, against 29 km in Asia, 53 in America, 55 in Africa and 114 in Oceania. Like other continents, Europe has had its share of urban sprawl and decay, but it also has a well structured system of small and medium-sized towns and regional capitals, said Bagnasco, arguing that in an age of globalisation, it is the strength of this urban fabric which prompts regionalist counterreactions. As Max Weber once observed, cities gain in power and visibility during certain historical interludes, when the higher levels of power weaken or falter.

"The historical precedent", said Bagnasco, "is the period between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, when, in a central corridor in Europe, stretching from the Mediterranean to the Baltic, a network of trading towns flourished and developed the earliest form of capitalism. Meanwhile, within these free cities a civil society in the modern sense of the term was being formed, and in the large centralised nation-States that were taking shape either side of the corridor cities also played a decisive economic part in ushering in modernity. Today the ability of several of our cities to select and plough their resources back into a new world is an unmistakable sign of the vitality of civil society in Europe.

"We should not forget", he continued, "that it is in these cities that modern society was born, of a pact between the political and economic spheres, between society and the State. Not civil society against the State, but the creation of institutions capable of ensuring balanced cooperation between the two, as a precondition for the balanced development of society." And he concluded: "These origins feed into a specifically political aspect of European identity which transcends national differences to form a shared cultural heritage."

European cities have always been a product of interaction between the market and the State, and that is what distinguishes them from American towns, added Yves Mény, who regretted that

cities were currently the poor relation of European integration. That, he said, was all the more damaging in that the cities were home to massive concentrations of people frequently excluded from civil society – foreigners in particular – and major investment was called for to develop participation in that society.

#### **Four transformations**

For middle Europe, after Bagnasco, Polish sociologist Jerzy Szacki, professor at the University of Warsaw, confessed that he was not entirely sure what civil society was, except "something very important and very good, which had been invented in the West and had now moved to the East." In the countries which had been under Soviet domination for 40 years, the idea had taken different forms at different times.

The first change, said Szacki, was a concept invented – or reinvented – by the democratic opposition in the late 1970s: a negation of the communist State, based on truth and freedom of choice. "It was a magnificent utopia, a self-governing committee and emancipated individuals who wanted, above all, to create a new moral and social order," he explained. "It was all about negating and rolling back the communist State, which was very good for uniting nations against communist rule, but offered neither a blueprint for a democratic State nor an economic programme for the future."

It was accordingly replaced by two other concepts, one political and the other economic. The first was based on the conviction that the most pressing concern after the revolution was political participation: joining parties, turning out to vote and building a new democratic framework, and for that the individual had to become an active citizen. The second was based on the assumption that there could be no true independence without private property and free enterprise. Rather than a moral or political transformation, what was needed, therefore, was economic reform in accordance with liberal principles, and all social problems were ascribed to problems in the functioning of the market.

The last transformation of civil society concerned NGOs and the voluntary sector. 20,000 voluntary associations had sprung up in Poland since 1989. "Some are small, some are short-lived, and there are those that see them as simply islands in a sea of complacency and indifference. That is true," admitted Szacki, but he nonetheless thought the development highly promising. Of the four faces civil society has adopted in eastern Europe over the past decade – moral, political, economic and charitable –, however, he could not say which was the most significant.

## **The distress of Romania**

The only Romanian participant at the seminar was Christian Preda, who lectures at the University of Bucharest. He stressed the "erratic correlation between political and economic progress". In Romania after 1989, he explained, two radically different arguments were heard. The first was extremely optimistic, maintaining that political and economic progress always went hand in hand. The second maintained they were always independent of each other: progress in one area precluded progress in the other. "This prompted a great deal of disillusionment in political circles, and also in Romanian society in general," Preda recalled; his personal view was that the relationship between the two was far less clear-cut, and had its highs and lows.

Was our analysis of civil society becoming an exercise in polyphony? Most of the speakers following these two introductory presentations suggested that it was, Nikos Mouzelis first of all. We could conclude, he summarised, that there are several concepts of civil society, each linked to a particular issue. It can be a means of curbing the authoritarian and arbitrary nature of the State, or of opposing absolutist or near-absolutist monarchies, authoritarian regimes or communism. From a completely different viewpoint, it can offer a criticism of bourgeois society and defence against the market.

Mouzelis himself would prefer to place civil society outside both the State and the market, and explore its scope as a self-organising structure for combating unemployment. "All citizens have the right and the obligation to remain active, undertake training and remain in the employment market," he declared. "Voluntary unpaid work should not be viewed as marginal." He himself saw it as "crucial", and argued that it was for civil society to find a way out of the absurd situation where vacancies could not be filled while at the same time most of the unemployed were paid to do nothing.

## ***Noblesse oblige***

Ronald Dore appeared somewhat sceptical about civil society's ability to counter the effects of the market. In economies such as the United States, it was the market that determined the primary distribution of income, he pointed out. As long as the number of unskilled jobs declined and those requiring a high level of training increased, the market would continue to favour qualifications, and Europe would not avoid the inequalities that could be seen elsewhere in market-led societies.

Tocqueville – once again – had observed that, in accordance with the motto "*noblesse oblige*", the motivation for collective voluntary activities in Europe was honour, whereas in the United States it was self-interest: joining forces when that best served personal interests. So, said Dore, if we want to stimulate voluntary activity, why not resurrect the notion of *noblesse oblige* here?

In Slovenia, it was civil society that had produced a new State after 1989. Now, however, the Slovenian State and civil society were in conflict. This point, examined by Dimitrij Rupel, echoed comments during the first round table discussion on the difficulty for the countries of central and east

Europe of delegating their newly regained national sovereignty.

Before 1989, Slovenia had been doubly disadvantaged, said Rupel. Not only was it subjected to a communist regime, but the State administration was in Belgrade – and formerly Vienna! – and very remote. The new democratic State had been born of civil society and the movement which grew up in the space of a single year, bringing together writers, the universities, the committee for the defence of human rights, poets and miscellaneous groupings. But it was too young to function properly yet, said Rupel. The people felt no attachment to it, and reserved their most virulent criticism for the decision to join the European Union, which was interpreted as a relinquishment of sovereignty and a betrayal of national identity and the Slovene language.

### **A disastrous result**

In Szent-Ivany's view, a functioning civil society implied close ties with the individual citizens, who must be responsible and aware of their duties as well as their rights. "That is the kind of person we lack," he said, explaining that communist domination, particularly in Hungary, had been founded on a more or less tacit agreement between the authorities and the citizens that allowed the latter a degree of freedom in their private life, on condition that they refrained from any involvement in public life. "Most people accepted it. The result was disastrous," said Szent-Ivany: "once neutralised, society became very self-centred and ultimately fragmented. That is what we now have to overcome."

Like Bagnasco, Pierre Kende saw civil society as comprising "all the networks of local and professional society", and he wondered whether they had become infra- or indeed anti-political. "Those who say they are part of civil society are generally anti-political," he said, and pointed out that in Europe it had traditionally been the role of the political parties to realise the aspirations of civil society and make democracy work on that basis.

Kende discussed the relations between civil society, of whatever kind, and political society, for, he said, "Europe's problem is political, and we must not lose sight of the fact that democracy has almost always grown out of a complex relationship between society and the political institutions. If we are thinking of Europe's future, it would be very helpful to know whether ties can be forged between the civil societies of every European country and European political society.

"We do not have to promote civil society. Either it exists or it doesn't; that is not our problem. But we do have to promote the possible connections between civil society and political society in Europe," he said, quoting examples from the recent past where civil society had contributed greatly to developing a national consciousness, as in Germany and the Slav countries. From that perspective, he would be happy to give the "civic societies" Davies had referred to earlier – drawing a distinction between civil and civic – the task of liaising between civil society and European society.

## **Pathology and politics**

When it came to definitions, Jean-Louis Bourlanges had plenty up his sleeve. For civil society, in France at least, he produced three:

"Anyone who goes on television to spout platitudes, and who is neither an elected politician nor a journalist, is a member of civil society." Alternatively, it could be "anyone who considers him- or herself to have political legitimacy without being elected", a group he immediately subdivided into three categories: "those who are preparing to be elected, those who were once elected, and – above all – those who for one reason or another are unelectable." And the indefatigable Bourlanges turned to Clausewitz for his third definition: "the continuation of politics by other means."

"There are thus as many manifestations of civil society as there political pathologies," he said, "as civil society exists wherever political society sickens. In the early 18th century, civil society was the development of a liberal and democratic society in response to an absolutist monarchy. More recently, in the countries of central and eastern Europe, it was protest against totalitarianism. But in our jaded and sceptical Western society it is something else again, associated with the particular pathology of each country."

In France, those who claim to speak for civil society were intellectuals, company directors and the leaders of the voluntary sector, and each group had its own grievance: poor analysis by political society, poor management by economic society, or the poor moral standards of politicians and public life.

What is the criticism levelled at politicians in general and MPs in particular? Bourlanges's reply was that the former are full-time career politicians and thus not representative of society, while the latter are merely the executive's shadow: the real decisions at national and Community level are taken elsewhere. "They are Plato's shadows in a cave. People know that and say so," he commented, going on to note that the aggregation and synthesis of social demand was itself a disputed function, and to suggest that there was perhaps a link "between the rise of civil society and that of social incivility."

## **Stifling new ideas**

Institutions dislike initiatives, particularly those that come from civil society. They tend to absorb them, and want to control everything, Elemer Hankiss commented, citing the example of the Greens, who had begun as a spontaneous civil movement and had then been absorbed by the institutional establishment. "Of course new ideas should be incorporated into institutions," he acknowledged, "but not too fast, because instant control stifles them before they have time to develop.

"And yet", he added, "there is no turning back the tide. The transformation of the basic values of the European Judaeo-Christian tradition cannot be reversed. So, whether we like it or not, institutions are going to change. If the people in power in Brussels or running national governments were to monitor the transformations occurring in civil society, that development could be speeded up."

"Civil society is a manifestation of the citizen's interest in public life," argued Czech senator Josef Jarab, explaining that in Prague after 1990, former dissidents such as President Vaclav Havel had supported civil society and sought to promote its development, whereas others such as the prime minister, Klaus, had seen it as an unwelcome form of opposition. In the debate at the time on whether civil society strengthened the pluralism of the democratic environment, Klaus had replied in the negative. "The way Klaus saw it, there was the citizen, as an individual within the market and a voter, on the one side and representative democracy on the other," Jarab claimed. "Between the two, there was nothing at all. It is not surprising", he added, "that that government was hostile to decentralisation and regionalisation, both of them closely linked to the rise in civil society."

## **Blowing the lid off**

Yves Mény provided the concluding remarks in the round table debate. Western democratic society rests on two pillars, he said: the popular vote, which justifies the democratic ideal, and constitutionalism, largely developed after 1945. That meant, he pointed out, that politics is increasingly circumscribed by norms, constitutional courts and fundamental rights.

"As a result of the unfortunate experiences of the interwar period, constitutionalism has remained in constant development everywhere, which is fortunate," he said, "but at the same time genuinely political forms of expression have ossified." That created an imbalance which he suggested had been more or less neutralised in the United States, where the federal system is highly constitutionalised but popular forces remain dominant at State level.

"So are we going to move towards a similar system in Europe?", asked Mény. "Towards a very strong constitutional legal superstructure at European level, and at national level popular – often populist – aspirations?" Unlike the United States, he suggested, Europe offered no channels for expressing such aspirations. He concluded with one last question: "What can we do to enable more

expression of popular concerns, so that frustrations do not build up and finally blow the lid off?"

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## 5 - Why live together?

**W**hen he visited eastern European countries after 1989 as president of the European Commission, Jacques Delors was in the habit of sounding out his hosts about what they expected from the European Community and why they wanted to join. Football being a universal language, the answer was often simply: "We want to play in the first division."

Despite his enthusiasm for the sport, Delors was not surprisingly unsatisfied by this reply, and by the failure to reflect more deeply on security problems in Europe, at a time when the race was on to see which institution, NATO or the European Union, would be the first to allow the countries of central and eastern Europe to join.

### **Putting the cat among the pigeons**

In his search for ideas to lead Europe into the third millennium, Delors was determined to prise an answer out of the representatives of middle Europe in Athens on the matter of "why we want to live together". To force them to respond and to ensure a lively debate for the last hour of the seminar, he was deliberately provocative: "What does European mean to you?" he asked them, and added coolly: "If you are looking to move up from the second to the first division, forget it! After all your criticisms of the current members yesterday, there is no point in joining them."

Then, really putting the cat among the pigeons: "We have not been a model for you in any way. We have failed to understand you. We have learned nothing from your achievements... So if the idea is simply to move up a division, don't join! Find yourselves another football league!"

This strategy yielded excellent results – to the satisfaction of all concerned. The middle Europeans present took advantage of a coffee break to consult with one another and agree on a collective response which, as Stéfan Tafrov said on their behalf, might seem disappointingly banal: "Our reasons for wanting to join the European Union are the political, economic and cultural reasons for which the Common Market was set up and has been maintained for so many years." Their individual explanations, on the other hand, were of very great interest.

## **A European dream**

From a specifically Bulgarian viewpoint, Tafrov gave the following reasons:

- Peacekeeping and reconciliation between the Balkan States: "We need a framework for that process," he said, "like Franco-German reconciliation after the war."
- The end of traditional superpower politics and the system of client States which had contributed to the region's misfortunes and tarnished its reputation.
- The impetus the European Union had given to the internal economic reform process, "by its very existence helping us carry out very difficult and painful reforms."

"We are feeling the lack of a common foreign and defence policy, and since we have security problems the Atlantic alliance remains the most realistic option for us," stated Tafrov, for whom in the final analysis the European project could not be solely political, economic or cultural. "The European identity could hinge on a European dream, just as the United States was built around an American dream," he said, "and I think we in what are at present the applicant countries should play an active part in shaping that dream."

Szent-Ivany expressed surprise that Delors's question to the countries of eastern Europe had not been put to Austria, Sweden and Finland before they joined. Delors corrected him: "I asked the question then," he stated, "and I am still asking it now: 'Why did you join,' I ask them, 'if you do not want a common foreign policy?' At the Commission, we resisted the temptation to plough on regardless, not because we wanted to avoid enlargement, but because we wanted an answer to the question: 'What do we want to achieve together?' Spain and Portugal, on the other hand, waited seven years and prepared carefully for accession, and their contribution to European integration has been quite remarkable."

Szent-Ivany briefly reviewed Hungary's reasons for wanting to join the Union:

- Political ambition: "We want to get away from the legacy of the cold war," he said, "and share not only the same values and traditions, but also the decisions."
- Economic interest: some 70% of Hungary's foreign trade was with the European Union, and the country needed free access to the market to acquire new technologies and attract investment. Any decision taken by the Council or the Commission had an impact on the Hungarian economy. How, asked Szent-Ivany, could they have such a close relationship and not take part in the decision-making?

## **Self-respect**

Elemer Hankiss had some rather different motivations to add to these general points:

- "We want to regain our self-respect," he said. "Over the past 50 years our societies have made too many mistakes, suffered too many setbacks and frustrations. We lost not only our sense of values, but some of our human dignity. Within the Union we could regain that self-respect far more quickly."

- The desire to participate in the largest political and economic project to be conceived since the second world war.
- "Hungary is a small country and you cannot make your voice heard if you speak Hungarian," he remarked. "We have a lot of good ideas that we would like to share with you. We feel that the European model is the best for resolving the complex problems of economic management and social justice. We would like to contribute to restoring the influence Europe has lost to America, making it a source of new ideas and new styles for the whole world once again."
- What is the difference between right and wrong? How should we face death? What is tolerance? "European civilisation needs to find new answers to these complex problems," Hankiss continued. "A nation-State cannot do much on its own. A continent such as Europe has many more opportunities open to it."

### **A question of ambition**

"A country that wants to join the Union is like a young person wanting to go to university: it is a question of ambition," suggested Dimitrij Rupel. His country, Slovenia, did 80% of its trade with the Union, and could not survive any other way. "It is not just the trade in goods and services," he insisted, "but also all the trade in ideas. Philosophy, literature, music: they all come to us from Europe," he said, "so we need to tie Slovenia to a culture to which it already belongs. If we want Slovenian still to be spoken 50 years from now, we need to start learning English and French. Without a knowledge of other languages, we will not keep our national identity alive."

"For us", said Josef Jarab, "the return to Europe is a human and cultural reflex of self-defence." He stressed the need for education felt by the countries of central and eastern Europe. "It is very important that the European Union is proposing the Tempus and Socrates programmes," he said. We need to bring mobility into education, and there must be more than just a study of the past: learning and markets, that's what we need."

The first opinion poll in Czechoslovakia on public perceptions of the country's future was held in January 1990. Some 95% of respondents said they were in favour of a resolute move towards an open and democratic system. "There can therefore be no alternative to joining the European Union. Any other policy would be seen as being without democratic legitimacy," declared Ivan Galal, recalling that voters in Slovakia had brought down the government when it sought to reverse this process, and replaced it with one in favour of EU and NATO membership.

## **Full members**

"Why are we so anxious to join NATO? Because", Gabal replied, "it is the only way to become full members of western Europe and the only way to secure its support for collective security and our defence.

"History has shown that bilateral relations and agreements with France and the United Kingdom are of no use," he added. "We are also very aware of what is going on in the former Yugoslavia; military action there must be an option, and that can happen only through NATO.

"What can we bring to the European Union?" he continued. "Admittedly a lot of negative experiences from our time outside the extended European family, but also markets with a high profit potential."

"There is a type of balance in the European Union that you do not find elsewhere, such as in the United States," Mouzelis stated, and he was in favour of improving that balance still further. As a Greek sociologist, he explained why he was glad that his country was a member of the Union, which was in essence that "Europe's forms of capitalism are more humane than the American brand and more democratic than Asian capitalism.

"It is by making this sort of comparison", he added, "that we can discover our shared interests, and it is on the basis of those shared interests, rather than on shared values, that we should build our European identity."

"Since we are trying to determine a European identity," remarked Constantinos Vgenopoulos, Director of the Greek centre for European studies EKEM, "we should bear in mind at least two fundamental factors which gave the Americans an advantage over the Europeans: a large internal market and the reserve function of their currency. For committed Europeans such as ourselves, the message should be clear."

Bourlanges also replied as a citizen of an existing Member State. He commented that Delors's question could in fact be broken down into two parts: "Are you interested in joining the Union?" and "What do you want to achieve together?" "The last enlargement taught us the cost of asking only the first of those questions," he said. "The Swedes, for example, had both every interest in joining the Union and a strong desire, once they were inside, that the Union should do nothing. They have largely achieved both those objectives."

It was the second part of the question he felt was important. "From the outset," he observed, "European integration has been more than an instrument serving what were in a sense external aims. It is an end in itself. It means establishing procedures and institutions, replacing confrontation with dialogue and the conventional trials of strength, which had brought only sorrow and destruction, with European Council meetings. European integration, combining the journey and the destination, is as baroque as the sculptures of Bernini, for whom Man was never more himself than when he was walking."

## **The risk of vacuum**

"Hence the risk of vacuum," said Bourlanges. "What is the point, some will say, since peace is increasingly seen – at least in the West – as a permanent achievement, requiring no consolidation? As this is combined with a degree of destabilisation at procedural level and a shift towards informal arrangements, there is at the same time something of a vacuum as regards objectives and a relaxation of procedure."

Having said that, Bourlanges argued that three factors continued to cement the pact:

- The trading function combined with certain collective values: a legally structured system designed to ensure a level playing field for producers, consumer safety and worker solidarity.
- The sharing function, which was now tending to displace all others and which involved reconciling sharing as a common policy goal with sharing within each Member State. The question was: "What should we do together at European level that we cannot each do in our respective countries?"
- The logic of power, which presented two temptations. The first, typically French, was the lure of a "powerful Europe": the idea that Europe can do what a great nation can no longer do by itself, i.e. make its mark on history. "That's absurd" said Bourlanges, arguing that Europe cannot be built on the nation-State model nor on opposition to the United States; what was needed was a form of partnership: "difficult to establish, but essential".

The second temptation was the equation whereby Europe exists to maintain economic and social welfare and the Atlantic alliance to maintain the balance of power. "If we start from that basis", said Bourlanges, "we misunderstand our fundamental objective, which is to secure not power but a presence, by accepting our share of responsibility in a new partnership."

He concluded by calling for an institutional pact between member countries, based on three things:

- the limitation of State power by law,
- the moderation of democratic passions by reason,
- the accommodation of others' concerns by the defence of personal interests.

## **In the first division**

"Europe must be equal to the strongest players, it must compete and defend itself. It must be in the first division," declared Norman Davies, returning to the football metaphor. He saw enlargement as an essential part of that process, but stressed the importance of reconciling the competing claims of deepening and enlargement.

Davies feared that on that point the wrong priorities had been chosen. "In the long term", he said, "enlargement will bring tremendous advantages, but in the short term we need to know who will pay the costs. What would be disastrous would be to pass them on largely to the poor countries of

Africa." Davies thought it "unrealistic to build higher and higher walls around the Union and expect the applicant countries to scale ever greater heights to get in. We need a compromise", he suggested, "between the existing achievements and the applicants' ability to meet European standards."

## Conclusion

Jacques Delors summed up the conclusions of the meeting – and the occasional illuminating clashes – between western and middle Europe, in the form of a preliminary assessment of what the two sides could pool together. First, however, he confirmed that the two main messages from eastern Europe had been received loud and clear, i.e.:

- 1) Western Europe has not been the model for either economic transition, where the American/British model had been dominant, or political transition.
- 2) Western Europe had shown no interest in the experience of eastern Europe or in what it could learn from the countries emerging from Soviet communism.

The first message he nonetheless tempered, pointing out that it was the European Union that had coordinated assistance to the countries of central and eastern Europe after 1989 and supplied the bulk of international aid. He also stressed the substantial efforts of the applicant countries in the ongoing preaccession process to harmonise their economic legislation with that of the Union and prepare their economies for the single market.

In east and west alike, Delors saw European cities as "a key element in our civilisation and our identity". The city as commercial centre, as cultural centre, as a vital aspect of regional development, or as the link between the market and the State? That, he observed, was a question to consider as part of a broad debate on European identity.

Civil society is neither the society of the State nor that of the market. That is true both in the east and in the west, where the voluntary sector and civic action are not without ambiguity. That conclusion from the discussions prompted Delors to ask two questions: can civil society become the co-creator of a new development model? Can it rebuild the fabric of community?

There was more or less unanimous agreement that the nation-State was in crisis, Delors noted. On the challenge of globalisation, however, opinions were divided between those who thought a united Europe was the most appropriate vehicle and those who thought the nation remained the essential force for social cohesion.

"Because of its size and the distances involved", he said, "the European Union will never be able to foster social cohesion." His own preference was therefore Europe as a "federation of nation-States in which the sense of national identity guards citizens against the intoxication of globalisation."

Delors argued that a European socioeconomic order should go beyond the social democratic model represented, each in its own way, by Sweden, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom at one time, and now the Netherlands and Denmark. What plans should be made for a European model? Opinions differed, he remarked. Some thought that it could be maintained, with some adjustments, but others did not think it could resist the pressure of globalisation without making compromises that would rob it of all meaning.

## **Fatal nostalgia**

Before closing, Delors identified some of what he felt were the crucial stages on the road to European integration.

- The first was "the European ideal and the European necessity". Even more than our political leaders, Delors confessed he was "haunted by the fact that Europe has not yet chosen between survival and decline."
- The second was the result of nostalgia for the past on the actions of the major European nations, which prevented a common external and security policy being implemented even by those that wanted it. "This nostalgia is fatal for Europe," he argued, "because it does not take the new balance of power into account. There is neither the objective scientific analysis nor the modesty required to take the world as it is."
- On the third milestone, peace, Delors had nothing to add to what had already been said.
- He did stress the fourth, however: the "family feeling" that means that "when Luxembourg speaks, it is just as important as if it were Germany, the United Kingdom or France." Delors saw this as "a tremendous lesson, perhaps the most positive the European Union has taught us." He saw that family feeling as essential for the institutions to function, and called on the European Parliament and Commission to cultivate it, as "without it there is no point in continuing."
- On the fifth milestone, the model of society, he suggested that Europe should be the continent of balance. "Of course changes are needed, and we must learn to adjust without abandoning our principles," he said. He nevertheless emphasised that in Europe, "unlike in the United States, the individual does not prosper at the expense of society and, unlike in Japan, society does not crush the individual."
- Delors inscribed the last milestone "ambition", for a Europe both powerful and generous. "And not to continue the dream of power of the great French nation," he said, "but because Europe has its own strengths."

Sadly, he remarked, rather than concentrating those strengths, the tendency was to disperse them at various points between heads of government, or between those in charge of the economy and those at the central bank. "Not to mention the armed forces and defence," he exclaimed: "how can a Europe who does not hold all its aces in one hand be expected to carry out even the simplest foreign policy operation?"

After that faint touch of disenchantment, however, he concluded on a more optimistic note, in reference to Stefan Zweig: we must, he said, "trust in the forces of the mind and of reason, and bring the intellectual community back into the political and public debate.

**ANNEX 1**

***THE EUROPEANS' EUROPE***

**by Henri MENDRAS<sup>1</sup>**

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<sup>1</sup> **Summary** of the book published by Gallimard, Folio collection, 1997

## **Introduction: the two Europes**

The idea of a Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals is a historical illusion. We will therefore distinguish between western Europe and the Other Europe. The dividing line runs precisely along the 1948 Iron Curtain, with the exception of two "errors of history" – East Germany and Bohemia, which are part of western Europe.

Four traits mark out this "European West" from the Other Europe.

### **1. Evangelical individualism**

Western individualism is rooted mainly in: **a)** the biblical message that every creature's salvation comes from the Creator alone, and **b)** Roman law, the most individualistic body of legislation ever enacted, as regards both personal law and property law. This radical individualism took thousands of years to permeate western society. It was an ideological upheaval of unimaginable magnitude, clashing as it did with the principle common to all known civilisations, whereby the group takes precedence over the individual. And it set western Europe apart from all other cultures, including those of the Other Europe, where individuals are first and foremost members of a society.

### **2. Peasants and nations**

Western Europe was populated by sedentary peasants from at least the 12th century onwards. The serf was "bound to the soil", which he could not leave without his master's permission. The agrarian history of the Other Europe is very different.

A clear distinction can be drawn between:

- the stable and individualistic farming communities of western Europe, and
- the farming communities of the Other Europe, ruled both by the boyars and by a collective tradition of individual submission to the laws of village and "undivided family".

The concept of nationhood is closely linked to that of the stable farming community. It derives from a conjunction of people, language and land. The concept of natural borders which is such an essential component of French national ideology stems directly from the culture of the sedentary peasant farmers. The State, whatever form it has taken in the various western European countries, has always identified itself with the nation. The Other Europe, in contrast, has an imperial tradition: it has no history of nationhood, despite the nationalist movements which emerged during the 19th century. While the concept of nationhood has been and remains dear to the peoples of eastern Europe, the diverse and geographically heterogeneous ethnic make-up of the region has always prevented them from putting it into practice.

### **3. The city, capitalism and industry**

In the teachings of the bible, two precepts found the separation of the worldly from the divine, the political from the religious sphere: "Ye cannot serve God and mammon" and "Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's". These two commands are at the root of the distinction between economics, politics and religion. A trichotomy unknown in most civilisations, and in particular in the Other Europe, where politics has never been divorced from religion and economics.

Against this background, the novel idea that capital should be exploited to increase

production, together with the legitimacy enjoyed by the bourgeoisie, ushered in western capitalism. And with the subsequent marriage of science and technology, industrial society was born.

The Other Europe, on the other hand (with the exception of Bohemia, which an "error of history" had placed on the other side of the Iron Curtain in 1948), still had no industrial base in 1939.

#### **4. The rule of the majority**

That half the population plus one should rule with the consent of the other half minus one is a bizarre arrangement that has never been legitimated outside western Europe (and for the past century, by contagion, the United States).

In contrast, the Other Europe has never known anything but unanimity: in the *mir*, the refusal of one head of a family was enough to block a joint decision. As this principle of unanimity is hard to maintain within larger units, the Other Europe has always been torn between rule by unanimity and anarchy. The idea that a majority should confer the legitimacy to rule is not merely an intellectual abstraction. It rests on a particular view of the world and of others, on trust in a society founded on the rule of law and the conviction that the State stands guarantor for the minority. This subtle ideological construct of centuries of legal wisdom cannot be transplanted from one civilisation to another like a turnkey factory. All the democracies of the Other Europe (except the Czechs) gave in to authoritarian rule before 1939, confounding the Allies' unthinking assumption that a few Paris-groomed politicians would suffice to run elections, political parties and democratic governments. "A charming naïveté not entirely without currency today, three-quarters of a century later".

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Individualism, capitalism, the nation-State and majority rule are not isolated characteristics

but essential properties which combine to form a "model". Nationhood and democracy imply a free citizenry; capitalism needs entrepreneurs and the rule of law.

No one element could exist without the others, and their conjunction is unique to western Europe. No one should be under the illusion that such profound differences between two models of civilisation could simply disappear with the fall of the Berlin wall.

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## **II. A western European model**

A western European "model" has thus developed around certain key concepts: an individualistic view of mankind; a distinction between three sources of legitimacy (religion, economics and politics); the importance of capital; the marriage of science and technology; contractual ties; the rule of law; and the right of ownership.

Is this model now moving towards greater uniformity or, on the contrary, will the new resources available to our societies encourage variety? We would support the second thesis: western society has become more flexible; its various components have gained greater freedom in relation to one another, resulting in greater complexity.

### **1. The religious heritage**

It may seem at times that we are entering a period of total dechristianisation, the secularisation of society being the inevitable corollary of modernity. In reality, the situation is more complex. There were four facets to religion in the established faiths: the expression of individual identity, the continuity of culture within a doctrine and learning, ethical principles and an emotional experience. That system has broken down. Today faith is possible without reference to a doctrinal tradition, and ethics without faith. Emotional experience is paramount and the sources of identity are undergoing a process of fragmentation.

People can construct their own religious memory and "believe" without necessarily "belonging" to a church. This is the culmination of the individualisation of religion that began with the Protestant Reformation. But it would be a grave mistake to think that this trend is isolating believers within their own personal rites. What has changed is that belonging has become a matter of choice, where once it was determined by birth. Witness the proliferation of spiritual groups (such as the free, Pentecostal and charismatic churches), reflecting what Lévi Strauss called the "revolt against meaninglessness" on a grand scale, with each seeking to recover a lost unity between body and mind, mankind and nature.

## **2. The advances of individualism and moral convergence**

Of their Christian heritage, the people of western Europe retained the basis of a shared individual and individualistic ethic. That common core remains in every population, region and section of society.

**a) Family and work** remain the dominant values. A happy family is the foremost aspiration of the European, whether within or outside the institution of marriage. Opinions on sexuality and the couple are highly diverse and often surprising. The Spanish, for instance, still have a traditional family structure but are also the leading proponents of unrestricted sexual freedom. The Scandinavians and Irish are those most in favour of abortion if the number of children is deemed sufficient... 60% of the Spanish population accepts the principle of single motherhood, compared with just 25% of Swedes... Work comes a close second after the family in the scale of values, but again with marked variations. The French are the most attached to their work, while in Germany and Britain one in five view it as not particularly important. These findings suggest that the Germans are best prepared for a world where work no longer takes up a person's entire life and working time varies with age and economic trends. The French and Spanish, on the other hand, would seem the least prepared for such changes.

**b) Interest in politics varies greatly,** from Belgium, where only 45% of the population claim to discuss politics from time to time, to Germany, where the figure is 85%. Political militants are generally a rare breed (5% on average, except in the Netherlands, where the figure is 10%) but non-institutional participation (in the form of petitions, strikes, boycotts, demonstrations, etc.) is growing. Direct participation would appear to have risen from 16% to 24% since 1973. It should be noted that the French are the most politically active (direct participation: 32%).

**c) Regions and nations.** Discrepancies are much more pronounced at regional level. Paradoxically, surveys have shown that the English and German cultures are comparatively homogeneous, although the two countries have both Catholic and Protestant communities and one of them is a federal State. Centralised, republican France, on the other hand, is almost as diverse as Italy. In terms of values, the most traditional regions are the southernmost Italy, Ireland, Extremadura and southern Portugal. England (with the exception of London) and Scotland are relatively traditionalist, while Germany (Bavaria excepted) and the Netherlands are modernist. Norway is more wedded to traditional values than Denmark and Sweden, while France and Belgium present sharp contrasts. These differences cannot be explained by religious tradition alone: Puglia, for instance, is more "modern" than left-wing Wallonia.

**d) Individualism and permissiveness.** Two forms of individualism may be distinguished. The pessimistic (or "particularist") variant is the self-seeking individualism that erodes the social fabric. The optimistic (or "universalist") variant upholds the principle of equal human dignity for all. Individualism may be thus seen as an attack on or an integral part of community. The contrast is particularly marked in Europe, where the degree of civic-mindedness varies from 20% to 45%. The most "civic" Europeans are the Irish, the Italians and the Scandinavians, while the French, Belgians and Germans rank lowest.

Scandinavia clearly has a universalist culture. Individual responsibility is valued, but so is

moral responsibility based on respect for the rules of community life. Conversely, the French, Belgians, Portuguese and Spanish are "uncivic" individualists. There is no sign of convergence in the way the two strains of individualism are developing. But modern individualism is not necessarily more self-serving. Trade union membership may have fallen from 13% to 10%, but participation in cultural associations has shot up from 6% to 10%, which would seem to indicate that the Europeans are moving away from institutionalised activities towards groups which meet their individual needs.

### **3. Family and kinship**

Emmanuel Todd makes a distinction between the models of the '**undivided family**', where all the brothers remain under the same roof subject to the authority of the patriarch, the '**stem family**', where only one child receives the full estate, and the '**nuclear family**', where the parents divide their belongings among their children. The first form is widespread in the Other Europe (with the exception of Poland), while the other two are characteristic of western Europe. Todd also demonstrates that each family structure corresponds to a particular world view (contrasting the differentialist ideology of Germany, where the stem family predominates, with the universalist ideology of France, where the dominant model is the nuclear family in which all the brothers are equal).

If we accept that differing family structures breed differing views of the world, the question is whether the current changes in these structures will overturn the most deeply held beliefs or whether these ideologies are sufficiently autonomous to survive the breakdown of the family unit. One thing is certain: the differences between family models have grown considerably more stark over the past 30 years. 30 years ago, 2.5 children per family was the average in almost all countries. Two-children families are now widespread in northern Europe and France. In northern Italy and Spain and southern Germany, however, the only child has become the rule. In other words, the gap is widening between those countries where population levels remain stable and the others.

The fall in the birth rate cannot be ascribed to any single factor. Neither religion (birth rates

are low in Spain and Italy) nor female employment rates (Liguria has both the lowest female employment rate and the lowest birth rate in Europe) provide a satisfactory explanation.

Up to the 1970s, family structures seemed unassailable, despite changing values and growing prosperity. Young people in western Europe were breaking with a long tradition of late marriage by tying the knot increasingly early, and the numbers of single people, births out of wedlock and common law marriages were declining and confined to the margins of society. At the time, these trends could be seen as a sign of a convergence of social values: for the first time, the whole of western Europe was conforming to the Christian model of the family. But then, at the start of the 1970s, the 1968 protest movement suddenly began to spread. What had seemed a limited rebellion in fact shook one of the fundamental institutions of Christianity to its very foundations. The average age for marrying again rose above 26 in all western European countries, whereas nowhere in the Other Europe does it top 24. Substantial variations emerged in the number of births out of wedlock, from 50% in Sweden to 35% in France and 15% in Germany. Lone person households grew to account for 40% of the total in West Germany and Sweden, and 27% in France. Diversity in family structures increased: singles and single mothers, unmarried couples living together, blended stepfamilies, etc. If blended stepfamilies were to become the majority, continental Europe would experience a major transformation in its kinship system, moving closer to the British model, which places the individual first.

However, as the family unit grows weaker, so the extended family is gaining in importance. Increased life expectancy has added a generation to all families, and the family network has come to play a fundamental role in the redistribution of services, income and estates. 75% of married Europeans live less than 20 km away from their parents, and there is an increasing tendency to draw on the extended family as a source of memories, identity, social ties and economic and moral support.

The only exceptions are Germany (where the Nazi era caused a rift between the generations) and the United Kingdom (where the extended family is not regarded as very

important outside aristocratic circles). The family is increasingly fulfilling an economic support role. But the relationship between the generations is now reversed: instead of children taking care of their elders, parents are helping their children. Families are shouldering some of the responsibilities of a welfare State in crisis. Nevertheless, while family ties have not necessarily loosened, they have changed. The individual is no longer subject to the institution; instead the latter must serve the individual. The family unit is expected to provide individual happiness, and one that does not can be replaced. Relationships that were once governed by clear rules have now become elective: everyone chooses how and with whom from among the extended family to forge ties.

#### **4. Yesterday, classes and social strata...**

The triumph of the middle classes has confounded Marxist theory, replacing it with the theory of a pyramid of social strata. In all western European countries, the remarkable demographic and economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s radically altered employment and career structures and generated a high degree of social mobility. Social background became a less significant factor in the choice of a partner than educational attainment. In other words, economic and social background is losing importance, and education is becoming crucial. Now that broad social groupings have ceased to form the basis of western European society, the individual is released from the confines of those limited, coherent worlds. Working-class, bourgeois and popular culture are no longer there to provide sure models of behaviour and moral standards. But while social structures have become more flexible, everywhere the social advancement that accompanied the post-war boom is slowing.

#### **5. Tomorrow, divisions and networking?**

- a) The emergence and formalisation of "**age groups**" is the most radical change to

have affected western societies in the last 50 years. The phenomenon has brought about an upheaval in social structures comparable with the emergence of class as industrial societies developed in the 19th century. Young people used to be "young adults", rather than "young people" as opposed to adults. They would begin work, marry and set up their own home in one step. They left their parents to get married once they were able to earn a living – instantly propelled into adulthood. Today the transition to adulthood stretches over around 10 years and can take very diverse forms from one European country to another, from the Mediterranean countries, where young people stay with their parents until they marry, to the French and Nordic model, where they leave the family home as quickly as possible, even before completing their studies, to live among their own peer group. At the other end of the age scale, increased life expectancy has generated the "third age" – a new social category which is the antithesis of the hard-working, productivity-minded post-war society, enjoying total leisure, good health and a steady income.

**b) Gender equality** in education is now established in almost all countries. Everywhere, a majority of both men and women think that a woman is entitled to work if she wishes (20 years ago, a majority believed that women should work only if they had to). However, while women account for 40% of the European workforce, they are still paid 23% to 35% less than men. Here again, several models can be identified. In the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, the female employment rate is low, gender pay differentials are pronounced and a large proportion of women work part-time and give up their job when they have children. This is in sharp contrast to Denmark, where employment rates and pay levels are virtually equivalent to those of men. It is worth noting that in all countries, marriage improves men's career prospects but harms women's.

**c)** The breakdown of the class system and the increase in average incomes may give an impression of growing equality. But new, more subtle forms of inequality are emerging. Information, for instance, has become essential to access the best school or hospital. Social segregation in the inner cities has increased in all countries. And a dangerous trend towards crystallisation can be observed at both extremes of the social scale: ever more stigma is attached to poverty, and the elite is demonstrating an

unfortunate tendency towards isolationism. Poverty was once a largely hereditary phenomenon affecting sections of both the urban and the rural population. Today it is mainly the culmination of a process of social exclusion: the "slide" into poverty follows a personal crisis such as unemployment, an accident or divorce. With the risk that this "new poverty" might again become hereditary, generating a new "underclass". And in all countries there is a correlation between occupational instability and marital instability, although it is impossible to determine which of the two is the causal factor of the other. But how this inequality is experienced varies markedly. In France, work is so important that unemployed people feel diminished. They become isolated from their family, colleagues and neighbours. In the United Kingdom, the strength of the working-class and local communities, the importance of such "institutions" as the pub, and the lesser value attached to work enable the unemployed to maintain and indeed extend their social network, through ties formed on the dole. The image of poverty also varies from one country to another. 10 years ago, the French used to think that the poor had only themselves to blame. But the tide of public opinion has turned, and poverty is now seen as a social ill for which individuals cannot be held responsible. Hence the concept of "national solidarity". Conversely, the British favour spurring the poor on to action and avoiding the snare of welfare dependency.

Three models of poverty coexist:

- **the integrated poverty** of less developed and under-industrialised regions, where the poor form a large group, well integrated into family and local community networks; combating poverty in this case is a matter for all-round economic development policy;
- **the marginal poverty** of the misfits who did not share in the post-war economic boom;
- **the poverty of exclusion**, born of the various mechanisms which are shutting out an increasing number of people who "slide" into poverty by accident; this is a predominantly urban phenomenon.

At the other end of the social scale, a gradual sclerosis of the **ruling classes** can be

observed. Efforts to democratise education have admittedly been successful in quantitative terms throughout Europe. Almost 90% of young people stay on at school between the ages of 16 and 18 in France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. Yet equal opportunities have not scored significant advances in any country. The governmental, political and administrative elite are becoming increasingly professional, and there is a risk of their losing touch with the public as a whole. In higher education, there is a sharp contrast between the selective, Malthusian British system, where 8.5% of school-leavers go on to university, and the open-access French and German models, where the figures are 25% and 23% respectively. The elite are trained within three educational models: the British Oxbridge model, an aristocratic form of recruitment through two generalist universities; the French *grandes écoles* model, an ostensibly meritocratic system which produces a highly specialised elite (public law and economics at Sciences-Po and the ENA and mathematics at the Polytechnique); and the German, Austrian, Scandinavian and Italian models, which comprise a number of universities of equal rank. It is worth recalling that in France the elite emerge far earlier than in Germany. The young people likely to attain the upper echelons of power are known in France from age of 20, whereas their German counterparts must wait until they are 35 or 40 before a promising start to their career signals the probability of future leadership.

Thus by a strange paradox, advances in equality have generated a host of inequalities. European societies are torn by a series of new divisions. New inequalities, affecting categories rather than individuals, are gaining ground.

## **5. The State, between Europe and the regions**

a) **The State** has become too small for the big things and too big for the small things, in the words of Daniel Bell. This is particularly true of the four large western European countries, where the State has lost a number of its sovereign powers and a

"Europe of the cities" is reemerging. At a time when the welfare State is passing on its responsibilities to local government, various factors are promoting greater decision-making autonomy for cities – and even large towns – in all countries. But it would be wrong to diagnose this as the demise of the State, which still occupies a central and decisive position between Brussels and the regional capitals. In certain respects, the State plays a greater part than ever in the daily lives – civic, family and professional – of the population, as a service provider and protector of the weak. Nevertheless, while nothing can be done without the State, it is also true that it can no longer command and be obeyed without first negotiating with Brussels, regional government and corporate representatives. In countries where the State is weak and local government and corporate power are well organised, the transition will be quite smooth. In France, however, where the intermediate levels of government have no other legitimacy than that conferred by the State, it will be a shock.

b) **Immigration** remains a good yardstick against which to compare the various concepts of nation and citizenship. The old opposition between German and French attitudes on the matter still holds today: France's strong capacity for integration is reflected in a high percentage of mixed marriages – 20% of children born of an Algerian father have a French mother and 25% of children born of an Algerian mother have a French father. In Germany, only 2% of children born of Turkish mothers have a German father.

## **6. The diversity of capitalist systems**

Since the end of the communist/capitalist dichotomy, attention has turned to the diversity of forms which capitalism can take. Even within the four large western European States, regional and sectoral discrepancies are so pronounced as to make it virtually impossible to speak of national systems of capitalism.

Four types may be distinguished:

- **Negotiated capitalism** (Sweden, Germany, Austria and Spain), which has been hard hit by economic globalisation in all countries.
- **Networked capitalism** (Italy, Denmark, southern Germany, northern Italy), found in industrial basins where a host of networked SMEs operate using State and banking services at regional level. The best example is the Turin-Milan-Trieste triangle, where the mainspring of growth is social rather than economic: strong family ties, self-help networks, openness to international trade, active municipal authorities and banking institutions, etc. This is a revival of the Italy of the late Middle Ages, where self-governing cities and principalities maintained links stretching all over the world.
- **Colbertian capitalism.** In France, company directors have always hesitated to venture abroad without the help of the State; economic life remains excessively centralised. The strength of the French model is first and foremost due to the State's decision-making power and the competence of its *grands corps* – its civil servant elite. There is no point, however, in seeking to replace the French model with a German or free-market one, for systems of capitalistic management cannot be imported. The lack of interdependence between the various economic institutions, the inability to synchronise change except at times of crisis and the fact that only the State can find new compromises are all obstacles to transferring the German model to France.
- **Individualistic capitalism** in the Thatcherite mould, in which there is no society, only individuals.

At a time when the Swedish model is becoming obsolete and the German and French models are proving too rigid to cope with globalisation, the only options would appear to be British-style free-marketeering and Italian-style networking. But the German and French models are closer than they appear and have the resources to evolve. Only an alliance between them could save organised capitalism.

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## **Conclusion: changing without losing identity**

A historical illusion might appear to suggest that the steamroller of modernity is levelling out diversity. In actual fact, although western Europe draws unity from an important common core of characteristics, it remains extraordinarily diverse. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the ongoing process of change is not carrying it towards greater uniformity. The Americanisation of Europe is a myth: the proliferation of hamburger joints is merely symptomatic of the diversification of eating habits which began with the introduction of Italian, Moroccan and Asian cuisine... The growing diversity of our tastes and lifestyles is a safeguard against the domination of a single culture.

During the post-war boom, the economy was the driving force behind the western world's great leap forward. But technology is no longer the *primum movens*; social considerations now prevail over economics rather than the reverse. As a consequence, the common goal of progress is losing its grip on the collective psyche. No social ideal remains capable of harnessing efforts in the hope of a better future. But the real revolution is perhaps the turnaround in relations between the individual and the group. Individual happiness rather than national glory must now be the chief concern of any government. We all want to be free to determine our own standards, lifestyles and relationships.

But the prophets of doom who warn of a weakening of social ties and the individual isolated in a "solitary crowd" are mistaken. Individualism implies stronger social ties, common values, shared feelings... it is the individual seeking communities where he or she can feel at home with others.

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## ANNEX 2

*Europe*  
*A History<sup>1</sup>*

by Norman Davies

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<sup>1</sup> Pimlico, 1997. **Summary** of the Introduction.

## Concepts of Europe

« Europe » is a relatively modern idea. It gradually replaced the earlier concept of « Christendom » in a complex intellectual process lasting from the fourteenth to the eighteenth centuries. The decisive period was reached in the decades on either side of 1700 after generations of religious conflict. In the early phase of the Enlightenment it became an embarrassment for the divided community of nations to be reminded of their common Christian identity; and « Europe » filled the need for a designation with more neutral connotations. In the West, the wars against Louis XIV inspired a number of publicists who appealed for common action to settle the divisions of the day. Quaker William Penn (1644-1718) had the distinction of advocating both universal toleration and a European parliament. The dissident French abbé, Charles Castel de St Pierre (1658-1743), author of "*Projet de paix perpétuelle*", called for a confederation of European powers. In the East, the emergence of the Russian Empire under Peter the Great required radical rethinking of the international framework. The Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 provided the last major occasion when public reference to the *Respublica Christiana*, the « Christian Commonwealth » was made.

After that, the awareness of a European as opposed to a Christian community gained the upper hand. Writing in 1751, Voltaire described Europe as « *a kind of great republic divided into several states...* ». Twenty years later, Rousseau announced: « *There are no longer Frenchmen, Germans and Spaniards, or even English, but only Europeans* ». According to one judgement, the final realisation of the « idea of Europe » took place in 1796, when Edmund Burke wrote: « *No European can be in complete exile in any part of Europe* ».

Even so, the geographical, cultural and political parameters of the European community have always remained open to debate.

Most of Europe's outline is determined by its extensive sea-coasts. But the delineation of its land frontier was long in the making. The dividing line between Europe and Asia had been fixed by the ancients from the Hellespont to the River Don, and it was still there in medieval times.

A fourteenth-century encyclopedist could produce a fairly precise definition: «...*Europe begins on the river Tanay (Don) and stretches along the Northern Ocean to the end of Spain. the east and south part rises from the sea called Pontus (Black Sea) and is all joined to the Great Sea (the Mediterranean) and ends at the islands of Cadiz (Gibraltar)* ». Pope Pius II began his early Treatise on the State of Europe (1458) with a description of Hungary, Transylvania and Thrace, which at that juncture were under threat from the Turks. Neither the ancients nor the medievals had any close knowledge of the easterly reaches of the European Plain. So it was not until 1730 that a Swedish officer suggested that Europe's boundary should be pushed back from the Don to the Ural Mountains and the Ural River. Sometime in the late eighteenth century, the Russian government erected a boundary post on the trail between Yekateringburg and Tyumen to mark the frontier of Europe and Asia. From then on the gangs of Tsarist exiles, who were marched to Siberia in irons, created the custom of kneeling by the post and of scooping up a last handful of European earth. « There is no other boundary post in the whole world », wrote one observer, « which has seen....so many broken hearts ». By 1833, when Volger's *Handbuch der Geographie* was published, the idea of « Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals » had gained general acceptance. None the less, there is nothing sacred about the reigning convention. The extension of Europe to the Urals was accepted as a result of the rise of the Russian Empire. But it has been widely criticised, especially by analytical geographers. The frontiers on the Urals had little validity in the eyes of Halford Mackinder, of Arnold Toynbee, for whom environmental factors had primacy, or the Swiss geographer, J.Reynold, who wrote that « Russia is the geographical antithesis of Europe ».

Geographical Europe has always had to compete with notions of Europe as a cultural community; and in the absence of common political structure, European civilisation could only be defined by cultural criteria. Special emphasis is usually placed on the seminal role of Christianity. Broadcasting to a defeated Germany in 1945, the poet T.S Eliot stressed the interdependence of the numerous sub-cultures within the European family and the centrality of the Christian tradition, which subsumes within itself the « *legacy of Greece, of Rome and Israël* »: «...*An individual European may not believe that the Christian faith is true; and yet what he says, and makes, and does, will all...depend on (the Christian heritage) for its meaning. Only a Christian culture could have produced a Voltaire or a Nietzsche. I do not believe that the culture of Europe could survive*

*the complete disappearance of the Christian faith* ». This concept is, in all senses, the traditional one. It is the starting point of what Mme de Staël once called « *penser à l'européenne* ».

For cultural historians of Europe, the most fundamental of tasks is to identify the many competing strands within the Christian tradition and to gauge their weight in relation to various non-Christian or anti-Christian elements. Pluralism is *de rigueur*. Despite the apparent supremacy of Christian belief right up to the mid-twentieth century, it is impossible to deny that many of the most fruitful stimuli of modern times, from the Renaissance passion for antiquity to the Romantics' obsession with Nature, were essentially pagan in character. Similarly, it is hard to argue that the contemporary cults of modernism, eroticism, economics, sport or pop culture have much to do with the Christian heritage. The main problem nowadays is to decide whether the centrifugal forces of the twentieth century have reduced that heritage to a meaningless jumble or not. Few analysts would now maintain that anything resembling a European cultural monolith has ever existed. One interesting solution is to see Europe's cultural legacy as composed of four or five overlapping and interlocking circles (see Appendix).

It would be wrong to suppose, however, that "Europe" was devoid of political content. On the contrary, it has often been taken as a synonym for the harmony and unity which was lacking. The messianic or utopian view of Europe can be observed as far back as the discussion which preceded the Treaty of Westphalia. It was loudly invoked in the propaganda of William of Orange and his allies, who organised the coalitions against Louis XIV, as in those who opposed Napoleon. It was present in the rhetoric of the Balance of Power in the eighteenth century and of the Concert in the nineteenth. In the twentieth century, the European ideal has been revived by politicians determined to heal the wounds of the two world wars. In the 1920s, it found expression in the League of Nations. It was specially attractive to the new states of Eastern Europe who sought communal protection against the great powers. In the late 1940s, after the creation of the Iron Curtain, it was appropriated by people who were intent on building a Little Europe in the West, who imagined their construction as a series of concentric circles focused on France and Germany. But it equally served as a beacon of hope for others cut off by oppressive communist rule in the East. The collapse of the Soviet empire in 1989-91 offered the first glimpses of a pan-European community that could aspire to spread to all parts of the continent.

For more than five hundred years, the cardinal problem in defining Europe has centred on the inclusion or exclusion of Russia. Russia's Western neighbours have often sought reasons for excluding her. Russians themselves have never been sure whether they wanted to be in or out. In 1517, a geographical treatise published in the University of Cracow upheld the traditional distinction between *Sarmatia europaea* (European samartia) and *Samartia asiatica* (Asian Sarmatia) with the boundary on the Don. So Poland-Lithuania was in and Russian-Moscovy was out. Three centuries later, things were not so clear. Russia's frontier had shifted dramatically westwards. When the Frenchman Louis-Philippe de Ségur passed by on the eve of the French revolution, he was no in doubt that Poland no longer lay in Europe. Yet there was exactly the era when the Russian government was insisting on its European credentials. The Empress Catherine categorically announced in 1767 that "*Russia is a European state*". Everyone who wished to do business with St Petersburg took note. The growth of a general consensus regarding Russia's membership of Europe was greatly strengthened by Russia's role in the defeat of Napoleon and by the magnificent flowering of Russian culture. After 1917, the conduct of the Bolsheviks revived many of the old doubts and ambiguities. The Bolsheviks were widely regarded abroad as barbarians - a gang of wild Asiatics like Attila or Genghis Khan. In Soviet Russia, the Marxist revolutionaries were often denounced as a Western implant, dominated by Jews, backed by Western money and manipulated by German Intelligence. Lenin and his circle identified closely with Europe. They saw themselves as heirs to a tradition launched by the French Revolution; they saw their immediate roots in the socialist movement in Germany and they assumed that their strategy would be to join up with revolutions in the advanced capitalist countries in the West. Only under Stalin, did the Soviet Union choose to distance itself spiritually from European affairs. Of course, seventy years of totalitarian Soviet rule built huge mental as well as physical curtains across Europe. In their hearts, however, many individual Russians followed the great majority of non-Russians in the Soviet bloc in fostering a heightened sense of their European identity. It was a life-line for their spiritual revival against communism. When the chains of communism melted away it enabled them to greet, in Vaclav Havel's phrase, the "Return to Europe". None the less, scepticism about Russia's European qualifications continued to circulate both in Russia, with nationalists, which dislikes and envies the West and unreformed

communists and outside Russia, where the Russian Federation is seen as unripe for liberal democracy.

Some commentators have insisted that Britain's European credentials are no less ambiguous than Russia's. From the Norman Conquest to the Hundred Years War, the kingdom of England was deeply embroiled in Continental affairs. But for most of modern history the English sought their fortune elsewhere. Like the Russians, they were definitely Europeans, but with prime extra-European interests. They were, in fact, semi-detached. Their habit of looking on the "Continent" as if from great distance did not start to wane until their empire disappeared. What is more, the imperial experience had taught them to look on Europe in terms of "great powers", mainly in the West, and "small nations", mainly in the East, which did not really count. The initiators of the first pan-European movement in the 1920s assumed that neither Britain nor Russia would join.

In the mean time, a variety of attempts have been made to define Europe's cultural subdivisions. In the late nineteenth century, the concept of a German-dominated *Mitteleuropa* was launched to coincide with the political sphere of the Central Powers. In the inter-war years, a domain called "East Central Europe" was invented to coincide with the newly independent "successor states" - from Finland and Poland to Yugoslavia. This was revived again after 1945 as a convenient label for the similar set of nominally independent countries which were caught inside the Soviet bloc. By that time, the main division, between a "Western Europe" dominated by NATO and the EEC and an "Eastern Europe" dominated by Soviet communism seemed to be set in stone. In the 1980s a group of writers led by the Czech novelist, Milan Kundera, launched a new version of "Central Europe", to break down the reigning barriers. The "Heart of Europe" is an attractive idea which possesses both geographical and emotional connotations. But it is peculiarly elusive. One author has placed it in Belgium, another in Poland, a third in Bohemia, a fourth in Hungary and a fifth in the realm of German literature.

During the seventy-five years when Europe was divided by the longest of its civil wars, the concept of European unity could only be kept alive by people with the greatest intellectual courage to resist not only persistent nationalism, but also the parochial view of a Europe based exclusively on the prosperous West. One such person was Hugh Seton-Watson (1916-84), professor at the School of

Slavonic and East European Studies.

His argument stressed three fundamental points - the need for European ideal, the complementary role of the East and the West European nations and the pluralism of Europe's cultural tradition. Seton-Watson was one the minority of Western scholars who bestrode the barriers between East and West and who saw Soviet communism for what it was.

### **Western Civilization**

For the best part of 200 years, European history has frequently been confused with the heritage of "Western Civilization". Indeed, the impression has been created that everything Western is civilized, and everything Western is civilized. By extension, or simply by default, anything vaguely "Western" or "Oriental" stands to be considered backward or inferior. The workings of this syndrome have been ably exposed with regard to European attitudes towards Islam and the Arab world. But it is not difficult to demonstrate that it operates with equal force in relation to some of Europe's own regions, especially in the East. Western civilisation is not taken to extend to the whole of Europe (although it may be applied to distant parts of the globe far beyond Europe). Historians most given of thinking themselves as from "the West" rarely see any necessity to describe Europe's past in its entirety. Any number of titles could be cited which masquerades as histories of "Europe" or of "Christendom" but which relate only to their chosen fragments of the peninsula. That is a very strange phenomenon. It seems to assume that historians of Europe can conduct themselves like the cheese-makers of Gruyère, whose product contains as many holes as cheese. If textbooks of human anatomy were designed with the same attention to structure, one would be contemplating a creature with one lobe to its brain, one eye, one arm, one lung and one leg.

The chronology of the subject is also instructive. The idea of the "West" is as old as the Greeks, who saw Free Hellas as the antithesis of the Persian-ruled despotisms to the East. In modern times, it has been adopted by a long succession of political interests who wished to reinforce their identity and to dissociate themselves from their neighbours.

As a result, "Western civilisation" has been given a dozen or so meanings and connotations: the Roman Empire; the Christian Civilisation; the Catholic world; Protestantism; the French variant of Western Civilisation in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; the imperial variant in the nineteenth century; the Marxist variant; the first German variant which led to a distinction between *Abendlich* (Occidental) and *Westlich* (Western) civilisation; the WASP variant which lasted from World War I until the collapse of the British Empire; the second German variant as conceived by the Nazis; the American variant which includes not only countries belonging to NATO but also the "Pacific Rim"; the Euro-variant with the EEC...

From all these examples it appears that Western civilization is essentially an amalgam of intellectual constructs which were designed to further the interests of their authors. It is the product complex exercises in ideology, of countless identity trips, of sophisticated essays in cultural propaganda. Its elastic geography has been inspired by the distribution of religion, by the demands of liberalism and of imperialism, by the unequal progress of modernisation, by the divisive effects of world wars and of Russian Revolution, and by the self centred visions of French philosophies, of Prussian historians, and of British and American statesmen and educators, all of whom have had their reasons to neglect or to despise "the East". In its latest phase it has been immensely strengthened by the physical division of Europe, which lasted from 1947-48 to 1991. On the brink of the twenty-first century, one is entitled to ask in whose interests it may be used in the future. A set of assumptions recurs time and again. The first maintains that West and East, however defined, have little or nothing in common. The second implies that the division of Europe is justified by natural, unbridgeable differences; the third that the West is superior; the fourth that the West alone deserves the name of Europe. Anachronism is particularly insidious. By taking transient contemporary divisions, such as the Iron curtain, as a standing definition of "West" and "East", one is bound to distort any description of Europe in earlier period. Poland is neatly excised from the Renaissance, Hungary from the Reformation, Bohemia from industrialisation, Greece from the Ottoman experience. More seriously, one deprives a large part of Europe of its true historical personality. There has been no shortage of counter-claims from

the East. The Soviet theme of an East free from moral and ideological corruption has been adapted by dissident intellectuals. They felt themselves less infected by the mindless materialism of the West, and argued that communist oppression had strengthened their attachment to Europe's traditional culture.

None the less no historian could deny that there are many real and important lines on the map which have helped to divide Europe into "West" and "East". Probably the most durable is the line between Catholic (Latin) Christianity and orthodox (Greek Christianity). It has been in place since the earliest centuries of our era. As shown by events during the collapse of Yugoslavia, it could still be a powerful factor in the affairs of the 1990s. But there are many others. There is the line of the Roman limes, there is the line between the western Roman Empire and the eastern Roman Empire, there is the Ottoman line and, more recently, the Iron Curtain. Less certainly, social scientists invent divisions based on the criteria of their own disciplines. Economic historians, for example, see a line separating the industrialised countries of the west from the peasant societies of the East. Historical anthropologists have identified a Leningrad-Trieste line, which supposedly separates the zone of nuclear families from that of extended family. Legal historians trace a line separating the lands which adopted the Roman law and those which did not. Some political scientists have found a line dividing "Western" and "non-western" forms of nationalism. Yet, one has to be prudent when dealing with such divisions. If one does, one finds that the best candidate for a nationalism of the Eastern type is to be found in the far West of Western Europe, in Ireland.

All these lines, real and imagined, have profoundly affected the framework within which European history has been conceived and written. Their influence is so strong that some commentators can talk disparagingly of a "White Europe" in the West and a "Black Europe" in the East. The division of Europe into two opposing halves, therefore, is not entirely fanciful. Yet one has to insist that the West-East division has never been fixed or permanent. Moreover, it rides roughshod over many other lines of division of equal importance. It ignores serious differences both within the West and within the East; and it ignores the strong and historic division between North and South.

Any competent historian or geographer taking the full range of factors into consideration can only conclude that Europe should be divided, not into two regions, but into five or six. Similarly, no

competent historian is going to deny that Europe in its various guises has always possessed a central core and a series of expanding peripheries. One could argue in a very real sense that Europe's periphery lies along a line joining San Francisco with Buenos Aires, Cape Town, Sydney and Vladivostok. Yet, once again, there can be no simple definition of what the core consists of. Different disciplines give different analyses.

They have based their findings on geography, ethnicity, culture, politics or economics. Wherever or whatever the core is taken to be, it is linked to the Ebro, the Danube and the Volga as well as the Rhône and the Rhine; to the Baltic and the Black Sea as well as the Atlantic and the Mediterranean; to the Balts and the Slavs as well as the Germanics and the Celts; to the Greeks as well as the Latins, to the peasantry as well as the proletariat. Despite their differences, all the regions of Europe hold a very great deal in common. They are inhabited by peoples of predominantly Indo-European culture and related kin. They are co-heirs of Christendom. They are connected by every sort of political, economic, and cultural overlap and interaction. Despite their own antagonisms, they share fears and anxieties about influences from outside - whether from America, from Africa or from Asia. Their fundamental unities are no less obvious than their manifest diversity.

Western supremacy is one of those dogmas which holds good at some points in European history and not at others. It does not apply in the earlier century when, for example, Byzantium was far more advanced than the empire of Charlemagne. It has applied in many domains in recent times, when the West has clearly been richer and most powerful than the East. Yet as many would argue, the criminal conduct of Westerners in the twentieth century has destroyed the moral basis to all former claims. The title of "Europe", like the earlier label of Christendom, therefore, can hardly be arrogated by one of its several regions. Eastern Europe is no less European for being poor, or being underdeveloped, or ruled by tyrants. In many ways, thanks to its deprivations, it has become more European, more attached to the values which affluent Westerners can take for granted. Nor can Eastern Europe be rejected because it is "different". All European countries are different. All West European countries are different. And there are important similarities which span the divide. A country like Poland might be very different from Germany or from Britain; but the Polish experience is much closer to that of Ireland or of Spain than many West European countries are to each other. A country like Greece, which some people have thought to be Western by virtue of Homer and Aristotle, is considerably

more distant from those of Western Europe than several countries who found themselves on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain.

The really vicious quality shared by almost all accounts of "Western civilisation" lies in the fact that they present idealised, and hence essentially false, pictures of past reality. They extract everything that might be judged genial or impressive and they filter out anything that might appear mundane or repulsive.

It is bad enough that they attribute all the positive things to the "West" and denigrate the "East". But they do not even give an honest account of the West: judging from some of the textbooks, one gets the distinct impression that everyone in the "West" was a genius, a philosopher, a pioneer, a democrat, or a saint, that it was a world inhabited exclusively by Platos and Marie Curies such hagiography is no longer credible. The established canon of European culture is desperately in need of revision.

### **The Allied Scheme of History**

Contemporary views of Europe have been strongly influenced by the emotions and experiences of the two World Wars and especially by the victory of the "Grand Alliance". Thanks to their triumphs in 1918, in 1945, and at the end of the Cold War, in 1989, the Allied have been able to export their interpretation of events worldwide. They have been particularly successful in this regard in Germany whose receptiveness was heightened by a combination of native guilt and Allied re-education policies.

This allied scheme, often projected back into more remote period, may be summarised as followed:

- The belief in a unique, secular brand of Western civilisation in which the "Atlantic community" is presented as the pinnacle of human progress.

- The ideology of "anti-fascism", in which the Second World War is perceived as the defining event in the triumph of Good over Evil.

- A demonological fascination with Germany condemned as the prime source of the imperialism which produced the First World War, and of the fascism which produced the Second.

- An indulgent, romanticised view of the Tsarist empire and the Soviet Union, the strategic ally in the East. Russia's manifest faults should never be classed with those of the enemy. For Russia's great merits as a partner in the "anti-fascist" alliance, outweigh all the negative aspects of her record.

- The unspoken acceptance of the division of Europe into Western and Eastern spheres. Whereas "Atlantic values" are expected to predominate in the West, the East is considered as Russia's legitimate sphere of influence.

- The studied neglect of all facts which do not add credence to the above.

The Allied scheme of history has never been consciously or precisely formulated; nor has it been systematically contested. Yet half a century after the Second World War it was everywhere evident in academic discussions and, perhaps unknowingly, in the conceptual framework which informs the policy decisions of governments. In the academic sphere, the Allied scheme has contributed to the crushing preponderance of research that is devoted to Nazi or Nazi-related themes, and to the prominence of German studies. It helps explain why the analysis of East European affairs continues to be organised in separate institutes of "Soviet" or "Slavonic" studies. It was responsible in part for the excessive emphasis of Russian within the Soviet and Slavic field, often to the total exclusion of non-Russian cultures. It was present, above all, in the assumptions and illusions surrounding views of the Second World War. Half a century after that war was fought, the majority of episodes which contradict the Allied myth continued to be minimised or discounted. Many wartime stereotypes have been perpetuated, especially regarding Eastern Europe. The Czechs and Serbs, for example, who had a long tradition of co-operation with Russia and hostility with Germany, could be hailed as "brave", "friendly" and "democratic" - at least until the wars in Bosnia. The Slovaks, Croats and Baltic nations, in contrast, who were thought to have collaborated with the enemy, deserved no such compliments. The Poles, as always, fitted no one's scheme. By resisting German aggression, they were obviously fighting staunchly for democracy. By resisting Soviet aggression, they were obviously

"treacherous", "fascistic", "irresponsible" and "anti-democratic". The Ukrainians, too, defied classification. Although they probably suffered absolutely the largest number of civilian casualties of any European nation, their main political aim was to escape from Soviet and Russian domination. The best thing to do with such an embarrassing nation was to pretend it didn't exist, and to accept the old Tsarist fiction about their being "Little Russians". In reality, they were neither little nor Russians.

The hold of the Allied scheme was evident in the reactions to the collapse of communism after 1989. The outburst of "Gorbymania", the priority given to the integrity of wartime allies (first the USSR and then Yugoslavia), and the wilful confusing of patriotism with nationalism in Eastern Europe can only be explained in terms of pre-set historical reflexes. It was only by a slow process of readjustment that Western opinion learned that "Russia" and the "Soviet Union" were not the same thing; that Gorbachev headed a deeply hated regime; that the Yugoslav Federation was a communist front organisation; that the most extreme nationalism was emanating from the communist leadership of Serbia; or that Lithuania, Slovenia, Ukraine or Croatia were distinct European nations legitimately seeking statehood. The realisation that "the West" had been misled on so many issues was bound to swell demands for the revision of European history.

## ANNEX 3

### Speech by Jacques DELORS<sup>1</sup>

Prime Minister,  
Your Excellencies,  
Ladies and gentlemen,

With a growing number of applicants for membership of the European Union and negotiations under way with the countries of central and eastern Europe, this has become an urgent issue.

The enlargement of the Union cannot be reduced to its institutional and financial implications. The arrival of new countries forces us to engage in the thorny debate on the meaning with which we wish to endow "Europeanness".

Who is European? Who is eligible to join? Or, to take that further, what is a political community: a club? An extended family? An association? These are some of the questions which are now arising.

That is why the Greek centre for European studies EKEM and the research and study group "Notre Europe" invited thinkers from all over Europe to launch a wide-ranging debate on perceptions of Europe and its various identities. And I must say that it has been a real pleasure, these past two days, to hear sociologists, historians, philosophers and men of letters trading their often sharply divergent views on those perceptions.

I would like to express my warm thanks to the Prime Minister, Mr Constantin Simitis and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Theodoros Pangalos, for their personal support in organising this event.

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<sup>1</sup> Delivered during the public session at the end of the seminar.

However, if you will permit me, this evening I would like to leave the field of sociology and history for a while, and take a more political view of the nature of European integration. What is the principle of identity on which the European Union should rest? What political model should be established to respond to the current challenges? I should like us to examine these two questions more closely.

## I. **European identity, a political identity**

### ***European identities and national identities***

All too often, European identity is seen as a kind of national identity on a European level. As a result Europe is expected to inspire the same emotional ties and the same type of loyalty as a nation.

The strength of identity is gauged from symbols, public speeches and sporting events. There can be no doubt that, measured on that scale, European identity seems a very pale, perhaps insubstantial thing.

But it seems to me that there is a misunderstanding here. European identity cannot be viewed as a rechanneling of nationalism into a larger sphere, as Professor Hartmut Kaeble demonstrated in a recent article on the subject.

Firstly because of the perception that Europe inherently draws, more than nationalism, on clearly defined objectives such as democracy, peace and prosperity.

Unlike national identity, European integration does not rest primarily on symbols, monuments, myths, or even a common language. Emotions bind us to our nations, but not to Europe.

Furthermore, European identity was not born of a military campaign or an act of resistance against another nation in the way that American identity was forged against Britain, German identity against Napoleon or Italian identity against the Hapsburgs... On the contrary, European identity was born of the lessons learnt from two world wars: far

from being a military victory, it was the experience of the ravages of war that called European integration into being.

At the end of the 19th century, the French writer Ernest Renan identified two conditions for the birth of the idea of nationhood. The first was a shared history: "a rich legacy of memory," he wrote. This he defined as follows: "a heroic past, great men, glory... these form the foundations for a national concept." The second factor was will: a desire to live together and to "continue the traditions handed down."

The contrast with European identity, at least as originally conceived, is plain. For what, in 1945, was the general perception of Europe's shared history? The history of their wars, rivalries and conflicts. And the will to unite was confined at the time to a tiny minority of intellectuals and politicians.

Another point on which European identity differs is that it has not, as has often been the case with nation-States, grown out of the weakening and marginalisation of its constituent entities. We often hear the nation described as a "natural" unit, in contrast to the "artificial" construct of European integration. But that is to forget that many of our States were established by complex political processes often involving violence. In other words, what today is presented as natural unity was actually formed by a combination of political action and force. European integration, on the other hand, is founded on peaceful ideals. European identity does not replace but overlays the internal ties which make up nation-States. It is born of the voluntary coming together of a number of countries, as symbolised by the cornerstone of the Union, the meeting of national heads of State and government within the European Council.

Modern European identity is also fundamentally different from that of such multinational European formations as the Hapsburg monarchy, the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia, all of which were founded in part on domination.

Is this new European identity set to gradually displace national identities? Absolutely not, in my view. The two are, it seems to me, not only different but complementary. And people know it, since a majority now consider themselves both Europeans and, first and foremost, citizens of their respective countries.

### ***The case for constitutional patriotism***

Having made these distinctions, what principle should we base our political Union on? Or, to put the question in cruder and more direct terms: what should be the primary criterion for membership of the European Union?

It seems to me that we can distinguish here between three broad options, all of which are implicit or explicit in the current political debate: cultural ties, external challenges and the democratic ideal.

#### Synergy through culture

The first option primarily focuses on cultural proximity, taking the word "culture" in its broadest sense, within the political model of the extended family. By that token, those countries that may be said to be to some extent culturally "related" could be part of the Union. And the distinction is made with particular reference to the supposed attributes of European identity: Roman law, Greek civilisation, German freedom and, above all, Christianity...

I do not deny the very great intellectual interest there may be in tracing the lines of cultural convergence and divergence in Europe. But can cultural ties be made a political principle? I think not.

It is also an extremely difficult task, since Europe's cultural parameters have always been a matter of debate. Europe, we are constantly hearing, is the cradle of the Judaeo-Christian faith and ethic. But, while that is true, as Professor Norman Davies has shown in his recent book on European history, many of the richest seams of inspiration in our history – the Renaissance passion for antiquity or the Romantic obsession with nature – have had pagan characteristics.

Of course Europe is partly defined by Christianity. But also by freethinking, agnosticism and atheism. And I would add, although some people will not like the idea, that Europe is now to some extent also defined by Islam. Pluralism has become essential.

Europe's foremost characteristic is precisely its extraordinary diversity. It is a multiple identity, forged from its constituent identities. That diversity is far from being decline, as some fear. Allow me to quote the sociologist Henri Mendras on the subject of western Europe: "A historical illusion might appear to suggest that the steamroller of modernity is levelling out diversity. In actual fact, although western Europe draws unity from an important common core of characteristics, it remains extraordinarily diverse. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the ongoing process of change is not carrying it towards greater uniformity. (...) The growing diversity of our tastes and lifestyles is a safeguard against the domination of a single culture."

### External challenges

A second criterion of membership, which is all too often tacitly accepted, is utilitarianism. This views society as a kind of accounting balance between the respective contributions of its members.

This is the model of the mutual benefit society, which sees the Union as a kind of great club. It can already be seen in western Europe in chauvinistic attitudes to safeguarding social welfare.

Far be it from me to underestimate the very great constraints, indeed the financial sacrifices, which enlargement represents. But let us be quite clear: the European Union must not become a club for the rich.

Now more than ever, the Union should be based not only, of course, on competition, but also on the cooperation which strengthens and the solidarity which unites. No democracy worthy of the name can mean-test for a say in decisions. Now more than ever, perhaps guided more reason than by passion, the people of Europe face the historical choice between a perhaps golden twilight on the one hand and on the other survival as a political entity proud of its traditions and cultures and with a power on the world stage which we must develop.

### Progress through the democratic ideal

Finally, the third criterion: the democratic criterion which could form the basis for what the philosopher Jürgen Habermas has termed "constitutional patriotism". According to this view, the Union's political identity should be established more firmly on the principles of autonomy and responsibility which underpin the concept of democracy and the rule of law.

Without denying local and regional solidarity, the key to identity here is no longer kinship or proximity, but commitment to the universal principles of human rights and democracy.

That immediately raises a problem: would the political community thus formed be virtually limitless? No. On the one hand, the democratic principle in itself contains a criterion of inclusion or exclusion. It means that being European or being rich does not confer a moral right to membership.

If a European people or State violates the community's principles of pluralism, tolerance, equality or liberty, they automatically forfeit the right to membership.

And on the other hand, we should not be naïve: decisions concerning membership will always be subject to other constraints. Spatial and geographical constraints, since to be acceptable the European area must be coherent and relatively clearly defined. Cultural and financial constraints too play a part.

### A democratic update

Ultimately, however, the idea of a democracy which is constantly being developed further and expressed in practical action can be the only inspiration for a genuine political Union. The instigators of the Maastricht treaty understood that when they defined European citizenship in terms of civil and political rights, and not by reference to any form of cultural unity, although they did not appreciate all the consequences it would have.

Yet we cannot simply stop there. If we want to avoid membership becoming a formality, we need a shared political culture, to borrow the expression coined by the philosopher

Jean-Marc Ferry. A shared culture, not a unified culture, since the strength of European integration will be precisely the opening up of each national culture to the others, the development of a pluralist public arena.

As you are aware, establishing an integrated economic area involved developing a harmonised legal framework for the free movement of people, products, services and capital. The formation of a shared political culture will chiefly depend on a civilised comparison of the various national legal traditions and sensibilities. A political culture cannot be established in the same way as a single market; it will grow from exchanging and pooling ideas.

## **II. The case for a new political model**

With these principles in mind, it is clear that Europe can no longer put off a wide-ranging debate on adapting its political model to the challenges of the 21st century.

The Union today faces more challenges than ever before in the history of European integration. First of all, several major events are on the horizon. Two important treaties are due to expire in the next few years: the WEU treaty in 1998, and the ECSC in 2001. To that must be added the immediate prospect of economic and monetary union, starting on 1 January 1999. Not forgetting, again in 1999, the expiry of the "financial package", which reflects the Union's choices on common policies and joint action, and particularly with regard to the principle of economic and social cohesion enshrined in the Single European Act.

On top of this official timetable come the political challenges created by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the chain of repercussions since 1990. Today Europe is in tremendous demand, witness the 13 countries now knocking at the door. And they will not be the last. This is a demand to which we must respond.

I think it is important to stress this at the outset, to counter the unjust accusation that those in favour of an effective model for the Community would prefer to avoid enlargement and give priority to deepening. Believe me, this ritual opposition between "deepening" and "enlargement" is a real and formidable problem. But in reality we have

no choice. Our cousins in the east, separated from us by a decree of history, are no less European than we are – culturally, geographically and spiritually. It is our duty on the eve of the 21st century to open the door to them.

Having said that, it is no easy task: how can we extend our values of peace and mutual understanding to the whole of Europe while maintaining a stable and effective Community model? After all, we should not forget that it is very much that model which has become the magnet for every nation on the continent.

We would be doing our eastern cousins the greatest disservice if we were to relinquish part of the identity we have achieved and which has been our strength.

In other words, Europe would be failing in its vocation if it rejected enlargement, but equally it would lose its dynamism if it did not adapt its "home", its political and institutional structure, to the new set of circumstances which enlargement creates.

This has become an urgent issue, for at least two reasons. On the one hand, previous enlargements involved only two or three countries. Now, as I said, no fewer than 13 countries are official candidates. On the other hand, the institutional structure originally designed for a Community of six countries is already showing clear signs of strain with a Community of 15.

What will it be like when there are 25 or 30 of us? How can we ensure that enlargement is not an accumulation of our weaknesses, but a joining of forces?

It is not my intention to present you with a ready-made institutional blueprint for resolving all these contradictions.

My rather more modest aim is to set out two requirements which I believe Europe must satisfy today: the requirement of democracy, which includes greater transparency and public understanding, and the requirement of effectiveness: tailoring our means to our stated aims.

### ***Making the Union more democratic***

Denouncing the democratic deficit has become part of the new orthodoxy in European debate. And it is true that the Union is distant from its citizens, too distant. It is clear that we can and must do better in terms of transparency and clarity.

But some clarification seems necessary in this debate, which has given rise to frequent and sometimes wilful misinterpretation.

All too often, Europe has been made the convenient scapegoat for our democratic doldrums.

Furthermore, it is clear that the European project has been since its inception and remains closely bound up with the democratic ideal. With its philosophical roots in resistance to totalitarianism of all kinds, it has constantly developed its role as a guardian of democracy and the rule of law.

The Community is also the only international organisation with a directly elected assembly – and one whose powers were significantly increased by the recent Treaty of Amsterdam.

But above all, it must be clear that the strengthening of democracy at European level cannot succeed without a similar effort to restore vigour and meaning to our national democracies.

It can therefore be said, I feel, that the democratic defect affecting Europe today lies primarily in the failure to involve people and their representatives in diplomatic and normative processes at both national and European level.

At a time when Europe is impinging upon ever more areas of everyday life, it alarms more than it reassures and wearies more than it inspires. Nor does this alienation affect Europe alone: the same problem can be found in many of our national democracies, where the rift between government and the governed is widening. It is true that the situation is not identical in all countries, and often depends on the strength of popular political culture. But this tension between supranational and national, and between

supranational and local, now affects every nation. In other words, we must resolve the paradox that, just as totalitarianism is retreating and formal democracy is expanding, our established democracies seem to be running out of steam.

We therefore need to rethink the democratic mechanisms for mediating between the various levels of power. The European Union can play a key part here in fostering the emergence of local and national aspirations within a supranational context, while at the same time devolving responsibility downwards through the development and encouragement of grassroots participation.

For that the aims of the European Union must be accepted and its workings comprehensible. Yet the developments of recent years point to a worrying move in the other direction: parallel structures, increasingly complex procedures and a confused extension of powers.

The result is the widespread feeling among our fellow citizens that the Community too often interferes in matters which do not concern it.

There are historical reasons for this confusion, to do with the "gearing" approach adopted by the Community's founding fathers. At the time of the treaty of Rome, it would have been unrealistic and politically unacceptable to lay down the precise division of powers between the Community and its Member States from the outset. A "softly, softly" process therefore began: the Community's sphere of competence was gradually extended, but without any clear indication of what would ultimately be transferred to supranational level and what would remain the responsibility of the Member States.

Experience shows, it is true, that various measures can be taken to limit the risk of overregulation. That was what the Commission began doing in 1985 by systematically applying simple principles such as mutual recognition, which avoided producing dozens of detailed regulations. Another remedy is systematic recourse to qualified majority voting, which prevents Member States from endeavouring to impose every last detail of their own domestic regulations on the Community text in order to avoid having to amend or simplify them.

However, it seems to me that at the present stage of European integration, we can no longer afford to put off a clear division of responsibilities between the Union and the Member States.

Having said that, it will not be easy, as exclusive competences have increasingly given way to joint responsibilities, shared between the Union, the Member States and the regions.

It therefore seems to me that it would be simplest to determine a number of areas as being the exclusive preserve of the Member States and, within those countries with federal structures, the regions. That would be a step beyond the simple requirement of subsidiarity laid down at Maastricht.

For subsidiarity, as you know, stems essentially from the ethical requirement that respect for human dignity, and thus for the exercise of individual responsibility, is the aim of all societies. To put it another way, subsidiarity does not just restrict intervention by a higher authority, it also obliges it to act to give the lower level the means to function fully. This is a measure of the ambiguity of the principle, which can be used in some cases to justify increased intervention by the Union, but has equally been wrongfully invoked by States to oppose all progress at European level.

So I feel that to revitalise its democratic ambitions, Europe must be founded on a twofold legitimacy: the legitimacy of the nation-States, represented in the European Council, and the direct legitimacy of the citizens through a European Parliament better integrated into the decision-making process, and a more clearly defined executive in which the Commission is institutionally accountable to both the European Council and the Parliament.

### ***Making the Union more effective***

Another requirement we must satisfy is the requirement of effectiveness. In the eyes of our fellow citizens, the Union has an obligation to produce results – witness the

accusations of impotence levelled at Europe on issues ranging from foreign policy to its action to combat unemployment.

"What do we want to achieve together?" This is the first question all the European States should in conscience be asking themselves. Because in a Union of 27 to 30 members, it seems unlikely that everyone is going to be equally willing to move forward at the same time.

However, I believe we must draw a careful distinction here between those who are unwilling and those who are unable to make that move. The treaties have always made provision for transitional periods for the "willing but unable", to allow them to gradually catch up with the front runners.

Those who are unwilling pose a different problem. Here the golden rule was propounded by the former German minister for foreign affairs Hans Dietrich Genscher: no State can be forced to go further than it wants, but nor can any State prevent others from going further if they so wish.

I had therefore hoped, before the new treaty was signed, that mechanisms would be established to allow a vanguard of countries to move ahead in certain areas. That vanguard would of course be open to all Union Member States, provided they wanted to be part and accepted the constraints and responsibilities it entails.

### Lending Europe its full meaning

To make a success of the unique political model which is the European Union, we have suggested here what is needed to improve the way it works: more democracy, more understanding, more transparency and more effectiveness.

Having said that, and having focused over the last two days on the issue of identity, viewed as a convergence of ideas and action allied to the maintenance of diversity, the

structure itself, however well conceived, will not find the strength it needs unless we recover the meaning of collective action – political action in which every citizen is called to participate.

And that is precisely where this seminar comes in. There can be no future without assessing and drawing benefit from the past, without learning the lessons it has to teach us. Because a people deprived of all reference to the past cannot invent a future for themselves.

Eternal and changing, Europe must be eternal because of all the positive contributions it has made to human history and all it still has to give today. And changing to adapt, as a world power, to present and future challenges, ethical, political and economic.

We have endeavoured here today to find reasons for living together, affinities we can develop and things we can learn from other countries in Europe. That in itself gives meaning to our shared venture.

As diversity increases in the 21st century, this is the path we must tread to clarify the European project and rally the broadest possible public support. And I can never repeat it often enough: we must find ambitious but realistic ways of adapting our means to our ends. That is our best chance of succeeding in this collective adventure.

In this vast and unprecedented bid to develop a great community of nation-States, nothing is ever easy. But I would remind those discouraged by the scale of the task of the words of Jean Monnet: "I, for my part, have only ever known one way (to unite the countries of Europe). But the time it will take is uncertain. European integration, like all peaceful revolutions, needs time. Time to convince, time to make the mental and practical adjustment to great change".

## ANNEX 4

**Speech by Costas Simitis, Prime Minister<sup>1</sup>**

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The ongoing process towards a united Europe and political unification is meeting with ever growing scepticism. The arguments put forward by way of objection can be summarized as follows: a vision, a project which inspires and motivates cannot simply reproduce what already exists, but must go beyond it, must make a clear break so as to arouse emotions and imagination. This break is not visible. Tomorrow's Europe appears as the socio-economic extension of today's, in an improved form perhaps, but still its continuation.

The creation of the hyper-market, hyper-currency and hyper-institutions is no guarantee that an area with different languages, different religions, different ways of life, will form a united whole which will overcome both the ever increasing socioeconomic differences, and the deeply rooted concept of the nation-state.

The question therefore is whether there is a project with socioeconomic implications which will create a coherent dynamic.

The answer must be yes. There is a project which will change reality substantially. This answer becomes clear if we look at the dynamic being created by unification in the existing system. We must compare the development of the present European politico-economic formation when it sets in motion unifying processes on many levels, with that which would prevail if this formation remained the same.

I will touch upon only one point, but the most crucial, I believe.

The migrant worker at the beginning of the century who left Arcadia or Calabria was seeking new possibilities and opportunities for a better life. The same holds true for the migrant worker of the 60's who left for Germany. The Russian or German worker, in 1918, who rebelled were also seeking, through a new organisation of society, to open

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<sup>1</sup> <sup>1</sup> Delivered during the public session at the end of the seminar.

for themselves unlimited opportunities and possibilities, in the context of social justice. The European social model created by social democracy was also based on the same aspiration. To abolish impediments and obstacles, for there to be more avenues for each and every person. To create space for social justice. Through education, through collective negotiations, through developmental initiatives by the state, through social initiatives in health, social security, and welfare to create a more open and freer society.

These very elements - of an open society, of a society which continuously pushes forward its limits by abolishing impediments to the individual's potential for development and by improving living conditions, of a society which promotes social justice - constitute the propulsive force of the European effort. The citizens of each country will have more opportunities and possibilities in the united whole than today, and will live under conditions which allow them better to fulfill their potential.

An environment will be created which will multiply the avenues from which to choose, an environment socially more just. To use a metaphor, people will move from being merely operators of isolated computers to linking up with Internet, with an ever greater number of computers, and so make the leap into the information society. This is a qualitative leap, creating a different quality of life.

This is a minimalist model that does not break with the past, one may object, but there is a simple answer to that: The social democratic model was also minimalist compared with the communist one. It did however, slowly but surely, break with the past as concerns the living conditions of the great masses. European unification belongs to a "realistic utopia", not to a transcendental one. A social vision of rupture would sink the European project. It would lead to conflict, not to unity. The whole project depends on rallying as many social forces as possible, and aims at transformation not at rebirth from zero.

Let me stress right away that this means social changes are needed, and that unemployment and social exclusion must be dealt with effectively. The European society cannot be allowed to consolidate inequalities, a two-thirds society, neo - liberalism, a society of only markets and money. It must, on the contrary, form an extended area of freedom and social justice, an area of shrinking and drastic limitation to the phenomena which ignore the individual and impede independence, security and prosperity.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

European unification is a means by which we will be able to respond to the major changes marking our times.

The first such change is globalisation of the economy. The structures of production are

being radically altered, frontiers are being weakened, the traditional social model comes under pressure. It is becoming ever clearer that this is an irreversible trend, and that it cannot be held back. This does not mean, however, that we must be resigned to our fate. New regulatory mechanisms must be sought, as they had been in the old nation states. New rules must be found to thwart uncontrollable phenomena such as those we have recently experience and which threaten or undermine stability, development and social cohesion. Only Europe as a whole can co-determine such rules. European nation-states alone cannot.

The second development, linked to the first, is the weakening of the model of the nation-state, of the model of an omnipotent central power. Concentrated national power is gradually eroded. The traditional means of exercising policy are proving inadequate. The nation-state is retreating. We are moving from the nation-state which participated in games of a geo-political nature between states, to a nation-state which participates in a world system of a developmental nature under new conditions. At the same time, the interest of the citizen in the political scene is flagging. Supranational formations are becoming more and more important, but local societies and regions have now acquired decisive competences as concerns the everyday life of citizens.

The citizen is at one and the same time closer and further away from decision-making. Participating yet feeling marginalized. The answer to these problems will not be the privilege of any country alone. It will be determined by the forms of European cooperation, by its content and the unification processes, by the view prevailing in the European edifice as to the relations between citizens and power.

The third development is the generalized insecurity of citizens. As individuals gain independence from political and social bonds, there is more exposure to greater risks. Rapid changes in technology and the economy, demographic changes, new migratory flows, the inability to adapt to very swiftly altering social realities, the rise of criminality, all these developments pose new social problems. The traditional welfare state cannot deal with the new forms of social inequality, unemployment, social exclusion. The national means of fighting crime are insufficient. Insecurity as to the present and uncertainty as to the future are anathema to social cohesion and harm political co-existence itself.

These are problems common to all European states and can only be dealt with in common, especially in terms of ensuring conditions of greater social cohesion and solidarity.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

European identity is not only a matter of a common market, nor of an Economic and Monetary Union. It is a matter of principles, values, education and culture.

Our civilization is built primarily on the fundamental principles of the Enlightenment. On the principles of freedom, democracy, equality, social justice. But also on the principle of social responsibility, of a civil society.

Secondly, our common European culture is built on the broadest values of international co-existence: on the values of peace, of cooperation between peoples, of peaceful resolution of differences, on respect for international law. These are values which we Greeks, living on the south-eastern frontiers of Europe have a special respect for. That which is taken for granted in Western Europe must also apply to Eastern Europe.

Thirdly, the Europe which will allow us to advance must be the Europe of our differences. Europe embraces a single, but also multiple discernible realities. Europe is built on the idea of unity through diversity. European civilization built itself on opening up to the outside world, to a sense of universality through diversity.

We are looking to a Europe which believes in its plurality, in taking advantage from meeting with others. A Europe which cultivates a multicultural nature through various mechanisms. Which forms a context where all citizens can express themselves; which is not so much a single culture, but more an area where many cultures, many ways of life, many ideals may flourish.

In conclusion, the debate on Europe is, as a rule, focused on issues of economic policy. When we talk of Europe, we talk of own resources, of the Common Agricultural Policy, or the convergence of the economies. However, our common success also depends on education, culture, and research. It chiefly depends on the extent that the young will accept the new project and mobilise for it. It is high time we turned to issues of concern to young people, issues which motivate them.

It is my belief that only by taking steady steps towards a creative, productive, socially just, and multi-cultural Europe can we decisively deal with the challenges of our times. It is in this way that our identity will be forged.

To this end we need to involve everybody. The identity of Europe will not automatically derive from any system, but from the efforts and the struggles of those who will wish to co-determine it; by our common struggle.