Reaction of Pepper D. Culpepper and Archon Fung to Andrew Moravcsik’s article on the collapse of the Constitutional treaty

Crisply reasoned argumentation, even when it is dead wrong, is always welcome in the debate on the alleged crisis of democracy in the European Union. Andrew Moravcsik’s recent contribution is certainly well argued, and we agree wholeheartedly with his dismissal of the recent European Constitution as a legally unnecessary project driven primarily by public relations motives. His lessons for what we can learn from that debacle, however, are questionable. We question two central elements in particular: its basis in empirical political science and the implications of those findings for questions of democracy.

Moravcsik’s concise argument unfolds in five tightly connected steps. First, most of what the EU does is technical: its domain includes areas such as trade, industrial regulation, agricultural policy, and foreign policy (p. 225). These issues are the natural province of experts. Nation-states are just as likely as the EU to govern such issue areas through the delegation of authority to technical bodies, such as central banks for monetary policy. Second, EU policy-making is reasonably effective and legitimate; it is “more transparent than national policy-making, less corrupt, and at least as accountable” (p. 236). Third, greater democratic participation and deliberation is infeasible. Even if opportunities for citizen engagement increased, citizens would not substantially participate because the EU addresses issues that “are far less salient” to voters than the issues that arise in national politics (p. 225). Fourth, if citizens did participate, EU policy would be become less effective because citizens would lack the incentives to become knowledgeable, again because “everyday voters view the matters handled by the EU as relatively obscure, [so] they have little incentive to debate or decide them” (p. 226). Finally, even if it were possible, increased public participation and deliberation would not enhance the democratic legitimacy or popular trust of EU institutions. Moravcsik points out that public trust in lowparticipation institutions such as armies and police forces is higher than in political parties (p. 234).