Vertigo in a World of Disorder, The Urgency for Europe

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There are moments when current events do more than impose themselves: they force us to see the world as it has become. The war now spreading across the Middle East is one such moment. What is unfolding before our eyes is not merely another international crisis; it is the careful erosion of an order we once believed -if not stable – at least structured by shared and common rules. Strikingly, this erosion is being driven by the very country that long served as its guarantor, and which now appears to be stepping back for reasons and objectives that elude most of us.

This realization is unsettling.

Unsettling first on the human and political level. Nothing in this sequence suggests a positive outcome. This war will likely not overthrow an Iranian regime that will impose an even heavier toll – if that were possible – on its own population. It will not stabilize the region. It will add chaos to chaos, tension to tension, fractures to societies already fragmented.

Unsetlling, too, on the economic and environmental level. We already know what conflicts produce: energy shocks, rising prices, disrupted supply chains. As Phuc-Vinh Nguyen explains, the war in Iran is not only a geopolitical event; it is also a global economic shock, one that could accelerate certain dynamics – particularly further electrification – while exacerbating inequalities and vulnerabilities. In the end, prospects draw a world with more poverty, more instability, and more CO₂ emissions. As if each crisis further undermined our climate ambitions.

Above all, this conflict reveals a deeper trend: the retreat of efforts to collectively organize the world. Where rules – if not always respected – at least framed negotiations, a logic of power fragmentation now prevails. National, even private, interests are reasserting themselves. Coalitions form and dissolve depending on circumstances. In other words, there is a return to a kind of law of the jungle.

As so often, the European response was initially marked by shock and a dispersion of national positions. And, again as often, a degree of convergence eventually emerged. But this cycle – surprise, division, catch-up – is itself becoming a worrying symptom. In this context, I cannot help but ask – and to ask all of us – the question of Europe.

The Jacques Delors Institute’s work this month attempts to offer elements for answering complex situations, while deliberately avoiding simplistic solutions. It first shows that room for manoeuvre exists. Still, it requires clear political choices.

In her analysis of the future Multiannual Financial Framework (2028–2034), Eulalia Rubio highlights the scale of Europe’s needs: defence, energy transition, enlargement, competitiveness. These priorities cannot be financed without a qualitative leap in Europe’s ambition. Continuing to stack priorities without drawing the necessary budgetary consequences would amount to institutionalizing impotence.

On the trade front, the work of Elvire Fabry, Nicolas Köhler-Suzuki and Arancha González on a potential EU–CPTPP coalition reminds us that Europe now operates in a fragmented trade order, where agreements are no longer merely economic but geopolitical. The end of multilateralism as we knew it compels us to rethink our alliances, dependencies, and strategy of influence.

In terms of sovereignty, the link between defence and the energy transition has never been more central. The war in Ukraine had already demonstrated this; the current crisis confirms it. There will be no strategic autonomy without energy security, just as there will be no credible transition without strengthened industrial and technological capacities. Sovereignty and sustainability are not competing objectives – they are now inseparable.

Our two analyses on European perceptions of enlargement and on the Pact on Migration and Asylum also remind us that Europe must transform itself politically. Our Union cannot claim to carry its own weights in an unstable world if it does not clarify its borders, its rules, and its project. Enlargement will not only be a geopolitical decision; it will be a test of internal coherence.

Finally, the more forward-looking contributions – on European geopolitics and on completing the Single Market – underscore a fundamental point: Europe suffers more from a deficit of implementation than from a lack of diagnosis. Collectively, we know what needs to be done. What is missing is the capacity to decide quickly, together, and at the right scale.

This is where the central challenge lies. For the urgency keeps growing. Each crisis reveals a little more clearly the costs of inaction: economic costs, due to repeated energy shocks; political costs, because of a loss of credibility on the international stage; social costs, amidst deepening internal fractures.

And yet, Europe possesses considerable assets. It remains a major economic power, a pole of relative stability in an unstable world, and a space of rights and regulation that continues to exert attraction. But these assets will not suffice unless they are mobilized within a coherent strategy.

Recent history has shown that our Union can transform itself in adversity: the response to the pandemic, the recovery plan, support for Ukraine. But it has also shown that these transformations are often partial, incomplete, fragile.

This moment requires strong and decisive actions. It calls for a shift from a Europe that reacts to a Europe that acts; from a Europe that compensates to a Europe that invests; from a Europe that adapts to a Europe that anticipates; from a Europe that abandons its values to end up defending its interests.

In this moment of disorder, Europe is not merely an option – it is a necessity.