Gradual accession to the EU: it's time to turn words into action!

In response to the war in Ukraine, the European Union (EU) has adopted a geopolitical approach that has changed its attitude towards membership applications, whether from old candidates (the Western Balkan countries) or new ones (Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia). But three years later, with the risk of an unfavourable outcome to the war for Ukraine and its European allies re-emerging, the results of the relaunched enlargement policy are questionable. It should have been built around the idea of ‘gradual accession’. However, although this concept is now on everyone’s lips, including at the highest political level, it is struggling to be translated into reality. Yet gradual accession only makes sense if it brings new momentum and real acceleration. Not in years, but right now. It is therefore time to move from debate to political decisions that correspond – to paraphrase the Schuman Declaration – to “creative efforts proportionate to the dangers” threatening the European project.

A real change in rhetoric, but actions that remain modest

For more than three years, many European leaders have been saying that EU enlargement has once again become a priority, even a geopolitical necessity. This is good news, because it is also and above all – in the case of the Western Balkan countries – a broken promise that discredits the European project. And it is an opportunity to demonstrate once again the vitality and effectiveness of the latter, by proving that what has been possible between France and Germany is just as possible in the Balkans or in the “bloodlands¹ ” of Eastern Europe.

However, actions remain well below the “call of history”². Admittedly, the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, launched in 2023, brings several advances relating to the internal market, the most frequently cited example being the entry of Montenegro and Albania into the SEPA³ in November 2024, followed by North Macedonia in March 2025. Other examples include the granting of candidate status and the opening of negotiations, within historically short timeframes, for Moldova and Ukraine, as well as renewed energy in the negotiations with Albania and Montenegro. Another example is the re-establishment of a Commissioner’s post and a Directorate-General dedicated solely to this policy within the European Commission formed in 2024.

However, there have also been failures. The Union has not yet been able to resolve the situation that epitomises everything that is dysfunctional in the enlargement process towards the Balkans: the deadlock over North Macedonia. This other candidate country potentially able to make rapid progress in negotiations remains blocked by Bulgaria due to bilateral disputes⁴ . Yet the Bulgarian-Macedonian dispute falls precisely into the category of neighbourhood problems linked to the past and to issues of identity, which European integration should help to overcome rather than exacerbate. Similarly, despite its highly pro-European population, the EU is keeping Kosovo as the last country in the group of ‘potential candidates’, ignoring its official application submitted nearly two years ago. And for good reason: nothing is happening on the part of the five EU states⁵ that do not recognise Kosovo’s sovereignty.

As for all the undeniable advances already mentioned, one common denominator limits their scope: they are not visible enough and do not carry sufficient symbolic weight. The Growth Plan has many merits⁶, but how many citizens in the countries concerned understand this complex mechanism and perceive its political logic⁷? Moreover, the choice of name is revealing: are we anticipating the long-term effects of reducing the significance of the European project to economic issues?

These technical measures do not form a coherent whole that is politically meaningful and easily perceptible and understandable to citizens. They are sometimes weakened by an inability to make clear and consistent choices: for example, one might question the conditional decision to open negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina, when candidate status had already been granted conditionally, without the conditions having been met. Or we might lament the weakness of European reactions to the authoritarian excesses of the pro-Russian government in Georgia. Not to mention the restraint shown by European leaders in response to the situation in Serbia, with the notable exception of the statements made by Marta Kos, European Commissioner for Enlargement⁸ .

The serious risks of a French “no” vote

Finally, the return of enlargement to the list of priorities has so far had no noticeable effect on another fundamental aspect of this challenge: political communication targeting the citizens of Member States. The same observation can be made across the Union: there is no public debate on future enlargements, even in countries where public opinion is highly sceptical⁹. This is particularly problematic in the case of Germany: the driving force behind the 2004 enlargement, its population now seems rather opposed to the idea of further enlargements. The situation is even more serious in France, where public opinion has traditionally been sceptical on this issue. However, the French constitution provides for a referendum to ratify any new EU membership¹⁰. Let us imagine the worst-case scenario: encouraged by talk of “geopolitical necessity” and “the call of history”, the candidate countries mobilise, carry out the required reforms and meet the accession criteria, which are defined and interpreted in a stricter and more distrustful manner than in previous enlargements. And then… the French say “no”. This would be a disaster for the European project, which would then achieve the exact opposite of its raison d’être: instead of reconciling peoples, it would pit them against each other, creating frustrations and resentments that would be difficult to overcome. One obvious conclusion is clear in the face of this risk: all European leaders who promise candidate countries a European future should actively engage with their voters to explain and defend this project. For every lyrical speech in Brussels, three public debates at home!

These discrepancies between words and actions, between what is said “over there” and what is said to voters “here”, are embarrassing today and potentially destructive tomorrow… but unfortunately understandable, given the immense amount of political work that needs to be done. Firstly, because we have allowed the illegitimate but complacently widespread feeling to flourish that the “big bang” of 2004 was a failure and a mistake¹¹ . But also because some leaders whose countries have benefited so much from EU membership are doing a disservice to those who would like to follow in their footsteps: by flouting the commitments made on the path to accession, they discredit the idea that enlargement is the best instrument for consolidating a country’s path to democracy, freedom, the rule of law and prosperity. Or because the European ‘polycrisis’ has diverted attention and energy to other challenges, including Brexit, the very antithesis of enlargement. Finally, because the current candidate countries have a number and degree of problems that exceed the challenges of previous enlargements. The most striking example is, of course, the country at the heart of the current revival of enlargement: Ukraine.

Faced with these challenges, one idea has gained ground: that of gradual accession (or integration)¹². The aim is to make the accession process more gradual, offering candidates – provided they make substantial and credible progress towards accession – benefits that no candidate country has been able to enjoy in past enlargements. Until recently, this concept was merely a topic of discussion in a few think tanks, but it now appears in the conclusions of the European Council, in the coalition agreement that forms the basis of the current German government, and in a resolution of the French National Assembly¹³. This is hardly surprising, given that it addresses the problems that characterise future enlargements, as it suggests a compromise between the imperative to enlarge and the impossibility of doing so quickly. It offers an opportunity to restore the credibility of the promise of accession in the eyes of the citizens of the candidate countries and to reassure those of the Member States.

However, for gradual integration to be meaningful, it must translate into rapid, mobilising and innovative gains compared to previous enlargements. The first steps in this process must take place now – at least for some candidate countries – not in two-, five-, or ten-years’ time. However, since the idea was formalised by the European Council, the EU has continued to waste time. It has failed to capitalise on the new political momentum by proposing a new framework for the enlargement process that would be coherent, ambitious, visible and understandable to citizens.

Four guiding principles for a European response that is equal to the challenges

Without going into detail here about the various proposals already put forward in previous work by the Jacques Delors Institute’s Centre Grande Europe¹⁴, let us reaffirm four key ideas on which the European Union should build its new enlargement policy, based on a roadmap proposed to candidate countries, with the first deadlines to be set very soon. It is up to each candidate to decide whether to commit to it, and at what pace, but the Union must put a clear and strong proposal on the table.

1)Gradual integration into the EU institutions

Above all, this roadmap must enable the gradual integration of candidate countries into the institutional life of the Union, at both the political and technical levels. In this way, current and future Member States will be able to embark on a process of mutual discovery, socialisation and joint learning through practice.

Two precedents, one old and one recent, offer interesting inspiration:

the status (although not mentioned in the Treaties establishing the EU) of ‘acceding countries’¹⁵ granted to candidate countries for the period between the date of signature of the accession treaty and its entry into force. For example, from as early as 5 May 2003¹⁶, 162 observers from the 10 countries that were to join the Union on 1 May 2004 were involved in the work of the European Parliament.

Since September 2023, the European Economic and Social Committee has been welcoming representatives of civil society from the candidate countries¹⁷ – again, this is a practice that has been established under the existing treaties.

Building on these precedents, all EU institutions should identify the simplest and most practical way of opening up to representatives of candidate countries, as well as the conditions attached to this.

2)Participation in EU policies

This invitation should go beyond mere observer status. It should serve to gradually integrate them into the process of shaping and implementing EU policies.

The Growth Plan for the Western Balkans (later extended to Moldova) is a step forward in terms of integrating candidate countries into the internal market. However, it has two flaws. On the one hand, it allows candidate countries to benefit from certain EU policies without involving them in the decision-making process. It makes the candidate countries passive beneficiaries rather than co-responsible actors. Secondly, it is limited to relatively technical aspects of economic integration, such as integration into the SEPA system or lower roaming costs. Admittedly, these benefits do have the merit of affecting citizens’ daily lives. But are these advances sufficiently visible and symbolically powerful to (re)build genuine support for the European project? Is this not a way of reducing the latter to a simple economic cost-benefit calculation, obscuring its fundamentally political dimension? And this in a region where the political message of the European project – based on concepts such as peace, reconciliation, the rejection of nationalist passions, democracy and the rule of law – is particularly relevant and necessary.

It would therefore be wise to extend the concept of gradual integration to participation in the decision-making process in certain areas with a strong political dimension. Starting with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP): why should candidate countries that are already almost 100% aligned with the CFSP and are already allies of almost all EU Member States within NATO not be fully integrated into this policy, with the exception of the right to vote? It should be noted that this idea appears in the coalition agreement in Germany¹⁸. But beyond the CFSP, should candidate countries not be included in other common policies, particularly those covered by the chapters of negotiations that have already been closed?

Finally, it goes without saying that this approach would radically strengthen the process of socialisation between current and future Member States and would contribute greatly – and in the best possible way: through practice – to future members (both at the political and administrative levels) learning how the EU works. This development would also offer new career prospects for administrative executives in candidate countries, which could motivate young graduates trained abroad to return and invest in their country’s accession process.

3)Budget

In line with the logic of gradual accession, the Growth Plan has paved the way – with strong political conditionality – for additional financial resources for candidate countries, beyond traditional pre-accession aid. However, here again, questions arise as to the visibility and clarity of this mechanism for the citizens of these countries. Or even its real effectiveness, given the tension between the principle of conditionality and the need for predictability for donors expected to provide co-financing. There is therefore room to go further – and, incidentally, once again, to contribute to learning by doing in the use and management of European funds. Candidate countries that have fulfilled the conditions set by the EU should be able to benefit from part of the funds to which they will be entitled once they become members, the management of which would be identical – or at least as close as possible – to that of the cohesion funds for Member States. The EU’s next multiannual financial framework (2028-34) should incorporate these prospects¹⁹. In exchange, the candidate countries concerned should submit to the Union’s control mechanisms, not only by integrating the EU’s rule of law protection mechanism²⁰, but also by recognising the competence of OLAF and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and offering them full cooperation.

4)Conditionality and reversibility

Preserving conditionality and ensuring the reversibility²¹ of gradual integration is undoubtedly both a necessity and a major pitfall. Indeed, there is a high risk that Member States will find it difficult to reverse course, as this would be a political act with serious consequences. As Václav Havel said²², “institutions sometimes die of an excess of politeness”; and gradual integration could well die because of the difficulty Member States have in telling unpleasant truths to a candidate country that is backsliding.

This risk is related to the structural difficulty that Member States experience in sanctioning one of their own. It is this same logic that has rendered the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) ineffective. However, Member States learned lessons from this in the aftermath of the crises that Europe experienced after 2008 by introducing the idea of a ‘reverse qualified majority’. If sanctions are proposed by the Commission, they come into force unless a qualified majority of Member States oppose them. This same logic could be introduced into the gradual integration process.

Furthermore, the conditionality of the process could be strengthened by a more transparent, objective and open system for evaluating the reforms carried out by candidate states, with greater involvement of civil society²³. It could also be strengthened by requiring a broader political consensus in support of accession efforts, obliging the governments of candidate countries to genuinely involve the opposition and civil society. In turn, this would increase the chances that the reforms carried out – particularly with regard to the rule of law, media freedom and pluralism, etc. – would be sincere, non-partisan and sustainable.

Defining a new intermediate status

Of course, it is entirely possible to pursue gradual integration along these four axes without attaching them to a formalised status that would escape the candidate-member dichotomy. But in doing so, there is a risk that this change in approach will be invisible to citizens. The whole point is precisely to highlight a new progressive approach to the accession process that is motivating for the citizens of candidate states, reassuring for those of Member States, and also sends a strong geopolitical signal to the rest of the world. The best way to achieve this is to create an intermediate status, accompanied by a set of rights and duties, the substance of which would combine significant elements from the four areas mentioned above.

As the example of the status of ‘acceding country’ shows, this could be a simple practice based on a political decision, rather than a legal status enshrined in the treaties. In this regard, it should be noted that the very definition of the level to be reached in order to formally become a Member State is flexible and subject to political decision-making, since all previous enlargements have involved transition periods of varying length and scope, covering issues of varying importance. Today, some people take offence at the idea of a ‘trial period’ during which new Member States would not have the right of veto²⁴. But wasn’t the transition period for one of the four freedoms of the internal market²⁵ more significant in terms of the real and concrete consequences for inequality between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member States? Another example: the practice of ‘post-Maastricht’ enlargements has established the idea that a State that joins must only commit²⁶ to aiming for future membership of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). If a state that is not yet ready to participate in EMU can join, it is entirely possible to decide that other areas of integration may also be subject to efforts to be made only after accession, over periods of varying lengths.

We have proposed²⁷ the creation of the status of associated (member) state, a designation that is open to debate²⁸ . Would it be better to redefine the status of acceding state²⁹ ? Whatever terminology is preferred, the key is to offer states that wish to do so and that make the necessary efforts a status that is much more advantageous and rewarding than that of “candidate country”, but which can be achieved much more quickly than even the most optimistic scenario could predict for full membership.

Timing is crucial

One thing is clear: the question of timing is fundamental. For this new approach to be useful, credible and motivating, the new intermediate status must be available from 2026 for countries that are currently aiming for membership between 2028 and 2030³⁰. This pace also seems essential for Ukraine, regardless of the outcome of the current negotiations.

To ensure that it is not perceived as a consolation prize designed to delay actual membership – or, worse, that it does not become one in reality! – it must be granted at a time when membership is not a realistic option, i.e. before the closure of all 33 chapters of negotiations. Conversely, if it were only offered as the negotiations were about to end, this status would become useless at best and counterproductive at worst. The challenge is therefore to clearly define the conditions: significantly more than what the EU requires to open negotiations, but much less than what is needed to join.

The context of the current negotiations on Ukraine provides both an opportunity and a strong reason for the EU to launch a significant initiative. If the fighting ceases at the cost of difficult decisions accepted by Ukraine, the credible strengthening of the European perspective, promised by the EU on numerous occasions since 2022, could well be part of the equation. However, rapid ‘traditional’ accession is neither a realistic nor a desirable option – either for Ukraine or for the Union. Nevertheless, allowing Ukraine to become bogged down in a process similar to that experienced by the Western Balkan countries (with the notable exception of Croatia) is also not a reasonable option, as it would carry serious geopolitical risks for both sides. Therefore, a structured, politically bold and symbolically powerful form of gradual integration seems to be the best way forward. If it combines the elements mentioned above, it will be capable of truly changing the situation and finally bringing words and deeds into line with regard to EU enlargement. But, as Robert Schuman said in 1950, we must recognise that “it is no longer a question of vain words but of an act, a bold act, a constructive act”.

Notes

¹ To borrow the term coined by historian Timothy Snyder ( Snyder , T .: Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin , Basic Books , 201 0 .
² See the speech by the President of the European Commission on the State of the Union in 2023: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_23_4426
³ The Single Euro Payments Area
⁴ Macek, L. “North Macedonia: Neighbourhood Issues”, Repères du Centre Grande Europe, Jacques Delors Institute, March 2025, https://institutdelors.eu/publications/macedoine-du-nord-problemes-de-voisinage
⁵ Cyprus, Spain, Greece, Romania and Slovakia.
⁶ See also Mihajlović, M. & Macek, L. “New Growth Plan for the Western Balkans”, Brief , Jacques Delors Institute, March 2024 ( https://institutdelors.eu/en/publications/new-growth-plan-for-the-western-balkans )
⁷ Yet real – thanks to the conditionality mechanism around the “reform agendas”.
⁸ Although Ursula von der Leyen’s recent visit to Belgrade and the tone of the “enlargement package” published by the European Commission on 4 November 2025 seem to mark a change. See Maillard, S.: ‘Belgrade must be urged to play the European Union’s game’ in Le Monde , 4 November 2025 (https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2025/11/04/sebastien-maillard-politiste-il-faut-sommer-belgrade-de-jouer-le-jeu-de-l-union-europeenne_6651931_3232.html?random=990692995) or Couteau, B. “Serbia and the European Union at a crossroads”, Blogpost, Jacques Delors Institute, October 2025 ( https://institutdelors.eu/publications/serbie-et-union-europeenne-a-lheure-du-choix )
⁹ According to the September 2025 Eurobarometer ( https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3413 ), while on average 56% of Europeans say they are more or less in favour of future enlargement, in four countries this support is below 50%: Germany (49%), Austria (45%), the Czech Republic (43%) and France (43%).
¹⁰ Or a three-fifths majority in each of the two chambers of Parliament, which seems difficult to achieve in the French political landscape. See Macek, L.; Chopin, T.; Lequesne , C., “The enlargement of the European Union and the reforms it entails: the state of reflection and public debate in France”, Policy Paper, Jacques Delors Institute, November 2025 ( https://institutdelors.eu/publications/fr-lelargissement-de-lunion-europeenne-et-les-reformes-quil-implique-letat-de-la-reflexion-et-du-debat-public-en-france )
¹¹ See Macek, L.; Chopin, T.; Lequesne, C. op. cit .
¹² Various terms coexist, sometimes reflecting subtle differences in meaning. The debate was opened in particular by proposals for “step-by-step accession” by Pierre Mirel ( https://old.robert-schuman.eu//fr/doc/questions-d-europe/qe-529-fr.pdf ; https://www.robert-schuman.eu/questions-d-europe/0633-for-a-new-approach-with-the-western-balkans-phased-accession-with-a-c ) and by the think tanks CEPS Brussels and CEP Belgrade ( https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/a-template-for-staged-accession-to-the-eu/ ).
¹³ Resolution on the follow-up to the Conference on the Future of Europe on 29 November 2023, T.A. No. 197 ( https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/16/textes/l16t0197_texte-adopte-seance# )
¹⁴ Notably: Macek, L. “Advocating gradual accession to the European Union“, Policy paper 290 , Paris: Jacques Delors Institute, May 2023 ( https://institutdelors.eu/en/publications/pour-une-adhesion-graduelle-a-lunion-europeenne-2 ); Macek, L., Maillard, S. & Mirel, P. “Towards an Agenda 2030 for Enlargement”, Brief, Jacques Delors Institute, December 2024 ( https://institutdelors.eu/en/publications/towards-an-agenda-2030-for-enlargement ); Maillard, S. “Enlargement needs an Associated State status”, Policy Paper N°305, Jacques Delors Institute, October 2024 ( https://institutdelors.eu/en/publications/enlargement-needs-an-associated-state-status )
¹⁵ ” Countries that have signed the treaty of accession obtain the status of ‘acceding countries’ (…) . During the interim period, acceding countries benefit from special arrangements: they are kept informed of EU legislation via an information and consultation procedure and are given the opportunity to comment on proposals; they hold an active observer status in all the relevant bodies, in which they have the right to speak but not to vote. ” https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/glossary_en
¹⁶ See https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2003/5/8/ec38d6e4-04db-4dd1-b4ab-4525c6d9da65/publishable_en.pdf
¹⁷ See https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/initiatives/enlargement-candidate-members-initiative
¹⁸ “We are committed to a gradual approach to integration for candidate countries that do not yet meet all the conditions for membership but are courageously implementing reforms – without compromising on the criteria or the integrity of the internal market. This may include phasing in EU programmes and policies, granting observer status in the European Parliament and the Council of the EU, and associate membership without voting rights in certain areas such as the CFSP/ESDP. ” ( https://legrandcontinent.eu/fr/2025/04/15/contrat-de-coalition-allemand-le-texte-integral/ )
¹⁹ However, this is not the case in the proposal published by the Commission in July 2025. For more information on the financial costs of future enlargements, see Rubio, E., Couteau, B. and all “Adapting the EU budget to make it fit for the purpose of future enlargements”, Other document , European Parliament, January 2025 ( https://institutdelors.eu/en/publications/adapting-the-eu-budget-to-make-it-fit-for-the-purpose-of-future-enlargements ) or this infographic : https://institutdelors.eu/en/publications/the-budgetary-costs-of-enlargement-setting-the-basis-for-a-well-informed-debate
²⁰ This has already been the case since 2024 for four candidate countries: Albania, Montenegro , North Macedonia, and Serbia.
²¹ The “new methodology” of 2020 emphasises reversibility, but this principle is struggling to materialise.
²² Quote reported by Michel Foucher in an interview for Le Grand Continent ( https://legrandcontinent.eu/fr/2018/06/27/penser-lunion-europeenne-a-lechelle-mondiale/ )
²³ See, for example, the proposals from civil society in the candidate countries: https://cep.org.rs/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Monitoring-Reforms-in-the-EU_-A-WB-civil-society-contribution.pdf
²⁴ An idea already present in the stag ed accession model developed in 2022 by the CEPS think tank in Brussels and the CEP think tank in Belgrade : https://cep.org.rs/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/A-Template-for-Staged-Accession-to-the-EU.pdf
²⁵ A transition period on the free movement of workers was accepted by all countries joining in 2004 and implemented by 12 of the 15 “old” Member States.
²⁶ This commitment is highly relative, as evidenced by the example of Sweden (which held a referendum on this issue eight years after joining the EU) or that of the Czech Republic , Hungary and Poland, which have made little effort in this regard more than two decades after joining.
²⁷ See references cited in footnote 10.
²⁸ Notably because of possible confusion with the association agreements with the EU .
²⁹ Or should it maintain its current definition and should a complete change in approach to accession treaties be made , signing them much earlier and spreading out the ratification period? Or should we radically redefine the very status of EU membership, with early accession accompanied by a much larger number of transition periods covering significantly longer periods?
³⁰ Let us leave aside for now the question of whether this is a realistic objective or not. Let us just note that the “enlargement package” published by the Commission on 4 November 2025 is also in line with this approach.