Where are the sovereigntists in Europe?
The question may sound provocative. It was prompted by the recent outcome of the Hungarian elections, which marked the end of a political era dominated by Viktor Orbán – a leader who has consistently claimed the mantle of sovereignty while portraying the European Union as an intrusive power. At the same time, the Hungarian leadership has maintained close and sustained ties with Vladimir Putin, and more recently with Donald Trump – whose Vice-President, JD Vance, travelled to Budapest to express support for an embattled Viktor Orbán.
Beyond Hungary, such a “sovereignist” posture reveals a growing contradiction, at a time when no European nation can credibly claim to weigh alone against continental powers such as the United States or China, or even major regional actors. Rejecting the European dimension therefore means accepting other forms of dependency – ones that are neither neutral nor without consequences.
Can one still claim to be a sovereignist while opposing the development of renewable energy, thereby accepting continued dependence on oil and gas imports whose prices are set on volatile global markets shaped by geopolitical tensions and speculative dynamics? This energy dependence is also an economic and social one: it fuels inflation and directly weakens European citizens’ purchasing power.
More broadly, can one claim to be a sovereignist while slowing down investment in the green transition in the name of short-term competitiveness, thereby reinforcing dangerous structural dependencies?
Can one claim to be a sovereignist while refusing to support Ukraine – or worse, echoing Kremlin narratives – at a time when the outcome of this war represents an existential turning point for the continent’s security?
Finally, can one claim to be a sovereignist while favouring implicit or explicit alignments with external powers – often assertive or even aggressive, whether with Washington under Trump, Moscow or Beijing — instead of building an autonomous European power grounded in cooperation and multilateralism rather than domination and conflict?
These contradictions are not theoretical. They are at the heart of the debates we pursue at the Jacques Delors Institute, as our recent work illustrates. Thus, while Monique Pariat recalls that “European migration policy cannot be equated with the policy pursued by Donald Trump”, Lukas Macek warns that “the French referendum on EU enlargements: a ticking time bomb to defuse”. Clotilde Warin’s analysis of Hungary, “Hungary, a laboratory of illiberalism and a challenge for the European Union”, highlights how the country has become both a testing ground for illiberalism and a major challenge for the Union. Joachim Bitterlich asks: “Hungary: all’s well that ends well?”, while Nicole Gnesotto reflects on the lessons to be drawn from this “Hungarian revolution”. Guillaume Duval, meanwhile, examines another crisis: “War against Iran: three lessons for Europe”.
Bertrand de Cordoue’s reflections on the European defence industry, “Why consolidate the European defence industry?”, underline the urgency of strengthening our collective capabilities. This month’s infographic also summarises EU policies and initiatives in the field of common defence.
Our publications on the war in Iran also raise questions about energy dependency and the need to accelerate the transition. Alice Moscovici and Phuc-Vinh Nguyen ask: “War in Iran: the long-awaited wake-up call for Europe’s energy transition?”, launching a tracker of European policy responses to the crisis.
Similarly, work on the EU budget and the Single Market – such as the One Europe, One Market report - shows that Europe’s economic power remains its main lever of action in a fragmented world. In their report presented to the European Parliament’s BUDG Committee, “EU Support for Natural Disasters: Assessing the adequacy of the post-2027 MFF proposals”, Eulalia Rubio and her colleagues propose ways to improve the effectiveness, coordination and impact of EU disaster risk management tools. Our Berlin colleague Thu Nguyen argues for strengthening rule of law conditionality in the next EU budget to make it truly deterrent against illiberal backsliding.
Ultimately, sovereignty is not declared – it is built. The current context requires us to move beyond the illusion of national sovereignty towards further shared power: an “open and assumed” European sovereignty, grounded neither in withdrawal nor in naivety, but in the capacity to choose our interdependencies and act collectively. The real divide is between two visions of sovereignty: an illusory one, based on national retreat and leading in practice to dependence; or else a shared sovereignty, which accepts mutualising in order to regain real capacity for action.
European history already provides evidence of this. The euro, often criticised, has protected Member States from financial crises and speculation, and today stands as one of the EU’s most popular achievements. By contrast, Europe’s lag in digital technologies illustrates the cost of the absence of a common strategy: massive dependence on American and Chinese tech giants.
The conclusion is clear. In a world of heightened rivalry, geopolitical shocks and deep transitions, true sovereignty today lies in investing in common projects – defence, energy, technology, climate and democracy. European sovereignty has become the condition of our collective autonomy – and, in turn, of each citizen’s sovereignty.
