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Beyond Robert Schuman's Europe – citizen's ideas and historic perspective for a better Union



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Beyond Robert Schuman's Europe – citizen's ideas and historic perspective for a better Union

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INTRODUCTION

In 2020, five European organisations embarked on the project entitled *Beyond Robert Schuman's Europe* to mark the 70th anniversary of the R. Schuman Declaration, a turning point in the Europe's post-war history that has initiated the process of the European integration. Our joint project focused on the legacy of 1950 Declaration but more importantly on its relevance for modern European societies through the political and intellectual contributions of Great Europeans such as: Jacques Delors (France), Bronisław Geremek (Poland), Jerzy Giedroyc (Lithuania), Vaclav Havel (Czechia) and Altiero Spinelli (Italy).

Our aim was to build a bridge between the spirit of the 1950 Robert Schuman Declaration, contributions of five Great Europeans and the ongoing Conference on the Future of Europe that sets a new perspective on next steps of the European integration through collaborative engagement of European citizens. This paper proudly presents the results of the project built on two foundations: research papers examining the contribution of five Great Europeans to the European project as well as public debates that followed discussing the papers' findings. The debates have accordingly been focused on examining how the Robert Schuman Declaration legacy continues to inspire young generation of Europeans.

The 1950 Schuman Declaration was discussed through different perspectives on European integration the respective Europe's Founding Fathers embodied particularly in relation to diverse histories of member states and their struggle with totalitarian regimes.

The historic part of the project has not however been everything. The current developments in Europe remind us about the relevancy of the post-war priorities of Robert Schuman and other Great Europeans that constructed the European project: seeking what unifies the nations on the continent to avoid conflicts and divisions that were continuously putting nations into misery and war trauma of the past ages.

Today, the European societies need to confront a range of new challenges: the climate change, concerns over privacy in the digital age, pandemic and, sadly, the democratic downturn in some of the EU member states, such as Poland and Hungary. Then, the external and internal threats to the European Union unity have been high on the project's agenda. Seeking responses to these challenges, the project's partners have engaged citizens in their respective countries to discuss the modern European challenges and the universal meaning of the 1950 Declaration.

Let us embark together in this final project's report on the journey into the origins of the European integration symbolized by the 1950 Robert Schuman Declaration as well as into the five chapters of the European history that Jacques Delors, Bronisław Geremek, Jerzy Giedroyc, Vaclav Havel and Altiero Spinelli wrote throughout their intellectual and political lifespans. They are followed by the *Citizens ideas for the future of Europe*, a review of debates and discussions with the young generation of European.

I thank the dedicated teams of the organisations that took part in the 2020-2022 "*Beyond Robert Schuman's Europe*" project: Jacques Delors Institute in Paris, the Bronisław Geremek Foundation in Warsaw, the Jerzy Giedroyc Forum for Dialogue and Cooperation in Vilnius and the Altiero Spinelli Institute of Federalist Studies in Italy.

I thank the European Commission for the generous support to the project in the framework of the Europe for Citizens programme.

Wojciech Białożył
Member of the Management Board
The Bronisław Geremek Foundation

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES



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ROBERT SCHUMAN (1886-1963) - French politician, statesman, Catholic activist. The main initiator of the post-war unification of Europe. He was twice the Prime Minister of France also served as Minister of Finance and Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was one of the initiators of the economic agreement between France and Germany, which was joined by other countries to form the European Coal and Steel Community (1950). This far-sighted project is generally considered the beginning of the European Union. From 1958 to 1960, Robert Schuman was President of the European Parliamentary Assembly. He won the Charlemagne Prize in 1958.



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JACQUES DELORS (born in 1925 in Paris, France) - President of the European Commission from 1985 to 1995. He started his career at the Banque de France, where he worked until 1962. He was also a member of the Economic and Social Council. After a time at the General Planning Committee, he became a member of Prime Minister Jacques Chaban-Delmas' cabinet (1969-1972), and then associate professor at the University of Paris-Dauphine (1974-1979). He was elected as a Member of the European Parliament in 1979 and chaired the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee. From May 1981 to July 1984, he was Minister of Economics and Finance and was elected, in the meantime, Mayor of Clichy (1983-1984), before being appointed at the helm of the European Commission. His presidency of the European institution is remembered as the golden age of European integration. Jacques Delors has been awarded the title of Docteur Honoris Causa by 24 universities and won various prizes and distinctions, including the Charlemagne Prize (1992). He was distinguished as an honorary citizen of the European Union in 2015.



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Agencja Gazeta

BRONISŁAW GEREMEK (1932-2008) - visionary European and Poland's democracy architect. Chief advisor to Lech Walesa and "*Solidarnosc*" 1981-1989, key negotiator in the Round Table talks which led to partially free elections in 1989. Member of the Sejm 1989-2001. Minister of Foreign Affairs (1997-2000). Member of ALDE Party Group in the European Parliament 2004-2008, and its candidate for the EP's presidency (2004). Recipient of the Charlemagne Prize 1998 for his contribution to European unity. Member of the 2001 Laeken Group of Sages on the Future of Europe. Scholar of international recognition, recipient of 28 honorary academic degrees for his research on Middle Ages as well as on European integration. After his death in 2008, the European Parliament's main yard in Strasbourg was named: *Agora Bronisław Geremek*. The Senate of Poland has named 2022 as the Year of Bronisław Geremek to mark the 90th anniversary of his birth.


JERZY GIEDROYC (1906 – 2000) - outstanding intellectual born to a noble family of Lithuanian-Polish origin, publicist, and editor of one of the most influential journals of the post-war emigres - *Kultura*. In 1946 he established the Literature Institute in Rome which in 1947 was transferred to the outskirts of Paris – Maisons-Laffitte. For more than the next 50 years, it became a center that connected ideas of intellectuals, dissidents, and politicians not only from Europe but from all over the world. Together with his associate Juliusz Mieroszewski, Giedroyc formulated the ULB geopolitical concept which encouraged to give up historical imperialism in order to guarantee the peaceful coexistence of the nations in Central-Eastern Europe. Jerzy Giedroyc made an outstanding contribution to the political and cultural elites that came to power after the collapse of Communist regimes in the late '80s and early '90s. According to historians, in this way territorial and ethnic conflicts were prevented in this part of Europe.



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Václav Havel Library

VÁCLAV HAVEL (1936 - 2011) - dramatist, writer, essayist, human rights defender, fierce critic of situation during communist dictatorship, jailed repeatedly for his political views, co-founder of Charter 77 and the Committee for the Defence of the Unjustly Persecuted, leading figure in November 1989 political changes, Czechoslovak and later Czech president. Author of 13 stage plays, numerous essays, the best known of which is *The Power of the Powerless* (1978), and the books *Letters to Olga* (1979–1982), *Disturbing the Peace* (1986), *Summer Meditations* (1991) and *To the Castle and Back* (2006).

As Czechoslovak and later Czech president he was responsible for bringing about a return to freedom, the abolition of the Warsaw Pact, bringing the country into the European integration process and accession to NATO. Co-founder of the Forum 2000 Foundation and the Václav and Dagmar Havel Vision 97 Foundation, inspirer and supporter of many humanitarian and educational projects. Holder of 29 state honours, hundreds of prestigious international prizes, 50 honorary doctorates and many other prizes for his literary, philosophical and political works and his lifelong fight for adherence to human and civil rights.



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ALTIERO SPINELLI (1907-1986) - A communist and anti-fascist activist, in 1927 he was arrested and sentenced by the special fascist court to prison and then to exile. Having left the Communist ranks as an opponent of Stalin (1937), during the war years he developed the conviction that only a federation of European states could have prevented the recurrence of new world conflicts in the future: this led to the famous Ventotene Manifesto (1941), written while in exile with Ernesto Rossi, which was then taken up in the program of the European Federalist Movement (MFE), which he founded in Milan in 1943, as soon as he returned to freedom. After taking part in the European and Italian Resistance, he dedicated his political commitment to the realization of the European unification project, first as secretary of the MFE, then as European Commissioner (1970-76), and finally, elected as an independent member of the Italian Communist Party, as an MP (1976-83) and Member of the European Parliament (from 1976 until his death in 1986). In 1965 he founded the Institute of International Affairs in Rome. In 1983 he conceived the draft Treaty for the European Union, later adopted by the European Parliament, which now bears the name of Spinelli at the main entrance to its Brussels headquarters.

FOREWORD TO „ROBERT SCHUMAN’S LEGACY IN JACQUES DELORS’ VISION AND ACTION“

In Schuman’s footsteps

European construction is most often described according to two complementary narratives: that of crises and that of “small steps”. Jean Monnet is quoted as saying that “Europe will be forged in crisis”. This is particularly the case in this period of upheaval caused by a series of crises that the European Union Member States and its institutions have had to weather without pause: the sovereign debt crisis, the refugee crisis, Brexit and now Covid. The “small steps” approach, theorised by Jean Monnet himself, is applicable under ordinary circumstances, if there are any. It describes the pathway of a Europe which is shaped by small adjustments through treaties, deepening and enlargement. These two trends, the chaotic progress through crises and the orderly advancement through small steps, rely too much on their own strength to claim to move European integration forward. As if nothing could stop the European project since its launch on 9 May 1950. Its continuation is solely subject to unexpected events or, conversely, to an invariably slow walking pace.

This disregards men and women and their personalities. Their mettle or their lack of resolve. Their desire or their nonchalance. European construction is first and foremost a human endeavour. Its advances are based on the combination of ideas and circumstances, but above all on the personalities able to move them forward. In this respect, Europe is the result of legacies and inheritances, of projects begun by someone else and handed down to us, dissipated or taken up again, of handovers for which responsibility is more or less assumed. It is a credit to Beyond Schuman that it looks along this line of descent from the first “Father of Europe” and brings it to the attention of new generations.

The Jacques Delors Institute was pleased to take part in this research project, supported by the European Commission, with the honour of including its founder in this lineage. Without ever confusing the unique additions and specific directions provided by each person. Without ever reducing European construction to the work of its architects alone. Rather, to identify their common inspirations and references, the work’s establishment in what came before, thereby displaying a family resemblance.

I would like to thank the Geremek Foundation for conducting this project, an opportunity seized enthusiastically and with interest by the historian Cornelia Constantin and by Benjamin Couteau from our Institute. Their work has highlighted a kinship in approaches and a continuity of action between Robert Schuman and Jacques Delors. We can be sure that they belong to this very special second category of people, according to the famous distinction that Jean Monnet liked to make, to quote him once again: “There are two categories of people: those who want to be someone and those who want to do something”.

SÉBASTIEN MAILLARD

Director of the Jacques Delors Institute

ROBERT SCHUMAN'S LEGACY IN JACQUES DELORS' VISION AND ACTION

CORNELIA CONSTANTIN (born in 1978) is a historian. She holds a PhD from the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) of Paris. Her main research topics are collective memory in Europe, citizenship and the European public sphere. She published „Les pères de l'Europe en héritages“, Peter Lang, in 2021.

BENJAMIN COUTEAU (born in 1997) is a research assistant at the Jacques Delors Institute. He is a graduate of the University of Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne in European law and his work focuses on the protection of human rights in Europe and on the enlargement of the European Union.

“I believe that nothing can be done without history. [...] Memory is a very important part of building the future. I made it my duty to admire and consider the work of the Founding Fathers and to claim, as soon as the Berlin Wall came down, that East Germans and others play a part in Europe.”¹

This statement, quoted from Jacques Delors during a debate held in December 2007 by the France-Poland for Europe Association, demonstrates the importance of memory in the definition of the European project's priorities. This stance comes from one who knew best how to represent, embody and redefine the role of President of the European Commission. It is under his presidency of the Commission, between 1985 and 1995, that the increase in references to “European identity”, “European citizenship”, to European culture and history became a permanent fixture in European public action in culture and education. 9 May, date of the Schuman Declaration, has been celebrated as Europe Day since 1986. Which parts of the legacy of the Schuman Declaration and of Robert Schuman did Jacques Delors carry forward?

Today, Jacques Delors is viewed as the architect and successor of the Founding Fathers of Europe. Which factors resulted in this acknowledgement? Jacques Delors and Robert Schuman had different careers, but shared the same values. Jacques Delors' leadership is based on the Schuman Declaration and the Community method, which he adapted during his time in office. Jacques Delors' Federation of Nation-States draws its inspiration from the Fathers of Europe, recognising the nation and regions as sources of identity. The geopolitical and socio-economic changes of the time fostered his vision of federalism and action. This action is based on the need to find a new balance to adapt to global developments and the desire to build a tangible Europe that is close to its citizens. The Single European Act, the Economic and Monetary Union, the single currency, the cohesion policy and the Most Deprived Persons programme are all achievements that have changed the face of Europe. In this respect, Jacques Delors is an architect of Europe, of the “ever closer union” envisioned by the Fathers of Europe.

¹ „9 jeunes européens de Pologne, de France et d'Allemagne débattent avec Jacques Delors et Bronisław Geremek. Quelles valeurs pour faire progresser la construction européenne ?“, France-Pologne pour l'Europe (France-Poland for Europe), Paris, 13 December 2007 (viewed on 28 January 2022) (in French).

Robert Schuman's legacy in Jacques Delors' vision

Jacques Delors' vision of Europe is infused with the legacy of the Schuman Declaration. This is why Jacques Delors and Robert Schuman have this "family resemblance", despite having differing careers and growing in different environments.

Different generations, a common foundation of values

Robert Schuman — and more generally the first Fathers of Europe — and Jacques Delors are clearly from different generations and social backgrounds. Robert Schuman was born in 1886 in Clausen, a quarter in Luxembourg City, to a highly religious and relatively wealthy family. Schuman was born German, this nationality inherited from both his father and from his mother who became German upon her marriage. Following a religious education, he was admitted to the Athénée de Luxembourg. He then went on to attend several universities in Germany with a view to accessing the most renowned law classes. This mobility was common among all German students at the time. He studied at Bonn, Munich, Berlin and lastly Strasbourg. In 1912, he joined the Alsace-Lorraine bar and opened a solicitor and barrister practice in Metz. In charge of youth movements, he played an active role in organising the Katholikentag, the conference of German Catholics, which was held in Metz in 1913. This commitment was facilitated by the fact that he did not enlist during the First World War as he was excused on medical grounds. He spent the war as an "auxiliary soldier" with the civil administration. When Lorraine reverted to French ownership after the war, Schuman was appointed to a municipal commission in Metz by the French authorities who were looking for people they could trust there. He was then elected to the National Assembly on behalf of the Union Républicaine Lorraine. Initially a right-leaning conservative, Robert Schuman only moved closer to social Catholicism in 1931-1932 when he joined the Popular Democratic Party.

Schuman's political commitment is, however, similar to that of Alcide De Gasperi in his defence of his region's rights. Member of Parliament (MP) for Lorraine for an uninterrupted period from 1919 to July 1940, he stood out as a champion of Alsace-Lorraine's specific characteristics. As an advocate for maintaining local law and the teaching of religion in schools, he called for administrative decentralisation in France and an application of regionalism for the entire country, according to the projects put forward by his group.

During the Second World War, Robert Schuman voted full powers to Marshal Pétain, with other MPs, which led to him being deemed ineligible to run for office at the end of the war. Once De Gaulle lifted the ban on his eligibility, Schuman was elected to the first and second Constituent Assembly in connection with the Popular Republican Movement (MRP), reputed to be the party resulting from the Resistance. He was in particular Minister of Foreign Affairs from July 1948 to January 1953 and in this capacity signed all the treaties that shaped Europe during this period. On 9 May 1950, he gave the Schuman Declaration, drafted by Jean Monnet and his team, which laid the foundations for Franco-German reconciliation and for the first European Community by the Community method. This was the guiding principle of European construction, according to Jacques Delors: "This method, which we call the Community method, the successors of Europe's founding fathers have often referred to it. To such an extent that it can be said that each time we moved away from it, European construction was plunged into stagnation or inefficiency."²

After leaving his ministerial roles, Schuman built an increasingly European reputation as the "pilgrim of Europe". In early 1955, he accepted the presidency of the European Movement, a position he was

² Foreword by Jacques Delors, in Robert Schuman, *For Europe*, Nagel, 2000, p. 11.

forced step down from in March 1961 due to ill health. In 1958, he was elected by acclamation President of the European Parliamentary Assembly created through the Treaty of Rome and conducted a tour of capitals where he met political leaders. In the same year, he was awarded the Charlemagne Prize in Aachen, the oldest prize for European figures, the ultimate symbol and accolade of European dedication. Jacques Delors himself was awarded this prestigious prize in 1992. The jury of the Charlemagne Prize clearly stated that Delors was a successor of the Fathers of Europe: “The ‘new European architecture’ that is constantly discussed now, must above all be credited to its architect, Jacques Delors. In the historical treatises yet to be written, the internal market should be closely related to the name of the President of the Commission of the EC³. With the characteristic determination, tenacity and instinctive perception of development and change, the French President of the Commission, Jacques Delors, has been and remains the key guardian of the European unification process. His ideas and staunch convictions single him out as the architect of the construction of the European Community.”⁴

In 2015, he became one of only three figures, with Jean Monnet and Helmut Kohl, to have been bestowed the title “Honorary Citizen of Europe”.

Jacques Delors shared the original drive of the Fathers of Europe particularly when it comes to values. With Robert Schuman, he shared his Catholic faith. For Jacques Delors, the most important aspect that faith gave him for public life is resilience, the ability not to be discouraged following failure and to start again with a new line or a new method — a view of men and women as “enablers of their own changes”⁵. For Jacques Delors, Catholics have had and still have a role to play in European construction — without monopolising the project — alongside other social forces, by following the post-war ideals of peace, freedom and solidarity which must always be defended and carried forward, in an “active citizenship” approach⁶.

The value of the Schuman Declaration is particularly tremendous as both Robert Schuman and Jacques Delors lived through the war. Jacques Delors was born in Paris in 1925, to parents of a low-income background. Despite his vocation to become a journalist or a filmmaker, he joined the Banque de France, first as a trainee, where he passed the *concours de rédacteur* civil service exam by attending evening classes. He worked as department head, then *attaché* in the private office of the Director-General for securities and the money market. In 1944, Jacques Delors joined the French Confederation of Christian Workers, where he jointly ran the research and economic action office. Social dialogue and solidarity were the cornerstones of Jacques Delors’ principles of action, values that he applied later in his capacity as President of the European Commission. As Robert Schuman was a key figure of the MRP and of Christian democracy, Jacques Delors was only in this political movement for a brief spell as it was too right-leaning in his opinion.

At the same time, Jacques Delors became committed in the “La Vie Nouvelle” Catholic movement in which he created in 1959 the “Citoyens 60” magazine that he ran until 1965. In 1962, Jacques Delors became head of the social affairs department of the General Planning Commission, chaired at the time by Pierre Massé. In 1969, he joined Prime Minister Jacques Chaban-Delmas’ cabinet as advisor for social and cultural affairs. Following his resignation in 1973, Jacques Delors became a member of the General Council of the Banque de France. His abilities as an educator were enhanced in his role as associate professor of comparative political economics at the University of Paris Dauphine and at the École Nationale

3 The European Communities.

4 Jacques Delors’ archives (for which the Jacques Delors Institute is custodian — hereafter JD), JD-375 28/05/1992, Awarding of the Charlemagne Prize to Jacques Delors (Aachen).

5 Jacques Delors, *L’unité d’un homme : Entretiens avec Dominique Wolton*, Éditions Odile Jacob, Paris, 1994, p. 320-321 (in French).

6 Afterword by Jacques Delors, in Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences of the European Community, *Les catholiques et l’Europe*, Bayard, Paris, 2006, p. 141 (in French).

d'Administration (ENA). Jacques Delors joined the Socialist Party in 1974. Close to François Mitterrand's ideas, he became national delegate of the Socialist Party for international economic relations, then member of the Socialist Party's steering committee. Elected as a Member of the European Parliament in 1979 during the first direct elections, he chaired the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee there until 1981. As Economy and Finance Minister under Pierre Mauroy's various governments, Jacques Delors used his policies to root France in the European Monetary System, which called for discipline. Appointed President of the European Commission in July 1984, he was already a well-known European. He launched a tour of European capitals to gather support for his goals among European leaders. The daily newspaper *Le Monde* wrote the following about his early days as President of the Commission: "Never since Mr. Walter Hallstein, who was the first to lead the European executive, has the President-designate enjoyed such a capital of trust from across the Community. We acknowledge his European convictions, skill and political influence."⁷ As he was unanimously recognised as a European, Jacques Delors was also starting to become a great European figure. Through his leadership, he embodied the set of values shared by the Fathers of Europe.

This set of values on which the Schuman Declaration was based made the Declaration a singular and unprecedented event in human history and laid the foundations for Franco-German reconciliation. Jacques Delors himself emphasised this uniqueness: "In relation to what can be proposed today, nothing compares to Robert Schuman's call, either morally or spiritually. We must understand this well. I did not know how to define this spiritual shock and I read a book by Hannah Arendt which conveyed these fabulous words: forgiveness and promise. Forgiveness, which is not the act of forgetting, and promise mean that future generations will be reintroduced into the human community. We will forget nothing but nobody will be rejected. To find a man with such a strong project could only be after such human tragedy, an upheaval such that a new Robert Schuman or a new Jean Monnet would be necessary."⁸ Jacques Delors remembers his father, who was injured in the First World War, teaching him the importance of Robert Schuman's call of 9 May, telling him a few days afterwards: "The turning point is Robert Schuman's call"⁹.

"Engineer of change": a new take on the Community method

The legacy of the Schuman Declaration was carried forward by Jacques Delors, who took on and amended the "Community method". The Delors decade was punctuated by the revival of European construction against a favourable backdrop comparable to that in the golden age of European integration. In 1984-1985, the Commission successfully reproduced a formula that had formerly revived the European integration process: "intergovernmental consensus + founding text + 'strong' Commission President = relaunch of integration"¹⁰. The White Paper entitled "Completing the Internal Market", published in 1985, was one of the components of the formula that brought about the most meaningful relaunch of European integration since 1958. With the 1993 White Paper entitled "Growth, Competitiveness and Employment", it is one of the key strategic moments and turning points of European construction.

A pragmatic visionary, Jacques Delors knew how to understand the times he lived in and to act as an "engineer of Europe". In a debate with Simone Veil published following the European Council meeting held in Luxembourg in December 1985, he claimed:

"Simone Veil has already provided a response by stating the importance of the domestic aspect in the behaviour of Heads of State or Government when dealing with European affairs. Yet perhaps there

⁷ *Le Monde* dated 8 January 1985, JD-17 07/1984 - 01/1985, Press reactions to the appointment of President Jacques Delors (in French).

⁸ Remarks made by Jacques Delors at the "European state of affairs and outlook" round table, held on 9 May 2010 at Robert Schuman's House (Scy-Chazelles).

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ Helen Drake, *Jacques Delors: Perspectives on a European Leader*, Routledge (Taylor and Francis), 2002, p. 85.

is another reason that I look for when I consider how to make French citizens understand a reality which, for example, already concerns 30% of their legislation, that which keeps France alive? The most ardent champions of Europe, or those who claim to be the most ardent champions, I mean the Federalists you have spoken about, continue to voice their views against the backdrop of the 1950s, which were of course a time of enthusiasm and large-scale works. Often, I reread the memoirs of Mr. Spaak or Mr. De Gasperi, or of Mr. Adenauer or Mr. Schuman [...] thirty years ago it was a golden age. Yet I would like to stress, to pay tribute to them one last time this evening, that their situation was not easier than that of today's Heads of State or Government. I will not go on too much about this but they too were up against public opinion that they did not understand or pressure groups that were in opposition. They had to deal with the short-sighted and yet they achieved what remains a genius piece of work: the Treaty of Rome. To answer this question, we can say that the time of great performances and enthusiasm is over, and now is more the time for pragmatism and measured optimism."¹¹

"Engineer of change"¹² — that is what Jacques Delors called himself. He carried forward the Community method while adapting it to the times. In his message to mark the 30th anniversary of Robert Schuman's death, he stated that "we must remember that the success of the project, in the 1950s, resulted from the combination of pragmatic action and a prominently political vision. This method remains the key to success"¹³. He chose this method, deemed more appropriate than the tradition of federalists such as Altiero Spinelli.

The 1985 White Paper, the founding text to guide the completion of the single market by 1992, resulted in the adoption of the Single European Act. Jacques Delors was personally committed to drafting the two White Papers and the Single European Act, which in particular led to the partial relinquishment of the unanimity rule for decisions made by the Council of Ministers. His leadership was even more exceptional as he was not an official member of the Intergovernmental Conference and he successfully conveyed his ideas with support from the Luxembourg presidency and on occasion from the Franco-German motor. Delors also called on the ad hoc institutional group created within the Commission, thereby reducing the leeway of the College of Commissioners. He adopted a similar strategy within the Committee he chaired with a view to outlining the future Economic and Monetary Union¹⁴.

Following the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the Community method needed to be updated. As early as 1989, Delors highlighted the need for a "qualitative leap" in the European Communities involving a deepening of integration. Delors played a key role in 1989 to convince Member States to entrust the European Commission with the distribution and coordination of economic and humanitarian aid for Poland and Hungary. He took on a similar role in the integration of the former East Germany and the new Germany in the European Communities. A key idea of Delorism is the achievement of a European political union, with a stronger European Parliament and a European Commission accountable to democratic institutions. This is why he found the Maastricht Treaty a disappointment. While Delors claims authorship of the Single Act, of 1992 — the Single Market —, this is not the case for Maastricht, for which he criticised governments for failing to instil the European spirit into their fellow citizens¹⁵, for having opted for the system of organising the Union into pillars and for retaining an excessively intergovernmental decision-making process. Institutional reform is seen as a pre-condition to enlargement: "12 is the maximum with the current institutions"¹⁶, Jacques Delors claimed in 1994.

¹¹ JD-38 12/1985, Interview with Jacques Delors, *Paris Match*, 11 December 1985 (transcription) (original in French).

¹² JD-88 07/11/1988, Interview with Jacques Delors, *Jour de France*, 7 November 1988 (in French).

¹³ JD-1081 03/09/1993, Statement by Jacques Delors to mark the 30th anniversary of Robert Schuman's death (typewritten), 3 September 1993 (in French).

¹⁴ Ken Endo, *The presidency of the European Commission under Jacques Delors: The politics of shared leadership*, Macmillan Press; St. Martin's Press in association with St. Antony's College, Oxford, 1999, p. 213-214.

¹⁵ JD-1656 25/03/1994, Interview with Jacques Delors, *Le Nouvel Économiste*, 25 March 1994 (in French).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

The 1993 White Paper, dedicated to combatting unemployment, reveals the societal model Jacques Delors had in mind, based on the triptych of cooperation, between social partners (social dialogue), competition (within the single market) and solidarity (through redistribution and “positive” integration), which would be more of a “guide to action” than an abstract ideal¹⁷. Jacques Delors always attempted to remedy the democratic deficit resulting from the Monnet method¹⁸, to bring the institutions closer to citizens, which fuelled his commitment to dialogue with trade unions and interest groups, the many press interviews he gave and the citizen events he attended. The public debate on Maastricht demonstrated the weighting of nationalism and extremism in Europe, appointing the “technocrats” in Brussels as the scapegoats for all the continent’s ills. In his time, Robert Schuman was already calling for the construction of a democratic European political community, avoiding the excess bureaucracy and technocracy that he had observed on a national level¹⁹.

Jacques Delors is the main champion of a European identity that does not encroach on feelings of national belonging. In this regard, he advocated for a shared flag that Europeans could identify with. Following a negotiation with Pierre Pflimlin, President of the European Parliament, the current design of the European flag was decided, while each institution had previously placed its logo on the flag²⁰.

A specific vision of federalism

Jacques Delors’ brand of federalism is different to that of Denis de Rougemont or the Ventotene Manifesto. While federalists such as Altiero Spinelli view the nation as an obstacle and a failure, for Jacques Delors, on the contrary, “the nation is a key element in personal identity and collective belonging. [...] The nation must represent a space of belonging and a political space. This is why some of the nation’s powers in the most common areas such as education, health and social affairs must be maintained and justify the existence of the State. At the same time, it is the space in which fundamental agreements can be expressed between citizens, regarding solidarity between the rich and the less rich, and between generations. Europe must not take this key task away from nations. [...] Let’s make Europe the protector of national diversity, while being a power that brings our countries together to accomplish well-defined objectives.”²¹

This vision reflects the words of Robert Schuman: “The national flourishes within the supranational”²². Jacques Delors rejects the analogy with the USA’s model. For Jacques Delors, federalism on the contrary involves guarantees for the respect of pluralism, in which States retain their autonomy and the opportunity to participate and cooperate in a common project without subordination of one State to another²³.

The clarification of competences between the institutions of the European Communities and a democratic approach close to citizens are necessary. In response to the debate triggered in October 1994 by a report by the CDU-CSU parliamentary group of the Bundestag by MPs Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers on the future of European construction, proposing a “hard core” around the Franco-German motor and three other founding countries, excluding Italy, Jacques Delors clarified his vision of federalism even further in an interview given to the German newspaper *Der Spiegel* in November 1994. The federation of Nation-States will have to strengthen European nations on the basis of a common monetary policy,

17 Helen Drake, *op.cit.*, p. 129.

18 We would like to remind readers here that the first European Community was for the most part negotiated behind the scenes.

19 Robert Schuman, *For Europe, op. cit.*, p. 109.

20 Interview by Cornelia Constantin with Paul Collowald, former head of the private office of Pierre Pflimlin, 29 April 2021.

21 Jacques Delors, *L’unité d’un homme : Entretiens avec Dominique Wolton, op. cit.*, p. 285-286 (in French).

22 Robert Schuman, *For Europe, op. cit.*, p. 31.

23 Jacques Delors’ address at the College of Europe in Bruges, 17 October 1989, in Geëtane Ricard-Nihoul, *Pour une Fédération européenne d’États-Nations. La vision de Jacques Delors revisitée, Larcier*, Brussels, 2012, p. 29 and following (in French).

a coordination of the economic policy and a common foreign policy, which would consolidate Europe's international influence, in addition to the integrity of the national State and democracies. With the principle of subsidiarity, enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty, Jacques Delors achieved a compromise between the federal vocation of the Communities and the attachment to the nation and to regions²⁴. This echoes Robert Schuman's desire to preserve the identity of his homeland, Lorraine.

Robert Schuman's legacy in Jacques Delors' action

While Jacques Delors adapted Schuman's approach to the challenges of the time as President of the Commission of the European Communities, he implemented, above all, this updated vision, targeting two main goals through the reforms he launched: the need to renew the European compromise to adapt it to a profoundly changing world and the completion of a tangible Europe, a Europe at the heart of its citizens' lives.

The need to strike a new balance to adapt to global changes

Jacques Delors' presidency was marked by a repolarisation of the world. As the Cold War came to an end, he quickly understood that the Communities would have to grow their influence on their Eastern side, while dealing with the USA as the new superpower.

He channelled Robert Schuman's legacy when the latter stated, in the introduction of the declaration that bears his name, that "[w]orld peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it" and explicitly insisted on the absolute need for the contribution of an "organised and living Europe"²⁵. Once President of the Commission, Jacques Delors therefore strove to "find a new balance, or rather a new compromise, between ideal and necessity"²⁶.

It was under his presidency that Europe witnessed, on 9 November 1989, the fall of the Berlin Wall — which heralded the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) —, and, in the following years, the break-up of Yugoslavia and the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. Europe was changing and brought about a new distribution of global poles of power. It now had to find its place in the international arena.

To achieve this, Jacques Delors was aware that above all the Communities had to revise their internal operating method. While he was not a firm federalist upon his arrival at the Commission — he was a "European of reason"²⁷ —, he was aware of the interdependence, at least in economic terms, of Member States and of the deepening of the Communities that this interdependence required. This involved relinquishing the cumbersome intergovernmental method — which, as Jacques Delors knew, could not meet the needs of a Europe of 15 and then soon after 25 Member States —, and replacing it with the Community method, which delegated powers to independent bodies, thereby limiting the sovereign powers of Member States²⁸. This new balance was enshrined in the Single Act, signed on 17 and 18 February 1986, which established in particular qualified majority voting instead of unanimity voting at the Council of Ministers, thereby giving the Commission a greater scope of action. "Schuman's spirit lived on", Jacques Delors later wrote on this subject²⁹.

24 Julien Barroche, "La subsidiarité chez Jacques Delors. Du socialisme chrétien au fédéralisme européen", *Politique européenne*, 2007/3 n° 23, p. 153-177 (in French).

25 Schuman Declaration, Salon de l'Horloge at the Quai d'Orsay (French Foreign Ministry), 9 May 1950.

26 Jacques Delors, "Actualité du fédéralisme schumanien", *Lumière & Vie*, issue 294, April-June 2012, p. 76 (in French).

27 Helen Drake, "Jacques Delors et la Commission Européenne. Un leadership unique ?", *Politique européenne*, issue 8, autumn 2002, L'Harmattan, p. 136 (in French).

28 Renaud Dehousse, *The Community Method, The EU's 'Default' Operating System*, Jacques Delors Institute, 11 February 2013, p. 2.

29 Jacques Delors, "Actualité du fédéralisme schumanien", *op. cit.*, p. 80 (in French).



Jacques Delors greeting the crowd at the ceremony to inaugurate the adoption of the European flag, 29 May 1986.

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European Commission.

The Single European Act

Called the Single Act as it sets out provisions that make major changes to the Communities' institutional framework in just one document, it is a direct legacy of the Schuman approach. The triptych dear to Jacques Delors, "competition that stimulates, cooperation that strengthens, and solidarity that unites", which forms the backbone of the Single Act, is reminiscent of Robert Schuman's view when he wrote: "There is nothing like the cooperation and prosperity that we hope to achieve to establish consensus between neighbouring countries. [...] The wave of nationalism can only be averted through constructive and collective policy, under which each party stands to gain, through an effective solidarity of interests and efforts."³⁰

In practice, the Single Act took up the White Paper on completing the internal market presented by the President of the Commission in June 1985. It was therefore concerned with implementing "competition that stimulates": it proposed the completion of the internal market by 31 December 1992 with a view to relaunching the European economy by guaranteeing the free movement of people, goods, services and capital. In the early 1980s, Europe's economic situation was similar to that of the early 1950s: "the threat of a sluggish economy with growing unemployment"³¹ urged Jacques Delors to propose the creation of the single market, endorsed by Member States, pressed due to their economic hardships, without much discussion. Advocating a "fusion of markets"³² in his Declaration, Robert Schuman's vision was given a real grounding under the initiative of Jacques Delors.

"Cooperation that strengthens", while evident in the general gist of the Single Act, is particularly demonstrated in the institutional reforms implemented by the treaty. Hallmark of Delors' pragmatism, the relinquishment of the intergovernmental method was offset by the official recognition of the European Council, initially created unofficially upon the initiative of the French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing to bring together Member States' Heads of State. This European Council was in particular endowed with a key function, that of ensuring political cooperation between Member States for foreign policy. Considered since the signature of the Treaty of Rome, which did not make provision for it, constantly encouraged by Heads of State since, it was institutionalised by the Single European Act,

³⁰ Robert Schuman, "For Europe" (extracts), *Lumière & Vie*, issue 294, April-June 2012, p. 61 (in French).

³¹ Jacques Delors, "Actualité du fédéralisme schumanien", *op. cit.*, p. 80 (in French).

³² Schuman Declaration, *op. cit.*

which tasked the European Council with defining the broad political guidelines — its primary role in the Community method. This Community method is also apparent in the strengthening of the European Parliament's prerogatives. Its current name, adopted by the former European Parliamentary Assembly in 1962, was legally recognised by the Single Act. While its prerogatives remained broadly limited, the European Parliament was then endowed in particular with the power to reject a decision of the Council of Ministers or to issue its assent on the Accession Treaties and the Communities' association agreements.

"Cooperation that strengthens" dovetails with "solidarity that unites" in the provisions of the Single Act concerning the creation of a European social dialogue. While the Commission and trade unions had already been cooperating since the 1960s, Jacques Delors — having himself experienced Christian-democrat trade unionism — decided upon taking the helm at the Commission to involve social partners more closely in the process of completing the internal market through the Val Duchesse process, with a view to stimulating economic recovery, but above all to relaunch European construction³³. By legally recognising the role of trade unions in the continent's economic and social cohesion, the Single Act ultimately set the Communities on the path towards a European social area intended to spread "better systems for protecting workers and improving working conditions"³⁴. It paved the way for the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, adopted by the European Council in 1989.

The Maastricht Treaty & the Economic and Monetary Union

"From the feeling of necessity to the perception of an accomplishment, this is how we could describe the years from 1985 to 1989: the enlargement to Spain and Portugal was a great success, economic growth was restored and millions of jobs were created. Against a backdrop of euphoria, new ideas emerged, all with a common goal: to go further with European integration."³⁵

As Jacques Delors wrote, the Single Act was a success and encouraged Member States to commit further to the pursuit of European construction. Robert Schuman had contributed to establishing "a common economic system [that] may be the leaven from which may grow a wider and deeper community"³⁶. Jacques Delors implemented this system under his presidency.

While the Maastricht Treaty, signed on 7 February 1992, was admittedly embedded in intergovernmentalism, due to States' will to limit the transfers of sovereignty to the Commission, it was the latter which prepared the new modification of treaties by working on a draft Economic and Monetary Union, under the aegis of its President. "Delors' intellectual and organisational contribution was key in maintaining the impetus and attention paid to this project by national leaders", claims Helen Drake³⁷.

If we look firstly at the treaty itself, it sets out a three-pillar structure. Jacques Delors understood that only a single community would bring about the "effective solidarity of interests and efforts" to which Robert Schuman aspired and proposed that Member States implement the Tree theory, "with the growth of different branches (the economy, the currency, foreign affairs, security, internal affairs)"³⁸. He then came up against refusals from the United Kingdom, Portugal and Denmark and had to agree on the separation of the Community pillar from two other, intergovernmental, pillars, namely cooperation in justice and home affairs and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). For these last two pillars,

33 Jacques Delors, Address to open the work of the European Economic and Social Committee, 14 April 2005.

34 Jacques Delors, "The Single Act and Europe: A moment of truth", Address given on 21 November 1986 to mark the tenth anniversary of the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence (Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union).

35 Jacques Delors, "Actualité du fédéralisme schumanien", *op. cit.*, pp. 80-81 (in French).

36 Schuman Declaration, *op. cit.*

37 Helen Drake, "Jacques Delors et la Commission Européenne. Un leadership unique ?", *op. cit.*, p. 139 (in French).

38 Jacques Delors, "The Maastricht Treaty 20 years on", Address dated 7 February 2012, given in Brussels.

the Community method was sidelined and the Commission was unable to exercise its legislative initiative, in favour of the Council.

The Community method remained the rule for the first pillar and was even strengthened to become a guarantee of democratic progress, a key characteristic of Robert Schuman's approach to the European project. The use of qualified majority voting in the Council, a minor revolution brought about by the Single Act, was extended, meaning that the Commission, which enjoys the legislative initiative, has greater chances of seeing its proposals adopted. Above all, the powers of the European Parliament — again following on from the provisions of the Single Act — were further extended. In particular, it was included in the Commission's appointment process and became co-legislator with the Council.

The real progress for European integration achieved by the Maastricht Treaty remains however the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), supported by Jacques Delors. The EMU's provisions are specifically included in the Community pillar. The continent had changed since Germany's reunification and these changes once again called for an updated compromise between Europeans, supported by the Franco-German tandem. The Delors Report became the foundation of this compromise, embodying the "economic unification"³⁹ of Europe to which Robert Schuman aspired.

The first of the three stages of the Delors Report entailed in particular the completion of the internal market, planned for 31 December 1992 since the Single Act, thereby further weakening the weighting of national borders which, according to Robert Schuman's wish, were to "decreasingly be a barrier to exchanges of ideas, people and goods"⁴⁰. The second stage, implemented by the treaty, created a European System of Central Banks (ESCB), with a view to coordinating the monetary policies of Member States.

With the third and final stage, the most tangible European achievement was set to be implemented, and one that we all hold in our hands each day: a single currency.

The drive to create a tangible Europe

"Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity"⁴¹. This famous quote from the Schuman Declaration, which illustrates the small steps method, guided Jacques Delors, not only in his desire to adapt the Communities to a changing world, but also in his determination to make them tangible, clear and commonplace for Europeans.

The European elections, which were held twice before Jacques Delors' tenure as President of the Commission, brought more radical parties to the European Parliament than in national parliaments. This marked the end of the permissive consensus: while the Latin maxim *qui tacet consentire videtur* was considered an appropriate way of describing Europeans' attitudes towards European construction, it was then seen that a large minority did not hesitate to express its opposition. Jacques Delors understood that all Europeans did not experience the benefits of the European project and that it was necessary to make this project tangible for them.

³⁹ Schuman Declaration, *op. cit.*

⁴⁰ Robert Schuman, *op. cit.*

⁴¹ Schuman Declaration, *op. cit.*



Jacques Delors (left)
and Simone Veil (right)
at the European Parliament,
1979

© European Parliament

This required in particular the creation of a single currency, the Euro, and of European citizenship with the Maastricht Treaty, but also two accomplishments were made to provide a de facto solidarity: the cohesion policy and the programme of aid for the Most Deprived Persons.

A single currency & shared citizenship

It was political leaders themselves, in the euphoria of the favourable economic situation that led them to discuss the future Maastricht Treaty, who were the first to raise this idea, “based on the difficult but ultimately successful experiment of the European Monetary System created in 1979”⁴². The leadership of Jacques Delors, who was able to push forward his vision of a single internal currency against Pierre Bérégovoy’s⁴³ desire to implement a single currency just for external exchanges and John Major’s⁴⁴ preference to strengthen the ECU, brought the negotiations for the creation of the Euro to a successful conclusion. Later on, he wrote that “Robert Schuman would have most likely approved of this idea which belonged to the federalist arsenal, as it required a radical transfer of sovereignty”⁴⁵.

The Euro, which had the advantage of facilitating “the movement of persons and trade by removing currency exchange costs [...] and in this way favouring investment”⁴⁶ and economic growth, was put into circulation on 1 January 2002 — three years after the implementation of the third stage of the EMU — and permanently replaced national currencies six months later.

The Maastricht Treaty also enshrined European citizenship which does not replace national citizenship, but rather superimposes it. Individual rights are confirmed or attached to it, including “the right to settle, to circulate, and to leave, the right to vote [and to stand as a candidate, editor’s note] in local and European elections, and the defence, by consular authorities from every EU country, of citizens born in one of the other EU countries”⁴⁷.

42 Jacques Delors, “Actualité du fédéralisme schumanien”, *op. cit.*, p. 81 (in French).

43 French Minister for the Economy, Finance and the Budget at the time.

44 Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time.

45 Jacques Delors, “Actualité du fédéralisme schumanien”, *op. cit.*, p. 81 (in French).

46 CVCE.eu, “Le ‘rapport Delors’”, website (viewed on 28 January 2022) (in French).

47 Jacques Delors, “The Maastricht Treaty 20 years on”, *op. cit.*

The cohesion policy

According to Jacques Delors, the “cohesion policy is a way to bring the European project closer to the European citizen and is a way to remedy the democratic deficit”⁴⁸. On the basis of the regional policy enshrined in the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which already aimed to rebalance the economic development of European regions by providing subsidies for the poorest, Delors strove to give this policy a new impetus when he became President of the Commission. He presented the cohesion policy that he intended to conduct in February 1987, in his famous speech “Achieving the Single Act”⁴⁹.

In order to support the least developed European regions and those facing economic challenges related to the completion of the single market, he drew inspiration from the faith he shared with Robert Schuman to use the Catholic ideal of solidarity in his action — respecting the last part of his key triptych, “solidarity that unites”. This ideal of solidarity, taken on by the Christian-democrat ideology, champions “policies intended to provide, through public intervention on spatial arrangements, a little balance, equity, cohesion and lastly harmony, in a capitalist system that produces the exact opposite”⁵⁰.

After the Single Act, therefore, cohesion and solidarity were a hallmark of the European regional policy — until then made up of disparate funds — implemented by the Commission and reflected in the Delors packages. “For me regional policy is above all an instrument for development, which has the added value of a redistribution effect”⁵¹, Jacques Delors later commented.

This concept of redistribution is also found in another programme resulting from the solidarity ideal: the programme of aid for the most deprived.

The programme of aid for the most deprived

The Most Deprived Persons programme was initiated in 1987 by Jacques Delors, in particular following the appeals that he had received from Sister Emmanuelle and the comedian Coluche⁵². Once again, through the principle of solidarity, it reflects the Catholic social teaching, whose key principle of the universal destiny of the goods calls for a “preferential option for the poor”.

In connecting this new, mainly socially-oriented programme to the economic challenges raised by Member States’ surplus agricultural production under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the President of the Commission found a way to convince these States to take part in the programme. Through it, basic foodstuffs are delivered to charities across the Union⁵³ so that they could distribute them to the most deprived.

This is a partial accomplishment of Robert Schuman’s hope that “beyond the existing institutions, and responding to a deep aspiration from the people, the European idea, its spirit of solidarity as a community have taken root”⁵⁴.

48 Interview with Jacques Delors, “Reflections on Cohesion Policy”, *Panorama issue 43*, autumn 2012, Publications Office of the European Union, p. 6.

49 Marjorie Jouen, *The future cohesion policy should represent EU solidarity in action*, Jacques Delors Institute, 30 March 2017, p. 1.

50 Bernard Morel & Martin Vanier, “L’aménagement européen du territoire : un enjeu d’État pour ‘L’Europe des régions’”, *La Pensée*, 315, July-September 1998, pp. 29-39 (in French).

51 Interview with Jacques Delors, “Reflections on Cohesion Policy”, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

52 Nadège Chambon, “Subsidiarity versus solidarity? The example of the European Food Aid Programme for the Most Deprived”, Policy Brief issue 30, Notre Europe — Jacques Delors Institute, October 2011, p. 1.

53 For France: Secours Populaire, les Restos du Cœur, the French Red Cross and the French Federation of Food Banks (source: Fonds européen d’aide aux plus démunis, franceagrimer.fr).

54 Robert Schuman, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

Conclusion

As Robert Schuman's spirit can be found in Jacques Delors' vision and action, in the achievements brought about under his presidency, it also survives in Jacques Delors' disappointments, first among them the replacement of the term "Community" with "Union", under the pressure of some Member States, "which would have been disappointing for Robert Schuman"⁵⁵.

He also regrets the imbalance between the monetary policy and the economic policy resulting from the implementation of the EMU. Delors wrote: "despite my efforts which continued following my departure from the European Commission, the implementation of the Euro neglected the aspect of cooperation. In other words, the creation of the monetary pillar, embodied by the independent Central Bank, did not occur alongside an economic component, proposed as voluntary cooperation of national economic policies."⁵⁶ "Cooperation that strengthens", promoted by Jacques Delors and inspired by Robert Schuman, was weakened. It was further undermined by the CFSP, which, run by intergovernmentalism, gave the image of a Union unable to ensure "world peace", which was, however, the primary goal of the Schuman Declaration. In Jacques Delors' own words, Robert Schuman "would have been bitterly disappointed by [...] the fact that the foreign and security policy did not develop at the same pace as economic and monetary integration", thereby failing to "pave the way for a united European vision and action."⁵⁷

Jacques Delors did, however, prove to be "happy as a craftsman of European construction (sic)", in an interview given to the France 2 evening news programme on 1 January 1993, when the single market reached completion. "95%" of his proposals made upon taking the helm at the European Commission "had been achieved"⁵⁸. The few setbacks brought about by Member States' motivations cannot tarnish the implementation of qualified majority voting in the Council, the completion of the single market and the EMU, the creation of European social dialogue and the strengthening of the Parliament's prerogatives. While he "thought for a moment that the Maastricht Treaty was proposed too early", he quickly realised that this text was necessary, arguing on France 2 that "if we do not do it now, those advocating dissolution and withdrawal are so many that we would run the risk of losing all that was done by the fathers of Europe in the last forty years".

He continued to further the work of these Fathers of Europe after his presidency, proposing in 2010 a European Energy Community — the term specifically chosen — with Jerzy Buzek, who was President of the European Parliament at the time. Based on his triptych "competition that stimulates, cooperation that strengthens, and solidarity that unites", this Community drew inspiration from Robert Schuman's original plan for the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), with the goal of "putting energy back at the centre of European construction"⁵⁹. Using the Community method, this project "promotes solidarity", transposes the European social dialogue onto the energy sector and supports a "development policy in relation to populations in Africa, Asia and many other areas, who do not even have access to energy". This follows on directly from one of the "essential tasks" of the European project according to Schuman, namely "the development of the African continent"⁶⁰.

55 Jacques Delors, «Actualité du fédéralisme schumanien», *op. cit.*, p. 83 (in French).

56 *Ibid.*, p. 85 (in French).

57 *Ibid.*, pp. 82-83 (in French).

58 JD-1348 01/1993, Interview with Jacques Delors, *France 2*, 1 January 1993 (original transcription translated).

59 Jacques Delors & Sami Andoura, "De la Communauté européenne de l'énergie à l'union de l'énergie", Opinion piece published on huffingtonpost.fr, 28 February 2015, website viewed on 28 January 2022 (in French).

60 Schuman Declaration, *op. cit.*

He also weighed this proposal for a European Energy Community against the “fragmented, short-term and inward-looking approach that is dangerously affecting Europe, its Member States and its citizens”⁶¹. Since the Schuman Declaration, he noted that Europe “has not yet met its challenges”, as it is still vacillating “between survival and decline, between cooperation and scattered actions”⁶².

Taking note of the current rise in nationalism and other forms of populism, he asks us to remember the work of Robert Schuman, who had to overcome much greater obstacles and who nevertheless successfully helped to unify Europe barely five years after it had torn itself apart. As the Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted our shortcomings — and even our weaknesses — and calls for us to rethink how the European Union operates, we should remember that “memory is a very important part of building the future”.

Perhaps the federalist vision advocated by Robert Schuman and Jacques Delors can be found in the recovery plan recently adopted by Member States following the health and economic crises? While European collective memory already encompasses the achievements of Robert Schuman and the other Founding Fathers of Europe, it surely includes Jacques Delors’ achievements today. He has earned himself a place among these Fathers of Europe, as demonstrated by his title of “Honorary Citizen of Europe” awarded in 2015 and the proposal put forward by Clément Beaune⁶³ to have his image on our bank notes, a concrete expression of our Europe.

61 Jacques Delors & Sami Andoura, *op. cit.* (in French).

62 Jacques Delors, «Actualité du fédéralisme schumanien», *op. cit.*, p. 83 (in French).

63 Currently French Minister of State for European Affairs.

HISTORY, COMMUNITY, SOLIDARITY: ON THE POLITICAL REFLECTIONS OF ROBERT SCHUMAN AND BRONISŁAW GEREMEK

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For centuries, European history has been synonymous with struggles for national dominance, shaped on the grounds of military superiority and propagandistic clamor. It is no exaggeration to say that its main thread was the history of ongoing battles, conflicts, clashes, skirmishes, fights, and, sometimes negotiations for enlarged or shrink borders. As Krzysztof Pomian writes:

“This is (...) the history of conflicts. Conflicts between Europe and whatever outside forces hindered or repelled it. And the internal conflict between the aspirations to unite and unify Europe and those which divided and differentiated it”¹.

The detrimental force of this pattern of confrontation, in which war is the primary tool for resolving disputes between actors in international politics, dramatically impacted the lives of the inhabitants of many European principalities, kingdoms, and states. Although rulers or leaders liked to portray themselves as warriors, emphasize their wartime triumphs, war always meant tragic failure in the lives of their subjects and citizens, : it generated fear, suffering, pain, hunger, exile, and finally, the most terrible prospect of all, death. European thinkers repeatedly tried to remedy these inhumane tendencies. The classic example is Erasmus of Rotterdam’s 1517 Complaint about Peace, a quintessential work of Renaissance Irenaeism, a humanist doctrine whose primary goal was to bring peace and harmony to the various denominations of Christianity and ultimately among all people. All the same, political reality was most often governed by the harsh laws and relentless logic of conquest. This is precisely why the fruit of the dialectic of periods of war and ceasefire was more sensitive to the social crisis of European history rather than the idea of a victorious march towards a collectively constructed vision. María Zambrano addressed this tendency in the 1940s:

“It would seem that the European man has lost almost completely (...) that heroic zeal which allowed him to disregard what he encountered first before him and to go in search of something more stable, more permanent, and clearer to serve. He has lost the source of his heroic idealism.”²

The Iron Age lasted for several centuries of European history. It was a devastating experience for many generations that culminated in the outbreak and course of both 20th-century military conflicts. Both world wars demonstrated the ultimate consequences of inhumane power and perhaps even altered the way we think about Europe’s future. And although Europe emerged from the apocalypse with the morally shameful scar of the Iron Curtain, the “source of heroic idealism” mentioned by María Zambrano has fortunately not been exhausted. After all, the concern for what is more durable, more precise, and more stable appears in the European Coal and Steel Community project. The declaration was announced during a press conference at the Salons de l’Horologe in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Quai d’Orsay. In addition to a clear economic orientation, it offered an ideological agenda that both justified the project itself and indicated a new political formula; this project had the far-reaching consequences of an action plan:

¹ K. Pomian, *Europa i jej narody*, Gdańsk 2004, p. 7.

² M. Zambrano, *Agonia Europy*, Warszawa 2014, p. 28.

First day of the session
of the new European
Parliament. Speech
by prof. Bronisław Geremek.

20.07.2004, Strasbourg

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Agencja Gazeta



“For peace to be truly possible, there must first be a united Europe. Five years after Germany’s unconditional surrender, France has made the first decisive act on the European edifice and has incorporated Germany into it. The situation of Europe must thereby be completely transformed. This transformation will make possible other joint actions, hitherto impossible. Out of all this, a new Europe will be born; a strongly united and solidly constructed Europe.”³

One of the principal architects of the agreement was the then French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, and for this reason, the declaration signed on May 9th, 1950, is commonly referred to as the Schuman Plan. It is undoubtedly one of the essential documents in the history of European civilization, serving as the inspiration for a specific formula for law and policy-making for many years. From its inception, it inspired a particular procedure for understanding and practicing politics, a protocol that has been taken up and developed by only a few, including the Polish statesman Bronisław Geremek.

Similarity of fates

Even though more than two generations separated them - Robert Schuman was born in the second half of the 19th century, while Bronisław Geremek was born in 1932 - one could see certain biographical parallels between the two politicians. They were severely affected by the Nazi regime that raged during World War II.

3 Deklaracja z 9 maja 1950 roku [In:] R. Schuman, *Dla Europy*, Introduction B. Geremek, Kraków 2003, p. 93.

Schuman, a man from the Franco-German borderlands, a Lorraine activist, sincerely concerned about the future of his small country, was arrested by the Gestapo and imprisoned in Metz. After almost a year, he was released and sentenced to a forced stay in Neustadt-an-der-Hardt in Rhineland-Palatinate, from where he escaped at the beginning of August 1942 to make his way to unoccupied France. However, when German troops occupied the free zone, he was forced to go into hiding, and the German political police put a high reward on his head. Freedom did not come until the autumn of 1944, and Schuman returned to his beloved Metz and gradually began to join in social and political initiatives. On October 21st, 1945, he was elected to the Constituent Assembly from the Moselle constituency for the first time. His ethical stance, based on a Christian foundation, his extraordinary integrity, the effectiveness of his actions, and the trust of his constituents meant that he sat in the National Assembly until 1962.⁴ Bronisław Geremek, born a few years before the outbreak of World War II into a family of Jewish origin, was imprisoned in the Warsaw Ghetto eleven-year-old boy.⁵ He was reluctant to return to this time, marked by the stigma of death; he mentions it in a few scattered recollections. In a conversation with Spanish columnist Juan Carlos Vidal, he noted laconically:

“In my Warsaw, the shadow of the ghetto appeared. I was in the Warsaw ghetto until 1943. A few months before the uprising broke out, my brother and father left the ghetto, hoping to reach the West as many people did at the time. And they made it to a concentration camp. My father died in Auschwitz. My brother survived the war in a camp in Bergen-Belsen (...). My mother and I got out of the ghetto thanks to a man who later married her. I survived.”⁶

After the war, Geremek studied history at the University of Warsaw. His commitment to elementary values, intellectual honesty, civil courage, and responsibility for one's word, gained through extensive reading, led him to deal with the problems of social margin in the Middle Ages. Sensitivity to the human dimension of history, and therefore the ethical impulse of historical reflection, would characterize Geremek's involvement in public affairs, starting with his return of his the communist party member card in protest against the Warsaw Pact's invasion of Czechoslovakia, to his activity in the Society of Academic Courses, to his participation in numerous statements and political appeals of the democratic opposition, to his role as an advisor and member of the expert committee in the Gdansk shipyard; all of these actions represent a mere overview of the involved political career of Bronislaw Geremek.

It has to be repeated that for both Gemerek and Schuman, the personal experience of the nightmare of war and occupation became a school of political thinking, an indispensable factor in their later reflection and attitude, which consisted in looking for compromise solutions, resulting in a genuine agreement, an agreement taking into account the rationale of the parties involved and the perspective of a distant future. As Robert Schuman wrote:

“(...) it is necessary to point out the deep causes of the antagonisms that have torn mankind apart; the absurdity of the sacrifices made in numerous dynastic and ideological wars by peoples who have paid the cost of empty and reckless ambition and fanaticism”.⁷

4 Compare to J. Łukaszewski, *Robert Schumann (1886-1963)* [In:] *Cel: Europa. Dziewięć esejów o budowniczych jedności europejskiej*, Warszawa 2002, p.120-121.

5 Compare to A. Klich, Benjamin Lewertow: *uratował mnie Geremek*, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 14.07.2018.

6 *Geremek/Vidal. Rozmowy*, Warszawa 2015, p. 21.

7 R. Schuman, *Dla Europy*, p. 30.



Prof. Bronisław Geremek in the Office of Partia Demokratyczna - demokraci.pl. 28.04.2007 Warsaw

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History and nations

The establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community and the rise of Solidarity are examples of “audacious acts”⁸ of history, resulting from rational thought and moral imperative. The idea of a European community, rooted in Mediterranean culture but at the same time “stifled by the passions that are aroused and exploited,”⁹ was in a sense a precondition for the development of the European community as well as a manifestation of imagined power. Like any positive vision, however, it required a thorough explanation, including the dispelling of doubts and distrusts deeply embedding in the history of individual European states:

“The difficulties that confront the idea of European integration are primarily psychological. (...) For centuries, European states have fought bloody wars to gain independence and, consequently, to create internal unity. So it is not without regret and fear that they give up some of this independence. They feel that they are negating their glorious past.”¹⁰

The concept of a nation would be an area of particular reflection here since it is the key to understanding the history of Europe itself and the desire to overcome sharp political divisions, resentments, and conflicts. In contrast to all political structures, the nation is a “natural community.”¹¹ The views of Robert Schuman and Bronisław Geremek on this issue are very similar. Nations’ existence and right to have their cultural heritage, aspirations, and historical mission cannot be abolished because they are an expression of the spirit of communal freedom¹².

For this reason, too, political integration at its root is not directed against anyone - it is a peaceful intention. As Schuman emphasized:

⁸ Compare to J. Monnet, *Wspomnienia*, Warszawa 2015, p. 108.

⁹ R. Schuman, *Dla Europy*, p. 30.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

¹¹ Compare to G. DUBY, B. Geremek, *Wspólne pasje. Rozmowę przeprowadził Philippe Sainteny*, Warszawa 1995, p. 105.

¹² “Europe’s deepest aspiration, its creative principle, is freedom. The history of Europe is the history of freedom, at least in the sense that its idea crystallized and its realization expanded, that freedom was won by cities and states, nations and classes.” B. Geremek, *Freedom and Solidarity - the Polish message of European unification*. Speech by Bronisław Geremek, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the ceremony of presenting him with the Charlemagne Prize in Aachen, 21 May 1998 [In:] *Ibid.*, *Skuteczność i racja stanu. Z teki ministra spraw zagranicznych RP*, opracowanie. J. Głażewski, Warszawa 2016, p. 182.

“This united Europe (...) has no intention of aggression, no signs of egoism or imperialism, either within its bosom or towards other countries. It remains accessible to anyone who wishes to join it. (...) What counts in Europe’s favor is that, in response to the new desires of the peoples, it is able to make a significant and timely contribution to the needs of mankind.”¹³

The dissolution of national barriers, whose most tragic dimension turned out to be nationalistic isolationism¹⁴ - after all, it is isolationism that hides behind fears and phobias of agreement - would therefore require, above all, a recognition of the positive effects of integration. No one loses from implementing this project in the course of history, but everyone gains. Bronisław Geremek emphasized:

“As a historian, I am convinced that national cultures are the wealth of Europe. If it integrates, it should unite under the banner of unity in diversity, without losing what has previously constituted its richness. The process of integration should respect national traditions and sovereignty. For democratic politics to be truly acceptable, it must relate to identity, and European identity must be seen as a democratic structure.”¹⁵

European integration could thus create excellent investment capital, as it underlines what unites, harmonizes, and synchronizes. The foundation of this order of thought, in turn, is the Christian character of democracy - the division of Europe as an absurd anachronism has in some disastrous sense called into question the “Christian law of noble but humble brotherhood.”¹⁶

It was this that made it possible to see in the Other “the principle of the dignity of the human person, within the framework of personal freedom, respect for the rights of each (...) by practicing brotherly love towards all”.¹⁷ A few years before Poland’s accession to the European Union, Bronisław Geremek made a similar statement:

“From the Judeo-Christian and humanist tradition of our civilization, we derive the anthropocentric conviction that the human person is the foundation of the social order. Respect for individual and group human rights, defined in international and European documents, belongs to our ethical patrimony. (...) This entails not only accepting diversity and difference but also treating them as a particular richness of the European tradition (...)”.¹⁸

Reconstruction of community

Recognition of the Christian roots of modern democracy can lead directly to the restoration of the traditional European hierarchy of values and, in this way, to the recovery and reconstruction of the concept of community. The abolition of the fear of openness is, after all, a step on the way to trust in the spirit of understanding between nations and states. This is not an easy process, but certainly an necessary one. A sense of this historical necessity was expressed by Robert Schuman, remarking:

“Not all wounds have healed. The first condition of any rapprochement is learning to know each other as we are, with our strengths and faults, similarities and differences, prejudices, preconceptions, and habits.”¹⁹

¹³ R. Schuman, *Dla Europy*, p. 18.

¹⁴ Compare to *Ibid*, p. 19.

¹⁵ Rzeczpospolita europejska. Rozmowa z prof. Bronisławem Geremekiem, ministrem spraw zagranicznych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, „Wprost” 1998, nr 46, 21 June.

¹⁶ R. Schuman, *Dla Europy*, p. 27.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 34.

¹⁸ B. Geremek, *Wolność i solidarność – polskie przestanie zjednoczenia Europy*, p. 181-182.

¹⁹ R. Schuman, *Dla Europy*, p. 61.



Charlemagne Prize
Presentation
Aachen, 1998.

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własne prof. Bronisława
Geremka

Willingness to treat the idea of a European community as a reasonable political means to increase the sense of security, eliminate threats, secure freedom, and quality of life requires far-sighted courage and consistency. It also requires a specific moral imagination, and therefore such an understanding of politics that "is not a game of particular interests, but is above all an area of human thinking and acting in which the common good is at stake."²⁰ In a sense, contemporary social, economic, and civilizational conditions force cooperation - no country can meet the world's challenges on its own anymore. As Robert Schuman wrote:

"The supply of raw materials, labor and unemployment issues, the disturbing problem of refugees, exiles, population growth, modernization of industrial and agricultural equipment, international exchange and the fate of currencies, periodic crises, poverty, and overproduction are all examples of the fact that in all fields nothing effective and lasting can arise in isolation and separateness when the state is limited to its resources and capabilities."²¹

It is the logic of the geopolitical situation that defines the European community and provides its *raison d'être*. It is precisely for this reason that the citizens of Europe should recognize the necessity of community which might be called "European identity." Bronisław Geremek repeatedly stated that the creation of Europe must entail the creation of Europeans.²² A community attempt would bolster the credibility of a specific political vision built on an institutional framework of integration, means, goals, and aspirations. Robert Schuman emphasized this clearly: "One thing has been achieved: a whole host of those who consider themselves Europeans have arisen, that is, supporters of a united Europe."²³

20 B. Geremek, *Szansa i zagrożenie. Polityka i dyplomacja w rodzinnej Europie. Rozmawia Dorota Maciejewska*, Warszawa 2004, p. 56.

21 R. Schuman, *Dla Europy*, p. 22.

22 Compare to B. Geremek, *Unia Europejska i jej kryzysy* [In:] *Głos w Europie*, Kraków 2010, p. 48 and *Przyszłość Europy i prometejskie wyzwanie* [In:] *Nasza Europa*, Kraków 2012, p. 51.

23 R. Schuman, *Dla Europy*, p. 85.

Solidarity

The greatest strength of this type of project of a European community is necessarily the rejection of ad hoc calculations; it would transcend of the credal wheels of political egoism in favor of real interpersonal and supranational solidarity:

“It is necessary to prepare minds to accept the European settlement by fighting everywhere not only the pretensions of hegemony and the conviction of superiority but also the limitations of political nationalism, self-sufficient protectionism, and cultural isolationism. All these tendencies inherited from the past would have to be replaced by the concept of solidarity, that is, by the conviction that the true interest of everyone lies in recognizing and accepting in practice the interdependence of all.”²⁴

Cooperation based on trust would thus be “the best way to serve one’s country”.²⁵ A form of modern patriotism, without the sort of confrontations, that center on the struggle for an anachronistic and autonomy that proves inefficient in global conditions. Moreover, “solidarity among peoples who are guided by the same spirit and accept common tasks in their common interest”²⁶ is an indispensable condition for institutional integration; it must precede it and shape it in a profound sense. Solidarity thus becomes the leavening agent for all political decisions, especially the gradual incorporation of new states into the community. Countries that do not accept such solidarity “exclude themselves from future Europe.”²⁷

Bronisław Geremek pointed to the financial unprofitability of political egoism:

“The principle of solidarity is one of the foundations of the functioning of the European Union as a community - structural or cohesion funds, also the common agricultural policy are a practical expression of this fundamental principle. Richer countries and regions provide services for poorer ones - not as simple aid, but to mobilize their potential and energy”.²⁸

Of course, Geremek was well aware that European solidarity could not be reduced to a financial dimension. If one considers that the essence of integration was “the removal of sources of conflict” and “the joint exercise of Member States’ sovereignty in those areas they consider most important for their relations with one another,”²⁹ then solidarity would be a type of democratic solidarity, then solidarity would be a kind of democratic, pragmatic sanction, a utilitarian formulation of the impulse and moral sense that should be behind any thoughtful initiative with a socio-political dimension:

“(…) obstacles to the free circulation of goods, services, capital, and people had to be removed first and foremost. In economic matters - a common market. Outside the economic sphere, creating a basis of solidarity would allow Europe to integrate. And, in principle, the choice facing unifying Europe was a choice between the philosophy of the balance of power inherited from past centuries and the principle of cooperation and solidarity on which the European community based its existence”.³⁰

The above-quoted thought seems - to be yet another direct reference to the views of Robert Schuman, when he emphasized that Europe’s “raison d’être is solidarity and international cooperation, the judicious organization of the world in which it will have to play an important part.”³¹

24 Ibid, p. 28-29.

25 Ibid, p. 26.

26 Ibid, p. 21.

27 Ibid, p. 29.

28 B. Geremek, *Europa i świat* [In:] *Nasza Europa*, p. 43.

29 *Sukcesy i klęski Europy* [In:] Ibid, s. 21.

30 Ibid.

31 R. Schuman, *Dla Europy*, p. 18.



Opening of the Chair
of European Civilization
at the European College
in Natolin
20.02.2002, Warsaw

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For future generations

The similarities of the two politicians' thoughts is certainly not accidental. Bronisław Geremek was well acquainted with Robert Schuman's biography and contributed an introduction to the Polish translation of his book *Pour l'Europe*. In it, he presented a concise description of his great predecessor's political path, which he tried to follow while leaving his own creative imprint. To Geremek, Schuman's legacy meant an ideological commitment to public life and a respect for human dignity, a belief in democracy and human rights, and an ethical view of politics.³² Geremek's preface to Schuman's work leaves little doubt that the author is also writing about his understanding of social and political activity.

Both statesmen refused to ignore the potential dangers lying in the organizational sphere of integration; they warned against the domination of technocratic bureaucracy, the excessive multiplication of positions, and the abuse of the administrative apparatus. At the same time, however, they did not lose hope that the autocritical instinct of European political thought would make it possible to perceive and neutralize all dangers in advance. They were convinced that European integration, a result of a long-term transformation process, requires strenuous care, patience, constant improvement, and above all, reasonable education, without which Europe will not create its citizens. And yet the game is being played here for the next generations of conscious Europeans:

“May this idea of a reconciled, united, and strong Europe henceforth become the slogan of the young generations wishing to serve humanity finally liberated from hatred and fear, which is learning anew, after too long conflicts and rifts, Christian brotherhood.”³³

It is up to Europeans themselves to decide whether the dream of a common Europe will survive moments of crisis and lead to a better future, to a freer, more truthful, more beautiful, better horizon. Such a dream is worth pursuing. And defending.

³² Compare to B. Geremek, *Przedmowa* [In:] R. Schuman, *Dla Europy*, p. 8-9.

³³ R. Schuman, *Dla Europy*, p. 28.

CONCEPTS OF ROBERT SCHUMAN AND JERZY GIEDROYC AND THEIR RELEVANCE

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Political realism of the ideas of Robert Schuman and Jerzy Giedroyc

Five years after the end of World War II, Europe continued to struggle with its consequences; therefore, certain solutions were being sought to control them. Finally, it was acknowledged that joint coordination of steel production and coal mining should prevent a similar conflict from recurring in the future, making any war between the eternal rivals France and Germany “not only unthinkable but physically impossible”. There was a need for an idea that would unite and prevent future conflict and ensure peace. It was then that the project of a united Europe emerged in the political arena, led by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Robert Schuman (1886 - 1963). He was convinced from the very beginning that “Europe cannot be built in a moment or according to a single plan. It will be built on concrete achievements that will, first and foremost, create prerequisites for real solidarity. In order to bring the nations of Europe closer together, the age-old antagonisms between France and Germany must be eradicated.”¹ However, in order to achieve his goals, Robert Schuman needed the support of the then Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Konrad Adenauer, the Italian Prime Minister, Alcide de Gasperi, and the French diplomat, Jean Monnet. Hence, on May 9, 1950, Schuman’s plan was born as a project for the integration of Western Europe and later for the European Union, proposing to entrust the management of the entire French and German coal and steel industries to a joint General Board, open to other European countries.

At the same time, the Polish post-war emigrant, intellectual Jerzy Giedroyc (1906-2000), also in France, was struggling on a project for the post-Communist future of the independent and united states of Central and Eastern Europe. Contrary to Schuman’s plan, Giedroyc’s ideas seemed like a utopia to many people at the time. Since the Polish emigration government from 1939 to 1940 operating in exile in France, since 1940, having moved to London and although it did not have much recognition and effective power, remained as an opposition to the Polish People’s Republic and existed until 1990 till the end of the Polish communist regime, when it formally transferred its powers to the new government, never supported Giedroyc’s ideas, as he was still guided by the interwar ideas for preserving Polish *kresy* (edges of the state) in Poland under the Treaty of Riga. Moreover, the ideas could not be widely accepted in Communist Poland at the time. It seemed that in such circumstances J. Giedroyc’s ideas had no possibility of realization, because there was no one to transfer them to and where to spread them. However, this situation turned out to be deceptive, as both in emigration, in Communist Poland, as well as in countries outside Poland’s eastern borders, whose independence and autonomy J. Giedroyc advocated, not only gained support for his ideas, but also changed the attitudes of intellectuals throughout the region.

¹ R. Schuman’s Declaration, 1950 May: https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/history-eu/1945-59/schuman-declaration-may-1950_it

The ideas formed by J. Giedroyc and his team were first set out in 1974 in the so-called ULB concept of his closest London-based journalist Juliusz Mieroszewski (1906-1976). J. Mieroszewski himself masterfully described its essence and current relevance in writing: "If, for the sake of simplicity, we name the territory, which includes Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus, ULB, we should acknowledge that in the past, and in part today, the territory of ULB was somewhat more than an "apple of discord" between Poland and Russia. The ULB territory shaped the form of Russian-Polish relations and gave us Poles the role of either an imperialist or a satellite, therefore, Poland has always sought to dominate these territories either by military means or by federal plans, because history has taught her that Russia, dominating in these territories, is becoming an insurmountable competitor. Nothing else can be expected from the winning competitor - Russia - just tiredness."²

Although the concept stemmed from a federalist Polish geopolitical thought, it did not rely on interwar Polish federalist paternalism and the support of enlightened representatives of the Polish-speaking Eastern territories of the Republic of the Two Nations, but on the principles of an equal partnership and dialogue with the opposition ethnic elites of the Soviet ULB states. Thus, in the second half of the 20th century, space for independent and ethnic Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus emerged in Polish geopolitical thought. In creating his conception, J. Giedroyc abandoned the formulations of federalism and the idea of the Jagiellonians, which the ULB nations associated with the assimilation of their elite and the creation or loss of statehood.³ With the help of this concept, J. Giedroyc, together with his close partner J. Mieroszewski, was preparing Poles for a completely modern world, without historical sentiments - the ideas of the Jagiellonians or the federal plans of Pilsudski, consisting of nation-states in a united Europe, in order to avoid territorial conflicts and curb Polish and Russian nationalism. Although J. Giedroyc continued to think in terms of the categories he had taken from the Polish political thought of the interwar years, he did not seek to restore the status quo until the beginning of the Second World War, and this is the essence of the matter.⁴ In response to the Schuman Plan, as early as in 1952 in "Culture", the idea of a Central European Federation as a "replica of the Schuman Plan"⁵ emerged, recognizing that its realization cannot be achieved without a united Europe.⁶

ULB was Giedroyc's main political strategy and the merit that in 1989-1991 no Polish party made any attempt to revise the Eastern border of Poland, and the experience of the Kosovo war in Central and Eastern Europe was avoided.

During the half-century, Maisons-Laffitte near Paris, where J. Giedroyc, his "Culture" and Institute of Literature were located, became a real place of pilgrimage. Initially, it was visited by emigrants of World War II, later by young Polish dissidents, censor-oppressed creators and the opposition, and subsequently, after the restoration of independence, by delegations of heads of state and politicians.

The truth must be acknowledged that Marek Kornat, who in his preface to in the Lithuanian edition of the letters of J. Giedroyc and Cz. Miłosz wrote that "Giedroyc's mind did not look for ways to the past, but created a new Polish political idea. He longed for the reconciliation between our two nations, the Poles and the Lithuanians, not for sentimental reasons, but for the geopolitical realism that orders these nations to cooperate."⁷

2 Mieroszewski J. Rosyjski „kompleks Polski” i obszar ULB. *Kultura*, 1974, Nr. 9 (324).

3 Ibid

4 Kornat M. Preface to the Lithuanian edition. Jerzy Giedroyc, Czesław Miłosz. *Letters, 1952-1963*, p. 14.

5 Mieroszewski J. O reformę „zakonu polskości”, *Kultura*, 1952, nr. 4(54) p. 10.

6 Mieroszewski J. Psychologia przełomu, „*Kultura*”, 1951, nr. 9 (47), p. 100.

7 Kornat M. Preface to the Lithuanian edition. Jerzy Giedroyc, Czesław Miłosz. *Letters, 1952-1963*, p. 44

R. Schuman also realized the importance of political realism in implementing his ideas affirming that “painful history lessons taught us to avoid hasty improvisations and overly ambitious projects, but they also taught us that when an objective, well-thought-out opinion based on real facts leads us towards new, almost revolutionary initiatives, it is very important to us, even if those initiatives are hampered by established traditions, age-old antagonisms and the old routine, to stick firmly and persistently, because something constant cannot be done easily.”⁸

It is obvious that for both J. Giedroyc and R. Schuman the orientation in creating the vision and realization strategy was clearly directed not to the past, but to the future. Reflecting on the painful historical experiences of Europe, individual states and its nations, they realized that everything needed to be done to prevent the history from happening again, and this transformation requires a change in thinking, even if it would take time and sacrifice, while reassessing the geopolitical reality and the past of Europe and its individual states.

The need to demythologize history

In his last interview, J. Giedroyc contended that we are very divided in Europe about the future of the Eastern countries and that Poland is still ruled by two coffins – of Pilsudski and Dmowski.⁹ Lithuanian historian A. Bumblauskas has called this idea and J. Giedroyc’s concepts “an alternative to the great Polish narratives which remains relevant as a will to the Polish elites.” T. Snyder noted that the J. Giedroyc-J. Mieroszewski tandem had successfully synthesized the main currents of the Polish political thought - the Endeks and the Pilsudski followers.¹⁰

J. Giedroyc showed his allegiance to democracy, tolerance and open dialogue through his work, he made every effort to make the history of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as of Poland, told not only from “great Russian positions” and he also made efforts to “demythologize Polish history” because he realized that it could become a dangerous tool to hinder the creation of the future.

Schuman also saw the need to rethink history, stating that “rewriting history textbooks must become one of the most important works. And that this is not contrary to the freedom of thought and expression of adults or to true patriotism, which must be taught to young people, for under the pretext that we are patriots of our country and glorify its glorious past we often ignore the duty to be impartial and fair: we believe that we must constantly praise what has been deception, the cynical use of force and terror, and the imposition of too many mistakes on a competing country.”¹¹

Many analysts today acknowledge that Europe lacks identity, with the deficit primarily embodying a strategy aimed at giving its citizens a point of reference for time and space. In fact, this means the need for a revision of Europe’s historical memory and the implementation of a new history program.

R. Schuman emphasized that such a need did not mean changing national narratives, which remained vital for the education of young people, however, they need to be complemented by a “specifically European narrative in which young Europeans will learn that every national historical phenomenon has also been and is primarily European.”¹²

8 Schuman R. For Europe, 2002, p. 21-22.

9 Sto lat polskiego losu: z Jerzym Giedroyciem rozmawia Krzysztof Masłoń, „Plus Minus” 1999, nr 53.

10 Snyder T. Jerzy Giedroyc a polska polityka wschodnia. Nie jesteśmy ukrajinofilami. Polska myśl polityczna wobec Ukraińców i Ukrainy. Antologia tekstów. 2008. p. 327-331.

11 Schuman R. For Europe, 2002, p. 49.

12 Schuman R. For Europe, 2002, p. 49-50.

Although J. Giedroyc came from the family of Lithuanian dukes Giedraičiai and was born in present-day Belarus, but spent most of his life near Paris, he never tried to get a passport of a French citizen as well as he never received the highest award from Poland and did not become a politician in order to have the opportunity for criticism. His works, publications and ideas, and even posthumous masks became his passport. One of those posthumous masks is kept in Paris and two in Lithuania - one in Videniškės and the other in Varniai, testifying his origins and political foresight.

R. Schuman's personal background and experience are also thought to have influenced his vision as a European architect. Born in Luxembourg as a German national, in 1919 in the region of Alsace-Lorraine, where he lived after its return to France, Schuman became a Frenchman. During World War II, Schuman was actively involved in the French resistance movement and was captured and imprisoned by the Nazis. After escaping deportation to the Dachau concentration camp, he fled to a "free" zone in France and went into hiding for three years after the Nazis invaded it. He later rejected the invitation of the French leader in exile, Charles de Gaulle, to come to London and decided to stay with his compatriots in Nazi-occupied France. After the war, he was actively involved in French politics, finally in 1958 he became the first President of the European Parliament and a chief negotiator for key treaties and initiatives such as the Council of Europe, the Marshall Plan and NATO which were to ensure closer cooperation between the countries of the Western Alliance and the unification of Europe. Obviously both thinkers were close to the idea of Nobel Laureate Czesław Miłosz that without dealing with the past one will not create the future.

Eastern policy as an untapped opportunity for Europe

Today, the EU is inconsistent in its approach to solidarity and its efforts to defend the interests of Ukraine and Belarus, the EU public opinion differs widely on policies in Eastern Europe, therefore, it is necessary to analyze who could give priority to this region and political direction and return the European civilization to this part of Europe and its history.

In this context, the problem of the role of nation states and nationalism in the community inevitably arises. R. Schuman firmly believed that "the nationalism of another country cannot be properly denied, if we oppose it to our own nationalism. We will prevent a wave of nationalism only by implementing a constructive and common policy, according to which everyone will find something suitable and effective due to the solidarity of interests and efforts."¹³ Furthermore, he was certain that after the two world wars it was finally recognized that the best guarantor of a nation lay not in its wonderful secession, not in its own strength, whatever its power, but in the solidarity of the nations, which are guided by the same idea and who share common interests."¹⁴

J. Giedroyc was also convinced that Eastern Europe required the solidarity of nations, and for Poland, Eastern policy is an untapped opportunity to play a significant role in both Western and Eastern and Central Europe.¹⁵ He used to say that "Poles must not submerge into national megalomania and have to pursue independent policies, but not be clients of the United States or any other major state. Our main goal must be the normalization of Polish-Russian and Polish-German relations, while defending the independence of Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic States and closely cooperating with them. We must realize that the stronger our position in the East, the more important we will be in Western Europe."¹⁶

13 Schuman R. For Europe, 2002, p. 30

14 Schuman R. For Europe, 2002, p. 33

15 Dlaczego nie przyjechałem do Polski. Doktorat honoris causa dla Giedroycia, „Gazeta Wyborcza”, 1991, nr. 262, p. 7.

16 Giedroyc J., Autobiografia na cztery ręce, oprac. K.Pomian, 1994, p. 228.

When considering the unity of the EU and Europe, the Russian factor is inevitably touched upon. Schuman was convinced that “the main threat to peace lies in relations between East and West, i.e., the problem of relations between the Western and the Soviet worlds, therefore, if a lasting *modus vivendi* with the Soviet regime could be established, we will not only take a decisive step towards peace, but we will also approach the fear of all social and political fears.”¹⁷ Giedroyc had no expectations of the Soviet regime because he was convinced that the Soviet Union would collapse, therefore, he was preparing not only Poles but also other nations for a new reality, although he envisaged that co-operation with Russia would be possible if it changed. However, for him, the partnership was not possible at the expense of common neighbours, but by recognizing their autonomy and independence.¹⁸ He based those provisions on the fact that Poland’s Eastern neighbours should make sure that the partnership with Poland could offer them more than Russia and that its intentions are not imperialist. Moreover, he was convinced that “the more the Polish ambassador to free Kiev is valued, the more the Polish ambassador to Moscow will be valued”¹⁹, therefore, he stated from the outset that “when the situation in Eastern Europe changes, the Poles will only be able to influence it if they have agreed on an Eastern Policy Program.”²⁰

Both Schuman and Giedroyc unanimously agree that the division of Europe is an absurd anachronism, however, as R. Schuman contended, in order for “something to change, Europe must want to be the master of its own destiny and show solidarity, as Rome and Byzantium, exhausted by their internal struggles, collapsed due to absurd competition.”²¹ Both worried that the same fate might befall Europe because they realized that competition between European countries was exhausting them in relation to rival blocs and was jeopardizing Europe and its integration.

Wills of Robert Schuman and Jerzy Giedroyc

R. Schuman, like J. Giedroyc, was firmly convinced of the Christian foundations of Europe. “I can’t see Schuman anymore, I can’t see Adenauer anymore,” Pope Francis said in one of his last interviews calling for the remembrance of the builders of European unity who not only dreamed but dared to abandon the old model of coexistence of states and created a new project.²² According to the Pope, “Europe is full of fear. It is closed. From a fertile mother, she became a barren grandmother. Europe must be able to integrate, talk (in a dialogue) and create (give birth).”²³ It is no coincidence that the Pope remembers Schuman, who said that “democracy must be grateful to Christianity for its existence,”²⁴ therefore, he warned that Christianity could not be sacrificed to a political regime.²⁵ Schuman wanted to create a political union that would serve the citizens through the moral order inherent in Christianity in line with economic cooperation and integration.

Europe has been resolving the afore-mentioned issues for decades. Therefore, the modern definition of Europe challenges beyond the Christian dimension, hence the question of European identity, which has become an issue for many populist and far-right parties in Europe today, particularly while deciding on the implementation of immigrant policies. The negative attitude towards immigrants in many European countries shows their insecurity in terms of well-being, especially in Central European countries, which they expected when they joined the EU as well as anxiety about their own identity which was formed already during the post-Communist transformation period.²⁶ The sense of insecurity in some EU members is provoking new nationalism that is creating new myths for consolidation of a new European identity.

17 Schuman R. *For Europe*, 2002, p. 140.

18 Pomianowski J. *Prawdziwy król bez ziemi, Rzeczpospolita, dodatek „Plus-Minus”*, 2000, nr. 37 (403), p. 2.

19 Mieroszewski J. *Może zdarzyć się i tak. „Kultura”*, 1970, nr. 4 (271), p. 54.

20 Mieroszewski J. *Polska „Ostpolitik” „Kultura”*, 1973, nr. 6 (309), p. 68.

21 Schuman R. *For Europe*, 2002, p. 35-36.

22 *The Path to Change: Thoughts on Politics and Society*. Pope Francis and Dominique Wolton, 2018.

23 Garškaitė R. *Why does the Pope call Europe a tired grandmother?* 2018: <https://www.bernardinai.lt/2018-08-10-kodel-papiezius-pranciskus-europa-vadina-pavargusia-mociute/>

24 Schuman R. *For Europe*, 2002, p. 54.

25 *Ibid*, p. 57.

26 Krastev I. *After Europe*, 2017, p. 49.

The issue of European identity also touches upon the issue of Europe's borders. The Baltic states are constantly signalling threats to their security from Russia, there are doubts about the possibility of protecting them in the moment of attack which results in higher national military expenditure or an enhanced integration strategy. The issue is vital, because if Russia pursued an aggressive, expansionary policy like in Ukraine, what would the EU do? That would be a real test of borders and of European identity. Is the EU prepared to take action and risk human lives to protect the EU's common borders? This in turn forces us to define the continuity and completeness of Europe and to answer the growing question of the imperative relationship of the EU's "core" with its peripheral states as well as the EU coherence and effectiveness in crisis management and the geopolitical role of Europe. R. Schuman, for his part, stated that while Europe's challenge was to guarantee collective security against any possible aggression, [...] but defending Europe does not mean building it.²⁷ Furthermore, even at that time he warned that administrative inaction was a major threat to supranational mechanisms.²⁸

For his part, J. Giedroyc, who left clear guidelines in his autobiography on the direction of politics for his contemporaries and future generations, reminded them that "Poland's history has long been characterized by a tendency to weaken the Executive: famous *pacta conventa*, anarchist golden freedom, or *liberum veto*. Above all, we must change the mentality of the nation. This requires the strengthening of the executive branch and its control by the Seimas. It is imperative to restructure the parliamentary system and remove its partisanship and privacy. The rule of law and the persistent fight against corruption in all its forms and types need to be introduced. We need the press that is both free and full of responsibility. The Church must be separated from the state. The rights of all our national minorities must be respected; we must remember that this is a prerequisite for good relations with our neighbours. While perceiving that Catholicism is the faith of the vast majority, we must also care for Jews, Muslims, Protestants, and Orthodox whose faith is prevalent in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. These are the common features of the Polish vision, which I have fought for all my life."²⁹

R. Schuman and J. Giedroyc have set standards of vision, conscience, democracy and solidarity for politicians and states in Europe; in the face of modern geopolitical events, they are more relevant than ever.

It must be remembered that R. Schuman's vision of Europe, enshrined in the 1950 on 9 May, paved the way for the longest peace in Europe and the prosperity of its members, while J. Giedroyc's ULB concept is the foundation for the subjectivity and sovereignty of Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus after the agreements of the Yalta Conference and the political and cultural preconditions for EU membership, thus strengthening European solidarity and ensuring further peace.

However, today the ULB concept is not fully implemented, as neither Ukraine nor Belarus are members of the EU yet; moreover, the EU delay in taking political decisions on the annexation of Crimea or events in Belarus or a non-functioning Eastern Partnership program or growing nationalist radicalism testify to the ideas of R. Schuman and J. Giedroyc and the need for their continuity seeking not only to prevent the collapse of the EU or to ensure a European perspective of solidarity and security, but also the future of Eastern Europe, for which J. Mieroszewski predicted two possibilities: "either will be politically and economically united or divided".³⁰

27 Schuman R., *For Europe*, 2002, p. 34-35.

28 Schuman R., *For Europe*, 2002, p. 111.

29 Giedroyc J., *Autobiografia na cztery ręce*, oprac. K. Pomian, 1994: <https://www.polskieradio.pl/62/646/Artykul/438691,Przeslanie-Redaktora-Jerzego-Giedroycia>

30 Mieroszewski J., *Stare wino w nowych beczkach*, „Kultura” 1969, nr. 9, p. 39-44.

VÁCLAV HAVEL AND ROBERT SCHUMAN: THE SEARCH FOR THE SOUL OF EUROPE

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Since the Middle Ages, individual European nations and their elites have conceived and implemented various forms of integration of Europe and the West, with the idea of a United States of Europe first emerging in the 19th century. After the two devastating world wars of the 20th century, which were primarily European conflicts, an integration project was gradually carried out – first in the Western part of Europe – whose present fruition is the European Union.

Schuman, Havel and the consolidation of Europe

If Robert Schuman (1886–1963), a French statesman of German origin, was one of the founding fathers of post-war European integration, following the collapse of the Communist Soviet Russian empire the Czech writer and statesman Václav Havel (1936–2011) became a symbol of Western-Eastern European unification. It is worth remembering that when Schuman, who was two generations older, died Havel was 27 and already known as a dramatist. He dreamt of an artistic career but soon recognised that in Czechoslovakia, which was a helpless governorate of the Soviet Union, culture had replaced intellectual reflection and indeed politics.

The ancient German city of Aachen, close to the borders with Belgium and the Netherlands, has since 1950 been presenting the prestigious Charlemagne Prize to personalities who have made a significant contribution to European integration. The first recipient was Count Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi, the founder of the pan-European movement. It is little known, though highly symbolic, that in the interwar years this cosmopolitan aristocrat possessed Czechoslovak citizenship and a Czechoslovak diplomatic passport. In 1958 the laureate was Robert Schuman, a founding father of the European Union. And in 1991 the Charlemagne Prize also went to Václav Havel, a former dissident who had become Czechoslovak president. Though Schuman and Havel never met, both were regarded in their lifetimes as major supporters of European integration, freedom and democracy, human rights and dignity.

In similar fashion, Robert Schuman and Václav Havel also “met” in the Dutch city of Amsterdam; while Schuman received the Erasmus Prize in 1959, it was bestowed on Havel in 1986, though, as a dissident persecuted by Czechoslovakia’s Communist regime, he was unable to attend the ceremony in person. The speech that was read out in Amsterdam on Havel’s behalf also expressed a Schumanesque conviction about Europe’s shared spirit: *“By giving their Erasmus Prize to a Czech, I am convinced the Dutch people are demonstrating that for them – as for that Czech – there exists but one Europe, a Europe which may be divided politically but is not divided; indeed, it is spiritually indivisible.”*¹

¹ Václav HAVEL, Děkovná řeč, Obsah – November 1986 (samizdat), p. 2–7.

Though the name of Robert Schuman was very much anathema in Communist Czechoslovakia and the entire Soviet Empire, and though Václav Havel was largely unaware of him until 1989, he unknowingly followed in the footsteps of the famous son of Lorraine, further developing his ideas about the importance of Europe's spiritual profile.

Schuman as anti-Soviet "agent of the Vatican"

Robert Schuman's name was long little-known in the Czech context; Czechoslovakia had been a Soviet satellite with a deformed democracy from the end of WWII and indeed a Communist tyranny had been established there in 1948. While economic and political integration was taking place in Western Europe, Czechoslovakia was part of an utterly different project of integration: the Soviet-dominated so-called Eastern Bloc.

Though he did not refer to Schuman or other protagonists in the integration of Europe by name, the Czech Communist intellectual and "politician" Zdeněk Nejedlý referred in 1950 to efforts at integrating the Western part of Europe as a fraud initiated by the United States of America. The capitalists had apparently "*made a complete cripple of Europe*"; America is behind the birth of "*a new, small Europe*" which it will be able to control. According to Nejedlý this "*Americanised Europe*" will no longer be Europe, because "*the true Europe of the best and highest traditions is today in the Soviet Union*". Concluding his triumphalist tirade, the Communist guru declares: "*Our Europe today, a Socialist and Communist Europe, will not disappear and will not sink. It is running victoriously and will move further ahead.*" He also issues a warning to Western Europe: "*The true, progressive Europe, the Europe whose centre is Moscow, will triumph here and has already triumphed.*"²

If any reference was made to Robert Schuman in Communist Czechoslovakia it was solely in a negative context. After all, his efforts to unify Europe hindered the expansive plans of Soviet-Russian imperialism. In books published at that time, written in Czech or translated from other languages, he was insultingly described as a "*former German Reich officer, a Pétain minister, a post-war French prime minister, representative of the interests of Wall Street*" who had helped initiate "*a climate of anti-Communist and anti-Soviet hysteria*".³ Books were distributed in Czechoslovakia in which Schuman was dubbed a Catholic reactionary and supporter of fascism.⁴

In the 1950s a Czech reader could easily read in texts by French Communists that Schuman was a "*balding aging bachelor of insipid appearance, evil and two-faced*" or even that he was an "*old agent of the Vatican's secret diplomacy, though probably he was in the service of the Jesuits*".⁵ For the Czech Communist journalist Jiří Hronek, Robert Schuman was "*a skinny old man with a long pointy nose and unpleasant beady eyes*" and "*one of the least popular French statesmen*".⁶

Schuman's plan for European integration of 9 May 1950 was regarded by Czechoslovakia's Communists, who merely parroted Soviet propaganda, as "traitorous" as, apparently, it had been created at the instigation of the US, was targeted against the USSR and was a way of arming western Germany.⁷ This narrative was employed and extended in Czech journalism until the 1980s, i.e., until the breakup of the Eastern Bloc.⁸

2 Zdeněk NEJEDLÝ, O Evropě. Var. List pro kulturní otázky 3, 1950, p. 65–69.

3 Jean BAUMIER, Od Hitlera k Trumanovi, Prague 1951, p. 151, 167.

4 Michail ŠEJNMAN, Ideologie a politika Vatikánu ve službách imperialismu, Prague 1951, p. 180.

5 Jean CATHALA, Zrazují mír, Prague 1952, p. 158

6 Jiří HRONEK, V širším světě, Prague 1954, p. 106.

7 Jaroslav ČERNÝ – Jiří HOCHMAN, Evropské rozcestí. Boj proti remilitarisaci západního Německa, Prague 1955, p. 56–57.

8 Petr HLAVÁČEK, České „snění“ o Evropě 1948–1989. In: Petr Hlaváček – Jan Kysela (eds.), Demokracie a občanské ctnosti. K životnímu jubileu Petra Pitharta, Prague 2021, p. 522–541.

Czech exiles: Schumanesque reflections

In the Czech exile milieu the Schuman project was viewed, by contrast, as the sole instrument of the future liberation of Czechoslovakia and renewal of its state sovereignty. Petr Zenkl, an exile politician and chairman of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, promoted a European federation that would be capable of withstanding the pressure of the Soviet-Russian empire and helping bring about the liberation of the nations of Central and Eastern Europe. He formulated his thesis in 1953. In his view, the “federalisation of Europe” was in the spirit of Czech national tradition and political philosophy. The ancient Czech state was part of the West; Czechoslovakia had been born out of the ideals of Western democracy and had been violently forced into the ranks of Europe’s enemies by the Communists: *“Czechoslovakia’s entry to the European Union may not occur before its complete liberation from Moscow’s yoke”*. However, the history of Europe’s nations does not end with the creation of the European Union; a battle for primacy will continue among them. Europe also needs to collaborate with the other countries of the North Atlantic Treaty, particularly the US. For this reason, Zenkl highlighted the idea of Atlantic Union and, as a distant goal, the establishment of a world federation.⁹

The exile Jan M. Kolár, a Christian-oriented journalist and essayist who was closest to Schuman’s project, proclaimed a more pointed view in 1957: *“For us this cannot and may not be about a neutral Europe but an independent Europe. The departure of American troops will only be possible when Europe is united, strong and stable economically and strategically; the liberation of the satellites will only be possible within the framework of such a united and independent Europe.”* He also pointed out that *“European unification is by no means a way out of a crisis – on the contrary, it is a traditional European and Christian goal”*, warning against Czechoslovakia and Central Europe being turned into a kind of neutral zone between the “residual” Europe and the USSR, which for him would be the *“most terrifying fate”*. The renewal of Europe was to be brought about by reconciliation between the nations of Europe, just as between Christianity and “enlightened socialism”, and for him Europe-wide (con)federation was a personal target.¹⁰

Havel’s inspiration from Schuman

It is not until after 1989, when the nonconformist writer and persecuted dissident became president of the country and a major European statesman, that we come across the name of Robert Schuman in Václav Havel’s essays and opinion pieces. For instance, during a visit to Prague by German chancellor Helmut Kohl on 27 February 1992 Václav Havel delivered a speech in which he acknowledged the significance of German-French reconciliation in the creation of the European partnership, which he referred to as an inspiration to Czechoslovakia. *“The same task awaits us and the Germans today as the French and Germans after the war. The ideals and results of the work of Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer can be a constant inspiration to us on this journey. What is needed is the creation of new Strasbourgs, places that connect, not new wire fences and walls that divide.”*¹¹

When on 3 March 1999 Václav Havel appeared before the Senate in Paris, where he spoke about the ideals of European federation, it sparked a wave of criticism. Among other things Havel said on that occasion: *“Proximity to a totalitarian empire gave efforts at integration a comprehensible meaning. In many regards it directly stimulated them and, offering Western Europe a dark background of totalitarianism, fostered self-understanding. That was later a natural driver of unification.”* He added: *“In general therefore,*

9 Petr ZENKL, Tomáš G. Masaryk a idea federalisace Evropy a světa. Chicago 1953, p. 48–53.

10 Jan M. KOLÁR, Otázky české tradice. Lund 1957, p. 104–107.

11 Václav HAVEL, Spisy VI. Projevy z let 1990–1992. Letní přemítání, Prague 1999, p. 653.



Václav Havel, portrait taken by Oldřich Škácha in Havel's private office in Voršilská Street, Prague in October 2009.

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Václav Havel Library

That said, on 9 April 1999 the political scientist Rudolf Kučera published an essay on Havel's Paris speech in *Lidové noviny* whose title is also an interpretation of the criticised proposition: "Václav Havel builds on Robert Schuman". Though Václav Havel does not explicitly quote Schuman in his address, Kučera writes that the thesis that Europe is not a "material community" but has a "soul" builds on Schuman and the so-called Schuman Plan of 1950. So does the assertion that it is a "community of values" and should move toward federalisation. Furthermore, Havel also echoes Schuman's emphasis on human rights, as reflected in the 1953 Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Values, itself inspired by Schuman.¹³ Havel thus showed himself a successor to Robert Schuman, in particular in his appeal for a spiritual dimension to European integration.

Havel also strove to promote Europe Day, which has been celebrated every May 9 since 1985 in honour of Schuman's declaration in 1950. It has been marked in Czechia since 1995, so before EU accession. For instance, Havel made this comment about it to journalists on the streets of Prague on 9 May 2002: *"I have visited Europe Day in order to emphasise not only the significance of this day but the historic significance of minister Robert Schuman. He was there at the very inception of the integration process in Europe."*¹⁴

When the Italian economist and politician Mario Monti, a former European commissioner, was elected a member of France's Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, taking the place of the late Václav Havel, he delivered a ceremonial address in Paris on 5 May 2014 in which he referred to Havel as one of the *"most significant figures in contemporary Europe"*. He explicitly compared him to Robert Schuman, saying that both had regarded their political engagement as a responsibility, a duty and a certain form of sacrifice.¹⁵

Similarly the US political scientist Lily Gardner Feldman, who had earlier focused on German political reconciliation, compared the importance of Robert Schuman and Václav Havel; in her view, both had contributed majorly to the conciliation of their countries, France and Czechoslovakia (resp. Czechia),

¹² Václav HAVEL, *Spisy VII. Projevy a jiné texty z let 1992–1999*, Prague 1999, p. 826–839.

¹³ Rudolf KUČERA, Václav Havel navázal na Roberta Schumana, *Lidové noviny*, 9. 3. 1999, p. 11.

¹⁴ https://www.idnes.cz/zpravy/domaci/Prague-slavila-den-evropy.A020509_161134_Prague_lin

¹⁵ Knihovna Václava Havla, Archiv, ID 59092.

with neighbouring Germany.¹⁶

In addition the Spanish historian Guillermo Á. Pérez Sánchez, who studies the development of European integration at the turn of the 21st century and future outlooks, interprets the significance of Václav Havel (referring here to Michael Žantovský) as a successor and completer of the project of European unification that Robert Schuman outlined on 9 May 1950.¹⁷

So how specifically did Václav Havel draw on Schuman's key points?¹⁸ This is perhaps best captured in the speech that Havel delivered in Aachen on 15 May 1996 at the first meeting of the Charlemagne Plenum. In his address entitled "Europe as task" he reflected on the meaning of the name "Europe", pointing out that it is of Akkadian or Phoenician origin and means "sunset" or "twilight". And "twilight" may represent an opportunity for the future of Europe as it is a time of calm, slowing down and reflection: "It seems to me that this is the time for us to pause and reflect upon ourselves. It seems to me that we are facing a great historic challenge, a challenge to finally grasp and begin to put into practice the best possible meaning of the word 'twilight'. That is, we should cease to see the present state of Europe as the twilight of its energy and recognize it instead as a time of contemplation and self-reflection, as a time when physical rush stops for a while and when, as the sun goes down, the rule of thought sets in. This does not mean estrangement from ourselves and the world we live in. It simply means taking a calm look back at what we have accomplished, assessing the meaning and the consequences of our endeavours and making a few good resolutions for the next day."

What's more Havel is unafraid to say clearly: *"It appears that if not the most important point, then certainly the starting point of all our meditations at twilight should be a discussion about what Europe used to be and what it believed in now, what it should or could be, and what role it could play in the future."*¹⁹ The Czech intellectual Havel spoke as a genuine man of freedom, hope and responsibility on that occasion in Aachen.

Václav Havel as Schuman's successor?

In conclusion we can state that the ideas of Robert Schuman contained in his famous declaration of 9 May 1950 were a kind of latent inspiration for Havel's outlook on Europe. While Schuman's impulse was formally focused on the economic integration of the (Western) European space, it also had a geo-political, civilisational and, if you will, spiritual context. In his speech he devotes space not only to "coal and steel", i.e., the interlinking of the European (French-German) economy, but also to peace and reconciliation, which he regarded as essential conditions for the future creation of a "European federation".

If Robert Schuman once declared that Europe needed a soul, meaning an ideal and the political will to serve that ideal, it is clear that it was the intellectual Václav Havel, one-time president of the Czech Republic, who, following Schuman and other great 20th century Europeans, reflected on and formulated that ideal in a systematic manner. It is just from this spiritual perspective that we can regard Václav Havel as one of the most important successors of the great European and Christian Robert Schuman. In doing so we might recall a long-ago saying of Havel's appealing for courage and hope:

"Hope is not the conviction that something will turn out well but the certainty that something makes sense, regardless of how it turns out."²⁰

16 Lily GARDNER FELDMAN, *Germany's Foreign Policy of Reconciliation. From Enmity to Amity*, Lanham-New York-Toronto 2012, p. 341.

17 Guillermo Á. PÉREZ SÁNCHEZ, *The European Union Crossroads: Current Situation and Future Challenges*. In: David Ramiro Troitiño et al. (ed.), *The EU in the 21st Century: Challenges and Opportunities for the European Integration Process*, Cham (Springer) 2020, p. 14.

18 Petr HLAVÁČEK, *Unavení Evropou? Češi a jejich cesta k politickému národu*. In: Petr Hlaváček (ed.), *Nesamozřejmý národ? Reflexe českého třicetiletí 1989–2019*, Prague 2019, p. 20–47.

19 Václav HAVEL, *Evropa jako úkol*. In: Václav Havel, *Evropa jako úkol. Výběr z projevů 1990–2009*, Prague 2014, p. 133–134.

20 Václav HAVEL, *Dálkový výslech (rozhovor s Karlem Hviždálou)*, Prague 1989, p. 156–157. Compare Petr HLAVÁČEK, *Moc? Bezmocný?* Na okraj jedné havlovské politické meditace. In: Jiří Suk – Kristina Andělová (eds.), *Jednoho dne se v našem zelináři cosi vzbouří. Eseje o Moci bezmocných*, Prague 2016, p. 73–78.

BEYOND THE DECLARATION. SPINELLI, SCHUMAN, MONNET AND THE EUROPEAN FEDERATION'S FOUNDATION

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The Declaration and the indispensable Federation

After preparatory work that had included the prior agreement of Karl Adenauer, in the Clock Room of Quai d'Orsay, the headquarters of the French Foreign Ministry, Robert Schuman issued on May 9, 1950 the famous Declaration, whose key concepts and draft had been conceived by Jean Monnet and his team:

"Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity. (...)

With this aim in view, the French Government proposes that action be taken immediately on one limited but decisive point. It proposes that Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common High Authority, within the framework of an organization open to the participation of the other countries of Europe. The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe, and will change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims. (...)

By pooling basic production and by instituting a new High Authority, whose decisions will bind France, Germany and other member countries, this proposal will lead to the realization of the first concrete foundation of a European federation indispensable to the preservation of peace."¹

Those references to a federation did not escape Altiero Spinelli's notice, who reacted to the Schuman declaration with the article *Dal carbone all'acciaio* (From Coal to Europe), underlining, even within the limits of what was proposed, the courageous vision: "the great political objective - limitation of sovereignty, European federation - which lies behind the question of iron and steel, was explicitly indicated by the audacious French minister."²

It was necessary, however, to exert all the pressure possible to ensure that the declaration did not fall on deaf ears and that all the political consequences were taken:

"To move from words to deeds, to reap all the fruits of Schuman's step, it is, however, necessary to go far beyond the question of iron and steel. Victim of the pseudo-concreteness of the experts, Schuman did not take up, by specifying it and giving it the seal of authority of France, Adenauer's proposal to create a European Parliament."³

Spinelli introduces here in his reasoning a historical comparison, recalling the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, which finally gave the United States a real federal Constitution, after years of anarchy between

¹ Robert Schuman, Declaration of 9 May 1950, Paris. Italics are mine.

² Altiero Spinelli, *L'Europa non cade dal cielo*, il Mulino, Bologna 1960, p. 67. The article "Dal carbone all'Europa", republished in that book, appears for the first time in the magazine "Il Mondo" of July 1, 1950.

³ *ibidem*.

states and after the failed attempt of the Annapolis Convention of 1786 convened to solve the limited problems of navigation and interstate trade rules. Similarly, the forthcoming European Coal and Steel Conference could not have solved this limited problem without immediately raising the more general question:

“The European federation, indispensable, in Schuman’s words, to the preservation of peace, cannot be the consequence of a first stage in which only steel and coal are pooled. It must be the European parliament, government, judiciary, in a word, the European state, charged with controlling the production and market of iron and coal, and therefore also with establishing the general conditions of the European economy, as well as with replacing with the European army the humble French, Italian, Belgian, and Dutch armies, and with the specter of a renewed German army.”⁴

Schuman’s merit was for Spinelli doubtless that of having created the political premises for all this: “but premises alone are not enough if they are not followed by appropriate acts.”⁵

Six months after the Schuman Declaration - it is November 1950- Altiero Spinelli will therefore initiate the strategy of the European Constituent Assembly, presenting the idea in Strasbourg at the congress of the Union of European Federalists (UEF) and the associated Conseil des peuples d’Europe: both audiences welcomed this new watchword, which in the intense months that followed - and for a couple of years until the failure of the European Defence Community (EDC) project - would bring federalist action together with “the need in which the six ministers [of the ECSC founding countries] found themselves to create a federal authority”⁶.

Regarding the draft treaty of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), elaborated after long months of negotiations by the Schuman Plan conference, Spinelli presents an articulate analysis in an article published very few days before the signing of the Treaty of Paris (April 18, 1951), giving an ultimately positive judgment of it:

“Although the Schuman Plan deals exclusively with economic matters, its main meaning is purely political. In fact, it was conceived and elaborated essentially in order to initiate towards a satisfactory solution the problem of the continental unification of democratic Europe”.⁷

On this basis, the federalist perspective can and must be strongly relaunched:

“The High Authority for coal and steel therefore has a future and a positive meaning for Europe on the precise condition that without wasting time it be integrated, as a special department, into a European governmental system. The federal solution was made not less, but more urgent by the elaboration of the Schuman Plan”.⁸

Thus began an intense work of ‘federalist diplomacy’ that would see Spinelli at the forefront, with talks, proposals and memoranda addressed, among others, to both Schuman and Monnet.

4 *ibid.*, p. 69. Italics are mine.

5 *ibidem*.

6 Altiero Spinelli, *Diario europeo 1948-1969*, edited by Edmondo Paolini, il Mulino, Bologna 1989, p. 120. Nota del 31 dicembre 1951. There is also a reference here to Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi as the first to have spoken of a European constituent assembly: he had, however, dropped the idea, which instead “took on a precise shape and political weight thanks to my action” (*ibid.*).

7 Spinelli, *L’Europa non cade dal cielo*, cit., p. 85. The article, republished in the volume with the title “Il trattato della C.E.C.A.”, had already appeared in the magazine “Europa federata” of April 15, 1951. Italics are mine.

8 Altiero Spinelli, *L’Europa non cade dal cielo*, il Mulino, Bologna 1960, p. 88, italics mine. A curiosity -that has its own significance, as we shall see: Altiero Spinelli gave Jean Monnet a copy of this book, which is still preserved in the personal Monnet Library at the Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe (FJME) in Lausanne. The title page bears a handwritten dedication by Spinelli (“A Jean Monnet/ avec amitié / Altiero Spinelli //Rome, avril 1960”) with some verses from Dante’s *Inferno*, XXIII, 28-30 : “Pur mo venian li tuoi pensieri fra i miei / con simile atto e con simile faccia, / sì che d’entrambi un sol consiglio fei.” These are the words Virgil says to Dante as they are pursued by a host of devils in the Malebolge. A reference, it would seem, to their commonality of purpose in the struggle for European unification, and to the insidious opponents of their efforts?

Diplomacy for the European Constitutional Assembly

“He is a nice man”⁹: this is Spinelli’s impression of Monnet upon meeting him for the first time in Paris on July 4, 1951. The Schuman’s plan mind tells the federalist leader that “it will be necessary to make the constitution of Europe”, but he thinks that “it will be the Assembly of the Schuman Plan and the European Army that will receive the constitutional mandate”¹⁰, referring to the planned Assembly of the ECSC and that of the future EDC.

Two days later, on July 6, 1951 Spinelli personally meets Robert Schuman with a UEF delegation.

It is a long and cordial conversation: the French statesman shows his approval of the federalist action, declaring that the draft treaty for the convocation of the European Constituent Assembly - elaborated by the federalists in their international conference in Lugano in April 1951 - should certainly be taken into consideration at the right time: “he only asked us not to present it to the parliaments before the approval of the coal and steel plan because otherwise it could be a pretext for the opponents of the plan”¹¹.

The Federalists agreed with Schuman’s request, and he in turn gave his consent to their proposal for an ‘itinerant delegation’ to present the plan to the various governments and ask their opinion on a possible French initiative in this regard.

Spinelli therefore started to write a note for Schuman¹², but he would not be part of the UEF delegation that met with the French Foreign Minister again in November 1951, composed of German Eugen Kogon and French Henri Frenay who had just returned from a federalist tour in the USA. In his diary Spinelli reports with annoyance his exclusion from that meeting, summarizing the inconclusive results:

“Schuman told them that he did not yet know what to propose, that the proposal had to be adherent to the actual situation, that France alone could not make a proposal that was too radical, that for this reason he wanted to go through the Council of Europe, although he did not yet know whether the committee of Ministers would allow him to make serious proposals, that finally, there needed to be some kind of Hague Congress that would show the way forward.”¹³

Had he been present at the meeting with the French minister - he noted with his usual pride - he would have proposed to him precisely “to hold a huge congress in January without delay”¹⁴.

The federalist hopes for the Constituent Assembly will reach their peak while waiting for the double outcome of the session of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and of the Conference of the six foreign ministers for the European army that will be held between December 10 and 11, 1951 in Strasbourg to further discuss the Pleven Plan - which was also devised by Jean Monnet, as is well known. Spinelli thus expresses the urgency of the moment and his concerns in a note taken in the French city a few days before the beginning of the Assembly:

“For the federalist action a critical moment is approaching. If Schuman, De Gasperi and Adenauer, who will be here on Monday, do not have the courage to say that they will do the federation in spite of the resistance of the Belgians, I do not see how we can any longer hope to have a European army, and a continuation of Eisenhower’s policy. Nor how we can any longer influence the Italian, French and German ruling groups. We will have a breakdown of tension in all our organizations. But how will it be possible to move to Gandhist-type action, to the call for civil non-cooperation?”¹⁵

9 Spinelli, *Diario europeo*, cit., p. 84. Note of July 4, 1951.

10 *ibidem*.

11 *ibid.*, p. 86. Note of July 7, 1951.

12 “I’m working on a memo to Schuman”: *ibid.*, p. 102. Note of November 6, 1951, Paris.

13 *ibid.*, p. 104. Note of November 21, 1951, Frankfurt. Italics mine

14 *ibid.*, p. 105.

15 Spinelli, *Diario europeo*, cit., p. 110. Note of 4 December 1951, Strasbourg.



Altiero Spinelli shows to Jean Monnet his Agenda pour l'Europe in Paris, October 1952

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At the opening of the session of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, Alcide De Gasperi briefly declares that Italy, along with the European army, also wants a European government, a European parliament and a European federal tax. Altiero Spinelli, present in the press gallery, attends the speech and comments with satisfaction with the Swiss federalist Ernst Von Schenck sitting next to him: "it was the americans who pushed De Gasperi to commit himself fully, but it was our action that led him to speak with this clarity"¹⁶.

The federalist leader would also have the opportunity to hear the intervention of Robert Schuman, who "also preconized a substantially federalist solution"¹⁷ - polemicizing against the idea of a political authority constituted by a committee of ministers - and so shortly afterwards the German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer: both, however - he argues in his diary - compared to De Gasperi are "less clear and precise, since federalist thought is less clear in their countries"¹⁸.

However, despite these favorable interventions, the Assembly rejected by majority vote the federalist motion for the creation of a political authority to control the European army, thus causing the resignation of Paul-Henri Spaak from the presidency of the Assembly, which denounced the political impotence. But good news for the federalists came the day after, from the Conference for the European Army. De Gasperi, relying on Spinelli's memorandum on the *rapport intérimaire*, succeeded in obtaining Schuman's adhesion to the idea of a political community to control the common army, and had the famous article 38 inserted in the CED Treaty, which gave the Assembly an explicit constituent mandate. Spinelli reports in his diary on the press conference in which Schuman on the one hand announces the large majority vote with which the French Parliament rejected the motion to postpone the debate on the the ECSC Plan, and on the other informs about the positive results of the conference of ministers:

"There will be a single army and not a coalition army. There will be political authority, responsible in the first period both to the Assembly and to the national governments, but in the second period responsible only to a real European Parliament."¹⁹

After further meetings between ministers, the ECD Treaty was finally signed on 27 May 1952 in Paris - while the ECSC Treaty, once ratifications had been completed, came into force on 23 July 1952. At this point Spinelli, having achieved this initial success on the idea of a European constitutional assembly²⁰, intensify his 'diplomatic action' on the leaders of the nascent supranational institutions.

16 *ibid.*, p. 114. Note of 12 December 1951, on the train from Strasbourg to Rome.

17 *ibid.*, p. 115.

18 *ibid.*

19 *ibid.*, p. 118.

20 "The Constituent Assembly is practically launched (...) I would very much like to be a member of this Assembly. I am sure I could do a lot", *ibid.*, p. 120. So he noted in his diary on 31 December 1952, rejoicing at the victory, achieved in particular thanks to De Gasperi's tenacity.

A constituent mandate to the Schuman Plan Assembly

On June 22 in Paris, Spinelli met with Paul-Henri Spaak. He tells the Italian federalist about the lack of support among French politicians for the idea that the soon-to-be-convened Schuman Plan Assembly could be given a constituent function:

“With a mischievous smile, however, he added that Monnet insists, and that he will do his utmost to convince Schuman. If Schuman at the next meeting of the six ministers makes the proposal, all the French parliamentarians will at once see their stupid hesitations vanish. This is Spaak’s thought, and also mine.”²¹

To this account Spinelli integrates in his diary a severe consideration of the inadequacy of the political leadership of the European countries with respect to historical necessity:

“It hurts the heart to think that in about ten days’ time six men will be able quietly to begin a new history of Europe, and that probably through laziness and cowardice of mind they will not have the courage to do so. The history of Europe from becomes from dramatic to pathetic.”²²

Despite this hint of skepticism about the real will to act on the part of European leaders, Spinelli went ahead in his work of federalist diplomacy, and prepared for the Union of European Federalists (UEF) a memorandum on the Schuman Plan and the Constituent Assembly, which would be sent to all governments by June.²³

At the beginning of the summer of 1952, Spinelli met also Jean Monnet again in Paris, in his famous office of French Planning Commissioner, in Rue de Martignac 18. Monnet himself had summoned him, struck by the clarity²⁴ of the UEF memorandum written by Spinelli to explain in details to the ministers the method to be followed to entrust the Schuman Plan Assembly with the mandate of European Constituent Assembly.

The federalist leader colorfully reported in his diary the impressions of that conversation²⁵, finding in the ‘architect’ of European construction a correspondence of thought, expressed in these words:

“It is a revolution that we want, and we must make it by legal means, by statesmen without energy, without any sentimental appeal. I sometimes wonder if we are not mistaken, if force is not needed, if martyrs are not needed.”²⁶

The meeting with Monnet convinced Spinelli that the time had come to take the helm of the UEF, of whose bureau *exécutif* he would become president following the federalist meeting in early August at Bellagio, on Lake Como.

Confirming the central role that the UEF was playing at this historic juncture, Monnet telephoned Spinelli in Rome and, to his surprise, proposed that they collaborate “to give the first steps of the High Authority and the Assembly of the ECSC a start in the right direction”²⁷ and to join him immediately in Paris. Spinelli

21 *ibid.*, p. 137. Note of June 23, 1952, on the train between Paris and Rome.

22 *ibid.*, p. 138. The concluding sentence of the annotation seems to wink at the famous stinging incipit of Karl Marx’s *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (1852): “Hegel remarks somewhere that all great world-historic facts and personages appear, so to speak, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.”

23 See Spinelli, *Diario Europeo*, cit., p. 138. Shortly before leaving Paris, Spinelli meets Albert Camus, whom he had already met for the first time in 1945: their sympathy and understanding is renewed. He proposes that the writer could draft the manifesto of European intellectuals. Then buys his last book *L’homme révolté* for the return trip by train: “He has a problem very similar to the one I am facing. He accepts to make the journey into hell with a cool head - and he doesn’t have existentialist cravings. Not many people behave intellectually like this.” *ibid.*

24 “‘It is so rare’, he said, ‘to meet a person who thinks clearly’”, Spinelli noted in his diary, reciprocating: “From the continuation of the conversation, I too have repeatedly thought that I have very rarely met a person who thinks with the clarity and wants with the firmness of Monnet”, *ivi*, p. 140, Note of 14 July 1952, Rome.

25 “He is small in stature and rather petite, but has a somewhat heavy step, slow gestures and measured speech, which gives him a stocky appearance. One can see that he is a man of concentrated and powerful will. He has a dramatic and yet non-rhetorical sense of the gravity of the European situation, which coincides completely with my thoughts (...) He has seen deeply into Spaak. He has understood that he is with us, but also that he will not push the battle to the end”, *ibid.*

26 *ibid.* These words are put in inverted commas, as if Monnet himself had spoken them.

27 *ibid.*, p. 142, note of 4 August 1952, Paris.

accepted, giving up his vacation with his wife Ursula Hirschmann, "in the hope that we will succeed in giving the Assembly its constituent role", he clarified to Monnet: "Otherwise, if we remain at coal and steel, I will not be able to collaborate, but rather will have to be in opposition."²⁸ Monnet showed himself to be positive about the future²⁹ and Spinelli began to write for him the speech he was to make at the inaugural session of the High Authority³⁰, and also a new memorandum for the ministers regarding the De Gasperi-Schuman proposal³¹.

On August 6 Monnet proposes to Spinelli that he continue to work for the High Authority, formally with a responsibility over the press, essentially "to prepare for him the political speeches, which must be according to him the equivalent of Hamilton's Federalist."³² He expects a response from Spinelli a few days later in Luxembourg, where Monnet will finally deliver the ECSC's inaugural speech-written by the federalist leader- at the beginning of the High Authority's first session on August 10, 1952³³. Finally, Spinelli declined Monnet's offer, but they maintained "for the future relations of free collaboration"³⁴. In his diary he had already noted his decision days before, imagining themselves playing different but complementary roles:

"I will not accept to be an official of the High Authority. I will make him a counter-proposal. There must be a trio: Monnet at the High Authority; Spaak as head of the federalist group at the Assembly; me as head of the federalist forces. Of course I will help him to make all the political speeches. But I must still be independent. I do not intend to be an official, but a political leader."³⁵

By now having become "the travelling salesman of Europe"³⁶, Spinelli returns to Luxembourg to prepare - with some difficulty³⁷ - the second Monnet speech, which he will deliver at the inaugural session of the Common Assembly of the ECSC, which will take place on 10 September 1952 in Strasbourg and will be chaired by Paul-Henri Spaak.

After Monnet's speech, Konrad Adenauer, in his capacity as President of the Council of Ministers of the Community, gives the Assembly - which will be transformed in this role into an enlarged "ad hoc Assembly" - the mandate to draw up a draft Treaty for the European Political Community (EPC) by March 10, 1953. Spinelli thus saw the idea of the European Constituent Assembly, on which he had been fighting for a long time³⁸, take shape in front of his eyes and he prepared to put his hand to what he called the "Virginia plan of the European Constituent Assembly"³⁹, with clear reference to the project drafted by James Madison and presented at the Philadelphia Convention in 1787.

However, faced with this historic task, Spinelli feels he is not fully supported by his fellow federalists in the UEF, and in this he joins two other protagonists of the nascent European construction:

"Europe is about to be conceived. And I find myself alone, knowing that there is Spaak alone at a higher level, and Monnet alone at an even higher level. The UEF team, if they would follow me, could count for something. But they don't want to. They are afraid of me. They prefer to stay small with small positions."⁴⁰

28 *ibid.*

29 "He is optimistic - we will succeed, he says - just as anyone who puts himself at the helm of a ship, whatever the situation, is always desperately optimistic. Why else would he put himself at the helm?", *ibid.*

30 "I worked almost all day with Monnet and Hirsch to prepare his speech. A certain Uri - the intellectual of the Monnet clan - had taken over my draft and modified it completely. Monnet showed his text to four or five people who considered it *imbuvable*. So we had to go back to my text. Uri must have become my mortal enemy". *ibid.*, p. 142, note of 7 August 1952.

31 *ibid.*, note of 6 August 1952.

32 *ibid.*, pp. 142-143, note of 7 August 1952. Italics are mine.

33 "All the newspapers reproduced Monnet's speech, with which the first European supranational authority was inaugurated. It was my speech." *ibid.*, p. 143, note of 12 August 1952, Luxembourg.

34 *ibid.*

35 *ibid.*, p. 143, note of 7 August 1952.

36 This is what he calls himself in his diary's note of 8 September 1952, on the Luxembourg-Paris train: *ibid.*, p. 145.

37 "Yesterday evening, the speech that Monnet will make to the Assembly was almost finalised. Preparing it is rather an exasperating affair, and I hope that Monnet will find another ghost writer in the future (...) In any case, my relations with him are excellent, and *I have always esteemed him for the precision with which he knows how to approach the problems of real union*. There is no risk of him being misled by false solutions. I have promised him that in the next few days I will give him a coulisses job at the ECSC Assembly", *ibid.* Italics are mine.

38 "I watched this event in the hemicycle of the Assembly with detachment. My spirit was more concerned with the immensity of the task before which this poor Assembly found itself than with the satisfaction of seeing the principle of the European Constituent Assembly for which I have been fighting for years finally translated into reality." (*ibid.*, p. 148, note of 12 September 1952, Strasbourg).

39 *ibid.*

40 *ibid.*

After the EDC: the 'secret alliance' Spinelli-Monnet

The constituent ambitions of Spinelli and the federalists were to be shattered later on the inauspicious day of 30 August 1954: the French National Assembly, by approving a procedural motion to postpone the debate indefinitely, de facto brought down the ratification of the EDC treaty - already signed in Paris on 27th May 1952- and with it the constituent project of the European Political Community.

The question of the ratification of the European Defence Community (EDC) was to be interpreted a few months later by Spinelli as a test of strength between nationalists and pro-Europeans: "the struggle has long been uncertain, and precisely because it was uncertain the federalists felt the duty to commit themselves fully"⁴¹: victory, unfortunately, had already been won by the nationalists in France - "the oldest nation state in Europe" - since Schuman "hated by the Quay d'Orsay" had been replaced by Georges Bidault, "much more submissive to the wishes of French diplomacy"⁴².

Spinelli then immediately tried to re-establish contact with Jean Monnet, whom he visited again in Luxembourg in September, proposing that he become the "head of the European party" and develop a pro-European struggle in France that would create a crisis of the same intensity as the *affaire Dreyfus*. Although he shared the judgement on the serious European situation, Monnet declined: "he did not feel capable of being the animator, but only still the inspirer of European action."⁴³

Spinelli had also proposed to him a combined plan of parliamentary action and "violent public action" that would lead to the creation of a French government that, together with the German government, would decide to "convene the *European Constituent Assembly elected by the peoples directly* and whose constitution would be ratified by popular referendum."⁴⁴ Monnet seemed to accept the general plan but - Spinelli reasoned to himself - "he did not yet fully understand the necessity of the Constituent Assembly". Consequently, the federalist leader seems here to have become despondent and writes bitterly in his diary:

"I am quite impressed and horrified by the fact that I am the only one in the whole of Europe who has a precise idea of what has to be done. From Schuman to Monnet, to the federalist leaders, nobody knows what needs to be attempted. They only know what not to do. This means that the chances of success are almost nil for me. Pity. I have devoted 14 years to the fight for the European Federation, from 1940 until today. I left my mark on the European attempt to unite. And it all ends in nothing."⁴⁵

However, in a subsequent close conversation, Monnet assures him that he will do something, but when the time comes.⁴⁶ Spinelli seems willing to engage in one last federalist political battle, even though he is aware that the chances of success are very slim: "If Monnet decides to launch the action I have proposed, I have told him that I will put myself at his disposal, leaving everything in Italy. If he doesn't decide, I will leave everything in Europe"⁴⁷. Spinelli wrote him letters and documents, telephoned him, and tried to negotiate with him "to organise the federalist struggle in France in a big way"⁴⁸, along the lines of what he named a Monnet-Alphand plan - which should have also involved in fact Hervé Alphand, for a long time Director General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and supporter of the EDC, then French representative in the NATO Council.

Finally Monnet made his fundamental choice: on 9 November, he informed his colleagues that he would resign from the ECSC High Authority. Spinelli welcomed this news: "Monnet's decision means that there

41 Altiero Spinelli, 'Nuovo corso', in *Una strategia per gli Stati Uniti d'Europa*, edited by Sergio Pistone, il Mulino, Bologna 1989, p. 148. Article originally published in the journal 'Europa Federata', October 1954.

42 *ibidem*.

43 Altiero Spinelli, *Diario Europeo 1948-1969*, p. 204: note of 24 September 1954, Luxembourg. "He must be taken as he is", Spinelli adds in the same diary passage.

44 *ibidem*. Italics are mine.

45 *ibid.*, pp. 204-205. Italics are mine.

46 *ibid.*, p. 205: note of 27 September 1954, on the Paris-Rome plane. In this same page, he notes that he had instructed his Swiss federalist comrades François Bondy and Albert Lüthy to prepare "the manifesto to be launched by Monnet".

47 *ibid.*, p. 206.

48 *ibid.*, p. 216: note of 8 November 1954, Paris.

will still be a political battle for the European Federation.”⁴⁹ At the end of the month, he travelled to Luxembourg where he saw Monnet again, who explained to him the reasons for his resignation: the ECSC could not develop its competences autonomously as it had to carry out the mandate received from the States. Pressure must therefore be exerted on the governments to push them to further cessions of sovereignty: this is what Monnet wanted to commit himself to, convinced that he could persuade the French government to propose these nouvelles délégations de souveraineté to the other States, with a procedure similar to that of the Schuman plan. Spinelli expresses in his diary his perplexity about this intention:

“I am a little afraid that he intends to resign in order to be again the inspirer of some new Schuman, who will one day then put him at the head of the French delegation and a new diplomatic conference, in the course of which a new treaty will be arrived at which will transfer something else besides coal and iron.”⁵⁰

For the federalist leader, Monnet’s strategy of influencing governments was too optimistic: instead, it was now necessary to focus energies on an all-out propaganda action to demolish the myth of national sovereignty. The very watchword of the Constituent Assembly was itself subjected to Spinelli’s self-criticism at this stage:

“[Monnet] rejected the idea of the European Constituent Assembly because he did not believe it was feasible today, and I too do not believe it is feasible today, but also because he did not see in it the character of a forceful idea to agitate consciences against the sovereign state. In reality, I have not yet managed to make anyone understand this, and I have probably done wrong in speaking of an elected Constituent Assembly. One must first get the revolt against the national state into one’s head as a current idea.”⁵¹

For the time being, however, he decided to remain close to Monnet, to whom he would hand over new notes and projects. He also quickly got back on track with the Constituent Assembly idea, which he wants to succeed in convincing Monnet of, now proposing a more precise formula to be launched together:

“European constituent assembly, freely elected to draw up the constitution of the United States of Europe; popular referendums to approve this constitution; powers of the federal government to implement the common market, common defence, common foreign policy, common guarantee of citizens’ freedom.”⁵²

They met again in January 1955, and there seemed to be some progress:

“[Monnet] begins to understand the value of taking a stand in favour of the Constituent Assembly, but he also asks me to answer another question: how redresser le courant, what proposals to make immediately to set in motion forces that would then lead to European elections. I tried to show him that the change of current cannot be generated by us, but only exploited. We then talked about the problem of finding funds, the organisational formulas to be adopted.”⁵³

A new meeting took place in March, but Spinelli was again disappointed: “He was caught up in the fixed idea that it was necessary to think about tomorrow but to do something immediate now.”⁵⁴ Monnet had in fact explained to him his concrete project: pushing governments to enlarge the competences

49 *ibid.*, p. 217: note of 13 November 1954.

50 *ibid.*, p. 223 : note of 29 November 1954. Italics mine.

51 *ibid.*

52 *ibid.*, p. 232, note of 13 January 1955, on the train to Luxembourg.

53 *ibid.*, p. 233, note of 26 January 1955, on the Paris-Rome train.

54 *ibid.*, p. 240, note of 18 March 1955, Bonn.



*Altiero Spinelli
with Ursula Hirschmann
in Berlin, 1963*

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Federalista Europeo

of the ECSC towards other energy sources and transports. And this is what Monnet would effectively do by inspiring the creation of a European organisation for the peaceful development of atomic energy, which would then be included in the resolution of the Messina Conference chaired by Spaak in June 1955: an idea that would come to life as EURATOM with the Treaties of Rome signed on 25 March 1957 together with the EEC (European Economic Community).

Their collaboration seemed to have reached a dead end: “Monnet on whom I counted so much, thinks of some new Schuman plan, and will not give me more than friendly sympathy.”⁵⁵ However Spinelli in a new meeting tried to convince him that their different strategies were not necessarily contradictory, and could be complementary, going so far as to propose to him “a secret alliance”⁵⁶. Monnet understood the usefulness of popular action, and seemed to agree with Spinelli that “enlargements of competence are not the construction of the USoE [United States of Europe], but only a renversement de courant in national governmental action.”⁵⁷

From this meeting onwards, their contacts would in fact become more sparse: Monnet, in order to put pressure on governments, would focus on creating and animating the Action Committee for the United States of Europe - launched on 13 October 1955, Spinelli would later join it - while the federalist leader would set in motion the process of the Congress of the European People, which would hold its first session at the end of November 1957 in Turin, on the basis of self-organised elections held in a number of European cities.

On 14 May 1959, a delegation of the Congress of the European People arrived in Strasbourg to present Robert Schuman⁵⁸ - who had become the first President of the European Parliamentary Assembly - with a new draft Treaty for the convocation of the European Constituent Assembly, the result of the popular mobilisation action carried out by Spinelli with his federalist comrades in previous years.

⁵⁵ *ibid.*, p. 241, note of 20 March 1955, on the train to The Hague.

⁵⁶ *ibid.*, p. 244, note of 31 March 1955, on the Luxembourg-Paris train.

⁵⁷ *ibidem.*

⁵⁸ “We have been to Schuman”, *ibid.*, p. 366, note of 15 May 1959, Strasbourg.

A new Schuman Declaration?

Some twenty years after the defeat of the EDC project, the prestigious Schuman Prize was awarded to the European Commissioner for Industrial Affairs, Altiero Spinelli, at a ceremony at the Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelm Universitaet in Bonn on 12 March 1974.

At a time when the progress of European integration was in trouble, Spinelli took the opportunity to shake up the audience by referring to the origins of that process:

“I appear before you at a time when serious doubt, even a feeling of resignation and defeat, is weighing heavily upon the entire European venture. (...) Only in European hagiography were Schuman, Adenauer, de Gasperi and Spaak surrounded and supported by general consensus. In reality their European action was contested by many political and social forces which today have gone over or are going over to the European camp. (...) Monnet, Schuman and the other statesmen who answered their call, well understood that the profound meaning of their initiative resided entirely in a simple and strong idea: if different States wish to pool certain matters on a permanent basis, they must transfer certain competences to a common authority distinct from that of the States.”⁵⁹

In his diary, he specified the meaning of his speech as a “hard attack against the hybris and impotence of the bureaucratic, eurocratic and ministerial oligarchies that pretend to hold the European thing in their hands and do not even know how to do it” and at the same time “a request that the European construction be entrusted to the political forces, that is to the European Parliament”⁶⁰.

In fact, in those months Spinelli’s mistrust in a European Commission that did not know how to think big grew: “I proposed a *re-edition of the Schuman initiative of 1950*, but these little men all said to themselves: who are we to be able to say such ambitious things?”⁶¹

Good news came in December 1974 from the Paris summit of heads of state and government: it was decided to finally implement the objective of electing the European Parliament by universal suffrage, with the first vote planned for 1978.

An opportunity to express himself again on this subject would be the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the Schuman Plan in May 1975. Called upon to stand in for Commission Vice-President Henri Simonet at a prize-giving event at the Berlaymont for ecological paintings by young people, the federalist leader developed the theme of *what is alive and what is dead in Schuman* - a clear reference to a famous essay by the philosopher Benedetto Croce⁶² - and took the opportunity to reiterate: “what we must do now is to ask for the elections to be brought forward to 1976 and for the *elected Parliament to be given the task of a constitution*”⁶³.

It would be as a member of the European Parliament that Altiero Spinelli would achieve his political masterpiece. After the long weaving work with the “Crocodile Club” that he founded in 1980, his “draft Treaty establishing the European Union” was finally adopted by a very large majority by the European Parliament on 14 February 1984.

At this point, the federalist leader focused his action on François Mitterrand, President-in-Office of the European Community Council. Spinelli met him in Paris: he presented him with an analogy between the situation in which Mitterrand found himself and the one faced by Schuman before the Declaration. He handed him a note on which he had been working since February “with the *model of Monnet’s May 1950 note to Schuman* in mind”⁶⁴: he proposed that President publicly declare that the draft treaty would be approved by France by referendum as soon as a certain number of countries declared themselves

59 Altiero Spinelli, “The European Community at the crossroads”, Speech at the presentation of Schuman Prize, Bonn 12 March 1974, available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/12927/>

60 Altiero Spinelli, *Diario Europeo 1970-1976*, edited by Edmondo Paolini, il Mulino, Bologna 1991, p. 578. Note of 12 March 1974.

61 *ibid.*, p. 695. Note of 19-30 October 1974. Italics are mine.

62 Benedetto Croce, *Ciò che è vivo e ciò che è morto della filosofia di Hegel*, Laterza, Bari 1907.

63 Spinelli, *Diario europeo 1970-1976*, cit., p. 782. Note of 6 May 1975. Here ironically adds: ‘I apply the method of Cato’s *delenda Carthago*’, *ibid.*

64 Altiero Spinelli, *Diario europeo 1976-1986*, edited by Edmondo Paolini, il Mulino, Bologna 1992, pp. 999-1000. Note of 16 April 1984. Italics are mine.

willing to start the ratification procedures.

In his speech to the European Parliament in May 1984, Mitterrand made explicit reference to Schuman and declared his willingness to support the draft Treaty for the Union, relaunching the construction of the European Political Community.⁶⁵ Everyone considered this moment a new victory for Spinelli, but he was already thinking about the next steps:

“If Mitterrand is tenacious, it will be a repetition of the Schuman initiative. I think that if they were to hold a conference, they should, like Spaak for the Common Market and Monnet for the ECSC, put it under my presidency this time. I would give them a run for their money.”⁶⁶

The conference that he planned to preside over should ask the European Parliament to play a leading role by drafting the final text of the treaty to be submitted to the ratification of the States: this is the proposal that he puts forward to Mitterrand in a second note that he sends him through the Minister of European Affairs Roland Dumas whom he meets on 15 June in Paris⁶⁷. Spinelli’s hope of being the “Monnet of the 1980s”⁶⁸ was based on the conviction that the French president could succeed in imposing himself on the governments by using the “*Schuman method*, which consists of *setting a precondition* that obliges the participants to reveal their intentions (in Schuman’s case the High Authority, in Mitterrand’s case the EP draft)”⁶⁹.

But things turned out differently. The ‘mountain’ of mediations of the intergovernmental method would prevail, and Delors’ Single Act would be born with difficulty. “Only a miserable mouse, and many suspect that it is also a dead mouse...” said Spinelli severely in a memorable parliamentary speech, which concluded - relaunching the metaphor from Hemingway’s *The old Man and the Sea* - with a vehement invitation to his colleagues to resume fishing in the open sea: now that only a bone was left of the draft Treaty, it was a matter of preparing “the best means to catch the fish and protect it from sharks”⁷⁰.

In order to succeed, the federalist leader will therefore propose a new strategy: to invest the European Parliament with the mandate to write the Constitution of the European Union, sanctioning it through the next elections by universal suffrage, and at the same time to directly involve public opinion in this process, also through consultative referendums, in order to bypass the obstacle of intergovernmental procedural fetters. This is how Altiero Spinelli summarised the spirit of clarity of the new method in his last speech to the European Parliament, in the institutional committee:

“We want nothing to do with reforms prepared by bureaucrats and experts; we want nothing to do with the need for ratifications in order to carry out reforms. Europe must be made on the path of European democracy, which, thanks to the elected European Parliament, already exists.”⁷¹

65 François Mitterrand, Speech to the European Parliament (24 May 1984) : “When, in 1950, *Robert Schuman launched the plan for the European Coal and Steel Community*, I supported it and I believed in it. (...) And now your Assembly is encouraging us to go further down this road by proposing a draft treaty establishing the European Union. *Those of us who wish to do so, will observe the same method as in the past*. A new situation calls for a new treaty which must not, of course, be a substitute for existing treaties, but an extension of them to fields they do not currently cover. This is the case with the *European political Community*. France, ladies and gentlemen, is available for such an enterprise.” Italics are mine.

66 Spinelli, *Diario europeo 1976-1986*, cit., p. 1018. Note of 24 May 1984. Italics are mine.

67 “I have not had such a welcome at the Quai d’Orsay since the days of Schuman!”, *ibid.*, p. 1030, note of 15 June 1984. The note was accompanied by a letter to Mitterrand: “The appeal you made on 24 May in the European Parliament to the member countries of the Community to achieve political union is a turning point in the history of European integration, a turning point that will have no parallel if it is pursued *with the same tenacity as the appeal made by Schuman in 1950*. If a genuine European Union is born, it will bear your name and have the seal of France”. The passage from the letter is quoted in Edmondo Paolini, *Altiero Spinelli. Appunti per una biografia*, Il Mulino, Bologna 1988, p. 265; italics mine.

68 Spinelli, *Diario europeo 1976-1986*, cit., p. 1143. Note of 9 February 1985.

69 *Ibid.*, p. 1108. Note of 21 November 1984. Il corsivo è mio.

70 Altiero Spinelli, *Discorsi al Parlamento europeo (1976-1986)*, edited by Pier Virgilio Dastoli, il Mulino, Bologna 1987, pp. 368-373.

71 *ibidem*, pp. 380-381.

Conclusion.

Politics of European unification, between functionalism and radical federalism

In retrospect, Spinelli acknowledged that “Schuman performed a courageous act”⁷² with his declaration: he was in fact able to propose the creation of a common market for coal and steel under the control of a supranational authority, saying that France was ready to go ahead even only with Germany, knowing that England would not take part.

It was a real historical turning point: “with the Schuman Plan conference, made up of representatives of six countries, the real attempt at a policy of European unity began.”⁷³

A genuine tribute to the Schuman Plan and France’s role in European unification is made by Spinelli, as a European Commissioner, also in his book *Agenda pour l’Europe* [An agenda for Europe]:

“France, which had also emerged from the catastrophe, had discovered and felt the need for the European idea to such an extent that it was its government, inspired by men such as Monnet and Schumann, which set in motion the first community achievements, despite opposition from the right and the left.”⁷⁴

Spinelli presented this book in the presence of Jean Monnet himself in Paris on 16 October 1972 at the historic Pavillon Ledoyen on the Champs Élysées.⁷⁵

The central role of Jean Monnet and his method was also highlighted by Spinelli in his earlier *Rapporto Sull’Europa* [Report on Europe]:

“The crucial proposals of the Schuman Plan, the Pleven Plan, and Euratom all bear the seal of his mentality: to create solidarity of concrete interests around specialised European administrations endowed not with political autonomy but with administrative autonomy. Europe would thus have been created by these offices, almost without anyone’s knowledge, even if in the end the merit would have been arrogated more or less abusively to some man or political party.”⁷⁶

For Spinelli, this was the essence of the *functionalist tendency*, which had found fertile ground among senior international officials⁷⁷, as an alternative to the *confederal tendency*, expressed by those statesmen - such as Churchill and De Gaulle - who, driven by the ‘will to power’, believed in the possibility of consensually associating different states in various ways under the leadership of their own⁷⁸, and to the *federalist tendency*, which emerged during the anti-fascist Resistance among sectors of the democratic left and became an autonomous movement with the goal of federation as a decisive theme of European public life, “an institutional aspect of the vision of a new democratic society to be established and not of old societies, superficially or falsely democratic, to be restored or protected”⁷⁹. This last tendency is compared by Spinelli to that of *democratic radicalism*, as the “creative political

72 Altiero Spinelli, “Sviluppo del moto per l’unità europea dopo la seconda guerra mondiale” in id., *Il progetto europeo*, il Mulino, Bologna 1985, p. 184. The article was originally published in the collective volume *L’integrazione europea*, edited by G. Grove Haines, Bologna, il Mulino, Bologna 1957.

73 *ibid.*

74 Altiero Spinelli, *Agenda pour l’Europe. Ce qui existe, ce qui reste à faire*, Hachette, Paris 1972, p. 24.

75 A copy of the *Agenda pour l’Europe* can be found in the Monnet Library-FJME. The title page bears Spinelli’s handwritten dedication: “à Jean Monnet/avec amitié et / admiration/ Altiero Spinelli / Paris, octobre 1972”.

76 Altiero Spinelli, *Rapporto sull’Europa*, Edizioni di Comunità, Milan 1965, p. 22. Also this book is present in the personal Monnet library-FJME.

77 “Monnet in fact found intelligent and willing collaborators, first in the diplomatic delegations of all the countries that were preparing the successive treaties of the Communities, and then in the officials of the Communities themselves, in whose hands that much of Europe that has been created up to now is today to be found, and who have not without reason been baptised with the significant neologism of Eurocrats”, *ibid.*

78 This tendency is particularly “congenial to national diplomacies, which see in it a form of international cooperation that does not affect the national sovereignty entrusted to their care; and from diplomacies it passes easily to foreign ministers (...) when they do not have particularly innovative ideas in the field of European policy”, *ibid.*, p. 24 - as it was the case with Schuman and his declaration conceived by Monnet.

79 *ibid.*, pp. 21-22

thought at the origin of all democratic revivals and advances”⁸⁰. The main current of the federalist tendency is therefore named *radical federalism* insofar as it is characterised by a “radical way of thinking, which proposes the change of what exists whenever it no longer stands up to the criticism of the ideals of democratic justice”⁸¹ and is distinct - although often found mixed up in the same historical movement - from *utopian federalism*, which, being characterised by the “utopian way of thinking that proposes to transform what exists into a complete, perfect and immobile type of society”, sees the federation as a total ideal to be realised and not as “an institutional formula capable of solving some of the problems of our time”⁸², thus reducing itself to irrelevance in the process of European construction. Looking back, Spinelli describes the unfolding of the actual historical development of continental unification as follows:

“Before the Common Market, European unity was an ideal goal, but nothing existed in reality. Confederalism, functionalism, federalism were three beginnings from nothing.”⁸³

If today there is instead a unified European reality from which to move towards federation, this depends on the “great functionalist realization of a European bureaucracy independent of national administrations, directed by those strange and hardly definable supranational bodies that are the so-called ‘European executives’”⁸⁴, which give impetus to a series of action centres.

It must therefore be acknowledged that - Spinelli wrote this in 1965, but the words still resonate with meaning- “it was the functionalists who won the race for the first viable European creation, and therefore what was born of Europe was neither the Europe of the people, nor that of the states, but that of the supranational offices”⁸⁵. However, the political issue raised by the federalists has not disappeared: if on the one hand it is now possible to accept “the Europe of offices with their tenacious construction of detailed common rules”, on the other hand the “intrinsic deficiencies of the functional method are nevertheless making the problem of political power once again come to the fore”⁸⁶.

The mission of the federalists will therefore be to continue to demand that the European administration be subordinated to a federal government, subject to a real democratic Constitution. The battle for the European Constituent Assembly thus remains an irreplaceable legacy and task for the future of Europe.

80 *ibid.*, p. 22. Ursula Hirschmann expresses the link between radical-democratic progressivism and federalism very effectively as follows: “Marx already said that the exploited workers would take the fight against the capitalists upon themselves because they had nothing to lose but their chains (and in fact, since they have become, in this century, co-owners of the state and would therefore have much to lose, their struggle has waned somewhat). We *déracinés* of Europe, who have ‘changed borders more times than shoes’ - as Brecht, this king of *déracinés*, says - we too have nothing to lose but our chains in a united Europe, and so we are federalists.” (Ursula Hirschmann, *Noi senzapatría*, il Mulino, Bologna 1993, p. 22).

81 Altiero Spinelli, *Rapporto sull'Europa*, cit., p. 22.

82 *ibidem.*

83 *ibid.*, p. 31.

84 *ibidem.*

85 *ibidem.*

86 *ibid.*, p. 30.

CITIZENS IDEAS FOR THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

The Jacques Delors Institute's debate *Jacques Delors in Robert Schuman's footsteps* was organised in the framework of the Institute's flagship youth-oriented initiative Académie Notre Europe with the participation of the authors of the French paper *Robert Schuman's legacy in Jacques Delors' vision and action* Cornelia Constantin and Benjamin Couteau and the director of the Institute, Sébastien Maillard. They discussed the origin, inputs, and consequences of the Schuman Declaration and the Schuman's legacy in Jacques Delors' action. The event, attended by the young, international audience, created a space of asking about the modern meaning of Robert Schuman's legacy. For the young Europeans, Robert Schuman's name brings thoughts like Europe and Europe Day, founding father, European Coal and Steel Community and solidarity, fraternity, vision, research, and creation for the young Europeans.

The prof. Bronisław Geremek Foundation's event was attended online and offline by primarily young audience. The discussion was based on Jacek Głażewski's research paper: *"History, Community, Solidarity: On the political afterthoughts of Robert Schuman and Bronisław Geremek."* The author himself made the introduction to the topic. The debate was attended by distinguished experts on European politics like Piotr Buras, Justyna Miecznikowska, and Nicolas Maslowski. It was moderated by the Karolina Zbytniewska, editor-in-chief of EurActiv Poland. The discussion concentrated on the European values but went further to the recent political events – such as the Conference on the Future of Europe and elections in Germany and France. It presented the continuity of Robert Schuman's and Bronisław Geremek's ideas and their current resonance in the modern world. The vivid discussion that followed the debate focused mostly on the challenges related to the unity of the European project seen through the notion of a multi-speed Europe. The panelists questioned the idea of two-speed Europe, saying that the UE should instead develop in parallel and not anybody left behind.

The Jerzy Giedroyc Forum for Dialogue and Cooperation organized three events that engaged various groups of young people. The first was about the paper by Barbara Stankevič and Alvydas Nikžentaitis, *"Concepts of Robert Schuman and Jerzy Giedroyc and their modern relevance,"* and was moderated by a journalist and signatory of the Act of the Restoration of the Independent State of Lithuania - Rimvydas Valatka. The second discussion took place in September and was participated by the young audience of the Faculty of History at Vilnius University. It was moderated by a journalist Vytautas Bruveris, and other speakers – Barbara Stankevič and Alvydas Nikžentaitis, a special guest professor Alfredas Bumblauskas also attended the discussion as a speaker. During both live events, the authors of the paper, together with moderators and a special guest, compared the ideas of Robert Schuman and Jerzy Giedroyc and their political realism. However, the central focus was given to the Jerzy Giedroyc concept of Ukraine-Lithuania-Belarus, a geopolitical strategy for nations of Central and Eastern Europe. Due to the worsening pandemic, the last event was held online and included the online screening of the recording of the second event.

The Vaclav Havel Library organized two lectures and discussions related to Petr Hlaváček's essay *"Václav Havel and Robert Schuman: The search for the soul of Europe."* The audience contained students of the history and civics at the Faculty of Education at the University of West Bohemia in Pilsen and pre-final year students at Prague's Jan Neruda Grammar School. Alongside Petr Hlaváček, the meetings with students also involved Jolyon Naegele. The discussion topics contained European identity, transformations of Czech European consciousness throughout history, and Czechs' and other Central Europeans' long-standing affiliation to the West. Particular emphasis was placed on the geopolitical context of the second half of the 20th century, highlighting the figures Robert Schuman and Václav Havel. For the young audience, the most significant elements of concern was the condition of democracy in Europe. Among the essential threads: disinformation campaigns, attacks on free media, loss of media plurality, opaque media

ownership, and demonstrable press abuse in crooked political campaigning. By contrast, young people gathered at the event shared a positive view of the European Union's active approach to protecting the environment. However, they see the measures introduced as necessarily linked to preserving Europe's energy independence and the long-term economic viability of the adopted measures. The EU's standard energy policy, the so-called Green Deal, was positively assessed. On the other hand, the Nord Stream 2 case was raised as an example of undermining the European unity, and some EU member states' defence of short-sighted national interests without regard for the broader geopolitical context.

The Spinelli Institute organized a hybrid-form event and seminar. The programme, divided into three parts and three days, opened on 11 February 2022 in Rome with a round table on "The future of Europe in the federal perspective of Altiero Spinelli and Robert Schuman". The debate took place at the Spinelli Library, in the premises of Lazio Region, which gave its patronage to the initiative. The panel was introduced and coordinated by the director of the Spinelli Institute, Mario Leone and Michele Fiorillo (Scuola Normale Superiore). Among the speakers were Daniele Leodori (Vice President of the Lazio Region), Pina Picierno (Vice President of the European Parliament), Vito Borrelli (Representation in Italy of the EU Commission), Benjamin Couteau (Notre Europe - Institut Jacques Delors, France), Emma Galli (Luigi Einaudi Foundation), Matteo Gori (GFE-JEF Italy) and Diletta Alese (JEF Europe). The vital part of the discussion was the relationship between Altiero Spinelli's ideas and action and the Schuman Declaration with its outcomes. The federalist contribution to the process of European construction was also presented and discussed, in connection to the Conference on the future of Europe and the role of youth in Europe. The second and third parts of the event (12-13 February) took place in Latina, inaugurated also by the Mayor Damiano Coletta, the President of the Province Gerardo Stefanelli and Alessandro Capriccioli, President of the European Affairs Commission, Lazio Region Council. The training sessions consisted of three parts, six reports, and three moments dedicated to four working groups that involved about forty high school and university students from all over Italy and were selected among the participants of the last Ventotene Seminar (August 2021), which was inaugurated by the President of the Italian Republic Sergio Mattarella. The sessions were about the following topics: "The Economic and Monetary Union 20 years after the euro: From the Next Generation EU to the fiscal union" (keynote speakers: Alberto Majocchi and Francesco Saraceno), "The Conference on the future of Europe and the relaunch of the constituent process" (speakers: Stefano Castagnoli and Antonio Argenziano), "The worsening of the geopolitical crises in the absence of a European foreign policy: the case of Ukraine" (speakers: Nicoletta Pirozzi and Domenico Moro). On the afternoon of 13 February the Citizens' Assembly on "Young people and the Conference on the future of Europe" was opened, including among the speakers also Luisa Trumellini (Secretary General of MFE-UEF Italy), Antonio Parenti (Head of Representation in Italy of the EU Commission) and the Members of the European Parliament Matteo Adinolfi, Brando Benifei and Domènec Ruiz Devesa. The event provided a focus on the Conference on the future of Europe to the European citizens of Latina, including representatives of youth and social organizations: a unique opportunity, at the right moment, to think about European unification's challenges and priorities.

The full list of the speakers is available here:

<https://www.istitutospinelli.it/seminario-di-formazione-terzo-livello/>

ABOUT THE PROJECT

The Beyond Robert Schuman's Europe project focused on the legacy of 1950 Robert Schuman Declaration and its relevance for modern European societies through the political and intellectual contributions of Great Europeans such as Bronislaw Geremek (Poland), Jacques Delors (France), Vaclav Havel (Czechia), Jerzy Giedroyc (Lithuania), Altiero Spinelii (Italy).

The project was supported by the European Commission (Program: Europe for Citizens).



ABOUT THE PROJECT ORGANIZATIONS



NOTRE EUROPE – INSTITUT JACQUES DELORS is the European think tank founded by Jacques Delors in 1996 (under the name Notre Europe), at the end of his presidency of the European Commission. Its aim is to produce analyses and proposals targeting European decision-makers and a wider audience, and to contribute to the debate on the European Union. The main activities of the institute are: to make Europe known, to analyze the European current events, to offer to decision-makers innovative proposals, and to disseminate the ideas of Jacques Delors.



THE BRONISLAW GEREMEK FOUNDATION was established in 2008. The Foundation documents protect and promote the legacy of Professor B. Geremek. It focuses on civic education, European values, democratic engagement by promoting ideals of public life embodied by Professor B. Geremek. The Foundation pursues these goals by awakening respect for human rights and supporting intercultural dialogue. The Foundation actively supports and engages in all actions related to spreading the true and accurate information concerning the European integration and policies as well as to combatting disinformation. The Foundation organizes international conferences and debates as well as educational programs for youth and students, publishes books and reports.



JERZY GIEDROYĆ
DIALOGO IR
BENDRADARBIAVIMO
FORUMAS

JERZY GIEDROYC FORUM FOR DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION was established in 2013 by more than a hundred Lithuanian scientists, public figures and artists with the major aim to promote cultural dialogue and cooperation between the neighboring states: Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine and Belarus. The Forum also analyzes international relations between the nations, monitors media and organizes intellectual events. The Forum cooperates with partners from Poland – sister-organization Jerzy Giedroyc Forum for Dialogue and Cooperation in Warsaw, Bronislaw Geremek Foundation and others. Over a period of 2013 and 2022 Forum initiated various cultural events and initiatives such as multi-cultural debates on Ukrainian television, Lithuanian – Polish forum, Lithuanian – Belarussian social forum and others.



THE VÁCLAV HAVEL LIBRARY collects, researches, disseminates, promotes, and advocates the spiritual, literary, and political legacy of a great figure of modern Czech history - the author, playwright, thinker, human rights defender, and Czechoslovak and Czech president. It also focuses on people, events, and phenomena related to the legacy of Václav Havel and strives to place them in the context of the times and of the present. The main aims of the Václav Havel Library include: organizing archival, archival-research, documentary, museum, and library activities focused on the work of Vaclav Havel and documents or objects related to his activities, and carries out professional analysis of their influence on the life and self-reflection of society, serving, in a suitable manner, such as through exhibitions, the purpose of education and popularisation functions, thus presenting to the public the historical significance of the fight for human rights and freedoms in the totalitarian period and the formation of civil society during the establishment of democracy; organizing scientific research and publication activities in its areas of interest



Istituto di
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Altiero Spinelli
We create a future of Europe

THE ALTIERO SPINELLI INSTITUTE OF FEDERALIST STUDIES was born on 3rd of July 1987, at the headquarters of the Regional Council of Regione Lazio, a distance of just over a year after the death of Altiero Spinelli to contribute to the development of federalist ideas among young Europeans and to deepen and raise the issues that characterized the political and cultural life of Altiero Spinelli, the great advocate of a European supranational community. The Institute is a non-profit organization, that aims to contribute, by all means, inspired by the teachings of Altiero Spinelli, to the study and dissemination of the federalist culture. For this aim, the Institute organizes workshops, conferences, events, promotes research, care and disseminates publications.