

Is neutrality an outdated concept in Europe?

Since the Russian Federation launched its “special military operation” against Ukraine on 24 February 2022, several European states have broken with their respective traditions of neutrality. Urged by the urgency to take up a position, certain States, such as Finland and Sweden, have officially submitted a request to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as full members¹. Does this mean that the

various forms of neutrality in Europe have now become untenable²? Or that the neutral Countries’ strategic positions, however specific they may be, are currently changing rapidly? Between the Atlantic Alliance and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) led by Russia, are European States inescapably fated to pick a side? Is the post-USSR piecemeal Europe now giving way to a Europe divided into two blocs³?

EUROPE IN THE
WORLD

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#ukraine
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
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¹ <https://www.nato-pa.int/content/finland-sweden-accession>

² <https://www.la-croix.com/Debats/Guerre-Ukraine-impossible-neutralite-2022-03-16-1201205391> (in French)

³ <https://www.latribune.fr/opinions/tribunes/guerre-en-ukraine-de-l-europe-en-miettes-a-l-europe-en-blocs-906336.html> (in French)

MAP 1. Transnational organisations in Europe



Introduction • Neutrality in Europe: naive pacifism or a changing strategy?

On 18 May 2022, the Swedish and Finnish leaders submitted their official accession applications to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg. This was a turning point in the political history of these two Nordic neutral States. Submitted a few months after the start of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, these applications dramatically change their strategic positions which have historically been founded on neutrality, understood as non-participation in military conflicts and alliances on the continent. However, this turning point has far-reaching and long-term repercussions well beyond the Nordic countries and the Baltic area: it is indeed across the wider Europe that the concept of neutrality appears to have become obsolete at best, or dangerous and reprehensible at worst. Today, we can see just how this European movement is out of step with the Global South's desire for non-alignment. Has Europe therefore committed to a realignment just as independent lines are beginning to be asserted in Asia, Africa and Latin America?

On the European continent, the principle of neutrality comes in different forms with different elements. Neutral status is considered in the plural due to each country's respective legal character, their specific national roots and the strategic positions they entail. For several States (the Swiss Confederation, Moldova, Austria, and Sweden until 2022), neutrality is an obligation, legally guaranteed (by an international treaty, a constitutional provision or a law) not to participate in any international armed conflict or in any military alliance, and not to export military equipment to any countries at war. For others (Ireland, Finland until recently), neutrality is less of a legal, treaty or constitutional obligation and more of a long-standing foreign policy forged by political will or circumstances. In Dublin and Helsinki, this involved not being a member of NATO, but has not ruled out participation in the sanctions policies adopted by the European Union against the Russian Federation since 2014. For other European nations, neutrality is limited. Within an alliance, this entails only partial alignment with the major powers (USA, Russia, China). In this way, Belarus, France, Serbia, Hungary and Turkey have, each in their own fashion, practised this restricted form of neutrality.

This latter form is more of a partial disalignment with the strategic mainstream than non-alignment or abstention. From absolute neutrality, which constitutes the abstention of all participation in a war that is internationally guaranteed by the UN, to attempts to find an alternative strategic line, without ruling out participation in military alliances, the spectrum of forms of neutrality in Europe is clearly very broad.

The war in Ukraine has now quickly and profoundly challenged this spectrum in its entirety, at least in Europe. Facing the most serious violation of the collective security system on the Old Continent since the end of the USSR in 1991, how could Europeans not take sides? With the mobilisation of European public opinion to support the Ukrainian population, how could some governments maintain a neutral stance, perceived as naive and almost complicit? Given the geopolitical risks brought about by Russia's foreign policy, how can European solidarity not be strategic: sanctioning Russia, strengthening solidarity with Ukraine, further extending NATO and placing neutral countries that share a border with Russia under Western collective protection? Are these points not urgent and essential? As is often the case in major international crises, in Europe, the very concept of neutrality appears to be reaching its limits.

As in a Sartre scenario, European nations face the obligation to pick a side, the type and scope of their support to this side and the form of their alliances. Refusing to pick a side between the different camps is a choice in itself. Abstaining is actually expressing an explicit position. Not taking sides boils down to accepting the challenge to Ukraine's territorial integrity by military operations and the sham referendums of 27 September 2022.

Have both absolute and limited neutrality become impossible today? As a result, does the polarisation of Europe into support for Ukraine (an overwhelming majority of European States) or support for or reliance on Russia (Belarus, Armenia to a lesser extent) make any middle road impossible? Is the entire continent doomed to be reconstituted into antagonistic blocs that are political (liberal democracies against authoritarian regimes), military (NATO against CSTO) and

diplomatic? Would this not mean under-estimating the crises and shortcomings within these two organisations?

In this respect, the various versions of neutrality seem obsolete as they are naive, untenable and an admission of weakness. Naive, as long-standing neutral countries are thought not to take into account the new strategic landscape in Europe. Dangerous, as the underlying analysis of Finland and Sweden is that it was the lack of guarantees provided by article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty that was detrimental to Ukraine in February 2022. Lastly, in Europe, these neutral positions can be perceived as admissions of weakness by States that have given up ensuring their own national security themselves. Gone are the days when neutrality was a means of maximising the benefits of peace. The Swiss Confederation considered its security assured by the military expenditure of bordering countries and was able to generate budgetary leeway for its economy.

However, several legitimate objections can be levelled against the belief that European neutral States can no longer maintain their positions. Firstly, several long-standing neutral countries are still thriving in Europe: Austria, Ireland, Moldova and the Swiss Confederation have not announced their intention to join a military alliance. Secondly, calling for a widespread end to neutrality would paradoxically actually justify the Russian doctrine of spheres of influence: if neutrality is unacceptable, then Europeans are, in practice if they are not legally recognised, stakeholders of the conflict, or in other words warring parties, as they sanction Russia and provide strong support for Ukraine. If Europe is polarised by opposition to or support for Russian foreign policy, the continent is split into spheres of influence which justify the hegemony of one State above others. Yet this was specifically what Ukraine had been fighting since the Maidan Uprising: it is calling for the right not to belong to any sphere of influence. To sound the death knell of forms of neutrality in Europe would mean consenting, once again, to the division of Europe, this time not by an iron curtain but by a downpour of missiles.

As a result, while the war in Ukraine triggered Finland and Sweden's application

to join NATO, limiting the ability to remain neutral in Europe (1), neutrality, however, is doing well in other European nations (2) in such a way that the European understanding of neutrality is currently experiencing a crisis that heralds some changes (3).

I • The war in Ukraine has made neutrality impossible by rekindling the approach of military blocs in Europe

In the space of a few months, Russia's invasion of Ukraine made the long-standing traditions of neutrality in Sweden and Finland obsolete (1.1.), leading to a reinforcement of military blocs, both in the West and the East of the continent (1.2.).

I THE END OF SWEDEN AND FINLAND'S NEUTRAL POSITIONS HERALDS A STRATEGIC POLARISATION OF THE EUROPEAN AREA

In less than three months, from February to May 2022, two paradigmatic figures of neutrality in Europe radically changed their strategic identities. For these two major neutral Nordic States, launching the NATO accession process was more than a means of updating their principles, constituting a full revolution commensurate with the shock caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

We cannot under-estimate the domestic and foreign magnitude of the leap forward made by the Republic of Finland in the space of a few weeks. Finnish neutrality, summed up in the "Paaskivi doctrine" between 1946 and 1947, had formed the backbone of the country's foreign policy since the victory against the USSR in the Winter War (1940-1941), its defeat against the Soviet Union during the Continuation War (1941-1944) and the end of World War Two. The USSR imposed neutrality on Finland following the annexation of a substantial part of Finnish territory, Karelia. This neutral status operated as a life insurance, enforced and not chosen, for Finnish democracy and society. Undertaking through the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance of 1948 not to participate in the Marshall Plan and not to join NATO, the young Finnish State success-

fully avoided its integration in the Warsaw Pact, the imposition of a communist regime and the development of planned economy. Inappropriately called "Finlandization" by the Austrian minister for foreign affairs Karl Gruber in 1953, this emergency version of Finnish neutrality enabled the country to retain its domestic political autonomy and its strategic position in foreign affairs. By officially submitting the application to join NATO, in no time at all Finland took cognizance of the Russian threat to the thousands of kilometres of border shared with the Russian Federation, committed the country to a reinforcement of military capacity and thereby took up a position opposing Russia's foreign policy. For a large percentage of the population, this act drastically changed the country's national and international political identity.

For the Kingdom of Sweden, this reversal is much more significant as its neutral status was more long-standing and was deliberately adopted to avoid the suffering of European conflicts. As far back as 1812, the Swedish king Charles XIV, born Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte, committed his State to neutrality through non-participation in the Napoleonic war coalitions. Over the centuries, this neutral status garnered broad support from the Swedish, particularly as it went beyond border protection. Sheltered by this neutrality, firmly reinforced by significant military capacity, the Kingdom of Sweden was able to devote itself fully to the Industrial Revolution and the creation of a welfare state, by opting out of the European wars of the 19th century and the World Wars of the 20th century. Officially joining NATO is therefore a genuine break for the country. This move is commensurate with the reassessment of the Russian threat: for the last decade, Sweden has become aware of its weaknesses in the Baltic opposite Russia. It remilitarized Gotland Island, which is on the Russian Navy's route in the Baltic Sea, relaunched its weapons programme, with a focus on air and naval weapons, and reintroduced military service in 2019. Sweden's break from neutrality in 2022 remains significant: the Kingdom has shifted from a *si vis pacem para bellum* system protected by secular neutrality to an active commitment to the largest integrated military alliance in the world.

The extent of the shockwaves caused by the war in Ukraine can be measured by this double revolution in Northern Europe: with membership of NATO, two models of historical neutrality have become obsolete.

I EUROPE APPEARS TO BE HEADING IRREVOCABLY TOWARDS THE (RE) CONSTITUTION OF ANTAGONISTIC MILITARY BLOCS, BETWEEN SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE AND SUPPORT FOR RUSSIA

The decisions made by Finland and Sweden have an impact on the entire continent. While it cannot be said that all long-standing neutral states have changed, they have all considered the question. The Swiss Confederation, Austria, Ireland and Moldova have witnessed the debate on NATO membership be rekindled, both domestically and in the international arena. Within these States, to varying degrees of intensity, citizens, political parties and military leaders have asked themselves this question: faced with the Russian invasion, out of solidarity for Ukraine, would it be appropriate to follow in the footsteps of Sweden and Finland? Should they move from a status as member of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) to becoming a candidate and possibly a member of the Alliance?

Indeed, the war in Ukraine has changed the content and value of neutrality in Europe. Often viewed as a useful position of non-belligerence when acting as an intermediary or an "honest broker", neutrality was quickly viewed in an entirely different light in European public debate.

The conceptual and political change is three-fold. Firstly, neutrality is now perceived as naive. In 2022, for Europeans, the debate on Russian foreign policy appears to have been closed. The 2022 invasion of Ukraine cleared up all ambiguity that may have remained for some following the intervention in Syria (2015), the annexation of Crimea (2014) and the war with Georgia (2008). It would now be naive to believe that Russia wishes to maintain the collective security system

and preserve the inviolability of borders. Secondly, this neutrality comes across as dangerous for neutral States themselves: committing to neutrality or remaining neutral is perceived as a vulnerable position. Abstaining from joining a military alliance (strict neutrality), holding an intermediate position of blocs (more limited neutrality) or simply calling for mediation (neutrality in its broadest sense) boils down to being exposed, unarmed and isolated faced with the political operations and military campaigns of a Russian Federation that is actively committed to revising, through force, the Europe formed in 1991. Remaining neutral is not only unrealistic; it is dangerous as it marks out a country's status as a target or prey. Thirdly and most importantly, considered as the middle ground between Ukrainian and Russian warring parties, neutrality is seen as an accountable act with regard to Ukrainians. For many Europeans, neutrality through abstention is seen as a lack of solidarity with an independent State and a population that are victims of an invasion.

On the other side, military and diplomatic alliances have been stepped up under the pressure of the situation. Therefore Belarus, under president Lukashenko, has further developed its movement of alignment with Moscow, through their bilateral relations, the plan for a Union State of Russia and Belarus and the multilateral security alliance of the CSTO. There have been several contributing factors to this: firstly, president Lukashenko's isolation following the rigged elections in the summer of 2020, then the economic and political support subsequently provided by Russia and lastly the announcement by the Belarusian president of joint military forces to combat the threats that Minsk sees coming from Poland and Ukraine.

In short, the explicit end to the long-standing neutral status of Sweden and Finland is a general wake-up call for the States and peoples of wider Europe: the continent is now structured by opposition to or support for (Belarus) Russian foreign policy. The choice is unescapable. Abstaining is now impossible.

II • Some European neutral States do, however, remain strong as their strategic causes continue despite the war in Ukraine

While Sweden and Finland's applications to join NATO mark a turning point for long-standing neutral countries in Europe, they have not generated a domino effect: several neutral States continue to exist (2.1.) because the strategic function of neutrality is still a matter of debate (2.2.).

I SOME EUROPEAN NEUTRAL STATES ARE STILL FIRMLY ROOTED

While the end of neutrality in the Nordic countries has left its mark, it has not given rise to a wide-reaching movement of constitutional revision, withdrawals from international treaties or changes in military strategy. Long-standing bastions of strict neutrality continue to exist in Europe.

The Swiss Confederation has no plans to challenge its "perpetual neutrality" guaranteed by the 1815 Treaty of Paris. Throughout the current crisis between Russia and Ukraine, it has, in its own way, asserted its adherence to its "active neutrality". Following the European Union, it adopted the eight packages of sanctions against Russia. Its commitment is indeed the key to the success of this continental strategy: if the individuals sanctioned by the European Union were able to circumvent the measures prohibiting access to EU territory and measures to freeze assets in Europe through Switzerland, the European Union could not expect to have any meaningful impact on Russia. Switzerland's endorsement of the sanctions strategy is key for it to be credible. However, the Confederation has applied these sanctions with great moderation and even a certain reluctance. Its economic interests are at stake with the placing of Russian assets in Switzerland. Its international political identity is also at stake. The most emblematic expression of this neutrality, within a sanctions strategy, concerns authorisations to export military equipment to Ukraine. The Confederation argues its neutral status to avoid following the EU and NATO in their policies to support the Ukrainian armed forces. Positioning itself as guardian of its own neutrality, Switzer-

land is a voice for neutrality (which is almost inaudible for some Europeans). In this way, it draws attention to the risks of direct involvement in the confrontation with Russia. As the voice of European pacifism, it reminds us of the dangers of the EU's "co-belligerence" with the Russian Federation.

Similarly, but not identically, the two major long-standing neutral States of Ireland and Austria have not changed their relations with NATO: neither Dublin nor Vienna have plans to shift from the Partnership for Peace (PfP) to informal discussions with a view to accession. Sure enough, the threat is less direct than it is for Moldova, **but the preservation of these neutral statuses within the European Union is a sign: it is possible to sanction Russia and support Ukraine without giving up the principle of neutrality, understood as non-participation in military alliances.**

I IS NEUTRALITY THE PROBLEM OR THE SOLUTION?

Out of the neutral States of Europe, Moldova has not interpreted the conflict in the same way as Sweden and Finland. For Stockholm and Helsinki, it is the fact that Ukraine was not a member of NATO that enabled, if not encouraged, the Russian invasion. For the former Nordic neutral countries, the three Baltic States and Poland, NATO's repeated rejection of Ukraine's (and Georgia's) accession application marks them out to be coveted by Russia. For Chişinău, it is the repeated and adamant request for NATO membership that has given Moscow a pretext or an opportunity to attempt to conquer Ukraine. This argument has been well-known since it was presented by Hubert Védrine: the gradual enlargements of the Atlantic Alliance to the former people's democracies and former Soviet Republics (the three Baltic States) are a challenge to Western commitments at the end of the Cold War, at least from the standpoint of the Russian State. To some extent, under this interpretation, a "Finlandization" of Ukraine, as proposed by Nicole Gnesotto just before the invasion, would have mitigated the risks of a Russian military operation. Along these lines, since the outbreak of the war, Ukraine has itself insisted more on joining the European Union than NATO.

Yet not all European neutral States were forged on the very specific model of Finland. The neutral States of Europe are not all the result of a defeat against the USSR, of fear of Russian aggression or a risk of destabilisation. In Switzerland and Ireland, they stem from a deep-seated distrust of outbursts in European geopolitics and of the excesses of continental military alliances. Moreover, in Serbia, neutrality - which is political and not legal - is fostered by two historical trends that feed into the country's contemporary national identity: firstly, loyalty to pan-Slavism promoted by Russia in the Balkans in the 19th century and, secondly, an Orthodox faith community. In this respect, Serbia promotes a neutral status that aims to strike a balance (or, according to some, one based on hypocrisy) between multifaceted solidarity with Russia and its application to join the European Union.

Viewed through this lens, Finland and Sweden joining NATO is less of a turning point and more of a culmination. The official accession procedure would mark the end of a "strategic illusion" as Finland and Sweden were already involved in many NATO operations and exercises in the Baltic and elsewhere.

In short, in Western Europe, the general debate on neutrality and specifically on NATO membership is not definitively closed. Firstly, the long-standing neutral statuses of Switzerland, Ireland and Austria remain stable between a participation in the PfP and a contribution to the European Union's sanctions against Russia but not NATO membership. Secondly, beyond their significant differences, forms of neutrality in Moldova and Serbia remain signals that should not be overlooked. For these States, neutrality is not necessarily a source of risks. It may be part of the solution to their intermediary strategic position. It would therefore be mistaken to consign neutrality in Europe to the past or to the strategic folklore of the Concert of Nations, an idea has long since been left behind. Some neutral States continue to exist in a polarised continent because they appear to be a more powerful protection than membership in alliances, however powerful they may be.

III • The crises facing neutral States herald not only a growing polarisation of the continent but also a search for new strategic positions.

Neither outdated strategies nor perpetual abstentions, neutral States in Europe are currently facing a crisis as experienced several times already during their history (3.1.). **As a result, they likely to undergo changes rather than be subject to an inevitable collapse.**

I EUROPEAN NEUTRAL STATES PUT TO THE TEST OF CONTINENTAL CRISES

2022 did not suddenly force European neutral States into a shift from an age of stability to a period of decline. Even the oldest of these countries, such as Switzerland, Sweden and Ireland, have experienced many crises and challenges. None of these forms of European neutrality constitute a "freezing" of these countries' foreign action. Neutral States cannot abstain from taking action. Furthermore, they cannot exempt themselves from the obligation of adapting to the circumstances. Non-participation in alliances and direct conflict has never enabled a European State to be completely isolated from life on the continent. The war in Ukraine is no exception.

While Switzerland never took part in the global conflicts of the 20th century, it played an indirect but tangible role in these wars by offering asylum, guaranteeing assets and fostering negotiations. Similarly, Sweden and Ireland have regularly been criticised for maintaining a role of artificial neutrality. During the Second World War, Stockholm was accused of breaking its neutrality in allowing the use of its railways to transport German troops to the Norwegian front. Along the same lines, Dublin was accused of favouring the West during the Cold War by allowing the stopovers of unarmed NATO military aircraft and Irish soldiers to enlist in the British army.

Planned for the long-term, the principle of neutrality in Europe has therefore been subject to changes, challenges and criticism. The

current polarisation of the European continent is an additional challenge for neutral States in Europe. However, it is not the end of all attempts to achieve neutrality on the continent, whether this comes in the form of strict neutrality or limited involvement.

I CONTINENTAL MILITARY BLOCS WITH NATIONAL POLITICAL FRACTURE LINES

Against a backdrop of certain polarisation into military and political blocs in Europe, several forms of neutrality are emerging and changing, often at the boundaries of the classic neutrality model.

The classic (and legally guaranteed) neutralities of Switzerland, Ireland and Austria remain unchanged under the law but are evolving in practice. Their respective neutralities are clearly shifting from non-participation in European conflicts to indirect and restricted action against Russia's foreign policy. In these three cases, taking part in the European Union's eight sanctions packages against Russia and the two sanctions packages against Belarus sends a very clear message: the three major neutral States that remain following Sweden and Finland's accession to NATO intend to support Ukraine and counter the Russian military campaign. These neutralities are undergoing a substantial change as they do not prevent active assistance for an indirect strategy of confrontation with Russia. These neutralities are alignments without any military alliance.

Other disaligned (rather than non-aligned) strategic positions play on various memberships to establish an ambivalence which borrows certain characteristics from neutrality. Thus, Serbia's display of support for Russia and hostility towards NATO since the strikes on its territory do not hamper its candidate status for accession to the European Union. Unlike other orthodox Balkan States such as Bulgaria, Serbia does not believe that it must take sides in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Military neutrality confined to a balancing act, its unique position is being asserted more strongly than it is being eroded.

Similarly, within NATO, Hungary and Turkey are fostering disalignment to avoid an excessive show of solidarity with the NATO-EU

bloc. Hungarian prime minister Orbán continues to be a dissonant voice when it comes to sanctions or the enlargement of NATO. Above all, however, Turkey leverages its many memberships in defiance of the bloc approach. Far from finding itself obliged to show bloc solidarity, it views the conflict as an opportunity to reassert its specific strategic position: while it exports Bayraktar drones to the Ukrainian armed forces, Turkey plays the role of mediator for the resumption of cereal exports, and cultivates its relations with Moscow to promote ceasefires. The process resembles neutrality as Turkey refuses to sanction Russia, but can be a 'lone ranger' approach with uncoordinated initiatives within NATO. It can also equate to isolationism by pursuing a strictly national agenda.

Moldova will become the testing ground for neutrality in Europe. With a geographical, military and constitutional situation that is one of a kind, Moldova has all the restrictions. As a former Soviet Socialist Republic, made Russian by force in the 19th century, this poor territory adjoins military operations and has had to deal with the separatism of Russian-speakers in Transnistria and the unionism of some Romanians since its independence. All of this means that the country's constitutional neutrality does not protect it from the risks of destabilisation. Yet, for now, this tenuous neutrality is holding, for fear of a greater evil: Russian armed action and destabilisation to prevent its accession to NATO. Is there a better embodiment of the dilemma neutral States in Europe are facing? Are they still protected by this principle? Or is it instead a sign of weakness?

Conclusions • A polarised Europe and evolving forms of neutrality

The war between Russia and Ukraine stepped up and expedited the polarisation of Europe into strategic blocs. It restored NATO's historical vocation of being an integrated military alliance that protects Europeans from Russia. In doing so it pushed aside Europe's strategic autonomy and rekindled Russia's drive to cement its traditional military alliances with Belarus and, on the borders of Europe, with Armenia. In short, the fragmented Europe forged at the end of the USSR seems to be over for good. In this respect, the end of the

neutral status upheld by Sweden and Finland heralds a return to the military alliance approach.

This question is particularly relevant today for several States: the Republic of Serbia, both candidate to join the European Union and historically relatively hostile to NATO; the Republic of Moldova, committed through its 1994 Constitution to remaining neutral but ever more directly exposed to the conflict in Ukraine; Georgia, which wishes to submit its application to join NATO; and, naturally, Ukraine. For these three States, the key question of neutrality remains: is it a guarantee of national security or on the contrary a weakness? The Republic of Serbia appears to be opting for an “Irish” approach, in that it will ultimately join the European Union and thereby enjoy its protection without joining NATO. Given its great openness towards Russia, Serbia does not need the protection of the North Atlantic Treaty. For Ukraine, the window of opportunity seems to be permanently closed: after suffering such an invasion, the population will not accept neutrality as a form of protection. The issue remains open, however, for Moldova. For Georgia, which has a border with Russia, the question appears to have been pushed back as the country continues to uphold its application to join NATO while being denied the official accession procedure.

For these four States, be they neutral or non-aligned, could the recently founded European Political Community (EPC), which includes in particular States which do not wish to or cannot align themselves with two-fold EU+NATO membership, provide a way out of this quandary?

Is it inevitable, then, that a Europe split into blocs will take over? This is not certain: as the conflict develops, as sanctions have an effect on Russia and also on Europeans, very active neutrality strategies are being reaffirmed. As during the Cold War, military crises give rise to movements of unification and solidarity. They do, however, also foster dissenting strategies: on a unified continent, the State which cultivates disalignment and uses the vocabulary of neutrality stands out all the more. And as always after two centuries of war in Europe, forms neutrality are criticised, overhauled and updated.

The end of Swedish and Finnish neutrality places a big question mark on domestic traditions of neutrality, without prompting a domino effect. Europe appears to be following its own approach and is responding to its own emergencies: after three decades of disalignments, it seems to see its future as a bloc. To the south, with efforts to theorise and encourage the emergence of the Global South, we are in fact witnessing a new effort of non-alignment.

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