The industrial aspects of an expanded nuclear deterrent

It is now rare for a debate on the future of European defence to overlook the issue of nuclear weapons and their place in the security architecture that Europeans are striving to build. The concept of ‘advanced nuclear deterrence’, introduced by the President of the French Republic in his speech on 2 March 2026, has stimulated further reflection on this subject.

Nuclear deterrence, as is well known, rests on a combination of three elements which, taken together, contribute to its credibility: a doctrine of use, sole decision-making authority, and weapons that are among the most technologically advanced. As part of this third pillar, there is therefore an industrial dimension that is integral to deterrence; it plays a significant role in the defence economy and is potentially affected by the upheavals currently shaking the sector as a result of geopolitical shifts. To assess the extent of this impact, it is necessary to evaluate the resources that, directly or indirectly, contribute to the nuclear posture, identify those resources that are partly beyond purely national control, and attempt to anticipate disruptions that could further increase these dependencies. The French proposal to broaden deterrence suggests that this shift should take place within a European framework.

1) A wide range of capabilities contribute to deterrence:

In addition to nuclear weapons proper (nuclear warheads), France has two delivery systems capable of delivering these weapons: one is ballistic missiles carried by submarines (SSBNs¹), and the other is air-launched missiles (from aircraft, some of which are based on aircraft carriers). For its part, the United Kingdom possesses only the submarine-based component.

The conditions under which these two types of delivery systems are deployed are quite different, and their combination contributes to the credibility of the strike force. Their deployment relies on critical assets such as: communications satellites and maritime patrol aircraft for SSBNs; refuelling aircraft and aircraft carriers for airborne missiles; and high-performance optical and electronic intelligence capabilities in both cases.

Some of this equipment, such as refuelling aircraft or communications satellites, has dual-use applications, both nuclear and conventional. The companies that produce them have this dual capability to meet the requirements of deterrence and the more open-ended demands of conventional applications, or even the civilian sector. It is known, for example, that ArianeGroup is the prime contractor for both nuclear ballistic missiles and Ariane launchers, capitalising on the technological synergies between these two types of rocket.

Taken together, these systems account for a significant proportion of the defence expenditure of the countries that possess them. The portion allocated to delivery systems proper (nuclear warheads and missiles) thus represents around a quarter of France’s military equipment budget in 2026. If we add the delivery and support systems (essential for the deployment of missiles), this figure approaches one-third of that budget. It therefore represents a very significant proportion of the business of French defence companies, involving the main prime contractors and numerous subcontractors.

France’s investment in deterrence is seen by some as a justification for lower levels of spending in the conventional domain, an area on which its European partners are focusing their efforts. It is also responsible for the obstacles to cooperation on major programmes such as the SCAF, the abandonment of which – at least as far as the manned aircraft is concerned – is partly attributable to French requirements relating to deterrence (the French aircraft manufacturer using this as an argument to demand full prime contractor status for the programme…).

However, this brief description of the physical aspects of deterrence demonstrates, in any case, its interdependence with a defence industrial base that it underpins technologically, and its dependencies, which partly fall within the conventional sphere.

2) National control over the means of deterrence is neither comprehensive nor static:

Firstly, it is evident that certain elements of the deterrent arsenal are the subject of international cooperation, creating a breach in the dogma of national independence in this field. This is the case, for example, with the air-to-air refuelling aircraft, which are derived from Airbus A330s assembled in Spain. Furthermore, there are components or items of equipment which, out of necessity, are sourced from abroad (such as the US-made catapults for aircraft carriers), not to mention certain electronic components or raw materials essential for the production of weapons. However, these dependencies do not, in fact, affect the autonomy of use of these weapons, which is a fundamental condition of their operational doctrine.

However, the role played by technical components of deterrence that fall outside the scope of strict national sovereignty could grow. This is suggested by the concepts of ‘advanced deterrence’ and ‘strategic support’ highlighted in President Macron’s speech and which are now the subject of discussions with certain European partners. These concepts involve cooperating on capabilities that play a vital role in the deterrence posture, such as early warning, extended air defence and deep strike capabilities.

The possibility has also been raised of stationing French nuclear weapons and their delivery systems (in practice, aircraft) in other European states, thereby helping to safeguard their territories. This would de facto imply a partnership in the operational support of these platforms and would open the door to a ‘dual-key’ principlE² (which would undermine the necessary single-person decision-making capacity regarding their use…).

These proposals are not merely doctrinal: if implemented, they would have consequences for the French deterrence industrial chain, compelling it to engage more deeply in European cooperation on both technical and programme-related matters.

This reality and these prospects show that, whilst a literal ‘Europeanisation’ of deterrence remains incompatible with a credible doctrine of use, sharing certain material elements of it with France’s European partners appears unavoidable and, in some respects, desirable for both operational and budgetary reasons. This approach, by paving the way for the initial pooling of resources devoted to this fundamental element of European defence, would help to safeguard it from dependence on third countries, particularly the United States.

3) Like all armaments, the industrial pillar of deterrence is facing major technical and operational disruptions:

Without entering into the doctrinal debate, it must be acknowledged that the theoretical conditions for the use of nuclear weapons in the European theatre are being affected by the upheavals currently taking place in conventional warfare. Ongoing conflicts and the emergence of hybrid threats (acts of aggression not involving armed force) are radically and significantly altering perceptions of a situation that could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. Although uncertainty is part and parcel of deterrence, the concept of escalation – which underpins the notions of a crossing point and a final warning, neither of which precludes first-³ e use – is becoming more complex to grasp.

Highlighted by the situation in Ukraine, the massive influx of new technologies onto the battlefield – with the widespread use of robots, drones and software utilising artificial intelligence – is helping to blur the traditional approach to conflict, characterised by a ‘ ’ progression. By undermining the relevance of conventional platforms – such as aircraft or missiles – developed following lengthy and costly programmes, this trend could also call into question the nuclear variants of these platforms, which are often the defining factor in determining their performance.

The discussions currently taking place within the General Staff to respond to these new operational paradigms⁴ – accompanied by the growing rivalry between established companies in the sector and new entrants from the tech industry – could call into question the industrial balance upon which the physical infrastructure of France’s deterrent force has been built.

The introduction of AI and, in the longer term, that of quantum computing are further factors that could destabilise the nuclear equation, leading to a reassessment of the human factor within the decision-making loop and of the cryptology essential to its operation.

In the immediate term, the budgetary cost of deterrence weighs heavily on this debate: as a weapon designed not to be used, it cannot, now more than ever, exempt its possessor from a substantial rearmament effort adapted to the new context. The logical extension of this observation implies that European defence efforts, whilst needing to be more coordinated and pooled to yield results, should not exclude the nuclear component currently borne by France and the United Kingdom.

Whilst these reflections suggest that nuclear deterrence is not immutable, either in its principles or in its means, they highlight above all the overarching challenge posed by its desirable contribution to Europe’s defence posture in the context of the US withdrawal. Its future usefulness will depend on the role it is given within the defence strategy that Europeans are bound to develop together. This reality will not come about solely through doctrinal developments, but through a series of technological and industrial breakthroughs that will make the status quo untenable: increased fungibility between conventional and nuclear delivery systems, the digital integration of decision-making systems, the reallocation of resources to capitalise on these synergies, multinational cooperation on critical equipment, the pooling of intelligence, and so on.

Footnotes

Nuclear-powered missile submarines.↩︎
The system currently in force for US nuclear weapons stationed in Germany, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands.↩︎
See ‘The French Guarantee’, Benoît d’Aboville (Commentaire magazine, Spring 2026)↩︎
See ‘Speed is the Matrix of New Power’, Pierre Vandier (Le Grand Continent, April 2026)↩︎